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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: automatic]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/automatic</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2008 09:37:13 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/215d1f3ffdea93e64224f10dcdb310d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/215d1f3ffdea93e64224f10dcdb310d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just when you think that email harvesting matured into user names harvesting in a true Web 2.0 style with the recently uncovered harvested IM screen names , and Youtube user lists for spammers,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLPj-Z2aPhI/AAAAAAAACHM/KxPZ6rpqjZs/s1600-h/email_harvesting_20.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLPj-Z2aPhI/AAAAAAAACHM/To_TE0L7esg/s200-R/email_harvesting_20.jpg" /></a>Just <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/09/email-spam-harvesting-statistics.html">when you</a> think that <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/01/inside-email-harvesters-configuration.html">email harvesting</a> matured into user names harvesting in a true Web 2.0 style with the recently uncovered harvested <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/thousands-of-im-screen-names-in-wild.html">IM screen names</a>, and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/harvesting-youtube-usernames-for.html">Youtube user lists</a> for spammers, phishers and malware authors to take advantage of, someone has filled in the gap that's been around as long as email harvesting has been a daily routine for spammers - dealing with text obfuscations which still remain highly popular online, once it became evident that spammers are in fact crawling for default mailto lines. This email harvesting module can be run a separate script, or get integrated as a module within any botnet, is capable of harvesting the following text obfuscations often used in order to prevent spamming crawlers : <br />
<br />
<b>mail@gmail.com <br />
mail[at]gmail.com <br />
mail[at]gmail[dot]com <br />
mail [space]gmail [space]com <br />
mail(@)gmail.com <br />
mail(a)gmail.com<br />
mail AT gmail DOT com</b><br />
<br />
The overall availability and easy of obtaining a huge percentage of valid email addresses within an organizaton, is not just resulting in the increasing <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/segmenting-and-localizing-spam.html">segmentation and localization of spam, phishing and malware campaigns</a>, it's increasing the profit margins for the spamming providers which is now not just <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample.html">offering verified to be 100% valid email addresses</a>, but also, can providing the foundations for spear phishing and targeted attacks.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Quality assurance in spaming</a> is still in its introduction phrase, with customers starting to put the emphasis on the number of emails that actually made it through the spam filters, than the number of emails sent as <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">a benchmark for increasing the probability of bypassing anti spam filters</a>. Taking into consideration the big picture, sniffing for email addresses streaming out of malware infected hosts, and stealing huge email databases by exploiting vulnerable online communities, seems to be the tactics of choice for the majority of individuals whose responsibility is to continuously provide fresh and valid email addresses.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2rXjAK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2rXjAK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=nGHWgK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=nGHWgK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BC4Y6k"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BC4Y6k" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=N6ZPDk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=N6ZPDk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Pklg3K"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Pklg3K" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=TfpIxK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=TfpIxK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iTLEzk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iTLEzk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/375213353" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Aug 2008 04:01:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email addresses">email addresses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/valid email addresses">valid email addresses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam filters">spam filters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/huge email databases">huge email databases</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti spam filters">anti spam filters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail spacegmail spacecom">mail spacegmail spacecom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail">mail</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/375213353/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Houston-Fi, ASCII WPA Passphrases, Green Wi-Fi]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7f30d96346f66d41619e4abd9bae8e7d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7f30d96346f66d41619e4abd9bae8e7d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Houston flips switch on free downtown Wi-Fi: Dwight Silverman of the Houston Chronicle accidentally discovers the soft launch of the network funded by EarthLink's $5m default fee. (The fee was paid...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/weefi.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://blogs.chron.com/techblog/archives/2008/08/it_lives_city_of_houston_turns_on_free_downto.html"><strong>Houston flips switch on free downtown Wi-Fi:</strong></a> Dwight Silverman of the Houston Chronicle accidentally discovers the soft launch of the network funded by EarthLink's $5m default fee. (The fee was paid when they missed a milestone, and the firm later walked away.) The downtown area now has a limited pilot project that's free; the real effort in Houston is supposed to be at 10 housing projects and in parks where service would be used to bridge the digital divide and improve the quality of life. How, exactly, is part of what's being tested.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/08/18/MNH312BTS1.DTL&hw=wi+fi&sn=004&sc=589"><strong>That's ASCII, not hex:</strong></a> An article on wardriving raises security hackles by repeating some slightly overheated statements about Wi-Fi security. The article opens with a 63-character ASCII WPA passphrase, which is later described as "hex." (ASCII passphrases in WPA can be up to 63 "printable" characters - ASCII 32 to 127 - while a hex version of a 256-bit TKIP or AES password is 64 hexadecimal digits long.) The article tries to conflate Wi-Fi attacks that led to the largest set of breaches in retail credit-card systems and wardriving, a hobbyist activity that's never been looked on very favorably by law enforcement. The sense of ennui of wardriving pioneers is pretty clear; when Wi-Fi is everywhere and generally secured, it's far less interesting. The wardriver in the article convinced the reporter that a maximum-length WPA passphrase stored on a USB drive for automatic use was the best way to go. But, really, 20 characters containing letters and punctuation and no words found in a dictionary along with changing your network's SSID (network name) provides all the security you'll ever need for a home or small business. (If you need more, deploy WPA/WPA2 Personal.)</p>

