<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: administer]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/administer</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 15:29:17 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[US Government Won't Cede Control Over DNS Root Zone]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/921395ec15b9d9c6bc5244b23e58a028</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/921395ec15b9d9c6bc5244b23e58a028</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In a letter to ICANN Board chairman Peter Dengate-Thrush Meredith A. Baker, Acting Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information in the Commerce Department's NTIA (National Telecommunications...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/comments/2008/ICANN_080730.html">a letter to ICANN Board chairman Peter Dengate-Thrush</a> Meredith A. Baker, Acting Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information in the Commerce Department's <A href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/">NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information Administration)</A> has declared that the US government has no plans to yield the control it now has over changes to the Internet's DNS root zone file. ICANN manages the DNS root zone, but according to terms of an agreement between it and the NTIA. The distribution of changes in the zone file to the various root servers across the world is performed by VeriSign.

ICANN's authority to administer various aspects of the Internet DNS derives from agreements with the Commerce Department. The current agreement for that authority, <a href="http://www.icann.org/general/JPA-29sep06.pdf">the JPA or Joint Project Agreement</a>, is set to expire in September 2009. <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/index.htm">ICANN has been gearing up for what comes next</a> with preparations for taking more complete control. The Baker letter pulls the rug out from under some of those plans.

I'm not surprised at the letter and it wouldn't surprise me if even an Obama administration were to retain such control, but observers in Europe and Asia will probably be disappointed.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=2ab9e9989e648261565bc1d66a94e510"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=2ab9e9989e648261565bc1d66a94e510"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=2ab9e9989e648261565bc1d66a94e510" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><img src="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/352691125" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 06:54:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control">control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns root zone">dns root zone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/baker">baker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/joint project agreement">joint project agreement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agreement">agreement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/baker letter pulls">baker letter pulls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter">letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet dns derives">internet dns derives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/352691125/us_government_wont_cede_control_over_dns_root_zone.html">US Government Won't Cede Control Over DNS Root Zone</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[U.S. Government Won't Cede Control Over DNS Root Zone]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/acdeee9347364bcb941d4fd5080bf4ed</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/acdeee9347364bcb941d4fd5080bf4ed</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In a letter to ICANN Board Chairman Peter Dengate Thrush, Meredith A. Baker, acting assistant secretary for communications and information in the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[In <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/comments/2008/ICANN_080730.html">a letter to ICANN Board Chairman Peter Dengate Thrush,</a> Meredith A. Baker, acting assistant secretary for communications and information in the Commerce Department's <A href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/">National Telecommunications and Information Administration,</A> has declared that the U.S. government has no plans to yield the control it now has over changes to the Internet's DNS root zone file. ICANN manages the DNS root zone, but according to terms of an agreement between it and the NTIA. The distribution of changes in the zone file to the various root servers around the world is performed by VeriSign.

The authority of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers to administer various aspects of the Internet Domain Name System derives from agreements with the Commerce Department. The current agreement for that authority, <a href="http://www.icann.org/general/JPA-29sep06.pdf">the Joint Project Agreement</a>, is set to expire in September 2009. <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/index.htm">ICANN has been gearing up for what comes next</a> with preparations for taking more complete control. The Baker letter pulls the rug out from under some of those plans.

I'm not surprised at the letter, and it wouldn't surprise me if even an Obama administration were to retain such control, but observers in Europe and Asia will probably be disappointed.<img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/x3qgSRHLfMQ" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 06:54:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control">control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns root zone">dns root zone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/baker">baker</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/joint project agreement">joint project agreement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agreement">agreement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/baker letter pulls">baker letter pulls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter">letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet domain">internet domain</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/x3qgSRHLfMQ/us_government_wont_cede_control_over_dns_root_zone.html">U.S. Government Won't Cede Control Over DNS Root Zone</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Midazolam as a Non-Lethal Weapon]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1d80ef94fd9435a077d690395074b1df</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1d80ef94fd9435a077d690395074b1df</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Did you know that, in some jurisdictions, police can inject midazolam into suspects to subdue them? &quot;There is no research guideline. There is no validated protocol for this. There's not even a clear...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Did you know that, in some jurisdictions, police can <a href="http://www.wsmv.com/news/16844880/detail.html#-">inject midazolam</a> into suspects to subdue them?  

