<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: apache]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/apache</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2008 06:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[40 Security Flaws Fixed In Mac OS X Security Update 2008-007]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9e4b9e799dfaeee65d3d9efef1162688</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9e4b9e799dfaeee65d3d9efef1162688</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Apple has released another pack of patches that cover a total of 40 documented vulnerabilities affecting the Mac OS X. The Security Update 2008-007, available for Tiger and Leopard, covers a range of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Apple has released another pack of patches that cover a total of 40 documented vulnerabilities affecting the Mac OS X. The Security Update 2008-007, available for Tiger and Leopard, covers a range of third-party components and Mac OS X flaws that could users at risk of remote code executions attacks.
The more serious vulnerabilities include:
Apache: CVE-2007-6420, [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2008 20:56:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mac">mac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerabilities include">vulnerabilities include</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerabilities">vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flaws">flaws</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/third-party components">third-party components</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/range">range</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tiger">tiger</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/40-security-flaws-fixed-in-mac-os-x-security-update-2008-007/">40 Security Flaws Fixed In Mac OS X Security Update 2008-007</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Two Years of Broken Crypto: Debian's Dress Rehearsal for a Global PKI Compromise]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/432d2495bf0e8b9c969c9d8efd4895eb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/432d2495bf0e8b9c969c9d8efd4895eb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A patch to the OpenSSL package maintained by Debian GNU/Linux (an operating system composed of free and open source software that can be used as a desktop or server OS) submitted in 2006 weakened its...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A patch to the OpenSSL package maintained by Debian GNU/Linux (an operating system composed of free and open source software that can be used as a desktop or server OS) submitted in 2006 weakened its pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), a critical component for secure key generation. Unnoticed for two years, the weak PRNG created a crypto-implementation nightmare with wide-ranging consequences that are difficult to repair. Putting both servers and users at risk, this vulnerability affected OpenSSH, Apache (mod_ssl), the onion router (TOR), OpenVPN, and other applications. In this article, I'll examine the issue and its consequences.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=82b45bc2d7e3da625459c51c5bb78bca" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=82b45bc2d7e3da625459c51c5bb78bca" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 00:42:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prng">prng</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure key generation">secure key generation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weak prng">weak prng</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical component">critical component</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/openssl package">openssl package</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/debian gnulinux">debian gnulinux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/onion router">onion router</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/consequences">consequences</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source software">source software</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=82b45bc2d7e3da625459c51c5bb78bca">Two Years of Broken Crypto: Debian's Dress Rehearsal for a Global PKI Compromise</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[VMWare is Better Than Microsoft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a030161b183f83f292761020fb04b7d9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a030161b183f83f292761020fb04b7d9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[After barely surviving the VMworld registration process, my first session was From Hypervisors to VMware Infrastructure What Matters? or as I would have called it why VMware is so much better than...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After barely surviving the <a href="http://www.vmworld.com/conferences/2008/" target="_blank">VMworld</a> registration process, my <a href="https://vmworld2008.wingateweb.com/scheduler/eventguide/publicScheduleByType.jsp?ts=1221517325133" target="_blank">first session</a> was “From Hypervisors to VMware Infrastructure – What Matters?” – or as I would have called it “why VMware is so much better than Microsoft…and if you don’t believe that we can help you make even more money on top of your already successful Microsoft business.” (I know, that title is way too long but quite descriptive.)</p>
