Remember the Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers experiment, proving that malicious parties don't even take the basic precautions to camouflage their ongoing migration to the web for the purpose of botnet and malware kits C&Cs? Let's experiment wi the BlackEnergy DDoS bot, and prove it's the same situation. What's the BlackEnergy DDoS bot anyway :

"BlackEnergy is an HTTP-based botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks. Unlike mostcommon bots, this bot does not communicate with the botnet master using IRC. Also, wedo not see any exploit activities from this bot, unlike a traditional IRC bot. This is a small(under 50KB) binary for the Windows platform that uses a simple grammar tocommunicate. Most of the botnets we have been tracking (over 30 at present) are locatedin Malaysian and Russian IP address space and have targeted Russian sites with theirDDoS attacks."

The following are currently live botnet C&Cs administration panels, and with BlackEnergy's only functionality in the form of DDOS attacks, it's a good example of how DDoS on demand or DDoS extortion get orchestrated through such interfaces :

httpdoc.info/black/auth.php (66.29.71.16)
wmstore.info/hello/auth.php (216.241.21.62)
lunaroverlord.awardspace.com/auth.php (82.197.131.52)
333prn.com/xxx/auth.php (64.247.18.208)

It's getting even more interesting to see different campaigns within, that in between serving Trojan.Win32.Buzus.yn; Trojan.Win32.Buzus.ym; Trojan-Proxy.Small.DU, there's also an instance of Email-Worm.Zhelatin. A clear indication of a botnet in its startup phrase is also the fact that all the malware binaries that you see in the attached screenshot use one of these hosts as both the C&C and the main binary update/download location.