<p><a href="http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/08/16/BUA712BH1O.DTL&hw=wi+fi&sn=001&sc=1000"><strong>Green Wi-Fi's Senegal efforts hit snags:</strong></a> The folks at Green Wi-Fi are well motivated, and they're running up against all forms of security theater and bureaucracy both here and in Senegal, where they have an active project. The San Francisco Chronicle notes the group's effort to build solar-powered, self-sustaining Internet access via mesh networked nodes. Getting devices out of the country, clearing customs in Senegal, and hooking up their solar system all hit problems they're working through. As with the One Laptop Per Child program, I see a "build it and they will come" mentality in <a href="http://www.green-wifi.org/"><strong>Green Wi-Fi's mission statement</strong></a>: the notion that providing computing power and Internet access will result in good things, rather than an effort to figure out what good things need to be achieved, and whether computers and the Internet will assist. </p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2008 06:26:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi">wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi attacks">wi-fi attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/houston">houston</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi security">wi-fi security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free downtown wi-fi">free downtown wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ascii">ascii</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security theater">security theater</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008423.html">Wee-Fi: Houston-Fi, ASCII WPA Passphrases, Green Wi-Fi</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/df22299b279b6326bc0fb82a62ea61b9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/df22299b279b6326bc0fb82a62ea61b9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The tactic of abusing web servers whose vulnerable web applications allow a malicious attacker to locally host a malicious campaign is nothing new. In fact, malicious attackers have been building so...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiClCFucVI/AAAAAAAAB_0/SSFpGnP3wvA/s1600-h/fake_flash1.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiClCFucVI/AAAAAAAAB_0/qKqvrWeAN3s/s200-R/fake_flash1.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The tactic of abusing web servers whose vulnerable web applications allow a malicious attacker to locally host a malicious campaign is nothing new. In fact, malicious attackers have been building so much confidence in this risk-forwarding process of hosting their campaigns, that they would start actively spamming the links residing within low-profile legitimate sites across the web.<br />
<br />
This campaign serving fake flash players is getting so prevalent these days due to the multiple spamming approaches used, that it's hard not to notice it - and expose it. From a strategic perspective, having a legitimate low-profile site -- of course with the obvious exceptions being on purposely registered for malicious purposes within the participating sites -- hosting your malicious campaign is pretty creative in terms of forwarding the responsibility, and the eventual blocking of a legitimate site to the its owner. As far as the owner's are concerned, it appears that some of them are already seeing the malware page popping-up on the top of their daily traffic stats, and have taken measures to remove it.<br />
<br />
Moreover, <a href="http://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/2008/08/verifying_installers.html">Adobe's Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) issued a warning notice about the attack yesterday</a>, which could come handy if the <a href="http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/08/05/Adobe_warns_of_bogus_Flash_Player_installers_1.html">attackers weren't taking advantage of client-side vulnerabilities</a>, putting the unware end user is a situation where he <a href="http://blogs.stopbadware.org/articles/2008/08/05/same-dogs-new-tricks">wouldn't even receive a download dialog</a> :<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiP_0v81lI/AAAAAAAACAM/LuFjz3rFLAc/s1600-h/fake_flash3_exploit.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiP_0v81lI/AAAAAAAACAM/GXwA3Ai1LLY/s200-R/fake_flash3_exploit.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>"<i>We have seen coverage from the security community of a worm on popular social networking sites that is using social engineering lures to get users to install a piece of malware. According to the reports, the worm posts comments on these sites that include links to a fake site. If the link is followed, users are told they need to update their Flash Player. The installer, posted on a malicious site, of course installs malware instead of Flash Player.We’d like to take this opportunity to reiterate the importance of validating installers and updates before installing them. First off, do not download Flash Player from a site other than adobe.com – you can find the link for downloading Flash Player here. This goes for any piece of software (Reader, Windows Media Player, Quicktime, etc.) – if you get a notice to update, it’s not a bad idea to go directly to the site of the software vendor and download the update directly from the source. If the download is from an unfamiliar URL or an IP address, you should be suspicious.</i>"<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiGkBrMqII/AAAAAAAAB_8/6PfKZxTNQao/s1600-h/fake_flash2.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiGkBrMqII/AAAAAAAAB_8/ADBheDs2hkk/s200-R/fake_flash2.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The structure of the malware campaign is pretty static, with several exceptions where they also take advange of client-side vulnerabilities (Real player exploit) attempting to automatically deliver the fake flash update or player depending on the campaign. On each and every site, there are <b>dnd.js</b> and <b>master.js</b> scripts shich serve the rogue download window, and another .html file, where an IFRAME attempts to access the traffic management command and control, in a random URL it was <b>207.10.234.217/cgi-bin/index.cgi?user200</b>. A sample list of participating URLs, most of which are still active and running :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"><b>joseantoniobaltanas .com</b></div><b>automoviliaria .es/hotnews.html<br />
risasnc .it/fresh.html<br />
carpe-diem .com.mx/fresh.html<br />
kotilogullari .com.tr/hotnews.html<br />
ferrariclubpesaro .it/hotnews.html<br />
imobiliariacom .com.br/default.html<br />
misoares .com<br />
osniehus .de/fresh.html<br />
mydirecttube .com/1/5098/<br />
madosma .com/default.html<br />
tutotic .com/checkit.html<br />
veit-team .si/default.html<br />
antigewaltkurse .de/stream.html<br />
kwhgs .ca/topnews.html<br />
vorgo .com/stream.html<br />
ankaraspor .com.tr/default.html<br />
xxxdnn0314 .locaweb.com.br/watchit.html<br />
ossuzio .com/watchit.html<br />
cit-inc .net/default.html<br />
negocioindependiente .biz/default.html<br />
ambermarketing .com/topnews.html<br />
web27 .login-7.loginserver.ch/stream.html<br />
moretewebdesign .br-web.com/stream.html<br />
omdconsulting .es/topnews.html<br />
parapendiolestreghe .it/hotnews.html<br />
campodifiori .it/topnews.html<br />
212.50.55.81 /stream.html<br />
logisigns .net/fresh.html<br />
intimaescorts .com/default.html<br />
ghioautotre .it/live.html<br />
geckert .de/stream.html<br />
yuricardinali .com/watchit.html<br />
retder .com/fresh.html<br />
valdaran .es/default.html<br />
getadultaccess .com/movie/?aff=5274<br />
bauelemente-giering .de/stream.html<br />
newyork-hebergement .com/watchit.html<br />
allevatoritrotto .it/live.html<br />
exoss2 .com/hotnews.html<br />
soundandlightkaraoke .com/stream.html<br />
land-kan .com/stream.html<br />
grimaldi.nexenservices .com/watchit.html<br />
inconstancia .com.br/watchit.html <br />
gretelstudio .com/stream.html<br />
sumacyl .com/watchit.html<br />
mysna .net/fresh.html<br />
gimnasioyx .com.ar/watchit.html<br />
lagalbana .com/watchit.html<br />
bielizna.tgory .pl/topnews.html<br />
bcs92.imingo .net/stream.html<br />
lapiramidecoslada .es/topnews.html<br />
raulortega .com/stream.html<br />
go-art-morelli .de/hotnews.html<br />
wowhard.baewha .ac.kr/watchit.html<br />
dianagraf .es/default.html<br />
komma10-thueringen .de/hotnews.html<br />
miavassilev .com/stream.html<br />
swampgiants .com/watchit.html<br />
compagniedephalsbourg .com/fresh.html<br />
arla-rc .net/hotnews.html<br />
salacopernico .es/watchit.html<br />
drfinster .de/checkit.html<br />
healthylifehypnotherapy .com/stream.html<br />
ecotrike-bg .com/fresh.html<br />
paoepalavra .org/watchit.html<br />
jureplaninc-sp .com/topnews.html<br />
fichte-lintfort .de/default.html<br />
hergert-band .de/checkit.html<br />
izliyorum .org/topnews.html<br />
lideka .com/stream.html<br />
athena-digitaldesign .com.tw/hotnews.html<br />
e-paso .pl/stream.html<br />
colombeblanche .org/stream.html<br />
teatromalasa .es/watchit.html<br />
mesporte.digiweb.com .br/stream.html<br />
bistrodavila.com .br/watchit.html<br />
hausfeld-solar .de/topnews.html<br />
nakedinbed.co .uk/topnews.html<br />
csr.imb .br/stream.html<br />
herion-architekten .de/default.html<br />
jbhumet .com/default.html<br />
gruppouni .com/hotnews.html<br />
francex .net/fresh.html<br />
galvatoledo .com/topnews.html<br />