<p>The session took place at the beginning of Partner Day. The “regular” conference sessions actually begin tomorrow. Today is spent focusing on partner issues and enablement.</p>
<p>The panel for this session included:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mark Chuang <small>Group Manager, Product Marketing, </small>VMware, Inc.</li>
<li>Kenon Owens <small>Staff Systems Engineer, </small>VMware, Inc.</li>
</ul>
<p>You have to remember that <a href="http://www.virtualization.info/2008/09/more-than-20-partners-announces-support.html" target="_blank">most of the Partners here</a> are not vendors like ScienceLogic, but big and small shops that are selling IT, networking and now virtualization solutions into end-customer environments. For these guys, understanding what virtualization partner programs and tools are at NetApp, for example, is very useful. And many of these companies are already selling Microsoft software and surrounding services for Microsoft products. So if you’re VMware, what’s the message to these partners in the face of the Microsoft juggernaut?</p>
<blockquote><p>Microsoft to partners: “You may not like to admit it, but you’re probably already in bed with us.”</p>
<p>VMware to partners: &#8220;Our hypervisor technology outperforms Hyper-V and Xen, especially at scale. And anyway, it’s not about the battle at the hypervisor. It’s about the V-services on top of the hypervisor – VMotion, Storage VMotion, DRS, etc.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting and what we all already know, or think we know. The scale issue is an interesting one – too soon for <a href="http://blogs.technet.com/virtualization/archive/2008/09/12/pre-vmworld-check-out-hyper-v-server-and-live-migration-demos.aspx" target="_blank">Hyper-V</a> and who uses Xen? But also interestingly enough, no announcement or even talk about extending VMware management tools to other hypervisors. The point, as the VMware product marketing guy made a point of saying, is that the question they needed to answer used to be “Why Virtualization?” and now it’s “Why VMware?&#8221;.</p>
<p>One more tidbit – this survey run by VMware asking their customers:</p>
<p><strong>What are the top 6 apps you are running on VMware today</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>IIS</li>
<li><em>Apache</em></li>
<li>Active Directory</li>
<li>SQL Server</li>
<li>Sharepoint</li>
<li>Exchange</li>
<p><em></em></ul>
<p><strong>That means, 5 of 6 are Microsoft applications. </strong>Certainly it makes it even more challenging for VMware to navigate a path here.</p>
<p>The change since 2004 – would have talked about why virtualize. And now why VMware. (Duh.)</p>
<p>Talking to partners – many of which already have a successful Microsoft business. How VMware <a href="http://gigaom.com/2008/09/14/for-vmware-an-uncertain-future/" target="_blank">enhances your existing Microsoft business</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Top 6 apps running on VMware today (5 of 6 are Microsoft applications)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>IIS</li>
<li><em>Apache</em></li>
<li>AD</li>
<li>Sql server</li>
<li>Sharepoint</li>
<li>Exchange</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Source: VMware survey</em></p>
<p>Esxi - VMware – true thin hypervisor; maximizes resources utilization (over 100% memory commitment – allows avg of 2:1 memory overcommit) – host system memory is usually the resource bottleneck – plus Advanced Scheduler runs VMs better under load and to a greater capacity (hard to show this part); performance acceleration – using binary translation (32bit), para-virtualization and Hardware Assist (for 64-bit)</p>
<p>(rvi – rapid virtualization indexing)</p>
<p>No parent partition that all hypervisors have to go through</p>
<p>Vs ms/xen</p>
<p>Parent partition – dom 0 =&gt; potentially problem at scale; i/o that could be a bottleneck</p>
<p>Hyper-v SPECjbb comparison</p>
<p>= 9 vms on VMware and hyper-v hypervisors</p>
<p>Outperform (CPU) by 50% - general purpose scheduler isn’t able to keep up? “got to be”</p>
<p>(cpu only test)</p>
<p>Also used VMmark – to demonstrate again that VMware is performance tuned and designed to run at scale vs Hyper-V</p>
<p>Size Does Matter:</p>
<p>Vmware ESXi: 32MB</p>
<p>Hyper-v – 2.6 GB</p>
<p>Xen – 1.2 GB</p>
<p>Hyper-V uses Microsoft Server Core – so the last two Patch Tuesdays had to make changes to Server Core (nothing to do with Hyper-V) but service interruption for Hyper-V.</p>
<p>VMware VMsafe – “Provides an unprecedented level of security” “virtual is more secure than Real” (uh oh – clearly didn’t read about the</p>
<p>*****************</p>
<p>VMware TEST:512 mb vms on server w/ 4gb ram –</p>
<p>7 vms - xensource (w/no memory overcommit)</p>
<p>6vms – hyper-v before error (w/no memory overcommit)</p>
<p>14vms - w/memory overcommit and management</p>
<p>Running sql io sim – heavy workloads</p>
<p>TCO – not just license; now ESXi is free – so hardware</p>
<p>809 - ESXi</p>
<p>871 – vi3 foundation ($995)</p>
<p>1168- vi3 enterprise ($5750)</p>
<p>1621 – hyper-v – 2x cost because of hw</p>
<p>Xen – 1618</p>
<p>Memory overcommit (89% in production vs. test/dev)</p>
<p>Survey – 37% of respondents at 2:1 RATIO OR HIGHER; real average is around 1.8: 1</p>
<p>*********************</p>
<p>This guy Mark sounds like a used car salesman:</p>
<p>“Always On, On Demand Data Center”</p>