<blockquote>"There is no research guideline. There is no validated protocol for this. There's not even a clear set of indications for when this is to be used except when people are agitated. By saying that it's done by the emergency medical personnel, they basically are trying to have it both ways. That is, they’re trying to use a medical protocol that is not validated, not for a police function, arrest and detention," Miles said.

"The decision to administer Versed is based purely on a paramedic decision, not a police decision," Slovis said.

It's up to the officer to call an ambulance and determine if a person is in a condition called excited delirium.

"I don't know if I would use the word diagnosing, but they are assessing the situation and saying, 'This person is not acting rationally. This is something I've been trained to recognize, this seems like excited delirium.' I don't view delirium in the field as a police function. It is a medical emergency. We're giving the drug Versed that's routinely used in thousands of health care settings across the country in the field by trained paramedics. I view what we're doing as the best possible medical practice to a medical emergency," Slovis said.</blockquote>

The biggest side effect is amnesia, which makes it harder for any defendent to defend himself in court.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=bKJoFJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=bKJoFJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=g3MHPJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=g3MHPJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 07:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/decision">decision</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paramedic decision">paramedic decision</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police decision">police decision</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police">police</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police function">police function</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/view">view</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/view delirium">view delirium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/delirium">delirium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical emergency">medical emergency</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/midazolam_as_a.html">Midazolam as a Non-Lethal Weapon</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Maybe the NAC used car salesman can claim them as a customer too? In NAC quality counts!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d80f68ce6e6808f9d06f6e7946e4e4a0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d80f68ce6e6808f9d06f6e7946e4e4a0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Dark Reading had a good article today talking about GuideWorks , the TV Guide/Comcast joint venture's 2 year odyssey with NAC, which finds them finally starting to see some good results. I immediately...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dark Reading had a <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=157719&amp;f_src=darkreading_section_296">good article today</a> talking about <a class="zem_slink" title="GuideWorks" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GuideWorks" rel="wikipedia">GuideWorks</a>, the TV Guide/Comcast joint venture's 2 year odyssey with NAC, which finds them finally starting to see some good results. I immediately went to the website of the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/the-used-car-sa.html">NAC used car salesman</a> to see if they claimed them as a NAC customer too, but didn't see anything yet. But with those guys you never know. <br><br>Seriously though folks, this story is a classic NAC story. GuideWorks had guests and unmanaged users visiting their offices all the time. When they would ask to plug in they were told sorry, wait till you get back to your hotel. Over time this answer became unacceptable and they realized they needed a way to give these people a way to get on the net and get their email while keeping their network secure. This very same need drives many initial NAC deployments.<br><br>Like many other NAC customers they wanted something easy, not add major overhead or network changes and easy to administer. Again straight out of the NAC playbook. In the Summer of '06 they began a pilot of the Tipping Point NAC product which is based on the old Roving Planet technology. Now Roving Planet was more of a wireless security company, but near the end they rebranded themselves as NAC and Tipping Point uses that with their IPS devices to enforce. Best of all for GuideWorks the price was sub 10k. <br><br>Here is where the other side of NAC comes in. This is what the article says:</p><blockquote><p><em><p>While NAC tools are often advertised as plug-and-play, GuideWorks found that the NAC setup required a high level of networking expertise. Fortunately, the Inglewood site had plenty of technical expertise because that’s where many of the company’s developers are stationed. In addition, GuideWorks put one of its front-desk employees in charge of setting up new accounts. But because her technical background was limited, the company had to walk her through a learning curve. </p>

<p>Now the company is planning to deploy the system at its Radnor office, which will be a bit more challenging since there’s less technical expertise there, and that office gets a greater number of visitors. So GuideWorks has been on the search for employees to support the NAC system there. The company expects to have NAC up and running there by the end of the summer. </p></em></p>

</blockquote><p>So 2 years after trial they are rolled out in one office and have to hire employees to support the NAC system at the next office. This was a problem with many of the failed NAC companies over the last few years and I think the problem with this Tipping Point solution. Just providing guest access should not be that hard! Yes the StillSecure Safe Access solution would have been much easier and faster to implement, but to be fair, any of the leading NAC solutions would have been up and running easier as well. </p>