cmeedilizia .eu/topnews.html<br />
kroenert .name/default.html<br />
textilhogarnovadecor .com/topnews.html<br />
keithcrook .com/stream.html<br />
elpatiodejesusmaria .com/checkit.html<br />
neticon .pl/hotnews.html<br />
malerbetrieb-pelzer .de/hotnews.html<br />
easterstreet .de/fresh.html<br />
piogiovannini .com.ar/watchit.html<br />
ser-all .com/topnews.html<br />
petzold-dieter .de/checkit.html<br />
beatmung-brandenburg .de/checkit.html<br />
ossuzio .com/watchit.html<br />
teatromalasa .es/watchit.html<br />
vuelosultimahora .com/topnews.html<br />
zelenaratolest .cz/pornotube/index1.htm<br />
ambulatoriovirtuale .it/topnews.html<br />
10a3 .ru/index1.php<br />
izliyorum .org/topnews.html<br />
collectedthoughts .co.uk/index12.html<br />
afg .es/topnews.html<br />
albertruiz .net/topnews.html<br />
bielizna.tgory .pl/topnews.html<br />
blueseven.com .br/topnews.html<br />
bollettinogiuridicosanitario .it/topnews.html<br />
caprilchamonix.com .br/topnews.html<br />
carlolongarini .it/topnews.html<br />
champimousse .com/topnews.html<br />
cheviot.org .nz/topnews.html<br />
contrapie .com/topnews.html<br />
gruppouni .com/topnews.html<br />
hausfeld-solar .de/topnews.html<br />
herbatele .com/topnews.html<br />
houseincostaricaforsale .com/topnews.html<br />
alim.co .il/topnews.html<br />
allevatoritrotto .it/topnews.html<br />
amafe .org/topnews.html<br />
ambulatoriovirtuale .it/topnews.html<br />
atelier-de-loulou .fr/topnews.html<br />
automoviliaria .es/topnews.html<br />
autoreserve .fr/topnews.html<br />
izliyorum .org/topnews.html<br />
jureplaninc-sp .com/topnews.html<br />
kwhgs .ca/topnews.html<br />
lapiramidecoslada .es/topnews.html<br />
last-minute-reisen-4u .de/topnews.html<br />
marcadina .fr/topnews.html<br />
maremax .it/topnews.html<br />
corradiproject .info/topnews.html<br />
dantealighieriasturias .es/topnews.html<br />
deliriuslaspalmas .com/topnews.html<br />
ecchoppers .co.za/topnews.html<br />
elianacaminada .net/topnews.html<br />
fonavistas .com/topnews.html<br />
fraemma .com/topnews.html<br />
fundmyira .com/topnews.html<br />
galvatoledo .com/topnews.html<br />
grafisch-ontwerpburo .nl/topnews.html<br />
markmaverick .com/topnews.html<br />
micela .info/topnews.html<br />
motoclubnosvamos .com/topnews.html<br />
nebottorrella .com/topnews.html<br />
negozistore .it/topnews.html<br />
neticon .pl/topnews.html<br />
norbert-leifheit.gmxhome .de/topnews.html<br />
segelclub-honau .de/topnews.html<br />
snmobilya .com/topnews.html<br />
splashcor .com.br/topnews.html<br />
stephanmager .gmxhome.de/topnews.html<br />
svcanvas .com/topnews.html<br />
tautau.web .simplesnet.pt/topnews.html<br />
textilhogarnovadecor .com/topnews.html<br />
theflorist4u .com/topnews.html<br />
thewindsorhotel .it/topnews.html<br />
vuelosultimahora .com/topnews.html<br />
aliarzani .de/topnews.html<br />
ambermarketing .com/topnews.html<br />
arnold82.gmxhome .de/topnews.html<br />
ocoartefatos.com .br/topnews.html<br />
omdconsulting .es/topnews.html<br />
parapendiolestreghe .it/topnews.html<br />
positive-begegnungen .de/topnews.html<br />
projetsoft .net/topnews.html<br />
rbc.gmxhome .de/topnews.html<br />
beatmung-sachsen .eu/topnews.html<br />
campodifiori .it/topnews.html<br />
clickjava .net/topnews.html<br />
cmeedilizia .eu/topnews.html<br />
dammer .info/topnews.html<br />
embedded-silicon .de/topnews.html<br />
ferrariclubpesaro .it/topnews.html<br />
fgwiese .de/topnews.html<br />
fswash.site .br.com/topnews.html<br />
fytema .es/topnews.html<br />
gildas-saliou. com/topnews.html<br />
go-art-morelli .de/topnews.html<br />
go-siegmund .de/topnews.html<br />
guerrero-tuning .com/topnews.html<br />
gut-barbarastein .de/topnews.html<br />
japansec .com/topnews.html<br />
komma10-thueringen .de/topnews.html<br />
koon-design .de/topnews.html<br />
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myadultcube .com/flash//aff=5176<br />
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colombeblanche .org/stream.html<br />
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medical-service-krause .de/topnews.html<br />
nakedinbed.co .uk/topnews.html<br />
ossuzio .com/watchit.html<br />
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sumacyl .com/watchit.html<br />
swampgiants .com/watchit.html<br />
xn--glland-3ya .de/stream.html<br />
yuricardinali .com/watchit.html</b><br />
<b>nepi .si/topnews.html<br />
dammer .info/topnews.html<br />
atelier-de-loulou .fr/topnews.html<br />
galvatoledo .com/topnews.html<br />
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csr.imb .br/stream.html<br />
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malerbetrieb-pelzer .de/hotnews.html<br />
dantealighieriasturias .es/topnews.html<br />
oyakatakent46537 .com/stream.html<br />
89.19.29 .13/stream.html<br />
slobodandjakovic .com/fresh.html<br />
cqcs.com .br/stream.html<br />
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ferien-urlaub-lastminute .de/default.html<br />
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liguehavraise .com/live.html<br />
capacitacaoemlideranca .com.br/fresh.html<br />
materialesyacabados .com.mx/stream.html<br />
208.112.7.68 /checkit.html<br />
152.10.1.37 /1.html<br />
carlolongarini .it/topnews.html<br />
splashcor.com .br/topnews.html<br />
lobpreisstrasse .org/1.html<br />
motoclubnosvamos .com/hotnews.html<br />
hk-rc.com /1.html<br />
taaf.re /stream.html<br />
dulceysalao .com/default.html<br />
amafe .org/topnews.html <br />
</b><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiNeb1AJDI/AAAAAAAACAE/MTxnF1XLDCw/s1600-h/fake_flash3_rogue_software.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJiNeb1AJDI/AAAAAAAACAE/3Dgh4x23dRs/s200-R/fake_flash3_rogue_software.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Sample detection rate : <span id="status_nombre">flashupdate.exe</span><br />
<span id="status_nombre"><b>Scanners Result</b>: 35/36 (97.23%)</span><br />
<span id="status_nombre">Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Exchanger.hk; Troj/Cbeplay-A</span><br />
<b>File size</b>: 78848 bytes<br />
<b>MD5</b>...: c81b29a3662b6083e3590939b6793bb8<br />
<b>SHA1</b>..: d513275c276840cb528ce11dd228eae46a74b4b4<br />
<br />
The downloader then "phones back home" at <b>72.9.98.234 port 443 </b>which is responding to the rogue security software AntiSpy Spider (<b>antispyspider.net</b>) :<br />
<br />
"<i>AntiSpy Spider is a cutting-edge anti-spyware solution.This revolutionary anti-spyware program was created by the industry's top spyware experts in order to protect your computer and your privacy.html, while ensuring optimal system performance.With the ability to locate, eliminate and prevent the widest range of spyware threats, AntispyStorm is able to offer its users a safe, spyware-free computing experience; and with it's convenient automatic update feature, AntispyStorm ensures continuous up-to-date protection.</i>" <br />
<br />
Sample detection rate : antispyspider.msi<br />
<b>Scanners Result</b>: 11/35 (31.43%)<br />
FraudTool.Win32.AntiSpySpider.b;&nbsp; <br />
<b>File size</b>: 1851904 bytes<br />
<b>MD5</b>...: 2f1389e445f65e8a9c1a648b42a23827<br />
<b>SHA1</b>..: e32aa6aa791e98fe6fdef451bd3b8a45bad0acd8<br />
<br />
The bottom line - over a thousand domains are participating, with many other apparently joining the party proportionally with the web site owner's actions to get rid of the malware campaign hosted on their servers.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/underground-multitasking-in-action.html">Underground Multitasking in Action</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/blackhat-seo-redirects-to-malware-and.html">Blackhat SEO Redirects to Malware and Rogue Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/malicious-doorways-redirecting-to.html">Malicious Doorways Redirecting to Malware</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/portfolio-of-fake-video-codecs.html">A Portfolio of Fake Video Codecs</a><b> <br />
