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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: admit]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/admit</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 09:30:27 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Stigma Enigma, Revisited]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c238be0f778cce325c4423b05b36b9e3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c238be0f778cce325c4423b05b36b9e3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently my pal Bill Pytlovany (of WinPatrol fame) wrote an article on his blog asking &quot;What's Wrong With Toolbars

I wrote something along similar lines way back in 2005 , and it's vaguely depressing...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        Recently my pal Bill Pytlovany (of WinPatrol fame) wrote an <a href="http://billpstudios.blogspot.com/2008/08/what-wrong-with-toolbars.html">article</a> on his blog asking "What's Wrong With Toolbars"?<br /><br />I wrote something along similar lines <a href="http://www.revenews.com/chrisboyd/the-stigma-enigma/">way back in 2005</a>, and it's vaguely depressing to see how little has apparently changed. I'm not going to quote myself, but rather compare and contrast Bills experiences (and those of his commentators) with the person who posted a comment to my entry, which I quote below in full:<br /><br /><div class="comment-content">
                                                <p><i>"Unfortunately,
the few 'honest' toolbars have indeed taken the wrath of users as a
result of the spyware, parasite, adware and other creepy applications
of an otherwise good technology.</i></p>
<p><i>What's interesting is that, as far as my own toolbar system goes,
I've had offers from clients all over the world to develop different
kinds of toolbars -- and without fail -- it is the US-based companies
that seem most willing to cross the line and request applications that
I simply refuse to develop.</i></p>
<p><i>We're talking about features like:</i></p>
<p><i>- Forced Install<br />
- Hidden Install<br />
- Report all URLs back<br />
- Report all searches back<br />
- Forcibly and hidden set home page<br />
- Forcibly and hidden set default search engine<br />
- Forcibly generate un-blockable pop-ups<br />
- Install and run hidden executables<br />
- Bypass all security and anti-virus tools<br />
- The list goes on...</i></p>
<p><i>What's sad is that I'm able to generate the most powerful and
incredibly useful toolbars imaginable. Ones that can save countless
hours of time and effort. Ones that can be customized on a per-user
basis to make the Internet and use of ones's own computer a pleasure.</i></p>
<p><i>However, there will always be people around who's sole motivation is the almighty dollar -- and who will do ANYTHING to get it.</i></p>
<p><i>These people don't care about you, your wants, your needs, your
security or safety -- as long as they can line their pockets with your
money, or by taking advantage of actions you perform (even one lousy
click!).</i></p>
<p><i>They'll infect your machine, using whatever means necessary, and they won't stop -- EVER."</i><br /><br />The "industry" has certainly cleaned up since then, but the insistence on wanting to cram a toolbar on every PC, ever, remains. I must admit to being kind of disturbed that none of these companies seemingly want to take "No" for an answer - instead of leaving alone, they keep coming back every month or so. Of course, given the potential for mass moneymaking that's on offer I can't say I'm entirely surprised...<br /></p>
                    </div><br /> 
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2008 10:58:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/toolbars imaginable">toolbars imaginable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/toolbars">toolbars</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/forcibly">forcibly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/install">install</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/toolbar">toolbar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/applications">applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/contrast bills experiences">contrast bills experiences</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/toolbar system">toolbar system</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/the-stigma-enigma-revisited.html">The Stigma Enigma, Revisited</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another Site Hiding Pirate Movies Behind a Zango Installer Prompt]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/503b43d35c6104929785ac82ff1128b5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/503b43d35c6104929785ac82ff1128b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A few days ago, I wrote about a site asking you to install Zango before you could view the site content (which happens to be pirated movies ). Well, another site has come to light doing a similar...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        A few days ago, I wrote about a site asking you to install Zango before you could view the site content (which happens to be <a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/a-dark-knight-for-zango.html">pirated movies</a>). Well, another site has come to light doing a similar thing - I'm starting to wonder how many of these are actually out there. It's also served to highlight what I feel is a particularly confusing popup box, but we'll get to that later. First off, here's the website in question:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc0.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc0.html','popup','width=846,height=676,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc0-thumb-346x276.jpg" alt="bc0.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="276" width="346" /></a></span><br /> </div><div><div align="center">Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Bestcinemaonline(dot)com. As you can see, the site is similar to the last one (except that site is registered <a href="http://whois.domaintools.com/movietvonline.com">anonymously</a> to an individual in China, whereas this one is registered to <a href="http://whois.domaintools.com/bestcinemaonline.com">someone in Indonesia</a>). Also, the format is different - the last site was more of a "movie repository", whereas this one takes the shape and style of a blog with each individual entry pointing to a film. And what films they are!<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="bc5.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc5.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="228" width="309" /></span><br /></div></div><div><div align="center">Batman!<br /></div><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="bc6.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc6.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="244" width="363" /></span><br /></div></div><div><div align="center">X-Files!<br /></div><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc2.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc2.html','popup','width=672,height=649,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc2-thumb-372x359.jpg" alt="bc2.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="359" width="372" /></a></span><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br /></div><div>Hellboy! (Is that even out yet?)<br /><br />As you might have expected, a lot of the movies end up looking like this when attempting to watch them:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc3.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc3.html','popup','width=771,height=573,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc3-thumb-371x275.jpg" alt="bc3.