<blockquote><p>Hypervisor is very important but what is more important are the v-services on top of this. Manage shared, pooled resources. “Value Above the Hypervisor”</p></blockquote>
<p>How does all this save “your customers” $$?</p>
<p><strong>VMotion – saves cost on planned maintenance: no more overtime, no more time scheduling maintenance windows (see cost framework below)</strong></p>
<p>10 (# of servers) x 6 (@ of updates) x [ (overtime cost 2hrs x $150/hr) + (scheduling downtime # of apps per server 15 x time spend scheduling per app 0.75 hr x $50/hr)] = $58,500</p>
<p>Same thing with using VMware Storage VMotion</p>
<p>Overtime cost + scheduling downtime + planning move + alternative tool cost - $68,750 (2.5 TeraBytes)</p>
<p><strong>The Value of High Availability</strong></p>
<p>- cost of lost business, lost work</p>
<p>- cost of lost productive time</p>
<p>4 hours of downtime x # of users per vm 10 x number of vms per host 15 x cost of user productive time $50/hr x failures per year in 10-host cluster 2 = $60K</p>
<p>(10 servers, 150 vms)</p>
<p><strong>SAVINGS (using enterprise version)</strong></p>
<p>Update management 149,760</p>
<p>HA 60K</p>
<p>DRS, VMotion Storage VMotion 187,250</p>
<p>808,259 – hw, power cooling, etc.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 19:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware">vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/survey">survey</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware survey">vmware survey</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware enhances">vmware enhances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware infrastructure">vmware infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test">test</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware test">vmware test</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/overtime cost 2hrs">overtime cost 2hrs</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/vmware-is-better-than-microsoft/09/2008">VMWare is Better Than Microsoft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Web Services and XML Security Training at OWASP]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6d12835067b0b2251fdc4b658b6928cc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6d12835067b0b2251fdc4b658b6928cc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am teaching Web Services and XML Security training at OWASP's AppSec conference in NYC, Sept 22-23. Web services provide the backbone that integrates many things in the enterprise from application...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am teaching <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_AppSec_Conference_Training#T3._Web_Services_and_XML_Security_-_2-Day_Course_-_Sep_22-23.2C_2008">Web Services and XML Security training</a> at OWASP&#39;s AppSec conference in NYC, Sept 22-23. Web services provide the backbone that integrates many things in the enterprise from application servers, databases, ERP, and CRM. &#160;Increasingly we are seeing Web services in more B2C roles with Rest, Federation and other technologies. The class looks at how Web services applications are built, what are common threats and vulnerabilities in Web services, and how to build your Web services application to defend against them.</p><br /><div>I have often said that OWASP conferences are my favorite ones because they are in depth technically and very practical. I always look forward to teaching at OWASP and the speaker lineup for this conference looks excellent.</div><br /><div>Here is a quick list of tools we have used in past classes<br /></div><br /><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; "><p style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; text-align: left; "><strong>Web Services frameworks</strong><br /><a href="http://incubator.apache.org/cxf/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Apache CXF</a>&#160;- very interesting open source Web services framework with support for JMS, SOAP, and Rest<br />Apache&#160;<a href="http://ws.apache.org/axis/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Axis</a>&#160;&amp;&#160;<a href="http://ws.apache.org/axis2/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Axis2</a><br /><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Communication_Foundation" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">.Net</a><br /><a href="https://metro.dev.java.net/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Metro</a>&#160;- interesting framework from Sun for interop with WCF</p><p style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; text-align: left; "><strong>Identity</strong>&#160;<br /><a href="http://www.pingidentity.com/products/pingfederate.cfm" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">PingFederate</a>&#160;- leading federation tool, we&#39;ll look at browser based SSO with SAML<br /><a href="http://www.pingidentity.com/products/web-services.cfm" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">PingFederate Web Services</a>&#160;- we&#39;ll look at how to implement a STS in Web services<br /><a href="http://www.bandit-project.org/index.php/Welcome_to_Bandit" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Bandit</a>&#160;-&#160;<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_CardSpace" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Cardspace</a>, authorization, and auditing</p><p