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/356677080" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 10:50:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file">file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/html file">html file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/html">html</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comtopnews">comtopnews</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/detopnews">detopnews</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows media player">windows media player</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/player">player</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real player exploit">real player exploit</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/356677080/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0a86c9e6b40c8995b8c3f84a2d12480a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0a86c9e6b40c8995b8c3f84a2d12480a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In what appears to be a lone gunman malware campaign -- where the malware spreader even left his email address within the binary - the now down Twitter malware campaign managed to attract only 69...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJgk-RghwII/AAAAAAAAB_c/xbrYBDO4K9Q/s1600-h/twitter_malware1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJgk-RghwII/AAAAAAAAB_c/om2-uxKUmR4/s200-R/twitter_malware1.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>In <a href="http://www.twitpwn.com/2008/08/coming-up-malware-on-twitter.html">what appears to</a> be a lone gunman <a href="http://www.viruslist.com/en/weblog?weblogid=208187551">malware campaign</a> -- where the malware spreader even left his email address within the binary - the now down <a href="http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/08/05/twiters_trojan_problem.html">Twitter malware campaign</a> managed to attract only 69 followers before it has shut down, <a href="http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/07/27/who-is-johng77536-and-how-did-he-game-twitter/">using a trivial approach</a> for launching an XSS worm - <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery">Cross-site request forgery</a> (CSRF). More info :<br />
<br />
"<i>This week it’s Twitter’s turn to host an attack - one that is targeting both Twitter users and the Internet community at large. In this case it's a malicious Twitter profile twitter.com/[skip]/ with a name that is Portuguese for ‘pretty rabbit’ which has a photo advertising a video with girls posted.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>This profile has obviously been created especially for infecting users, as there is no other data except the photo, which contains the link to the video. If you click on the link, you get a window that shows the progress of an automatic download of a so-called new version of Adobe Flash which is supposedly required to watch the video. You end up with a file labeled Adobe Flash (it’s a fake) on your machine; a technique that is currently very popular.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJg7qxrXS-I/AAAAAAAAB_k/X5JjQEBfcgc/s1600-h/twitter_malware.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJg7qxrXS-I/AAAAAAAAB_k/tnrV5eIbz1M/s200-R/twitter_malware.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Let's analyze the campaign before it was shut down. The original Twitter account used <b>twitter.com/video_kelly_key</b> basically included a link to <b>player-video-youtube.sytes.net</b> (204.16.252.98) which was using a URL shortening service <b>fly2.ws/NilOMN3</b> in order to redirect to the banker malware located at <b>freewebtown.com/construimagens/ Play-video-youtube.kelly-key.com</b>. It's detection rate is as follows :<br />
<br />
<b>Scanners Result</b>: 14/36 (38.89%)<br />
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Banker.caw <br />
<b>File size</b>: 88064 bytes<br />
<b>MD5</b>...: 25600af502758ca992b9e7fff3739def<br />
<b>SHA1</b>..: 9262ca501ef388e0fe42c50a3d002ddbd6e254f2<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJg8dgf3PnI/AAAAAAAAB_s/zemAG6fn3rM/s1600-h/xss_csrfworm.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJg8dgf3PnI/AAAAAAAAB_s/lOjia4dpUaw/s200-R/xss_csrfworm.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Twitter isn't an exception to the realistic potential for <a href="http://0x000000.com/index.php?i=512&amp;bin=1000000000">XSS worms though CSRF that could affect each and every Web 2.0 service</a>, which as a matter of fact have all suffered such attempts, namely, <a href="http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20071220/orkut-xss-worm" title="Orkut XSS Worm">Orkut</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samy_%28XSS%29" title="Samy MySpace XSS Worm">MySpace</a> (as well as the <a href="http://securitylabs.websense.com/content/Alerts/1319.aspx" title="MySpace QuickTime XSS Flaw">QuickTime XSS flaw</a>), <a href="http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/786" title="GaiaOnline XSS Worm">GaiaOnline</a>, <a href="http://sirdarckcat.blogspot.com/2007/12/making-social-network-xss-worm-hi5com.html" title="Hi5 XSS Worm">Hi5</a>, and most recently the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1487">XSS worm at Justin.tv</a>, demonstrate that trivial vulnerabilities come handy for what's to turn into a major security incident if not taken care of promptly.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/xss-planet.html">XSS The Planet</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/xss-vulnerabilities-in-e-banking-sites.html">XSS Vulnerabilities in E-banking Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/05/current-state-of-web-application-worms.html">The Current State of Web Application Worms</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/06/g0t-xssed.html">g0t XSSed?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/06/web-application-email-harvesting-worm.html">Web Application Email Harvesting Worm </a><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/356281978" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 03:14:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter">twitter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter malware campaign">twitter malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss">xss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss vulnerabilities">xss vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original twitter account">original twitter account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss worms">xss worms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss worm">xss worm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/twitter users">twitter users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/worm">worm</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/356281978/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Ideal Tool to Solve Real Problems ... of the Near Future? - II]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4d45e2880b790245f00c577a7d0b0226</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4d45e2880b790245f00c577a7d0b0226</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I would like to continue the discussion I started in my previous post called &quot; Ideal Tool to Solve Real Problems ... of the Near Future? &quot; Specifically, upon outlining some problems with logging, I...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would like to continue the discussion I started in my previous post called &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/06/ideal-tool-to-solve-real-problems-of.html">Ideal Tool to Solve Real Problems ... of the Near Future?</a>&quot; Specifically, upon outlining some problems with logging, I will now forecast what will happen with them in 18-24 months. </p>  <ul>   <li>Which problems will be solved and forgotten? </li>    <li>Which ones will simply go away? </li>    <li>Which ones will persist and in fact increase? </li>    <li>Finally, which new ones might emerge? </li> </ul>  <p>First, let me bet my ass that &quot;<strong>Not knowing what to log</strong>&quot;<strong> </strong>problem <strong>will be licked in 18-24 months</strong>; at least as far as major regulations go, people will have a pretty good idea a) what&#160; the auditors want them to log (and review!) b) what they need to log for solving their problems. Now, for esoteric log sources (and custom applications) might still present a challenge from that point of view, but for basic &quot;staples&quot; (firewall, network gear, major OS) the mystery will be over (again, see &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/02/must-do-logging-for-pci.html">Tell me EXACTLY what to log for PCI?</a>&quot;&#160; for reference)</p>  <p>Next, the problem of &quot;<strong>Log volume&quot; will&#160; definitely get worse, much worse</strong>.&#160; One might think that <em>100,000 each second</em> is a lot of log - but there WILL BE more at many companies! <em>Big application log explosion is coming</em>, fueled by the need to address logging in areas where such motivation was lacking before (basically, custom and vertical applications) as well as harness the power of &quot;uncommon&quot; logs for such tasks as fraud analysis or SOA monitoring. Keep in mind that even though in some areas logging is NOT a preferred way of monitoring and auditing activities (see <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/12/how-to-do-database-loggingmonitoring.html">this discussion</a> on database logs <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/12/how-to-do-database-loggingmonitoring.html">here</a></u>), application logging will still explode on us...