1. Person A has position X.

2. Person B ignores X and instead presents position Y.
Y is a distorted version of X and can be set up in several ways, including:

1. Presenting a misrepresentation of the opponent’s position and then refuting it, thus giving the appearance that the opponent’s actual position has been refuted.
2. Quoting an opponent’s words out of context — i.e., choosing quotations that are not representative of the opponent’s actual intentions.
3. Presenting someone who defends a position poorly as the defender and then refuting that person’s arguments, thus giving the appearance that every upholder of that position, and thus the position itself, has been defeated.
4. Inventing a fictitious persona with actions or beliefs that are criticized, such that the person represents a group of whom the speaker is critical.
5. Oversimplifying an opponent’s argument, then attacking the simplified version.

3. Person B attacks position Y.

4. Person B draws a conclusion that X is false/incorrect/flawed.
This sort of “reasoning” is fallacious because attacking a distorted version of a position simply does not constitute an attack on the position itself.

For example, there has been some lively discussions recently around the notion that CEP is overhyped.

Debate:      “CEP is Overhyped.”

Person A:   “CEP has been overhyped.”

Person B:     “CEP is just hype.”

The point of the discussion by person A was to point out that CEP has been overhyped.  Person B has exaggerated this to a harder to defend position, “CEP is mere hype.” or “CEP is just hype.”

From the customer perspective, I don’t think that fallacies and red-herring arguments are good for CEP.   Believe me, if we could take an “out of the box” stream processing rules-engine and bolt it on to a network and insure a client it would detect complex fraud, or diagnose network faults accurately, and not put my entire professional reputation on the line, I would do it in a heartbeat.

It is not the speed of the an engine which makes a good CEP engine, it is the capability of the analytics to deliver high-quality, high-confidence complex event detection in real-time.

Of course, a major problem with that approach is that the “persons of interest” are long gone by the time the video shows that “yep, you can defiantly see some guy cutting off that lock and stealing that…”.

Another problem is that unless the equipment is being checked on a regular basis, it may be defeated (or just broken) for a long time before any problems are identified.

In the photo to the right, a NYC artist William Lamson, has created an interesting photo of hacking (or blocking) a security camera with a helium balloon. This is such a simple and inexpensive attack on the video surveillance camera that I am shocked I haven’t seen this before. I am also certain that the appearance of this in a TV or movie plot is imminent. It would have been pretty simple to use two balloons to block the camera without providing the nice tether to “fix” the problem.

Digital photography is a hobby of mine, and I have a mild obsession for photographing physical security faux pas (which to date has not resulted in any ‘Imperial Entanglements’ ). So I am going to use Mr. Lamson’s photo to kick off a new category (and series) on Art of Information Security, called “Security faux pas” - stay tuned…

Cheers, Erik

Coming Soon to a Movie Plot Near You…

We found that when we were in VMware VirtualCenter, we can add permissions via the inventory datastore & networks view but once we did that there was no easy way to view or delete the permissions within the same view. You need to go back and navigate the hosts/clusters view, one at a time, in order to view where these permissions showed up and if necessary delete/modify them one at a time as well, or check where that role is applied within the administration/roles view.

While this might work for small environments or for a couple of administrators, it absolutely wouldn’t work for large environments with hundreds of hosts or thousands of virtual machines or a complex resources structure with complex storage. Or what about environments with multiple administrators? One administrator makes a change to permissions, but the next administrator has no idea and a change to permissions here cascades through and impacts all VMs in that datacenter. Sounds like a good way to shoot yourself in the foot!

So is this a design flaw? Was the point of the “Add Permissions” feature for datastores and networks to prevent users from getting to those datastores/networks? Or was it to maybe give the appearance of ACL functionality? Or something like a poor man’s quota management? And if you’re going to let administrators add permissions in a view, why not let them view and delete just as in the other views?

Does anyone know why this feature is even available here for datastores and networks in VirtualCenter without really taking the feature all the way? Maybe I’m not seeing the forest for the trees at the moment but if you know or have used this, please do share…

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There is considerable value in separating out the two concepts: in explaining how the two are different, and understanding when we're referring to one and when the other. There is value as well in recognizing when the two converge, understanding why they diverge, and knowing how they can be made to converge again.

