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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: approach]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/approach</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 21 Sep 2008 01:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a ( updated version of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqbO7J3tvI/AAAAAAAACPg/YNDy4vo817c/s1600-h/fake_windows_xp_activation1.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqbO7J3tvI/AAAAAAAACPg/BYpcW4rkU0o/s200-R/fake_windows_xp_activation1.png" /></a>In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a (<a href="http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-042705-0108-99">updated version</a> of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it claims "<i>We will ask for your billing details, but your credit card will NOT be charged</i>", is requesting and remotely uploading all the credit card details required for a successfully credit card theft.<br />
<br />
Perhaps among the main reasons why such simplistic social engineering attempts never scaled in a "malicious economies of scale" approach, is because sophisticated crimeware kits capable of obtaining the very same data automatically, started leaking for everyone to start taking advantage of - including yesterday's cybercriminals using such DIY fake message builders. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div>Moreover, according to <a href="http://news.ncsu.edu/news/2008/09/wmswogalterfakemessage.php">recently reseased survey results</a>, end users cannot distinguish between fake popups and real ones, and on their way to continue doing what they were doing, click OK on that pesky warning message telling them that they're about to get infected with malware. Taking into consideration the fact that the popup windows the researchers used look like cheap creative compared to the average fake security software's layout high quality GUIs, it is perhaps worth restating your research questions with something in the lines of - <b>What motivates end users to install an antivirus application going under the name of Super Antivirus 2009 or Mega Virus Cleaner 2008?</b> The fact that the fake status bar is telling them that they're infected with 47 spyware cookies, or the fact that they ended up at the fake site while browsing their trusted web services? <br />
<br />
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqf_xbxL7I/AAAAAAAACPo/6uvXj2AuS_A/s1600-h/fake_windows_xp_activation2.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOqf_xbxL7I/AAAAAAAACPo/fa1jUBjFGOU/s200-R/fake_windows_xp_activation2.png" /></a>The increase of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_30.html">rogue security software domains</a> is happening due to the high payout affiliation based model, the standardized creative allowing the participants to come up with their own fake names if they want to, and due to the fact that the fake security threats scareware approach seems to be perfectly taking advantage of the overall suspicion on the effectiveness of their legitimate security software.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=mw30M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=mw30M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=WJFzM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=WJFzM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jNfpm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jNfpm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9lodm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9lodm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6go3M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6go3M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=TLsPM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=TLsPM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=JuYBm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=JuYBm" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/413264124" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 15:01:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card theft">credit card theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware author">malware author</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social">social</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mega virus cleaner">mega virus cleaner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/creative">creative</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/413264124/fake-windows-xp-activation-trojan-wants.html">Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Presentation from SANS 2008 Lunch and Learn in Las Vegas]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9e013f4069a35954694c89f4bb3e700d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9e013f4069a35954694c89f4bb3e700d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As promised , here is my infamous presentation on &quot;Log management 'Worst Practices'&quot; that I gave at SANS Network Security 2008 yesterday

This presentation can also be considered a sequel to my...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[As <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/10/my-lunch-presentation-at-sans-network.html">promised</a>, <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation">here </a>is my infamous presentation on "Log management 'Worst Practices'" that I gave at SANS Network Security 2008 yesterday.<br /><br />This presentation can also be considered a sequel to my <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/choosing-your-log-management-approach-buy-build-or-outsource">"Choosing a Log Management Approach" presentation</a>, which was my previous SANS Lunch and Learn preso.<br /><br />If you are involved / about to be involved with logging, read both (<a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/choosing-your-log-management-approach-buy-build-or-outsource">first</a>, <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation">second</a>)!