</p>  <p>The problem of &quot;<strong>Log diversity&quot; </strong>(the fact that most logs all look different in format and meaning) <strong>will get worse before it will get better</strong> - and better it WILL (!!!) get since <a href="http://cee.mitre.org">standards are being developed</a>. We will see people struggling with all sorts bizarro log data in the coming years. Virtualization, web services and SOA, various ERP applications and even cloud services will increase the diversity of logging in the coming years.</p>  <p>Similar to the above, a problem of &quot;<strong>Bad logs&quot; </strong>(ones that are subjective, miss key information, require groping for a crystal ball to understand, turn log <em>analysis</em> into dark voodooistic experience or are <a href="http://www.loganalysis.org/pipermail/loganalysis/2008-January/000534.html">useless in some other way</a>) will also follow the pattern of the above log diversity problems - it <strong>will get worse before it gets better</strong> (via the <a href="http://cee.mitre.org">CEE standard effort</a> that now covers the <u><a href="http://openxdas.sourceforge.net/">OpenXDAS effort as well</a>!</u>) I noticed that people started asked me questions about &quot;how to do application logging right?&quot; and &quot;what to tell application developers about logging?&quot; which almost never happened in the past. BTW, watch <a href="http://www.securitywarrior.org">my blog</a> for some uber-fun info on that!</p>  <p><strong>&quot;Getting the logs&quot;</strong>&#160; has gotten much easier in recent years; agentless collectors like <u><a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/lassolog">Project Lasso</a></u> (which, BTW, just <u><a href="http://www.loglogic.com/news/news-releases/2008/07/loglogic-launches-centralized-windows-event-log-collection-appliance-for-enterprise/">got updated</a></u>) and grabbing&#160; files remotely via secure protocols made application log collection easier (syslog-NG with TCP transfer and buffering also helped). Next, Windows 2008 will make it MUCH easier for the whole Windows kingdom due to their <a href="http://www.realtime-windowsserver.com/tips_tricks/2007/08/event_log_subscriptions_in_win.htm">use of web serv</a>ices (<u><a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/ericfitz/">thanks Eric!</a></u>). However, in the future it <strong>might resurface</strong> as we try to collect logs from &quot;weird&quot; places, again, <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/05/cloud-this-cloud-that.html">clouds come to mind</a></u> as well as <u><a href="https://www.sans.org/webcasts/show.php?webcastid=91979">virtual environments</a></u> (e.g. how do you get logs off a dormant VM?). What's the next frontier in this area? Log discovery - automatic finding and identifying log files on systems in order to analyze and retain them (Yo, <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thanks-for-wonderful-t-shirt.html">my t-shirt-making colleagues...</a> </u>:-))</p>  <p>All this, however, pales in comparison with my favorite &quot;uber-challenge&quot;, &quot;<strong>Making sense of logs in&#160; an automated fashion&quot;</strong> - this baby is definitely not going away in 2-3 years. Much more research is needed to make that &quot;<strong>log-&gt;conclusion&quot;</strong> jump automatically without head-scratching, invoking ancient deities and cursing under ones's breath. Only then we can attempt to reliable handle &quot;proactive logging&quot; (i.e. analyzing various failure or compromise precursors in logs and then predicting the future based on them), another Holy Grail of logging domain.</p>  <p>Anything new will emerge? Yes, I think awareness of the <strong>&quot;Logging Gap&quot; problem will grow</strong>. &quot;Logging gap&quot; happens when you combine &quot;a need to log&quot; with utter &quot;inability to do so.&quot;&#160; For example, this will happen when people will know that they HAVE TO log, say, for compliance, but will have no way of doing it due to application or platform limitations. This will become one of the challenges and special &quot;logging add-ons&quot; will appear to close the logging gap and create additional logs where activity audit is desperately needed, but native logging is not helping to achieve it.</p>  <p>Also, I think people will <strong>finally</strong> <strong>wake up to</strong> &quot;<strong>Log security</strong>&quot; challenges - i.e. producing for use as evidence, compliance attestations, etc. <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">Log security</a></u> is not getting the attention <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">it deserves</a></u>, but I think this challenge will finally emerge in full force in the next 2-3 years. My next poll will address that :-)</p>  <p>Anything else I missed? Share away!</p>  <p><strong>Related posts:</strong></p>  <ul>   <li>     <h5><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/06/ideal-tool-to-solve-real-problems-of.html">Ideal Tool to Solve Real Problems ... of the Near Future?</a></h5>   </li>    <li>     <h5><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/11/ideal-log-management-tool.html">Ideal Log Management Tool?</a></h5>   </li> </ul>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 17:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log discovery">log discovery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log">log</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log diversity">log diversity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/esoteric log sources">esoteric log sources</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log security">log security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application log explosion">application log explosion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application">application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log analysis">log analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log volume">log volume</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/356001661/ideal-tool-to-solve-real-problems-of.html">Ideal Tool to Solve Real Problems ... of the Near Future? - II</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
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<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
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<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a86a7c12b2395b3c5ee8667c3a4d13e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a86a7c12b2395b3c5ee8667c3a4d13e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With cybercrime getting easier to outsource these days, and with the overall underground economy's natural maturity from products to services, &quot; managed spamming appliances &quot; and managed spamming...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJAiYgYGvGI/AAAAAAAAB-c/0z_b5zxZV0c/s1600-h/customer_support.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJAiYgYGvGI/AAAAAAAAB-c/bUYt5gvY6SU/s320-R/customer_support.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>With cybercrime getting easier to outsource these days, and with the overall underground economy's natural maturity from products to services, "<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">managed spamming appliances</a>" and managed spamming services are becoming rather common. Increasingly, these "vendors" are starting to "vertically integrate", namely, start diversifying the portfolio of services they offer in order to steal market share from other "vendors" offering related services like, email database cleaning, segmentation of email databases, email servers or botnets whose hosts have a pre-checked and relatively clean IP reputation, namely they're not blacklisted yet.<br />
<br />
How much does it cost to send 1 million spam emails these days? According to a random spamming service, $100 excluding the discounts based on the speed of sending desired, namely 10-20 per second or 20-30 per second. Let's dissect the service, and emphasize on its key differentiation factors, as well as the customerization offered in the form of a dedicated server if the customer would like to send billions of emails :<br />
<br />