<p>While this article was supposed to serve as reference and case study for the Tipping Point NAC solution, it is far from inspiring. If I were a customer looking into NAC, I don't think this would make run out and look at the Tipping Point solution. Moral of the story is, just because you made a good IPS doesn't mean you have a very good NAC product. When it comes to something like NAC, quality counts and buying a 2nd tier solution can cost you in time to implementation and total cost of ownership.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/2c864e8d-b43a-4e14-9fdc-9ac4835bc27b/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_a.png?x-id=2c864e8d-b43a-4e14-9fdc-9ac4835bc27b" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none"></img></a></div>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=ia7VDL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=ia7VDL" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=bjKsGI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=bjKsGI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=DxCrYI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=DxCrYI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=YQ1SAI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=YQ1SAI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=wD2I6I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=wD2I6I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=FSLeNi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=FSLeNi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=2QntYi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=2QntYi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/321785853" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 19:36:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer">customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solution">nac solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solutions">nac solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac tools">nac tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac setup">nac setup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial nac deployments">initial nac deployments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac playbook">nac playbook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac companies">nac companies</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/321785853/maybe-the-nac-u.html">Maybe the NAC used car salesman can claim them as a customer too? In NAC quality counts!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Is this a case of; "Do as I say, not as I do"?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e9f20942f6d2bc7e6b9805de8abfecd7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e9f20942f6d2bc7e6b9805de8abfecd7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I think it is a shame when a Police Officer acts like a Politician. It seems like this might be what happened to the Police Chief in San Francisco