<br /><br />It is also embedded below:<br /><br /><div style="width: 425px; text-align: left;" id="__ss_635093"><a style="margin: 12px 0pt 3px; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; display: block; text-decoration: underline;" href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation?type=powerpoint" title="Anton's Log Management 'Worst Practices'">Anton's Log Management 'Worst Practices'</a><object style="margin: 0px;" width="425" height="355"><param name="movie" value="http://static.slideshare.net/swf/ssplayer2.swf?doc=sanslmworstpracticesd6oct2008-1223079958645247-8&amp;stripped_title=antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation"><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"><param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always"><embed src="http://static.slideshare.net/swf/ssplayer2.swf?doc=sanslmworstpracticesd6oct2008-1223079958645247-8&amp;stripped_title=antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="355"></embed></object><div style="font-size: 11px; font-family: tahoma,arial; height: 26px; padding-top: 2px;">View SlideShare <a style="text-decoration: underline;" href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/antons-log-management-worst-practices-presentation?type=powerpoint" title="View Anton's Log Management 'Worst Practices' on SlideShare">presentation</a> or <a style="text-decoration: underline;" href="http://www.slideshare.net/upload?type=powerpoint">Upload</a> your own. (tags: <a style="text-decoration: underline;" href="http://slideshare.net/tag/chuvakin">chuvakin</a> <a style="text-decoration: underline;" href="http://slideshare.net/tag/logging">logging</a>)</div></div><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Possibly related material:</span><br /><ul><li>All my presentation on Slideshare.<br /></li></ul><div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=Ch9yM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=Ch9yM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=27R3M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=27R3M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=0cfCM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=0cfCM" border="0"></img></a>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2008 07:11:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presentation">presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/view slideshare presentation">view slideshare presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log management">log management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log management approach">log management approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/infamous presentation">infamous presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/slideshare">slideshare</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worst practices">worst practices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous sans lunch">previous sans lunch</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sans network security">sans network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/411284395/presentation-from-sans-2008-lunch-and.html">Presentation from SANS 2008 Lunch and Learn in Las Vegas</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fun Reading on Security - 8]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot; Fun Reading on Security .&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008
Great...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Fun Reading on Security</a>.&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008.</p>  <ol>   <li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=162936">Great paper</a> that complements the whole &quot;SIEM is dead?&quot; saga - &quot;Most enterprises are looking for a product that <em>will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle</em>, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. &quot; </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001093.html">The Mess: looking for someone to blame?</a>&quot; is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up (&quot;<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html">If a tree falls in someone else's silo...</a>&quot;) </li>    <li>Mike call to &quot;<a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/rise-up-against-mediocrity">Rise up against Mediocrity</a>.&quot;&#160; - &quot;Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear.&quot;; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do &quot;Security FIRST!&quot; (and compliance second) </li>    <li>A great piece from Burton: &quot;<a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">On Response</a>&quot; - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. <a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">This</a> is definitely a good one for those still in the &quot;we'll just block the threat world&quot; - &quot;we will not win a continuing war of escalation&quot; and &quot;using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2008/08/security-metric.html">More on metrics</a>, including the highly-awaited ISO27004. </li>    <li><a href="http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64598.html">Pretty dumb paper</a> by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read <a href="http://treasuryinstitute.org/blog/index.php?itemid=174">this</a>). PCI doesn't &quot;fall short,&quot; it helps people who will otherwise not do <em>anything</em> and their systems will &quot;power&quot; those botnets of the future... </li>    <li>While we are on this subject: <a href="http://pcianswers.com/2008/10/01/pci-dss-version-12-differences-and-updates/">a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes</a>, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/11/recap-cso-executive-seminar-on-pci-compliance-by-james-deluccia/">here.</a> And more <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">here</a> (&quot;<a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths</a>&quot;). And, <a href="http://www.estoregfoa.org/StaticContent/staticpages/TM0508.htm#1c">more PCI myths</a>. And <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-29-2008">more good ideas</a> on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-)&#160; - also <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/19/the-inside-story-of-pci-confessions-of-a-qsa-commentary-by-james-deluccia/">this is good.</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/23/behavioral-monitoring/">Adrian on behavioral monitoring</a>; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security. </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://www.darkreading.com/blog.asp?blog_sectionid=327&amp;doc_id=164144">Premature Chasm-Crossing</a>&quot;&#160; - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and&#160; their easily-excitable PR teams...) - &quot;Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?