"<i>-- High quality and percentage of spam delivery&nbsp;</i><br />
<i> -- Fast speed of delivery<br />
-- Spam database on behalf of the vendor, or using your own database of harvested emails<br />
-- Easily obtainable and segmented spam databases on per country basis<br />
-- Randomization of the spam email's body and headers in order to achieve a higher delivery rate<br />
-- Support for attachments, executables, and image files<br />
<br />
The cost - $100 for a million for letters delivered spam, with the large volume of spam discounts 20% -30% -40% based on the value-added Do-it-yourself customer interfare based on a multi-user botnet command and control interface :<br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>-- Automatic RBL verification  <br />
-- Support for many subjects, headers,  <br />
-- Total customization of the email sending process  <br />
-- Autogenerating junk content next to the spammers email/link in order to bypass filtering<br />
-- Faking Outlook Message ID / Boundary / Content-ID  <br />
-- Interface added. Now do not necessarily understand all the features into the system to start the list.  <br />
-- Convenient management tasks.  <br />
-- A high percentage of punching, on the basis of good europe - 40-60% (For the United States - less because there aol and others). <br />
-- Improved metrics, whether or not the emails have been sent, lost, unknown receipt, or have been RBL-ed<br />
<br />
With the weight of a billion - even discounts and the possibility of making a personal server. " <br />
<br />
</i>Rather surprising, they state that European email users have a higher probability of receiving the spam message compared the U.S due to AOL. What they're actually trying to say is due to AOL's use of Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM). As far as <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/segmenting-and-localizing-spam.html">localization of the spam to the email owner's native languag</a>e is concerned, this segmentation concept has been take place for over an year now.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJA7MWbx4jI/AAAAAAAAB-k/BvKdLNRflW4/s1600-h/phishme_demo_ethical.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJA7MWbx4jI/AAAAAAAAB-k/Y5691Se7e2k/s200-R/phishme_demo_ethical.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>This service, like the majority of others rely entirely on malware infected hosts, which due to the multi-user nature of most of the malware command and control interfaces, allows them to easily add customers and set their privileges based on the type of service that they purchase. This leaves a countless number of opportunities for targeted spamming, and yes, spear phishing attacks made possible due to the segmentation of the emails based on a country, city, even company.<br />
<br />
In the long term, the people behind spamming providers, web malware exploitation kits and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/diy-phishing-kits-introducing-new.html">DIY phishing kits</a>, will inevitably start introducing built-in features which were once available through third-party services. For instance, hosting infrastructure for the spam/phishing/live exploit URLs, or even managed fast-flux infrastructure, have the potential to become widely available if such optional features get built-in phishing kits, or start getting offered by the spamming provider itself. And since the affiliate based model seems to be working just fine, the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/phishers-spammers-and-malware-authors.html">ongoing underground consolidation</a> will converge providers of different underground goods and services, where everyone would be driving customers to one another's services and earning revenue in the process.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=bsJ3iJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=bsJ3iJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IEP1EJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IEP1EJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ZzurFj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ZzurFj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=uIY3Pj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=uIY3Pj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=60gQsJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=60gQsJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Nb7yGJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Nb7yGJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=y37sBj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=y37sBj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/350363899" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2008 01:32:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam message">spam message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam discounts">spam discounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam database">spam database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam databases">spam databases</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam email">spam email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/emails based">emails based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email servers">email servers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/350363899/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dee3d028ca8134c75e2aec7f397d1493</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dee3d028ca8134c75e2aec7f397d1493</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHtuv_mJSwI/AAAAAAAAB6M/X83g6Zkr9hg/s1600-h/screen1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHtuv_mJSwI/AAAAAAAAB6M/b0YAu_NWEQk/s200-R/screen1.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Common office files as documents, presentations, spreadsheets and PDF files, are the most widely abused ones in targeted attacks, which when backed up with enough personal information and take into consideration the time of their attack if the social engineering campaign is either going to be based on a current/upcoming event, or on an event anticipated due to information gathered through open source intelligence, often make it through common signature based scanning solutions.<br />
<br />
Despite the relatively easy to obtain, point'n'click <a href="http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001450.html">DIY tools for backdooring common office files</a> are available for the script kiddies to take advantage of, some are <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">naturally remaining proprietary tools</a>, making them harder to analyze unless a copy is obtained. Like this one, generating "undetected" by signatures based scanning, office documents and spreadsheets that would drop the actual malware on the PC.<br />
<br />
Automatic translation of its description and core features :<br />
<br />
<i>"The program represents a generator OfficeJoiner macros in the language Visual Basic for Application (VBA), for introduction in the document Microsoft Office Word / Microsoft Office Excel executable file (win32 exe), followed by fully automatic recovery and launch, without any&nbsp; additional action by the user. The only requirement that formed in such a way xls / doc files is to support&nbsp; VBA macros on the computer end-user formed file and permission to launch macros.</i><br />
<br />
<i>The program uses NOT a vulnerability (exploit) or macro-virus tools for the introduction, extraction or running embedded files. This means that it has generated macros compatible with ALL versions of Microsoft Office products starting with Microsoft Office 97 package, with any established "patches" and the service pack. Macros generated by this program not detected antivirus, for the simple reason that they are not viruses or macro viruses. The program uses only "established" means products built into Microsoft Excel VBA language to achieve their goals.</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Fully automatic generation of macro for the introduction of documents word / excel any given exe-file with his persistence in the body and subsequent documents automatic recovery and launch, when opening a document word / excel.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Generated macros are compatible with all versions of ms word / excel since version 97,&nbsp; employments and regardless of the presence / absence of any patches / servicepacs.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Generated macros are not macro-viruses, exploits do not use and do not contain any malicious code, so do not be detected by any antivirus tools as viruses.&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Conversion body ex-file macro happening in such a way that while in doc / xls file it not detected any antivirus, and can be freely sent by mail safely passed all checks, even if in itself contains viral code defined antivirus. <br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>- Sgenerirovanny and attached to the body of the document macro can be protected with a password or signed certificate, using funds established Microsoft Office, which does not affect him productivity or efficiency (macro, in any case remain fully workable).&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Box macro can be made both in the new document, and in any document containing data and-or other macros. Generated program code is fully compatible with any other embedded in the document macros or entering data, and will not interfere with their work, as well as maintain its efficiency.</i><br />