style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; text-align: left; "><strong>Security Services</strong><br /><a href="http://www.vordel.com/products/vx_gateway/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">VordelSecure</a>&#160;- XML gateway, comprehensive web services security policy creation and enforcement, deploying decentralized security services<br /><a href="http://ws.apache.org/axis2/modules/rampart/1_0/security-module.html" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Apache Ramparts</a><br /><a href="http://www.modsecurity.org/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">modecurity</a></p><p style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; text-align: left; "><strong>Testing</strong><br /><a href="http://www.vordel.com/products/soapbox/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Soapbox</a>&#160;- web services security testing<br /><a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Project" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">WebScarab</a>&#160;- web services fuzzing</p><p style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; text-align: left; "><strong>Static Analysis</strong><br /><a href="http://www.fortifysoftware.com/products/sca/" style="text-decoration: underline; color: #003366; ">Fortify SC</a>A - how to scan your web services code for security bugs *before* you deploy</p></span><br /><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; ">This is just a quick list, new tools are added periodically. If you are using tools of these types in your company you may find it interesting <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_AppSec_Conference_Training#T3._Web_Services_and_XML_Security_-_2-Day_Course_-_Sep_22-23.2C_2008">to attend</a>.</span><br /></div><br /><div>Testimontials on past classes<br /><br /><div><span style="font-family: Times; font-size: 16px; line-height: normal; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 2px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 2px; ">&quot;High quality detailed overview of SOA security standards and approaches. Well thought-out and structured presentation.&quot;<br />- Sr. IT Architect, Fortune 10 enterprise<p>&quot;The knowledge and transfer was a great baseline and with the additional resources Gunnar made available, made this one of the best one day classes I&#39;ve taken.&quot;<br />- IT Security Lead, Fortune 10 enterprise</p><p>&quot;This class was a thorough and well-organized trek through the current Web Services Security landscape. Going beyond just describing the standards and the options available in the Web Services Security world, this class discusses real-world use cases and offers implementable solutions, best practices, even vendor choices in several key areas. &#160;This class provided me with actionable tasks that I took back to my project teams the very next day!&quot;<br />-Jesse Aalberg, Sr. Enterprise Application Architect, United Healthcare</p><p>&quot;The class was distinctly focused on Security requirements and the strength and weaknesses of the various solution approaches we could consider. The result of the course was actionable approaches to providing security in our SOA environment.&quot;<br />-Brad Sillman, Director IT Security, Deluxe Corp.</p><p>&quot;Anyone who wants up-to-date information on SOA Security, security standards and best practices should take this class.&quot;<br />-Kevin Beam, Senior Systems Engineer, Union Pacific Railroad</p><p>&quot;Good comprehensive overview of subject, standards, and threats&quot;&#160;<br />- Sr.Security Consultant, Ubizen</p><p>&quot;The class helped me get my head around what &quot;SOA&quot; and WS-Security is really all about&quot;<br />- Mike Zusman, Independent consultant</p><p>&quot;Topics addressed are timely and relevant. Labs are hands-on and help see concepts in action&quot;<br />- Jerry Tan, Systems Analyst, DTCC</p><p>&quot;This class was concise and covered a majority of the problem set my company is looking at and dealing with.&quot;&#160;<br />- Steve Reilley, Technical consultant, Commerce Insurance</p><p>&quot;Excellent two day overview of security topics as related to Web Services.&quot;<br />- Daniel Reznick, Information Security, ADP</p><p>&quot;Issue affecting&#160;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">most</span>&#160;of us today &amp; for those that don&#39;t - will soon. Very necessary education and technology.&quot;<br />Aaron Delashmutt</p><p>&quot;Great class! Effective and relevant teaching in an area without much guidance.&quot;<br />- Mark DiSabato, Senior Information Security Architect, Roche</p><p>&quot;The class cut through jargon to communicate concepts and implementation details.&quot;<br />- Developer, Fortune 100 insurance company</p><p>&quot;Good overview regarding SOA Security. Contains new technology like AMQP and REST&quot;&#160;<br />- Lars Loland, Statoil</p><p>&quot;The course covered what I had to learn about Web services&quot;<br />- Sven Vetsch, Dreamlab Technologies</p><p>&quot;Very good, eye opening especially for websecurity noob.&quot;<br />-Michael Brandon</p><p>&quot;Presenter has very broad and deep technical knowledge on subject. Content: good overview and comparison of SAML and WS-*&quot;<br />- Security consultant, ING</p><p>&quot;Good to learn where our application is vulnerable to attacks and how we can avoid them.