&quot; (Mike R <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-24-2008">also comments</a> on that). A related - and&#160; just as interesting point is made here: &quot;<a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/security_is_not_a_solution">Security is not a solution</a>&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/print/450190">More</a> on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: &quot;I think this is a dangerous trend unless the &quot;checklist&quot; is all inclusive.&quot; (how can a checklist include <strong>ALL? :-)</strong>) </li>    <li><a href="http://forensics.sans.org/community/top7_forensic_trends.php">&quot;SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008&quot;</a> </li>    <li>Read &quot;<a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/09/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html">The three approaches to computer security!</a>&quot;&#160; Why? Come on, it is from <a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com">Joanna</a>! :-) </li>    <li><a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/09/ids-vitamins-or-prophylactic.html">A fun discussion</a> about a hot new technology:<em> network IDS. </em>Is IDS <em>absolutely</em> indispensable to <em>ALL</em> companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion. </li>    <li>On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/why-lasers-wont.html">Some say no.</a> </li>    <li>Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): &quot;<a href="http://blogs.gartner.com/greg_young/2008/09/30/get-rich-quick-with-network-security/">Get Rich Quick With Network Security</a>&quot; </li> </ol>  <p>Enjoy!</p>  <p><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Previous security reading.</a></p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/409462346" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 06:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security managers">security managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous security">previous security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss exists">pci dss exists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci fun">pci fun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security checklists">security checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/409462346/fun-reading-on-security-8.html">Fun Reading on Security - 8</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Building secure application]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a8751c1e2c121c425f35e02e25053c89</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a8751c1e2c121c425f35e02e25053c89</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Developers have the objective of building a functional application. They are focused on building more functionality into applications. Moreover, building security creates more workload for Developers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P><IMG style="WIDTH: 434px; HEIGHT: 369px" height=404 src="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/developer.bmp" width=604></P>
<P>Developers have the objective of building a functional application. They are focused on building more functionality&nbsp;into applications. Moreover, building security creates more workload&nbsp; for Developers which is a disincentive and moreover,&nbsp;Developers are&nbsp;rewarded for building more functionality than building more security. I have never seen a Developer in my professional life for being rewarded for building a secure application.</P>
<P>Hackers are focused on how to break the application. They look for weak links in application that will enable them to access application data. Developers usually follow process to build application, but Hackers have no process and all they have is multitude of possibilities.&nbsp;Hackers are innovative in trying various permutations in compromising the application. </P>
<P>A million dollar&nbsp;question is whether we can&nbsp;build secure applications when a Developer&nbsp;is focused on functionality&nbsp;but not on breaking the application?</P>
<P>There is a school of thought about Inside-out security where the application is built securely from scratch. Unfortunately,&nbsp; this approach won't suffice because hackers traverse Outside-in. A little reflection will&nbsp;highlight the importance of&nbsp;vulnerability scanning and&nbsp;penetration testing of application. This will bring the perspective of what developers do not know already.</P>
<P>Building a secure application inside out is not enough. In order to address unknown unknowns (or blind spots of developers), penetration testing should be done.&nbsp;Both whitebox style penetration testing (where components of an application is known)&nbsp; and also blackbox style penetration&nbsp;testing which mi micks an Hacker who may not have any knowledge of the application, should be carried out.</P>
<P><EM><STRONG>An application of higher level of security is not built just by Developers. It is&nbsp;built by integrative&nbsp;process&nbsp;of Developer&nbsp;mindset&nbsp;and Hacker mindset.&nbsp;&nbsp;This is a constant struggle for years to come.<BR>&nbsp;</STRONG></EM></P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 02:35:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application">application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure application">secure application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/functional application">functional application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure application inside">secure application inside</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access application data">access application data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/penetration">penetration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/whitebox style penetration">whitebox style penetration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/developers">developers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hackers traverse outside-in">hackers traverse outside-in</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/10/2/3912084.html">Building secure application</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CEP, Politics, and Decision Making]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4e349d27b47bdef874454b93f7a7a6b2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4e349d27b47bdef874454b93f7a7a6b2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I have changed my mind about injecting presidential politics into The CEP Blog. I thought about linking complex events and politics into a discussion on complex events and the decision making process...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have changed my mind about injecting presidential politics into The CEP Blog.  I thought about linking complex events and politics into a discussion on complex events and the decision making process.</p>