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="275" width="371" /></a></span><br /></div></div><div><div align="center">Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />.....whoops.<br /><br />I must also give a special mention to one of the most confusing popup warnings I've ever seen - it really threw me, and I admit I nearly installed Zango accidentally after seeing it. If (when prompted with the Zango installer box) you click "Cancel", this appears in the middle of your screen:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="bc1.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/bc1.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="126" width="476" /></span><br /></div><div><br /><i>"Click <b>OK to Cancel </b>or<b> Click "Cancel" to continue </b>the installation".</i><br /><br />.....Whaaaaaa? That's a bit of a brain bender, right there. I hope this set of writeups doesn't become a Trilogy...<br /><br /><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2008 03:44:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zango">zango</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site content">site content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zango installer box">zango installer box</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click">click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movies">movies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/individual">individual</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cancel">cancel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/install zango">install zango</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/another-site-hiding-pirate-mov.html">Another Site Hiding Pirate Movies Behind a Zango Installer Prompt</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[New Weblog - Its Gonna Be Good: Risktical.Com]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/699bc1a6e609a6adbff2a6f29a39d86d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/699bc1a6e609a6adbff2a6f29a39d86d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[From Chris Hayes at http://risktical.com
I have the utmost respect for Chris as a risk analyst. Hes big in (started?) the Columbus OWASP chapter (and I have to admit to not getting to a meeting yet...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Chris Hayes at <strong><a href="http://risktical.com/">http://risktical.com/</a>.</strong></p>
<p>I have the utmost respect for Chris as a risk analyst.  He&#8217;s big in (started?) the Columbus OWASP chapter (and I have to admit to not getting to a meeting yet because I&#8217;m a slacker), works, lives and breathes Information Risk, and <strong>if you want a pragmatic, practical view of risk within the context of a sophisticated IRM program, his blog is something you&#8217;ll want to read.</strong></p>
<p>Also, he&#8217;s into the cello.  Which is cool.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 07:51:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breathes information risk">breathes information risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk analyst">risk analyst</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris hayes">chris hayes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/columbus owasp chapter">columbus owasp chapter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris">chris</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/utmost respect">utmost respect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risktical">risktical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/irm program">irm program</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=380">New Weblog - Its Gonna Be Good: Risktical.Com</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Companies struggle to keep data safe]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ea787b99274d82fda27cf6e8cde9f971</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ea787b99274d82fda27cf6e8cde9f971</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A staggering 94% of companies admit that they are powerless to prevent confidential data from leaving their company by e-mail, according to a new study from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A staggering 94% of companies admit that they are powerless to prevent confidential data from leaving their company by e-mail, according to a new study from Mimecast.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent confidential data">prevent confidential data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies admit">companies admit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-mail">e-mail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/powerless">powerless</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mimecast">mimecast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/study">study</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/080108-companies-struggle-to-keep-data.html?fsrc=rss-security">Companies struggle to keep data safe</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[DNS patches cause problems, developers admit]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/55f6eda07baf9c020ac6627ce9966fb3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/55f6eda07baf9c020ac6627ce9966fb3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Developers acknowledged that there were problems with the July 8 fix that was rolled out as part of a multivendor update to patch a cache poisoning flaw discovered months...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Developers acknowledged that there were problems with the July 8 fix that was rolled out as part of a multivendor update to patch a cache poisoning flaw discovered months before.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=Mmqr6b"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=Mmqr6b" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/349852620" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/developers">developers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fix">fix</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flaw">flaw</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/july">july</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multivendor">multivendor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patch">patch</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cache">cache</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/months">months</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/349852620/article.do">DNS patches cause problems, developers admit</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Symantec takes a fling it on the wall approach to NAC]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5fdd01f2a0625307de1c754d60d3d1b2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5fdd01f2a0625307de1c754d60d3d1b2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was reading Tim Greene's column this morning about Symantec 's new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I was reading <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/072808nac1.html">Tim Greene's column</a> this morning about <a class="zem_slink" title="Symantec" href="http://www.symantec.com/" rel="homepage">Symantec</a>'s new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market and competition pretty closely, get pretty confused with all of the different offerings Symantec has come out with around NAC. Symantec seems to be following a fling stuff on the wall and see what sticks strategy when it comes to NAC.&nbsp; The problem is separating the keepers from the rest of it when evaluating their offering.</p>