<br />
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Added auto-finding ways to extract exe-file; <br />
&nbsp;</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Added possibility of a macro arbitrary text in the body of the instrument; <br />
&nbsp;</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>- Optimized algorithm macro-generation code; <br />
</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>&nbsp;</i> </div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div>
<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHt7EgPiRwI/AAAAAAAAB6U/BtNJaK_13LM/s1600-h/officedocs_malware_sample.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHt7EgPiRwI/AAAAAAAAB6U/xhaiKacT-eM/s200-R/officedocs_malware_sample.PNG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><i>Enabling this option will lead to the creation macro code, who himself will find a way to unpack and run embedded exe-file. Auto-search finds the current user folder and produces there extraction and launch embedded file. The peculiarity of this method is that this method will work on the computers of users with a limited account, because in its user folder in any case has the right to record / performance. Using this option is justified to improve the "punching" macro on computers with limited account or unknown file structure (let Windows installed on the disk is different from C). <br />
<br />
You can specify a name for final file independently, or leave blank, then the name will be generated automatically.</i> </div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i><br />
</i></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><i>On this possibility has asked for a user program, its essence is that after running a macro, retrieval and downloading exe-file the document with the introduction of exe-file will be withdrawn posed text. Perhaps in this way can improve the application of social engineering, designed to force the user to allow support for macros. For example, in the text of the document indicate: <br />
<br />
"This document contains hidden text (password, a system of calculation formulas, interactive components, etc.), Which can be viewed only after the inclusion of support macros. Please enable support for macros and re-opening this document ". <br />
<br />
After resolving support macros, and the implementation of embedded exe-file, the document will be withdrawn given a string containing probable "password" or any other textual information.</i>  " </div>
<br />
Despite that the tool is proprietary, the underground economy's leaks are largely driven by bargain hunters who would exchange proprietary tool, whose often biased exclusiveness may increase the profit margins, for a service or a good that may be worthless for them in general, but impossible to obtain and take advantage of in the present. It will not just leak in one way or another, someone will inevitably backdoor the backdooring tool and trick the novice bargain hunters into running it, by having both their host infected and money taken.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-diy-proprietary-malware.html">Yet Another DIY Proprietary Malware Builder</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/small-pack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit - Proprietary</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/diy-exploit-embedding-tool-proprietary.html">DIY Exploit Embedding Tool - A Proprietary Release</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/skype-spamming-tool-in-wild.html">Skype Spamming Tool in the Wild - Proprietary Release</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=mMDIJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=mMDIJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vtGZUJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vtGZUJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Voeqqj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Voeqqj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=QZJLHj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=QZJLHj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=4VmcIJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=4VmcIJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=rqLHKJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=rqLHKJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LnaC8j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LnaC8j" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/335226251" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 07:20:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/document">document</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/document macros">document macros</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/support">support</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enable support">enable support</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/macro">macro</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/macro viruses">macro viruses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/support vba macros">support vba macros</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exe-file">exe-file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extract exe-file">extract exe-file</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/335226251/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2e181320354dd6dbef7263b149510ae5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2e181320354dd6dbef7263b149510ae5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A bogus media player ( iSexPlayer.jar ) targeting Symbian S60 3rd edition devices according to several affected parties, is currently being spammed through blackhat search engine optimization. Once...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPPpaT5DsI/AAAAAAAAB4s/DzzzoRm7qQw/s1600-h/iSexPlayer.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPPpaT5DsI/AAAAAAAAB4s/RrF0dGd28i8/s200-R/iSexPlayer.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>A bogus media player (<b>iSexPlayer.jar</b>) targeting Symbian S60 3rd edition devices according to several affected parties, is currently being spammed through blackhat search engine optimization. Once infected upon confirming its execution since it's doesn't seem to be exploiting a specific vulnerability besides "bargain hunters" desire for free adult material, the malware attempts to trick the user into participating by becoming a member, however, a quick peek the source code reveals interesting facts about the scam.<br />
<br />
For instance, once providing them with your credit card details and basically wanting  to try out the service, it appears that there's no way out of it which is a problem since "<b>Trial membership recur at $US 29.95 unless cancelled, Monthly membership recur unless cancelled</b>" and also, "<b>Do you want full access to all pictures and videos? Cost is 2 Euros, charged 100% descreet on your phone bill over SMS. Please allow iSexPlayer to send SMS</b>".<br />
<br />