<p>However, this approach risks alienating folks who take their politics serious or have other concerns.   For that reason,  I am going to go another, less political, direction on The CEP Blog.  I will not blog on the US presidential election here.</p>
<p>In my next series of  blog posts I will discuss how asymmetric event processing and asymmetric situational awareness was the genesis for complex event processing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 05:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/politics">politics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep blog">cep blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex events">complex events</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential politics">presidential politics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog posts">blog posts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/asymmetric situational awareness">asymmetric situational awareness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential election">presidential election</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/29/cep-politics-and-decision-making/">CEP, Politics, and Decision Making</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Of Planes and Ships]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/47dfbf92b3eaba317f07cfa2064d0a9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/47dfbf92b3eaba317f07cfa2064d0a9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Tom Barnett is consistently the most interesting writer on globalization and econo-security seam. This weeks piece confronts a problem every security architect can relate to (emphasis added on the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/09/column_121.html">Tom Barnett</a> is consistently the most interesting writer on globalization and econo-security seam. This weeks piece confronts a problem every security architect can relate to (emphasis added on the &quot;nail it to the wall&quot; quote at the end):</p><p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">One of the main problems in counterterrorism today is that there are so many people and vehicles, and so much data and material, moving through globalization&#39;s myriad networks that it seems virtually impossible to track it all effectively. Nowhere has this problem been more acute than on the high seas.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">In 2006, Adm. Harry Ulrich, then U.S. commander of NATO Naval Forces Europe, decided to do something about it. Despite having virtually no resources, his dream was to transpose the global air-traffic control system onto sea traffic.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Worldwide, aircraft are transparent, because they&#39;re all required to carry an identification beacon that allows them to be tracked leaving and entering airports, and monitored between airports, by a global network of sensors. Act suspiciously and somebody&#39;s fighter aircraft will soon be on your tail.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">No such pervasive system currently exists globally for maritime traffic. While bigger ships carry an ID beacon similar to aircraft, without a shared monitoring network, that&#39;s like tracking only selected commercial jets and giving everyone else a pass.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">So Ulrich, upon taking command, asked a simple question: &quot;If we can do that in the air, why can&#39;t we do it on the sea?&quot; He made a point of pioneering his sea-traffic-control effort first inside the Mediterranean, where NATO&#39;s southern naval forces have historically been concentrated, but his real target was waters off Africa -- the most ungoverned maritime space in the world.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Ulrich knew the U. S. Navy couldn&#39;t do it alone, much less bring Africa&#39;s meager coast-guard-like navies up to snuff so they could do it on their own. So he quickly created a network of assets -- both public and private -- to manage that space, modeling his monitoring system on international air-traffic control.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Ulrich began stitching together a network of shore-based sensors ringing the Mediterranean. His naval command then began initial monitoring by tapping into the International Maritime Organization&#39;s existing Automated Identification System, transforming NATO&#39;s ability to track ship traffic in the Med.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Almost overnight, NATO went from tracking dozens of ships on the Mediterranean to thousands, and instead of getting the data sometimes up to 72 hours late, now the contacts were being tracked in one to five minutes -- to an accuracy within 50 feet on the earth&#39;s surface.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">When the classic big-firm systems integrators told Ulrich it would be too costly to pull it off, the admiral turned to the Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a U.S. Department of Transportation research center. Instead of hundreds of millions of dollars, Ulrich&#39;s initial network cost $900,000. The shore-based receivers are small, roughly the size of a radar dish you might find on a pleasure craft.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The strength of the system is a function of its reach: the more countries join, the larger the shared operational picture. By the time Ulrich retired at the end of 2007, he had enlisted 32 countries throughout the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, along the west coast of Africa, around the Black Sea, and in the Pacific. Today, the network continues to spread around the planet.