Some fundamentals first. Viewed from the perspective of economics, security is a trade-off. There's no such thing as absolute security, and any security you get has some cost: in money, in convenience, in capabilities, in insecurities somewhere else, whatever. Every time someone makes a decision about security -- computer security, community security, national security -- he makes a trade-off.

People make these trade-offs as individuals. We all get to decide, individually, if the expense and inconvenience of having a home burglar alarm is worth the security. We all get to decide if wearing a bulletproof vest is worth the cost and tacky appearance. We all get to decide if we're getting our money's worth from the billions of dollars we're spending combating terrorism, and if invading Iraq was the best use of our counterterrorism resources. We might not have the power to implement our opinion, but we get to decide if we think it's worth it.

Now we may or may not have the expertise to make those trade-offs intelligently, but we make them anyway. All of us. People have a natural intuition about security trade-offs, and we make them, large and small, dozens of times throughout the day. We can't help it: It's part of being alive.

Imagine a rabbit, sitting in a field eating grass. And he sees a fox. He's going to make a security trade-off: Should he stay or should he flee? Over time, the rabbits that are good at making that trade-off will tend to reproduce, while the rabbits that are bad at it will tend to get eaten or starve.

So, as a successful species on the planet, you'd expect that human beings would be really good at making security trade-offs. Yet, at the same time, we can be hopelessly bad at it. We spend more money on terrorism than the data warrants. We fear flying and choose to drive instead. Why?

The short answer is that people make most trade-offs based on the feeling of security and not the reality.

I've written a lot about how people get security trade-offs wrong, and the cognitive biases that cause us to make mistakes. Humans have developed these biases because they make evolutionary sense. And most of the time, they work.

Most of the time -- and this is important -- our feeling of security matches the reality of security. Certainly, this is true of prehistory. Modern times are harder. Blame technology, blame the media, blame whatever. Our brains are much better optimized for the security trade-offs endemic to living in small family groups in the East African highlands in 100,000 B.C. than to those endemic to living in 2008 New York.

If we make security trade-offs based on the feeling of security rather than the reality, we choose security that makes us feel more secure over security that actually makes us more secure. And that's what governments, companies, family members and everyone else provide. Of course, there are two ways to make people feel more secure. The first is to make people actually more secure and hope they notice. The second is to make people feel more secure without making them actually more secure, and hope they don't notice.

The key here is whether we notice. The feeling and reality of security tend to converge when we take notice, and diverge when we don't. People notice when 1) there are enough positive and negative examples to draw a conclusion, and 2) there isn't too much emotion clouding the issue.

Both elements are important. If someone tries to convince us to spend money on a new type of home burglar alarm, we as society will know pretty quickly if he's got a clever security device or if he's a charlatan; we can monitor crime rates. But if that same person advocates a new national antiterrorism system, and there weren't any terrorist attacks before it was implemented, and there weren't any after it was implemented, how do we know if his system was effective?

People are more likely to realistically assess these incidents if they don't contradict preconceived notions about how the world works. For example: It's obvious that a wall keeps people out, so arguing against building a wall across America's southern border to keep illegal immigrants out is harder to do.

The other thing that matters is agenda. There are lots of people, politicians, companies and so on who deliberately try to manipulate your feeling of security for their own gain. They try to cause fear. They invent threats. They take minor threats and make them major. And when they talk about rare risks with only a few incidents to base an assessment on -- terrorism is the big example here -- they are more likely to succeed.

Unfortunately, there's no obvious antidote. Information is important. We can't understand security unless we understand it. But that's not enough: Few of us really understand cancer, yet we regularly make security decisions based on its risk. What we do is accept that there are experts who understand the risks of cancer, and trust them to make the security trade-offs for us.

There are some complex feedback loops going on here, between emotion and reason, between reality and our knowledge of it, between feeling and familiarity, and between the understanding of how we reason and feel about security and our analyses and feelings. We're never going to stop making security trade-offs based on the feeling of security, and we're never going to completely prevent those with specific agendas from trying to take care of us. But the more we know, the better trade-offs we'll make.

There is considerable value in separating out the two concepts: in explaining how the two are different, and understanding when we're referring to one and when the other. There is value as well in recognizing when the two converge, understanding why they diverge, and knowing how they can be made to converge again.