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<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPXAdxKXSI/AAAAAAAAB40/lx0NNyGF8DU/s1600-h/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPXAdxKXSI/AAAAAAAAB40/G-ed7CKFn3g/s200-R/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer1.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The spammed through blackhat SEO sites are currently active, and perhaps a bit ironic, once you make any transaction with these people, anything that goes on at a later stage such as automatic calling or sms-sing to squeeze your bill, may be in fact legal since you authorized it. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.symbian-freak.com/news/008/07/first_known_s60_3rd_ed_malware.htm">Symbian Freak</a> has some details, as well as <a href="http://www.esato.com/board/viewtopic.php?topic=171238">an affected party</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Last week, I had lend my N73 to one of my friends for use as he had lost his phone. <b>I did not know what he did, but I checked my bills today and see some International calls made that amount to around 20USD. That is around 800 Indian rupees</b>. To check, I called the number and learnt that it was a phone sex line. Now it was time for my friend to answer. <b>The thirteen calls were made during a period spanning two days. On an average there were 7 calls a day.</b> <b>Now, the thing that struck me is, going by the call records, the calls on the second day were made when I had the phone with me</b>. I am pretty sure no one dialled the numbers. I called my buddy and asked him if he had downloaded something. He then spilled the beans informing that he did go to some adult website and installed a software (I do not recall the name).</i>"<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPXMcq4MwI/AAAAAAAAB48/xflFOsg6ETM/s1600-h/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPXMcq4MwI/AAAAAAAAB48/bwX9gzwKouA/s200-R/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer2.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The name of the "software" as I've already pointed out is iSexPlayer. Let's dissect the scammers and their sites currently spammed across 100,000 sites using blackhat SEO tactics. Related domains sharing the same IP and internal pages :<br />
<br />
<b>3g6.se<br />
3gx.se<br />
conn2.3g6.se<br />
conn2.3g6.se<br />
test.3gx.se</b><br />
<br />
83.241.194.132 (83.241.194.128-83.241.194.191 DGC-DIRECT2-01 Direct2Internet AB - Internet Access Located in Johanneshov, Sweden)<br />
<br />
<b>3g6.se/dstream.php<br />
3g6.se/newplayerdl.php<br />
3g6.se/chrono/callback.php<br />
secure.chronopay.com/index.cgi</b><br />
<br />
The scammer's pitch :<br />
<br />
"<i>Free access to: - 500 Hardcore scenes - 100 Full lenght movies - Picture galleries Important! To install iSexplayer you must be at least 18 years old. You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Nintendo DS, You must install and run iSexplayer™ access module to watch the videos on Apple iPhone, Install iSexplayer</i>"<br />
<br />
Upon attempting to download the .jar file from the mobile page, the iSexPlayer.php does the magic like that :<br />
<br />
"<i>MIDlet-1: iSexPlayer,/icon.png,Easyloader<br />
MIDlet-Install-Notify: http://3g6.se/install_notify.php?id=1322451<br />
MIDlet-Jar-Size: 101313<br />
MIDlet-Jar-URL: http://3g6.se/iSexPlayer.jar<br />
MIDlet-Name: iSexPlayer<br />
MIDlet-Vendor: Vendor<br />
MIDlet-Version: 1.0<br />
MicroEdition-Configuration: CLDC-1.0<br />
MicroEdition-Profile: MIDP-2.0<br />
did: 1322451<br />
did2: 9416755</i>"<br />
<br />
Who's behind the scam?<br />
<br />
"<i>c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\ni<b>SexPlayer is owned by</b>: ");</i><br />
<i>c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\n<b>Enit Invest S.L</b>. ");&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nweb: <b>enitinvest.com</b> ");</i><br />
<i>c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nemail: <b>support@enitinvest.com</b> ");</i><br />
<i>c_javax_microedition_lcdui_Form_fld.append("\nTel: <b>1-800-845-4951</b> ");</i>"<br />
<br />
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Enit Invest S.L.<br />
Av. Machupichu 26, S 18<br />
28043 Madrid<br />
email: support@enitinvest.com<br />
Tel: 1-800-845-4951<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPjWZtvpNI/AAAAAAAAB5E/GCSyEOFBiOA/s1600-h/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHPjWZtvpNI/AAAAAAAAB5E/82001n4Xv0U/s200-R/iSexPlayer_Malware_Dialer3.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>And since I'm sure that there are more juicy details within the source code further exposing their scammy practices, which you should not authorize in any way, just like you wouldn't really like making a long call on a premium rate number thanks to having a malware infected phone, once more details are gathered, particularly its compatibility with devices, they'll be posted.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wedKOJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wedKOJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=UmSuCJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=UmSuCJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=VJW47j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=VJW47j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=fmvyWj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=fmvyWj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=GPevnJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=GPevnJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dDH6aJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dDH6aJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Yi9JAj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Yi9JAj" border="0"></img></a>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 03:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isexplayer">isexplayer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/install">install</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/install isexplayer">install isexplayer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access">access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet access">internet access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isexplayer access module">isexplayer access module</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackhat seo sites">blackhat seo sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sites">sites</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/330746890/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Automatic Profiling Is Useless]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dc933d0fdc42cbb24d44ff860c398f79</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dc933d0fdc42cbb24d44ff860c398f79</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[No surprise : Automated passenger profiling is rubbish, the Home Office has conceded in an amusing -- and we presume inadvertent -- blurt. &quot;Attempts at automated profiling have been used in trial...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/24/home_office_passenger_profiling/">No surprise</a>:

<blockquote>Automated passenger profiling is rubbish, the Home Office has conceded in an amusing -- and we presume inadvertent -- blurt. "Attempts at automated profiling have been used in trial operations [at UK ports of entry] and has proved [sic] that the systems and technology available are of limited use," says home secretary Jacqui Smith in her response to Lord Carlile's latest terror legislation review.</blockquote>

The U.S. wants to <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-07-02-terror-profiling_N.htm">do it anyway</a>:

<blockquote>The Justice Department is considering letting the FBI investigate Americans without any evidence of wrongdoing, relying instead on a terrorist profile that could single out Muslims, Arabs or other racial or ethnic groups.</blockquote>

I've written about profiling <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/profiling.html">before</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=w1HVtJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=w1HVtJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=W5xeuJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=W5xeuJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2008 09:37:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terror legislation review">terror legislation review</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home office">home office</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorist profile">terrorist profile</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presume inadvertent">presume inadvertent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/justice department">justice department</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lord carlile">lord carlile</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trial operations">trial operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/entry">entry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rubbish">rubbish</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/automatic_profi.html">Automatic Profiling Is Useless</source>
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