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 14px; line-height: 20px; "><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">With Ulrich&#39;s system in place, local police, coast guards, and border patrols catch most bad guys, obviating American military responses. As Harry told me for an article I wrote about his work in a fall 2007 issue of Esquire, </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&quot;I don&#39;t do defense; I do security. When you talk defense, you talk containment and mutually assured destruction. When you talk security, you talk collaboration and networking. This is the future.&quot;</span></span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The admiral&#39;s legacy program, the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, earned the Volpe Center a prestigious &quot;Innovations in American Government&quot; award this month from Harvard University&#39;s Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Security Collaboration + Networking &#160;= Federation. This is indeed the future - SAML came along just at the nick of time.</span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">When you assume that to do access control you must have &quot;Complete Mediation&quot; in Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s terms of the subject (users), the objects (data), the session, and the roles, then you are going to have an interesting life trying to deliver anything. And if you do it will mucho expensive.</span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">if you take the federated autonomous nodes approach, agree upon an attribute schema plus a protection model for same, and basic protocol, you are then free to move about the country. Security doesn&#39;t have to equal centralization or high cost. Get the attributes from point a to point b securely.</span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2008 19:04:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architect">security architect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identification system">identification system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial network cost">initial network cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial">initial</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cost">cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ulrich">ulrich</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time ulrich">time ulrich</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/of-planes-and-ships.html">Of Planes and Ships</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Misc notes on IDS/IPS]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d23f73e48c5a2e245c3eb52d268fa971</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d23f73e48c5a2e245c3eb52d268fa971</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Chris Hoff's response on his blog Rational Survivability makes me happy on two fronts. The primary reason I started this blog was to use this medium as an outlet for my ungrounded ego. The other was...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>Chris Hoff's response on his blog <A href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/">Rational Survivability</A> makes me happy on&nbsp;two fronts. The primary reason I started this blog was to use this medium as an outlet for my ungrounded ego. The other&nbsp;was&nbsp;to participate in the Security Blogging community which was then catching up when I started&nbsp; this blog 2 years ago. To get a response for my musings from&nbsp;brilliant minds&nbsp;such as Mike Rothman, Alan Shimel, Chris&nbsp;Hoff and others,&nbsp;gives me immense joy. May be this a good therapy for my undiagnosed attention deficit.</P>
<P>It does not matter if Chris is right or I am right. The outcome of IDS/IPS&nbsp;is all determined by random drift of market forces. There is no conspiracy&nbsp;to make IDS/IPS this way or that way.&nbsp;I would like to wrap up with a quote from Arthur Chandler : "We can tell when a technology has truly arrived when the new problems it gives rise&nbsp; to approach in magnitude the problem it was designed to solve".</P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2008 16:11:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris hoff">chris hoff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog rational survivability">blog rational survivability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chris">chris</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arthur chandler">arthur chandler</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market forces">market forces</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/random drift">random drift</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/immense joy">immense joy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mike rothman">mike rothman</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/9/28/3905240.html">Misc notes on IDS/IPS</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SDL Sessions at BlueHat]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bddb4f5b0c8437f73140811dafbc6401</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bddb4f5b0c8437f73140811dafbc6401</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Bryan here. Last January, I wrote a post on this blog bemoaning the difficulty of making security interesting and sexy to developers. Applied research conferences generally place a much greater...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Bryan here. Last January, I wrote a post on this blog bemoaning the difficulty of making security interesting and “</FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/01/29/sexy-development-lifecycle.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>sexy</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3>” to developers. Applied research conferences generally place a much greater emphasis on revealing new vulnerabilities and new attack techniques, and much less emphasis on educating people on how to actually fix those vulnerabilities. I was at </FONT><A href="http://www.rsaconference.com/"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>RSA Conference</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> last April, and I attended a session by a very well-regarded, high-profile security researcher. He gave an eloquent and educational presentation on the dangers of a significant new attack vector, but all the prescriptive guidance he gave for dealing with the threat amounted to something like, “If you’re worried about this kind of thing, talk to your browser manufacturer.” No offense to this presenter, but if I’m going to listen to 70 minutes of discussion of a dangerous threat, I want to leave the room with a clear understanding of what I can do to solve the problem! It’s not enough just to know that the problem exists.