It has leaked out that Chief Heather Fong has not...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I think it is a shame when a Police Officer acts like a Politician.  It seems like this might be what happened to the <a href="http://0-www.sfgate.com.mill1.sjlibrary.org/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/06/04/BARR1138G6.DTL">Police Chief in San Francisco.</a><span id="fullpost"><br /><br />It has leaked out that Chief Heather Fong has not qualified with her service weapon in years.  She actually admits to it but blames the lapse on her busy schedule.  This poses two really pressing questions.  Firstly, what would she do if she was getting into her vehicle going to or coming from work and she witnessed a grievous felony taking place?  If she pulled her weapon, she would most definitely not be able to respond in a manner befitting a trained Police Officer who had undergone requalification every 6 months as is her Department's policy.  Would she even be qualified/legally covered to use her weapon after going years without re-training?<br /><br />Secondly, how is she able to administer punishment to other officers who have failed to re-qualify when she herself is facing disciplinary charges?  What kind of message is she sending out?  Apparently, in San Francisco there seems to be one law for the street cops and another for high ranking officers.  This must do wonders for morale.<br /><br />Of course we know that you have a busy schedule Chief, but it is hard to believe that you couldn't find an hour once every six months to run out to the range and "pop a few off".  You would hardly have to wait in line like everyone else.    Have you forgotten what every Police Officer (and armed security officer for that matter) is taught, that using a weapon is based upon muscle memory?  In other words, if you don't use it, you lose it. <br /><br />People like Chief Fong are supposed to lead by example and shame on them when they don't.  Do the right thing Chief, bring a sandwich to work with you and go out to the range on your lunch break.  You shouldn't put yourself above the law.  <br /><br />  <br /></span><div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2008 23:23:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chief fong">chief fong</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chief">chief</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police chief">police chief</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chief heather fong">chief heather fong</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police officer">police officer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police officer acts">police officer acts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/busy schedule chief">busy schedule chief</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/busy schedule">busy schedule</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weapon">weapon</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/06/is-this-case-of-do-as-i-say-not-as-i-do.html">Is this a case of; "Do as I say, not as I do"?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Magic Security Bunnies]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/338839f61457d3f89d444b4c3b511fa6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/338839f61457d3f89d444b4c3b511fa6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Primarily because Brooks asked, but also because there are a whole lot of days where I face the Magic Bunny problem
Simply put, in any complex system - say, an application stack which has a backend...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href='http://www.liquidmatrix.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/magic_bunnies.jpg'><img src="http://www.liquidmatrix.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/magic_bunnies-300x300.jpg" alt="CC from http://flickr.com/photos/marcelgermain/2074203703/" title="magic_bunnies" width="300" height="300" class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-3103" /></a></p>
<p>Primarily because Brooks asked, but also because there are a whole lot of days where I face the &#8220;Magic Bunny&#8221; problem.</p>
<p>Simply put, in any complex system - say, an application stack which has a backend database, some application servers, some presentation servers and the connecting security stuff and network stuff - there are a number of Subject Matter Experts who need to be at the table when troubleshooting.  The issue is that as far as each is concerned, the other areas of expertise are the domain of Magic Bunnies. The Application folks don&#8217;t really grok the network glue stuff and so they talk about how one machine &#8220;can&#8217;t see&#8221; the other. The database guys don&#8217;t grok the need for a firewall between them and the world because it makes things difficult to administer and there is where you&#8217;ll find more Magic Bunnies. </p>
<p>Too often when I get called in on a troubleshooting swat team, it&#8217;s because as the security dude, I&#8217;m always more aware of the entire picture (grok the whole) than the SMEs and I can walk them through the problem from foundational Layer 0 stuff (is the data centre still there?) through to the Layer 9 stuff (is there a god who cares?) And damn if every time I sit in on one of these sessions, we don&#8217;t discover that there isn&#8217;t a nice overlap between areas of expertise and there&#8217;s a huge number of Magic Bunnies infesting our applications.</p>
<p>Do you have Magic Bunnies? </p>
<p>Is there a spray or ointment?</p>
<p>Chat amongst yourselves.</p>
<p>Or the bunny gets it.</p>
<p> Tags: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/magic+bunnies" rel="tag">magic bunnies</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+skills" rel="tag"> security skills</a>, <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/troubleshooting" rel="tag"> troubleshooting</a></p>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/Liquidmatrix?a=xCT0cA"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/Liquidmatrix?i=xCT0cA" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=mXH4pH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=mXH4pH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=wjFh1h"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=wjFh1h" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=VXR7Yh"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=VXR7Yh" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=iStqih"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=iStqih" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=hvjjgh"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=hvjjgh" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/Liquidmatrix/~4/300164430" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2008 19:53:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/magic bunnies">magic bunnies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security stuff">security stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stuff">stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network glue stuff">network glue stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network stuff">network stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/magic bunny">magic bunny</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bunny">bunny</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/layer">layer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/grok">grok</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/Liquidmatrix/~3/300164430/">Magic Security Bunnies</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Sprint's Public Safety Deal for Nextel Comes Home to Roost]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/62fc7be1eb4d0fe80bd5f1d1a21fbcbb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/62fc7be1eb4d0fe80bd5f1d1a21fbcbb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Sprint seemed awfully clever when it navigated a public safety deal and gained new spectrum as part of its acquisition of Nextel: That's all unraveling now. The FCC and the courts are saying that a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://telephonyonline.com/wireless/news/sprint-rebanding-appeal-0502/"><strong>Sprint seemed awfully clever when it navigated a public safety deal and gained new spectrum as part of its acquisition of Nextel:</strong></a> That's all unraveling now. The FCC and the courts are saying that a 26-June-2008 deadline for vacating its 800 MHz holdings in favor of public safety groups would hold even if the new users weren't on the band. The delays for new users getting on the band are reportedly Sprint's, given that it had the responsibility for this migration.</p>

<p>Nextel had splintered holdings in the 800 MHz band that were difficult to administer, and caused verifiable interference with (and vice versa) splintered public safety spectrum in that band. Sprint agreed to pay the estimated multi-billion-dollar cost of getting new equipment to public safety agencies in exchange for a hunk of spectrum that they wouldn't have to buy at auction from the FCC. The <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2004-07-08-cell-interference_x.htm"><strong>cost for a whole set of swaps</strong></a>, migrations, and givebacks was $4.8b, but there was technically no limit on how much Sprint would have to pay for public safety migration--as much as it cost is the true limit.</p>