<p>This latest offering appears to sure up a hole that was called out in the recent <a href="http://www.crn.com/security/209101095;jsessionid=4CV2CAHUGZHEMQSNDLRSKHSCJUNN2JVN?pgno=1">CRN review</a> of their product in a bake off against Sophos and StillSecure's Safe Access. In that review Symantec's drop off in functionality between agent and agentless was called out.&nbsp; So within just a few days comes this announcement addressing the issue.&nbsp; Very timely indeed.&nbsp; This comes on the heels of Symantec's peer-to-peer approach to NAC, which came on the heels of their Endpoint Security product version 11 which had NAC included (and which I understand has already been patched/upgraded several times since its release).&nbsp; </p>

<p>At this point you have Symantec NAC with their endpoint suite which is a throw in but has no guest access option on its own. Than you have the Symantec NAC appliance which can do enforcement of managed devices beyond what just endpoint suite gives you.&nbsp; Now you also have on demand/dissolvable agents available with the Symantec NAC server (but I guess not with the endpoint suite). You also have the Symantec peer-to-peer stuff, which I think also requires the SNAC server.&nbsp; Starting to get confusing? I guess this is what happens when your NAC offering is made up of an amalgamation of several different products lumped together.</p>

<p>Not to worry though, I am sure Big Yellow will still sell plenty of all flavors of their NAC offering. At the end of the day some of this stuff is bound to stick.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/a9b9cd5b-92ba-48a1-b363-de44351587fe/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=a9b9cd5b-92ba-48a1-b363-de44351587fe" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 03:41:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac appliance">symantec nac appliance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac">symantec nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac server">symantec nac server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec">symantec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/offerings symantec">offerings symantec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec peer-to-peer stuff">symantec peer-to-peer stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac market">nac market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/endpoint suite">endpoint suite</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/symantec-takes.html">Symantec takes a fling it on the wall approach to NAC</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Symantec takes a fling it on the wall approach to NAC]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0df0f414409f58415c15cbc4f2fea03c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0df0f414409f58415c15cbc4f2fea03c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was reading Tim Greene's column this morning about Symantec 's new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I was reading <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/072808nac1.html">Tim Greene's column</a> this morning about <a class="zem_slink" title="Symantec" href="http://www.symantec.com/" rel="homepage">Symantec</a>'s new on demand web log in for guests as part of their SNAC appliance offering. I have to admit that even I who follows the NAC market and competition pretty closely, get pretty confused with all of the different offerings Symantec has come out with around NAC. Symantec seems to be following a fling stuff on the wall and see what sticks strategy when it comes to NAC.&nbsp; The problem is separating the keepers from the rest of it when evaluating their offering.</p>