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>So, in conjunction with the </FONT><A href="http://blogs.technet.com/bluehat/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>BlueHat</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> team, I am pleased to announce that the SDL team will be organizing the sessions for the second day of the fall BlueHat conference. The BlueHat SDL sessions will be laser-focused on not just describing vulnerabilities but also solving them. Every attendee should leave every presentation with a clear idea of exactly what he or she needs to do to protect themselves from the threat that was discussed during the session.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>The sessions will begin, appropriately, with the topic of secure design. Danny Dhillon of </FONT><A href="http://www.emc.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>EMC</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> and the SDL team’s own Adam Shostack will each present their organization’s approach to threat modeling. As a bonus, Adam will also be demonstrating the new </FONT><A href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/1/5/0/150636A9-9EA8-4D00-9E6B-2723F4C188B4/Microsoft%20SDL%20Threat%20Modeling%20Tool%203.0.pdf"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>SDL Threat Modeling tool</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> that you might have heard about </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>last week</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Next up is Matt Miller, a recent and very welcome </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2008/08/18/matt-miller-joins-the-security-science-team.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>addition</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> to the Microsoft Security Science team. Matt has a fantastic presentation on the evolution of buffer overflow attacks and on the corresponding development of overflow mitigations. From there we will switch gears to look at some managed code implementation issues: </FONT><A href="http://www.isecpartners.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>iSEC Partners</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>’ Scott Stender and Alex Vidergar will demonstrate coding techniques to mitigate elusive concurrency vulnerabilities in web applications.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>At this point we will have covered the Design and Implementation phases of the SDL; where better to go from here than Verification? One of the most important activities in the Verification phase is fuzzing, and we have a trio of security experts from the Microsoft Security Science team to talk about it. Jason Shirk, Lars Opstad, and Dave Weinstein will answer three of the most common fuzzing questions: How should I fuzz? When have I fuzzed enough? And what do I do now that I’ve fuzzed? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Finally, we will wrap up the Verification phase talks with a return appearance to BlueHat by </FONT><A href="http://www.stachliu.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Stach &amp; Liu</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>’s Vinnie Liu. Vinnie will compare different approaches to security verification – static code analysis, blackbox analysis, and manual code review – and make recommendations as to when each approach is best used.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Even if you can’t make it in to BlueHat in person, you can still watch the sessions via streaming media on </FONT><A href="http://technet.microsoft.com/"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>TechNet</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3>. Additionally, webcast interviews with the speakers – condensed “Cliff’s Notes” versions of their full presentations – will be posted on </FONT><A href="http://channel9.msdn.com/Search/Default.aspx?Term=bluehat"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>Channel 9</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>. And we’ll be continuing the BlueHat tradition of inviting speakers and other industry notables to guest blog about their topics and the latest security trends. More information on all of these resources will be posted here when it becomes available.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8965212" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 12:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl">sdl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat">bluehat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sessions">sessions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl team">sdl team</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl threat">sdl threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat sdl sessions">bluehat sdl sessions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat conference">bluehat conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verification phase talks">verification phase talks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verification phase">verification phase</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/25/sdl-sessions-at-bluehat.aspx">SDL Sessions at BlueHat</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[John Zanni Delivers Keynote at the Tier1 Hosting Transformation Summit]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e6b5db3dba618f48e7fa728ff2173006</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e6b5db3dba618f48e7fa728ff2173006</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As General Manager of Worldwide Hosting, John Zanni is a key guy for every Managed Service Provider delivering Microsoft based solutions. At this years Hosting Transformation Summit , John gave a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="244" alt="spla_image" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/spla-image.png" width="244" align="left" border="0"> As General Manager of Worldwide Hosting, <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/jul08/07-29qazanni.mspx" target="_blank">John Zanni is a key guy for every Managed Service Provider</a> delivering Microsoft based solutions. At this year&#8217;s <a href="http://www.hostingtransformation.com/na/2008/" target="_blank">Hosting Transformation Summit</a>, John <a href="http://www.hostingtransformation.com/na/2008/agenda.php" target="_blank">gave a keynote</a> titled: &#8220;Leadership Perspective: Cloud Computing – is Virtualization Enough?&#8221;</p>