<p>Last August, the Wall Street Journal did a <a href="http://publicsafety.wifinetnews.com/archives/2007/08/sprint_nextels_move_off_old_sp.html"><strong>lengthy update of the 2005 deal</strong></a>, explaining that the effort was vastly behind schedule, and was vastly underbudgeted, too. One county in Pennsylvania estimated that its costs could run $18.5m to $150m, with the low number far above Sprint's own estimates.</p>

<p>It would be seemingly unfair to allow Sprint's delays in moving fire, police, and first responders off the band to also delay Sprint's requirement in vacating the band. We'll see how the FCC chooses to respond. It could cost Sprint billions and further accelerate the loss of Nextel customers, because Sprint would lose a number of active iDEN sites.</p>

<p>They have no one to blame but themselves. Sprint's management has blundered through this merger for years. They kept separate Kansas and Virginia headquarters, failed to produce high-quality dual-network devices, gave few incentives for Nextel customers to move to Sprint's dominant CDMA network, bled employees, and botched this migration.</p>

<p>Now Sprint did have the problem of needing to help move incumbents in the 1.9 GHz spectrum it received and the 800 MHz spectrum it was giving up. The articles on this court decision don't note whether Sprint's 1.9 GHz network is free and clear, nor whether Sprint had been working for the last three years to get its Nextel users to get dual-band handsets that would work with the new frequency.</p>

<p>With the WiMax plan also on the table, Sprint was basically committed to building or rebuilding and supporting four network architectures: CDMA (for 2G), EVDO (for 3G), WiMax (for 4G), and iDEN  (for 2G).</p>

<p>Sprint is in the position where it may variously be sold (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aBPRL6WdZcUU&refer=us"><strong>to Deutsche Telekom to merge with its T-Mobile USA division</strong></a>, which would add both GSM and UMTS/HSPA to the mix!), sell off its Nextel division (<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aBPRL6WdZcUU&refer=us"><strong>to a public safety venture headed by Cyren Call</strong></a>), and/or spin off its WiMax division or form a broad venture with Clearwire to build and market it.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2008 10:25:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public safety deal">public safety deal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public safety">public safety</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sprint">sprint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cost sprint billions">cost sprint billions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cost">cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nextel">nextel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reportedly sprint">reportedly sprint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public safety migration">public safety migration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/delay sprint">delay sprint</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008305.html">Sprint's Public Safety Deal for Nextel Comes Home to Roost</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Thousands of customer bank details on stolen Boots backup tape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/289929856e1c368db090de2556031b25</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/289929856e1c368db090de2556031b25</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
4/22/08

Organization
Alliance Boots

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Boots UK Limited
Boots Dental Plan
Medisure
Unnamed &quot;security company