&quot;<br />- Application Development Programmer Lead, Fortune 100 Insurance company</p><p>&quot;Entirely thorough overview of technology surrounding the use of web services with a 1 day presentation&quot;<br />- Technical consultant Contextis</p><p>&quot;Gave a good overview of the Web services security environment&quot;<br />- Francesco Degrassi, Emaze Networks</p><p>&quot;A great entry point for securing your web services&quot;<br />- Stig Kluver</p><p>&quot;Lots of good technical information about an emerging area that&#39;s very useful&quot;<br />- Rory McClune, HBOS PLC</p><p>&quot;This class reinforced the importance of software security assurance to me as it lucidly demonstrated why being &#39;behind the firewall&#39; is an outdated concept.&quot;<br />-Senior Support Engineer, Software Security vendor</p><p>&quot;The area of SOA Security is complicated and youg. A course such as this helps bring it into focus.&quot;<br />-Jayme Frye, System Engineer, Union Pacific Railroad</p><p>&quot;Web services security class provided application security concepts valuable for applications audits.&quot;<br />- Mary Ma, IT Auditor, DTCC</p><p>&quot;Very knowledgeable coverage of security requirements for Web services.&quot;<br />- David Libershal, Network Security Engineer, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory</p><p>&quot;WS/XML security is not a &quot;black art&quot;, but you do need to know about it to be able to take it into consideration.&quot;<br />- Applications Specialist, Global 500 manufacturer</p><p>&quot;Good overview of techniques worth considering when planning secure apps&quot;<br />- EAI Specialist, Leading Mobility company</p><p>&quot;Brought concepts in very easily understood terms.&quot;<br />-Glenn Bernard, Systems Engineer</p><p>&quot;Gives ideas about the latest Web services security standards in the industry&quot;<br />- Security Coordinator, Global 500 manufacturer</p><p>&quot;Class cleared up various WS-* standards and gave great concrete examples of how to build a message using each standard. Very good general thoughts on security groups&#39; role in IT.&quot;<br />- Matt Kasselman, UP Systems Engineering</p><p>&quot;I found this very useful as an IT architect in a &quot;security critical environment&quot;.&quot;<br />- Mika Pullinen, IT Architect, Finnish Defense Forces</p><p>&quot;Lots of useful information packed in a small amount of time. Good overall picture.&quot;<br />- Jari Pirhonen, Security Director, Samlink</p><p>&quot;Gunnar is very knowledgeable about security topics and has a great ability to explain complex ideas using simple, appropriate, and amusing language and analogies.&quot;<br />- Scott Redd, Sr. Project Engineer, Union Pacific</p><p>&quot;Excellent instructor who had a good pace to go through the presentation&quot;&#160;<br />- Anna Vaahtokan, Specialist, Nordea</p><p>&quot;Good application security principles.&quot;<br />- Tuomas Kivinen, IT Security Specialist, Nordea</p><p>&quot;I liked the class quite a bit. I took it in a &quot;survey mode&quot; where I wanted to learn about topics at a high level, and this was accomplished. It was good to listen to those in the class that were much more familiar with SAO than I.&quot;<br />- John Glazeski, Senior Systems Engineer</p></span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2008 04:55:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa security standards">soa security standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security standards">security standards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa security">soa security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa">soa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security critical environment">security critical environment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application security principles">application security principles</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/08/web-services-and-xml-security-training-at-owasp.html">Web Services and XML Security Training at OWASP</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Bot Hunter: An Event Processing Challenge]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ad344d30f5d4c2ad499d08baf386a23b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ad344d30f5d4c2ad499d08baf386a23b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently we penned The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds where we mentioned how cloud computing infrastructures can be used to stage malicous or accidential network attacks
Today I challenge our...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently we penned <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/31/the-attack-of-the-spiders-from-the-clouds/" target="_blank">The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds</a> where we mentioned how cloud computing infrastructures can be used to stage malicous or accidential network attacks.</p>
<p>Today I challenge our CEP/ESP/EP vendors (or SIs) to create the following solution to detect and block rogue bots on Apache web sites.   I will install and test each submitted solution on <a href="http://www.unix.com" target="_blank">The UNIX Forums</a> and post the results here.</p>
<p>Here are some basic requirements:</p>
<ol>
<li>Your solution must run on Linux and be installable and configurable remotely with SSH or HTTP.  There will be no physical access to the server. No exceptions.</li>
<li>Preferrably, the configuration can be done with a Web-Based Interface (WBI) - a browser.</li>