<p>John talked <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=10007" target="_blank">about Microsoft’s mission</a>, his perspectives on key industry trends and market opportunity; he touched on <a href="http://www.betanews.com/article/Will_Microsofts_virtualization_spur_a_lot_more_cloud_computing/1221867502" target="_blank">Cloud Computing and Virtualization</a> and took some Q&amp;A from the audience of <a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/serviceproviders/default.aspx" target="_blank">Managed Service Provider</a> executives.</p>
<p>One of his first proclamations - Microsoft has really embraced the heterogeneous environment. Really? How in the world is Microsoft going to help convince IT line managers, or mid level managers to believe this statement? I think they have a long way to go to achieve this vision with any credibility in the marketplace.&nbsp; I do know that they are making small strides.</p>
<p>Microsoft has been widely credited with some very good blogs that are self critical and introspective. They have also been quite active in the standards boards within <a href="http://www.dmtf.org/home" target="_blank">DMTF</a> and many others such as <a href="http://www.openwsman.org/" target="_blank">Open WSMAN</a> and CIMON (<a href="http://www.openpegasus.org/" target="_blank">Open Pegasus</a>). Microsoft in February published 30,000 pages detailed technical specifications – protocol documentation for Exchange, since that time they have published another 15,000 pages. They have had over 224,000 downloads since February 21, 2008. Thus they are trying to be more open by making some of these <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/default.mspx" target="_blank">secret sauce protocol resources</a> <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/openprotocols" target="_blank">directly available on the web</a>.</p>
<p>So for now, I will take a very cautious wait and see approach to this proclamation. Time will tell.</p>
<p><strong>Trends</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Rapid growth continues
<li>Hosting Competition has a new face
<ul>
<li>Platform gorillas (amazooglesoft)
<li>Ad supported Web 2.0 hosters (Google, Facebook,) </li>
</ul>
<li>Utility Cloud Computing models are expanding to non-traditional hosting companies
<ul>
<li>Wells Fargo vSafe - hard to believe that a big bank would start to offer a SaaS offering
<li>New tools and markets digital ribbon, CohesiveIT </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="http://mshostingsummit08.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4308FE7290C0AF4!245.entry" target="_blank">IDC Data shows that growth of SaaS ISV’s is the biggest layer of growth</a>. The fastest growing services are complex, custom applications. IDC says this area will be bigger than the hosting area in the next 5 years. John said that <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/ukisv/archive/2008/09/22/the-route-to-saas-and-beyond-final-seminar-places-remain-2nd-oct-08.aspx" target="_blank">Microsoft is spending a lot of time, money and energy on this right now</a>.</p>
<p>John said:</p>
<blockquote><p>“when Microsoft thinks about the building blocks that make-up the cloud, <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/virtualization/" target="_blank">virtualization is a core piece</a> of the puzzle. However you also need also identity services, Operating system with standard set of libraries to tap into… or remote storage that application developers will tap into.. Developers will consume these set of services, but you will also need a set of tools to manage your physical, virtual and geographically distributed datacenter infrastructure.” (that is where ScienceLogic comes in!!)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He went on to say,</p>
<blockquote><p>“In some ways, virtualization enables decentralization – allows you to move from data centers, enables fast scaling out, business to move from on premise to the cloud and off again…. Automation is very important – this will help you scale your business – this is core to your future success.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He talked about a new breed of knowledge worker: He called them Digital Natives (compared to grey haired guys like me who are left out of this category).</p>
<p>Definition of a Digital natives? A young adult who has grown up with cellphone, web based applications, Facebook account, as their primary mode of communications.</p>
<p>John commented that we are 5 years into a 10 year journey. Only 12% of all servers in the world are virtualized today… in the next 4 years it will double to 25%. This is <a href="http://www.interopnews.com/news/vmware-ceo-maritz-addresses-virtualization-the-cloud-and-cha.html" target="_blank">the time to think through</a> how this business will affect you.</p>
<blockquote><p>‘Virtualization without good management is more dangerous than not using virtualization in the first place.” Thomas Bittman, Analyst Gartner</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Patching and provisioning nightmare – no scalable administration – sprawl chaos.</p>
<p>John posed a question to the audience: How do you partner to provide the ISV support in application development with specific market needs… partner by keeping the <a href="http://tarrysingh.blogspot.com/2008/09/microsofts-coo-on-cloud-computing.html" target="_blank">hosting to SaaS solution</a> providers up and running and provide the quality of service that their customers expect…. Complimentary services of storage and backup is a big win with a huge market-upside over the next 5 years..</p>
<p>John said that <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/mhpta/archive/2008/04/10/microsoft-hosting-summit-2008.aspx" target="_blank">Microsoft continues</a> to make&nbsp; <a href="http://www.virtualization.info/2008/07/microsoft-bets-on-hosting-providers-to.html" target="_blank">huge investments with Managed Service Providers</a>.</p>
<ul>
<li>Investing in the <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/hosting/" target="_blank">windows hosting platform</a>
<li>Hyper V and SQL2008 GoLive program - getting beta code out to service provides to find as many bugs as early as possible.