Victims...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/boots.jpg" align="right" height="69" width="109"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>4/22/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.boots-plc.com/">Alliance Boots</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>Boots UK Limited<br>Boots Dental Plan<br><a href="http://www.medisure.co.uk/">Medisure</a> <br>Unnamed "security company"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Customers and employees<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>34,000*<br><br><font size="1">*27,000 dental plan customers and 7,000 company employees</font><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, addresses and bank details<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The high street chemist chain has today admitted losing 27,000 customer records and 7,000 employees details related to their dental plan. The information included bank account details, as well as names and addresses."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/nottinghamshire/7360821.stm">BBC News</a> <br><a href="http://www.cio.co.uk/concern/security/news/index.cfm?articleid=2770&amp;pagtype=allchandate">CIO Magazine online</a> <br><a href="http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/news/191292/boots-security-worker-loses-data-on-34000-people.html">ITPRO</a> <br><a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/04/23/230409/boots-loses-thousands-of-customer-bank-details.htm">CompterWeekly</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>BBC News<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>Personal details of thousands of customers of Boots' dental plan have been stolen after a courier car was broken into in Bristol.<br><br>The information from Boots Dental Plan included customer bank account details<br><br>officials claimed it was "highly unlikely" these could be accessed<br><br>The stolen data tapes included names, addresses and bank details of 27,000 dental plan customers, which is run by private healthcare contractor Medisure. The tapes also contained the records of 7,000 employees.<br><br>Boots and Medisure, who administer the plan for the company, said all customers had been informed.<br><br>The tapes were taken from the car of a subcontracted data security company in Bristol on 3 April, 2008.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A data security company left backup tapes unattended in a car?&nbsp; I will go on to speculate that the car was probably unlocked and the tapes were probably left in plain sight.</span><br><br>Boots declined to name the courier company.<br><br>Avon and Somerset Police said they were investigating the theft from a car on St Thomas Street<br><br>The data is described as "technically complicated" and only accessible with specialist IT equipment and software.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Hah!&nbsp; You know, specialist IT equipment like a tape drive and software like Backup Exec (or something similar).&nbsp; If the tape wasn't encrypted, I trust that the tape will be read, thus exposing the information.&nbsp; Maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but sometime.&nbsp; I would bet the rest of my half cup of coffee on it!</span><br><br>Boots said in a statement: "We would like to reassure our Boots Dental Plan customers that because of the type of data tape that was stolen and the way the information was stored it is highly unlikely that any personal data could be accessed or misused."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Encrypted?&nbsp; No mention specifically, so I assume not.&nbsp; What is so special about the "way the information was stored" then?</span><br><br>Boots said it takes data protection "extremely seriously,"<br><br>Medisure added the information was not stored on standard software or CDs and could not be used on any home-style PC or laptop.<br><br>Medisure did not say whether the data was encrypted<br><br>"Reviewing this incident closely with the Police, they consider this to be an opportunist theft rather than a planned operation," Medisure said in the letter.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>There is so much about this breach that we do not know, so we speculate.&nbsp; Often times we speculate worse case type of scenarios.&nbsp; It's just human nature.&nbsp; The fact that the tapes were left exposed in a car is bad enough.&nbsp; If some of our other assumptions are correct, then all the worse. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/04/25/boots.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2008 06:14:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/boots">boots</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/alliance boots">alliance boots</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/boots dental plan">boots dental plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tape">tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dental plan">dental plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dental plan customers">dental plan customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company employees">company employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tapes">tapes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/04/25/boots.aspx">Thousands of customer bank details on stolen Boots backup tape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[51,000 Current and former Agilent Technologies employees at risk]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7f98d0a3b5ecf0829f46d93469acf677</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7f98d0a3b5ecf0829f46d93469acf677</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
3/22/08

Organization
Agilent Technologies

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Stock &amp; Options Solutions