<p>This latest offering appears to sure up a hole that was called out in the recent <a href="http://www.crn.com/security/209101095;jsessionid=4CV2CAHUGZHEMQSNDLRSKHSCJUNN2JVN?pgno=1">CRN review</a> of their product in a bake off against Sophos and StillSecure's Safe Access. In that review Symantec's drop off in functionality between agent and agentless was called out.&nbsp; So within just a few days comes this announcement addressing the issue.&nbsp; Very timely indeed.&nbsp; This comes on the heels of Symantec's peer-to-peer approach to NAC, which came on the heels of their Endpoint Security product version 11 which had NAC included (and which I understand has already been patched/upgraded several times since its release).&nbsp; </p>

<p>At this point you have Symantec NAC with their endpoint suite which is a throw in but has no guest access option on its own. Than you have the Symantec NAC appliance which can do enforcement of managed devices beyond what just endpoint suite gives you.&nbsp; Now you also have on demand/dissolvable agents available with the Symantec NAC server (but I guess not with the endpoint suite). You also have the Symantec peer-to-peer stuff, which I think also requires the SNAC server.&nbsp; Starting to get confusing? I guess this is what happens when your NAC offering is made up of an amalgamation of several different products lumped together.</p>

<p>Not to worry though, I am sure Big Yellow will still sell plenty of all flavors of their NAC offering. At the end of the day some of this stuff is bound to stick.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/a9b9cd5b-92ba-48a1-b363-de44351587fe/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=a9b9cd5b-92ba-48a1-b363-de44351587fe" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=2Val4x"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=2Val4x" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=QOQfsJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=QOQfsJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=1VUC0J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=1VUC0J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=jtR7aJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=jtR7aJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=OoZFwJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=OoZFwJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=BrlZNj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=BrlZNj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=1KoExj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=1KoExj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/349362002" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 02:49:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac appliance">symantec nac appliance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac">symantec nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec nac server">symantec nac server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec">symantec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/offerings symantec">offerings symantec</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/symantec peer-to-peer stuff">symantec peer-to-peer stuff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac market">nac market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/endpoint suite">endpoint suite</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/349362002/symantec-takes.html">Symantec takes a fling it on the wall approach to NAC</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[McAfee's Hacker Safe nominated for a Pwnie]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/19cd58f1b0361803b4a478f04fdc8485</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/19cd58f1b0361803b4a478f04fdc8485</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Mondays don't usually include such glorious highlights but I'll gladly pass on this exception. The Pwnie Awards 2008 nominations are out, and under Lamest Vendor Response we find McAfee's Hacker Safe,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mondays don't usually include such glorious highlights but I'll gladly pass on this exception. The <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/index.html" target="_blank">Pwnie Awards 2008</a> nominations are out, and under <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/awards.html#lamestvendor" target="_blank">Lamest Vendor Response</a> we find McAfee's Hacker Safe, specifically Joesph Pierini's response to the findings <a href="http://www.xssed.com/news/55/ScanAlerts_Hacker_Safe_badge_not_so_safe_and_PCI_compliant/" target="_blank">XSSed.com</a> and I gave to Thomas Claburn for publication in <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/cybercrime/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=JN2ZP21JSGB4WQSNDLOSKH0CJUNN2JVN?articleID=205900444&_requestid=339479" target="_blank">Information Week</a> this past January. <br />Joseph Pierini, director of enterprise services for the "Hacker Safe" program, stepped in it when he said that XSS vulnerabilities can't be used to hack a server:<br /><span style="font-style:italic;">Cross-site scripting can't be used to hack a server. You may be able to do other things with it. You may be able to do things that affect the end-user or the client. But the customer data protected with the server, in the database, isn't going to be compromised by a cross-site scripting attack, not directly.