<li>Your solution will listen to continuous updates to the Apache2 access log, exact location configurable in your solution, and identify robots ( bots), also known as spiders, from the log.</li>
<li>Your solution will provide a confidence metric, key indicator (KI), for each bot detected, from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates &#8220;absolutely a bot,&#8221; 0 is &#8220;absolutely not a bot.&#8221;</li>
<li>Your solution will update the IP address of each bot and KI you identify in a file/table called, for example, ./bot_scorecard.txt where each line is an IP address of a bot, followed by a semicolon (or other delimiter of your choice) and the confidence factor, for example,  10.0.0.1;10 means that 10.0.0.1 is a bot, 100% sure.</li>
<li>Your solution must compare bots detected to a file/table called, for example, ./bots_allowed.txt and ./bots_denied.txt that are in the format IP address/mask, for example 10.0.0.1/24, or 10.0.0.1/32.</li>
<li>If the KI &#8220;confidence factor&#8221; of the IP address of your detected bot is higher than the tunable &#8220;is a bot&#8221; KI, then your solution should update the tables/files and then call iptables and block the bot.</li>
<li>It should send an email to one or more email addresses with a message, for example:  &#8220;New Bot Detected - Confidence 8&#8243; with IP address, etc. in the message.  Another example would be an email, &#8220;Bot Blocked&#8221; - with details, etc.</li>
<li>You cannot automatically block any traffic that is not a bot.  Blocking one &#8220;non-bot&#8221; results in failure, no exceptions.</li>
<li>The Prize:  The winner will get their logo (w/link) on this site in a block called &#8220;Bot Hunter Winner&#8221; (or something like that.)</li>
</ol>
<p>These are some basic requirements; I don&#8217;t want to restrict your thinking or solution, so be creative!  Feel free to ask any questions in the comment section of this thread.</p>
<p>Remember, sometimes you may have to manage the state of IP addresses for days, or hours, before you can accurately deterimine if it is a bot based on behavior alone.   So, you will need to work with both long and short time windows.  Latency is not important. Detection accurate is importance.</p>
<p>Anyone care to submit a solution for testing?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2008 05:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot">bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/winner">winner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot hunter winner">bot hunter winner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot based">bot based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-bot results">non-bot results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/results">results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot scorecard">bot scorecard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solution">solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/block rogue bots">block rogue bots</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/15/the-bot-hunter-an-event-processing-challenge/">The Bot Hunter: An Event Processing Challenge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Show 028 - An Interview with Bill Cheswick]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e2b76fcc8fd5ae0b6ef0cc50f2744a36</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e2b76fcc8fd5ae0b6ef0cc50f2744a36</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[On the 28th episode of The Silver Bullet Security Podcast , Gary interviews Bill Cheswick, a lead member of technical staff at AT&amp;T Research and all around security guru. Bill has been working in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img align="right" alt="Bill Cheswick" title="Bill Cheswick" src="http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/bcheswick-125.png" style="padding-left: 7px;" /></p>
<p>On the 28th episode of <em>The Silver Bullet Security Podcast</em>, Gary interviews Bill Cheswick, a lead member of technical staff at AT&#038;T Research and all around security guru.  Bill has been working in computer security for over 35 years.  He coined the term &#8220;proxy&#8221; in 1990 with reference to firewalls, and co-authored the book <em>Firewalls and Internet Security</em> which was used to train an entire generation of sys admins.  Gary and Bill discuss whether we&#8217;re winning or losing the computer security war, how security threats have evolved from pimply-faced teenagers to organized crime, whether we should move security into &#8220;the cloud,&#8221; and whether re-naming &#8220;Christmas lights&#8221; to &#8220;solstice lights&#8221; would bypass NJ holiday decoration ordinances.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.cheswick.com/ches/">Bill Cheswick</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.research.att.com/">AT&#038;T Research</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.lumeta.com/">Lumeta</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.wilyhacker.com/">FWIS</a></li>
<li>“<a href="http://www.clusit.it/whitepapers/gateway.pdf">The Design of a Secure Internet Gateway</a>” (Usenix 1990, coining of “proxy”)</li>
<li><a href="http://httpd.apache.org/">The Apache web server</a></li>