Victims
Current and former Agilent employees

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/agilent.jpg" align="right" height="51" width="200"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>3/22/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.home.agilent.com/agilent/home.jspx?cc=US&amp;lc=eng&amp;cmpid=4533">Agilent Technologies</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.sos-team.com/">Stock &amp; Options Solutions</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Current and former Agilent employees<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>51,000<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, Social Security numbers, home addresses and details of stock options and other stock-related awards"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"A laptop containing sensitive and unencrypted personal data on 51,000 current and former employees of Agilent Technologies was stolen from the car of an Agilent vendor March 1 in San Francisco, the company said in a letter mailed to former employees this week."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.mercurynews.com/peninsula/ci_8660115?nclick_check=1&amp;forced=true">The Mercury News - Silicon Valley</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Vindu Goel, The Mercury News<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>A laptop containing sensitive and unencrypted personal data on 51,000 current and former employees of Agilent Technologies was stolen from the car of an Agilent vendor March 1 in San Francisco, the company said in a letter mailed to former employees this week.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A person in the comments of Vindu's View From The Valley "</span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://www.mercextra.com/blogs/vindu/2008/03/21/agilent-alert-thief-steals-laptop-with-personal-info-on-51000-employees/">Agilent alert: Thief steals laptop with personal info on 51,000 employees</a><span style="font-style: italic;">" story claims "Estimates show that 700,000 laptops are stolen every year. A little more than 1900 a day!"&nbsp; This number seems high to me, but I guess I wouldn't be too surprised if it were true.&nbsp; Storing confidential information on laptops (especially without additional controls) is risky.</span><br><br>The data includes employee names, Social Security numbers, home addresses and details of stock options and other stock-related awards.<br><br>In the letter, Agilent blamed the San Jose vendor, Stock &amp; Option Solutions, for failing to scramble or otherwise safeguard the data - "in violation of the contracted agreement."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] We don't often read about a company coming right out and blatantly pointing the finger at their vendor.&nbsp; I like the "call it like you see it" approach.</span><br><br>"It wasn't encrypted, which was a surprise to us," said Agilent spokeswoman Amy Flores. She said the vendor told Agilent that an East Coast employee had brought the data-laden laptop to California for encryption, but someone broke into her car and stole the computer and her other belongings while the vehicle was parked near Fisherman's Wharf.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] #1, we (meaning information security personnel) should not be surprised by what our vendors are doing with the information we are charged with protecting.&nbsp; Not only should we mandate specific controls in policies and contracts, but we also need to audit for compliance.&nbsp; #2, The vendor employee was bringing the laptop to California for encryption?&nbsp; I don't think there are any requirements that you have to go to California to encrypt laptops.&nbsp; Encryption should have taken place prior to allowing the information on it in the first place, and better yet should be part of a "standard" laptop build.</span><br><br>Flores said Agilent, a Santa Clara maker of test and measurement equipment, has no evidence that the lost data has been used to steal anyone's identity. However, Agilent is offering affected employees one free year of credit monitoring from Equifax.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I haven't said this for a while, but credit "monitoring" is an after the fact solution that only alerts a person after they are an identity theft victim.&nbsp; One year of monitoring is good for monitoring information that is no longer useful after one year.&nbsp; Obviously a Social Security number will still be valid after the monitoring has ended.</span><br><br>Ironically, Stock &amp; Option Solutions was hired to make sure that money management firm Smith Barney had properly transferred employee stock data to a new management firm, Fidelity Investments, which had been hired to administer Agilent's stock programs.<br><br>Matt O'Brien of Milpitas, a former research manager at Agilent who left in 2001, said he was "disgusted" when he received notice of the theft in his Friday mail.<br><br>said O'Brien. "Agilent should have put all of the data into an encrypted format to begin with."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Bingo.&nbsp; A victim with more information security common sense than the offender.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>At what point do we no longer accept lost or stolen laptops with confidential personal information at risk?&nbsp; Are the myriad of laws, regulations, negative news reports, etc. having a positive impact in reducing the frequency and number of victims?&nbsp; Maybe it's too early to tell.<br><br>I am also curious what Agilent and/or Stock &amp; Options Solutions are planning in order to prevent similar circumstances in the future. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/03/25/agilent.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2008 06:13:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agilent">agilent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agilent technologies">agilent technologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agilent vendor march">agilent vendor march</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendor">vendor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/administer agilent">administer agilent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agilent alert">agilent alert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agilent employees">agilent employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock options">stock options</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/03/25/agilent.aspx">51,000 Current and former Agilent Technologies employees at risk</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/75812f9fda3843d3a9c570619e18d91f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/75812f9fda3843d3a9c570619e18d91f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Montego Networks Prediction
Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010
Neil McDonald of Gartner reported in 2007 that throughout 2009, 60% of virtual...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p class="MsoNormal">Montego Networks Prediction:</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical
counter parts by 2010.</p>



<p class="MsoNormal">Neil McDonald of Gartner reported in 2007 that throughout
2009, 60% of virtual environment deployments would be less secure than their
physical counter parts.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Although I tend to believe Neil’s prediction I’m a bit optimistic
about the markets awareness of the security concerns within virtualized
environments and feel companies will start to address those concerns by
2009.&nbsp;I also believe that by the end of 2009
the majority of companies virtualizing will have built virtualized environments
that are more secure than their physical counter parts.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Now, you may be thinking I’m either crazy or that I’m just one
of these guys that just states the opposite of what someone else says!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Well, not at all.&nbsp;I’ve
been studying the virtual security market for some time now and after talking with
many companies that are deploying virtualization I’m starting to get the sense that people
get it (security).&nbsp;It’s pretty evident that when
people are made aware of what seems to be the obvious (security), that something clicks
and they get it right away.&nbsp;In fact,
many times the light bulbs start turning on and people start thinking about
more creative ways to secure severs by taking advantage of virtualization which
enables them to do things they’ve never been able to do before.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">So, although I agree that there has been this issue of security
being once again forgotten and that 60% of virtual environments will be less
secure up until 2009, I’m not so sure I’m going to underestimate the market and
think that this pattern will continue much longer after that.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Take a look at the following graphic and it depicts the
various layers in a network.&nbsp;History has
proven itself time and time again that a new network layer is built first and
security always comes along afterwards. </p>