</span><br />As you can imagine, this one gets my vote.<br />Winners will be announced at the BlackHat USA reception at Caesar's Palace, Las Vegas on Wednesday, August 6th, 2008.<br />Should you wish further reading on the McAfee Secure / Hacker Safe fiasco, you need only utilize this <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Aholisticinfosec.blogspot.com+%22mcafee%22+%22hacker+safe%22&btnG=Google+Search" target="_blank">query</a> or refer to all of Nate's <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ablogs.zdnet.com%2Fsecurity+%22mcafee%22+%22hacker+safe%22&btnG=Google+Search" target="_blank">coverage</a> on <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/" target="_blank">Zero Day</a>. <br />I must admit, I'm curious who McAfee will have at Black Hat to receive this prestigious award should they win. I'm torn between suggesting <a href="http://www.0x000000.com/?i=574" target="_blank">Brett Oliphant</a> or Pierini himself. ;-)<br />Cheers.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/07/mcafees-hacker-safe-nominated-for-pwnie.html&title=McAfee's%20Hacker%20Safe%20nominated%20for%20a%20Pwnie " title="McAfee's Hacker Safe nominated for a Pwnie ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/07/mcafees-hacker-safe-nominated-for-pwnie.html" title="McAfee's Hacker Safe nominated for a Pwnie ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 07:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hacker safe">hacker safe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee">mcafee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hacker safe fiasco">hacker safe fiasco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pierini">pierini</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/joseph pierini">joseph pierini</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee secure">mcafee secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendor response">vendor response</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/joesph pierini">joesph pierini</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/07/mcafees-hacker-safe-nominated-for-pwnie.html">McAfee's Hacker Safe nominated for a Pwnie</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Locksmiths Hate Computer Geeks who Learn Lockpicking]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2e7f9f6eda9d878131a3c134b5617101</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2e7f9f6eda9d878131a3c134b5617101</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[They do : Hobby groups throughout North America have cracked supposedly unbeatable locks. Mr. Nekrep, who maintains a personal collection of more than 300 locks, has demonstrated online how to open a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[They <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080711.wlpicking11/EmailBNStory/lifeMain/">do</a>:

<blockquote>Hobby groups throughout North America have cracked supposedly unbeatable locks. Mr. Nekrep, who maintains a personal collection of more than 300 locks, has demonstrated online how to open a Kensington laptop lock using Scotch tape and a Post-it note. Another Lockpicking101.com member discovered the well-publicized method of opening Kryptonite bike locks with a ball-point pen, a revelation that prompted Kryptonite to replace all of its compromised locks. 

Other lock manufacturers haven't admitted their flaws so readily. Marc Tobias, a lawyer and security expert, recently shook up the lock-picking community by publishing a detailed analysis of how to crack the uncrackable: Medeco locks.

"We've figured out how to break them in as little as 30 seconds," he said. "[Medeco] won't admit it, though. They still believe in security through obscurity. But by not fixing the problems we identify, lock-makers are putting the public at risk. They have a duty to disclose vulnerabilities. If they don't, we will."</blockquote><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=tBmC9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=tBmC9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=DbdtVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=DbdtVJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 09:30:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kryptonite">kryptonite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kryptonite bike locks">kryptonite bike locks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/locks">locks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medeco locks">medeco locks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medeco">medeco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/supposedly unbeatable locks">supposedly unbeatable locks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kensington laptop lock">kensington laptop lock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security expert">security expert</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/locksmiths_hate.html">Locksmiths Hate Computer Geeks who Learn Lockpicking</source>
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