<li><a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/stevecla01/archive/2008/09/22/explaining-software-plus-services.aspx" target="_blank">Software + Services (S+S)</a> incubation center program
<li>Partnering for <a href="http://tarrysingh.blogspot.com/2008/09/microsofts-coo-on-cloud-computing.html" target="_blank">cloud platform market offers</a>
<li>Cloud platform guidance and best practices </li>
</ul>
<p>During the Q&amp;A, David Burns from Cincinnati Bell asked the very best question… “when are you going to make it easier for the Service Provider market to <a href="http://www.virtualization.info/2008/09/microsoft-to-allow-3rd-parties-to.html" target="_blank">deal with the Microsoft Service Provider Licensing Agreement (SPLA)</a> quarterly statistics pull and change the SPLA pricing to be more efficient and creative for the new Virtualization and Cloud offerings you have talked about?&#8221;</p>
<p>John’s response: “We hear your frustrations loud and clear and are working on some new ideas for the future version of SPLA.” My interpretation – &#8220;Dear Service Providers don’t expect anything new or easier to deal with in the next 6 months!&#8221;</p>
<p>His closing remarks: &#8220;Cloud is evolving = very early stages, lots of hype, but think of how this evolution will effect your business and how you can plug into it.”</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 12:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider market">service provider market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider executives">service provider executives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/john">john</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/john zanni">john zanni</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft based solutions">microsoft based solutions</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/john-zanni-delivers-keynote-at-the-tier1-hosting-transformation-summit/09/2008">John Zanni Delivers Keynote at the Tier1 Hosting Transformation Summit</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Complex Event Processing Approach for Strategic Intelligence]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4e21d0747b810dd832ec39a6f7f8bf1a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4e21d0747b810dd832ec39a6f7f8bf1a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[FUSION 2006 Technical Program , Paper Number: 200 , Tuesday, 11 July 2006
Special Session: Situation Management I
Paper: Complex Event Processing approach for strategic intelligence
Authors: Nicolas...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://fusion.carthel.com/technical_program/" target="_blank">FUSION 2006 Technical Program</a>, <a href="http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/fusion/FOI-R--2252--SE.pdf" target="_blank">Paper Number: 200</a>, Tuesday, 11 July 2006</p>
<p>Special Session: Situation Management I</p>
<p>Paper: Complex Event Processing approach for strategic intelligence</p>
<p>Authors: Nicolas Museux, Juliette Mattioli, Claire Laudy and Helene Soubaras</p>
<p>Abstract: One of the key issues of strategic intelligence within a crisis situation is to build an early assessment of the situation, based on a context sensitive information interpretation and through a well constructed situation representation. Our proposal is based on the conjunction of a conceptual modelling to represent situations out of document analysis and a reactive rule-based modelling to analyse them according to a domain knowledge and a goal. This paper focuses on this Situation Analysis process. But we present our global approach and sum-up the Situation Representation and its objectives. We introduce the Complex Event Processing formalism used for the analysis and dynamic recognition of such situations. We illustrate our approach through a case study taken from what happened during the energy crisis in California in 2001.</p>
<p>Presenter Biography: Dr. Nicolas Museux is a research scientist in the PLATON lab, at THALES Research and Technology. He had his engineering diploma in computer science in 1998. Then he started his Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics, Computer Science Systems and Control at the Computer Science Center of e&#8217;Ecole des Mines de Paris, and THALES Research and Technology. His Ph.D. focused on the application of constraint programming in distributing low-level digital signal processing programs onto multiprocessors architectures, to optimize data management and computing duration. After he obtained his Ph.D. in 2001, he worked until the end of 2004 on several projects in the PLATON lab linked with combinatorial optimization. Since 2005, Dr. Nicolas MUSEUX works on the Situation understanding research program. Its objectives are to identify, to specify and to design tools for situation model based reasoning in order to address situation analysis, risk assessment and situation projection.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 21 Sep 2008 01:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situation management">situation management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situation">situation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situation projection">situation projection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crisis situation">crisis situation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situation representation">situation representation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/situation analysis process">situation analysis process</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/address situation analysis">address situation analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analysis">analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/strategic intelligence">strategic intelligence</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/21/complex-event-processing-approach-for-strategic-intelligence/">Complex Event Processing Approach for Strategic Intelligence</source>
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