Some fundamentals first. Viewed from the perspective of economics, security is a trade-off. There's no such thing as absolute security, and any security you get has some cost: in money, in convenience, in capabilities, in insecurities somewhere else, whatever. Every time someone makes a decision about security -- computer security, community security, national security -- he makes a trade-off.

People make these trade-offs as individuals. We all get to decide, individually, if the expense and inconvenience of having a home burglar alarm is worth the security. We all get to decide if wearing a bulletproof vest is worth the cost and tacky appearance. We all get to decide if we're getting our money's worth from the billions of dollars we're spending combating terrorism, and if invading Iraq was the best use of our counterterrorism resources. We might not have the power to implement our opinion, but we get to decide if we think it's worth it.

Now we may or may not have the expertise to make those trade-offs intelligently, but we make them anyway. All of us. People have a natural intuition about security trade-offs, and we make them, large and small, dozens of times throughout the day. We can't help it: It's part of being alive.

Imagine a rabbit, sitting in a field eating grass. And he sees a fox. He's going to make a security trade-off: Should he stay or should he flee? Over time, the rabbits that are good at making that trade-off will tend to reproduce, while the rabbits that are bad at it will tend to get eaten or starve.

So, as a successful species on the planet, you'd expect that human beings would be really good at making security trade-offs. Yet, at the same time, we can be hopelessly bad at it. We spend more money on terrorism than the data warrants. We fear flying and choose to drive instead. Why?

The short answer is that people make most trade-offs based on the feeling of security and not the reality.

I've written a lot about how people get security trade-offs wrong, and the cognitive biases that cause us to make mistakes. Humans have developed these biases because they make evolutionary sense. And most of the time, they work.

Most of the time -- and this is important -- our feeling of security matches the reality of security. Certainly, this is true of prehistory. Modern times are harder. Blame technology, blame the media, blame whatever. Our brains are much better optimized for the security trade-offs endemic to living in small family groups in the East African highlands in 100,000 B.C. than to those endemic to living in 2008 New York.

If we make security trade-offs based on the feeling of security rather than the reality, we choose security that makes us feel more secure over security that actually makes us more secure. And that's what governments, companies, family members and everyone else provide. Of course, there are two ways to make people feel more secure. The first is to make people actually more secure and hope they notice. The second is to make people feel more secure without making them actually more secure, and hope they don't notice.

The key here is whether we notice. The feeling and reality of security tend to converge when we take notice, and diverge when we don't. People notice when 1) there are enough positive and negative examples to draw a conclusion, and 2) there isn't too much emotion clouding the issue.

Both elements are important. If someone tries to convince us to spend money on a new type of home burglar alarm, we as society will know pretty quickly if he's got a clever security device or if he's a charlatan; we can monitor crime rates. But if that same person advocates a new national antiterrorism system, and there weren't any terrorist attacks before it was implemented, and there weren't any after it was implemented, how do we know if his system was effective?

People are more likely to realistically assess these incidents if they don't contradict preconceived notions about how the world works. For example: It's obvious that a wall keeps people out, so arguing against building a wall across America's southern border to keep illegal immigrants out is harder to do.

The other thing that matters is agenda. There are lots of people, politicians, companies and so on who deliberately try to manipulate your feeling of security for their own gain. They try to cause fear. They invent threats. They take minor threats and make them major. And when they talk about rare risks with only a few incidents to base an assessment on -- terrorism is the big example here -- they are more likely to succeed.

Unfortunately, there's no obvious antidote. Information is important. We can't understand security unless we understand it. But that's not enough: Few of us really understand cancer, yet we regularly make security decisions based on its risk. What we do is accept that there are experts who understand the risks of cancer, and trust them to make the security trade-offs for us.

There are some complex feedback loops going on here, between emotion and reason, between reality and our knowledge of it, between feeling and familiarity, and between the understanding of how we reason and feel about security and our analyses and feelings. We're never going to stop making security trade-offs based on the feeling of security, and we're never going to completely prevent those with specific agendas from trying to take care of us. But the more we know, the better trade-offs we'll make.

This article originally appeared on Wired.com.