<li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down">Turtles all the Way Down</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/show-022/">Ed Amoroso’s Silver Bullet Podcast</a> (use blink test to compare)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.solsticelights.com/">Solstice Lights</a></li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:30:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bill">bill</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bill cheswick">bill cheswick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security war">computer security war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solstice lights">solstice lights</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/att research">att research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/holiday decoration ordinances">holiday decoration ordinances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apache web server">apache web server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/term proxy">term proxy</category>
      <source url="http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/show-028/">Show 028 - An Interview with Bill Cheswick</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Virtualisation - Welcome Back to the 90s.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/91a97db541c7009ccb12c514e3cee018</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/91a97db541c7009ccb12c514e3cee018</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've been thinking about this for a while but this blog post by Pascal Meunier pretty much sums up my feelings about Virtualisation

Back in the 90s when the Internet was new-ish and just becoming...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been thinking about this for a while but <a href="http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/virtualization-is-successful-because-operating-systems-are-weak/">this blog post by Pascal Meunier</a> pretty much sums up my feelings about Virtualisation.<br /><br />Back in the 90s when the Internet was new-ish and just becoming important all the machines running it were Unix boxes. (Maybe not all, but most). And a 386 would typically run DNS, sendmail, telnet (shell accounts), ftp and apache. All on the same box.<br /><br />Security wasn't so tight in those days but it was usually good enough and the box could happily do what it needed to do.<br /><br />Along came Microsoft and produced the idea of "one box - one service". You can't seriously consider running your domain controller as a file server. What are you thinking? And to put mail on the same box? No way. In fact, your SQL server is running under significant load, chain a few together.<br /><br />And companies would buy into this concept. Microsoft were happy - more licenses. All the PC guys were happy too - more money. More complexity - more jobs.<br /><br />Essentially what has happened now is that Moores Law has kicked in and has caught up with the complexity of Microsoft's software to the point where one server box can run multiple applications on it. Imagine that.  But Microsoft has planted the one-service-one-box concept so well that it is now part of IT law. File server and mail server on one box? But wait...whats this button over here....? Vir-vir-virtualisation.<br /><br />And now we have the tools to allow us to once again run multiple applications on one server without having to admit that one-application-one-server never made sense.<br /><br />To be fair - Virtualisation does have other advantages - running multiple Operating Systems for example, being able to easily move a virtual machine from one box to another (without configuration issues), being able to make a snapshot backup of a system.<br /><br />But running multiple applications on one box is not a huge win.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~4/325572539" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 02:37:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file server">file server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server box">server box</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/box">box</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail server">mail server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail">mail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple applications">multiple applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple">multiple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql server">sql server</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~3/325572539/virtualisation-welcome-back-to-90s.html">Virtualisation - Welcome Back to the 90s.</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Obama Campaign Hopes for Better Web Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b46725c61ac91ba0856cb6bb2a49aa02</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b46725c61ac91ba0856cb6bb2a49aa02</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Looking for a new security job with a helluva challenge? Know LAMP? Then the Obama campaign wants you
From PC World
Two months after their Web site was hacked, the organizers of Barack Obamas...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Looking for a new security job with a helluva challenge? Know LAMP? Then the Obama campaign wants you.</p>
<p>From PC World:</p>
<blockquote><p>Two months after their Web site was hacked, the organizers of Barack Obama&#8217;s presidential campaign are looking for a network security expert to help lock down their Web site.</p>