<p class="MsoNormal"><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=662,height=659,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/03/22/networklayers.jpg"><img width="200" height="199" border="0" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/03/22/networklayers.jpg" title="Networklayers" alt="Networklayers" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a>
</p>

<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Well, one of the challenges we’ve seen with these physical
networks is that it’s pretty costly, time consuming and a burden to purchase,
install and administer security.&nbsp;Then
once it’s in place and being run, you have to fork lift upgrade certain parts
of your security infrastructure due to bandwidth demands and changes in
application security concerns.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">What virtualization brings to the table is not only cost
savings for server consolidation, power consumption and datacenter space but
the ability to do all of those things for parts of your security infrastructure
as well.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Imagine instead of having to deploy engineers to install 20
firewalls across your datacenter, you could sit from a single workstation with
a couple of guys and install 20 firewalls in hours vs. days.&nbsp;The reason this is possible is because now
firewalls have just went virtual!&nbsp;You
can roll them out as software images or virtual appliances without leaving the
comfort of your cubical.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Imagine being able to “virtual-lift upgrade” vs. “fork-lift
upgrade” a new firewall, UTM appliance, IPS or whatever by simply powering off
a Firewall Virtual Machine and powering on a new one.&nbsp; Imagine being able to improve your performance by taking advantage of the multi-core processing and blade server computing trends vs. waiting for the next super fast security ASIC chip.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">In the past it’s been difficult to get security as close as
possible to the servers and desktops without having to deploy host based
solutions.&nbsp;The reason for this is
because we have been constrained by the physical limitations of our hardware
purchases from the likes of Cisco, Extreme and Foundry.&nbsp;Then for vendors that have thought about
putting security in a switch there has always been the price per port
debate.&nbsp;Also, many don't want to take the risk and replace Cisco for a new startup building a new switch (ie. Force 10's Switch + IPS product).&nbsp; Typically switching ports are
cheap and security is more expensive and when trying to combine the two, you
end up with a switch that costs a lot of money.&nbsp;So imagine having a 200+ port switch with a Firewall built in for $300
bucks.&nbsp;How could this be so?&nbsp;Because its virtual, and because its 100%
software.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Did he just elude to a firewall for every port?&nbsp; Does each Server or Desktop have firewalling between every other Server &amp; Desktop on the same switch?&nbsp; Absolutely! all because of virtualization!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Software makes it easier to bring the price per port down.&nbsp;When things are in software you can deploy
multiple copies of them to scale your network capacity without breaking the
bank.&nbsp;Virtualization also allows you to
do things like “Freeze” and “Thaw” servers and desktops automatically when vulnerability
is detected.&nbsp;If a denial of service is occurring
against a Virtual Server you can always VMotion that server to a network with
more capacity without an administrator having to lift a finger.&nbsp;Imagine an attack happening on a machine and
instead of it being quarantined it makes a snapshot image of the infected
machine and freezes it in its current bad state so you can go back and analyze
how someone broke in.&nbsp;As you can see,
there are lots of new capabilities brought to the security round table.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Virtualization will make security solutions even more
powerful and increase the adoption rate of security in general due to the massive
cost savings that can be appreciated through virtualization.&nbsp;For these reasons I see the market quickly
leveraging virtualization to make Virtual Environments more Secure than their
counter parts.&nbsp;Virtualization will
enable the innovations in security that has been since UTM and Reputation based
Anti-Spam.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">VMWare, Virtual Iron, Citrix and others, thanks from the
security industry for the innovation!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">John Peterson, Montego Networks, Co-Founder &amp; CTO</p>

</div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 15:29:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security concerns">security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application security concerns">application security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concerns">concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual server">virtual server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual appliances">virtual appliances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security infrastructure due">security infrastructure due</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lift">lift</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityInTheVirtualWorld/~3/256197165/virtual-environ.html">Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