<p>&#8220;Obama for America is looking for a network security expert who wants to play a key role in a historic political campaign,&#8221; reads the ad, posted to the Barackobama.com Web site.</p>
<p>The requirements are pretty much what you&#8217;d read in any e-commerce security help-wanted ad: VPN (virtual private network) and Unix or Linux experience, along with a &#8220;deep understanding&#8221; of LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL and Perl) development. And of course, the successful candidate must be willing to &#8220;respond off-hours to high urgency security situations.&#8221;</p>
<p>Successful candidates will join Obama&#8217;s Boston team and should expect to find a new job come November.</p></blockquote>
<p>So, find a new job in November cause its thanks for the memories? Or you can join the White House crew? So, if you can run on no sleep and you bleed caffeine then you might be a right fit.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/146997/obama_campaign_hopes_for_better_web_security.html">Article Link</a></p>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/Liquidmatrix?a=ZNINBW"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/Liquidmatrix?i=ZNINBW" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=J0XOoI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=J0XOoI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=yiUgdi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=yiUgdi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=GPZjii"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=GPZjii" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=gecyvi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=gecyvi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?a=97yJDi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/Liquidmatrix?i=97yJDi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/Liquidmatrix/~4/310397749" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2008 09:25:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security expert">network security expert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web site">web site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obama">obama</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obama campaign">obama campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security job">security job</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/job">job</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/linux">linux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/white house crew">white house crew</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/Liquidmatrix/~3/310397749/">Obama Campaign Hopes for Better Web Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Apple Patches for Apache, Flash and More]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5bab105b079ba8fb2f90fcc0e4655f7f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5bab105b079ba8fb2f90fcc0e4655f7f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday I blogged a Windows flaw for Adobe Flash player. Today I came across another advisory about a patch Apple just put out earlier this week for Adobe Flash. The security update also covers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday I blogged a Windows flaw for Adobe Flash player. Today I came across another advisory about a patch Apple just put out earlier this week for Adobe Flash. The security update also covers other software too. From <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/745?ref=rss">SecurityFocus</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The update patches eight vulnerabilities in the open-source Apache Web server and seven vulnerabilities in Adobe&#8217;s Flash Player plug-in. While the Apache flaws amount to, at most, cross-site scripting attacks, the Flash Player flaws could allow a malicious Flash file (SWF) to execute on the victim&#8217;s system, Apple stated in its security advisory.</p>
<p>The company also fixed five vulnerabilities in its ImageIO component that could allow denial-of-service attacks, information leakage, and in one case, possible code execution. The update also patches two flaws in the kernel that allow both local and remote users the ability to shutdown the system. A flaw in the way that the Mac&#8217;s Mail program handles the Internet&#8217;s next-generation addressing scheme, IP version 6, could allow remote code execution, Apple stated.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2008 06:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apple">apple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash player flaws">flash player flaws</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flaws">flaws</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adobe flash player">adobe flash player</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code execution">code execution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adobe flash">adobe flash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/remote code execution">remote code execution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security advisory">security advisory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apache flaws amount">apache flaws amount</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/301391276/">Apple Patches for Apache, Flash and More</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
