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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: barriers]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/barriers</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 06:09:41 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Managed Fast Flux Provider - Part Two]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/210da9c1b19bf76a539ca28b24edc989</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/210da9c1b19bf76a539ca28b24edc989</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We're slowly entering into a stage where RBN bullet proof hosting franchises are vertically integrating, and due to the requests from their customers are starting to offer that they refer to as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOQymgVga0I/AAAAAAAACOw/geleqRWDOE0/s1600-h/pharma_spam_fastflux.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SOQymgVga0I/AAAAAAAACOw/8PTQr8G6mBM/s200-R/pharma_spam_fastflux.png" /></a>We're slowly entering into a stage where <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/estdomains-and-intercage-vs-cybercrime.html">RBN bullet proof hosting franchises</a> are vertically integrating, and due to the requests from their customers are starting to offer that they refer to as "mirrored hosting" which in practice is plain simple fast flux network consisting of RBN-alike purchased netblocks, and naturally, botnet infected hosts.<br />
<br />
Managed fast-fluxing is only starting to go mainstream, for instance, in July I found evidence that <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">money mule recruiters were using ASProx's infected hosts as hosting infrastructure</a>, and in November, 2007, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">an infamous spamming software vendor</a> was also found to have been offering fast-flux services in the past.<br />
<br />
In this most recent fast-flux service, we have a known spammer and botnet master that in between self-serving himself on is way to ensure his portfolio of scammy domains remains online for a "little longer", is commercializing fast-fluxing and is offered a DIY service :<br />
<br />
"<i>Finally after hardwork and great appreciation from our normal bullet proof  hosting/server clients we are able to launch Mirrored hosting. What is </i><i>Mirrored hosting</i><i> ?</i><br />
<i><br />
================<br />
</i><i>Mirrored hosting</i><i> is a powerful mirrored  web hosting management, uses multiple Virtual servers to host  website with 100% uptime. </i><i>Mirrored hosting </i><i>is a combination of two things, which  are:<br />
<br />
1. Specially Designed Virtual Servers</i><br />
<i> 2. Powerful  Automated Control Panel</i><br />
<br />
<i>How does it work ?<br />
===============&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>Mirrored hosting</i><i> uses specially configured Virtual Servers making them link with the </i><i>Mirrored hosting</i><i> Control Panel  which is then controlled by our own control panel allowing us to provide smooth  streamline hosting with no downtime. No one is able to trace original IP of the  server or the place where the files are hosted so the websites/domains hosted  have a 100% Uptime. This is achieved by unique customisation of our Virtual Servers.<br />
<br />
<b>Actually, it takes ips around the world and our  powerful control panel just rotates the ips every 15 minutes. though all these  ips you will see will be fake no one can trace the orignal ip where files are  hosted. Sometimes the ip is from China, Korea, USA, UK, Japan, Lithuania etc.</b></i>"<br />
<br />
The concept has always been there for cybercriminals to take advantage of, but once it matures into a managed service it would undoubtedly lower down the entry barriers allowing yesterday's average phishers to take advantage of what only the "pros" were used to.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/storm-worms-fast-flux-networks.html">Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks</a><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-flux-spam-and-scams-increasing.html">Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-fluxing-yet-another-pharmacy-scam.html">Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/storm-worm-hosting-pharmaceutical-scams.html">Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AO71M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AO71M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xZIrM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xZIrM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ZGgOm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ZGgOm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=e7OAm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=e7OAm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BVPbM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BVPbM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iS1HM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iS1HM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iQOUm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iQOUm" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/409475392" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 08:39:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux provider">fast flux provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux networks">fast flux networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent fast-flux service">recent fast-flux service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/powerful control panel">powerful control panel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control panel">control panel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual servers">virtual servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple virtual servers">multiple virtual servers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux spam">fast flux spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/409475392/managed-fast-flux-provider-part-two.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider - Part Two</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wakeup Call for Risk Management]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5c961827ce1d8ef57419fb5d2d847236</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5c961827ce1d8ef57419fb5d2d847236</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Blogger: Dan Blum
With the crisis in financial markets still unfolding, it is important to draw what lessons we can from the experience. Since the roots of the crisis lie in a monumental failure of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Blogger: Dan Blum</p>

<p>With the crisis in financial markets still unfolding, it is important to draw what lessons we can from the experience. Since the roots of the crisis lie in a monumental failure of risk management, it’s important to understand more about what happened, and then draw some parallels to our business risk management and&nbsp; IT risk management situations.</p>

<p>The risk management failure in the housing market and on Wall Street had multiple interdependent dimensions:</p>

<ul><li><strong>Mortgage lenders abandoned long standing prudent loan practices</strong>. They made too many loans that buyers might not be able to repay. Exotic instruments like ARMs, option ARMs, and interest only loans proliferated. In many cases, all pretense of lending standards were abandoned, so-called “liar loans” approved.</li>

<li><strong>Capital was grossly over-leveraged</strong>. Mortgage lenders and other financial services packaged loans into securities, which they sold to raise capital to support more lending. Real capital reserve requirements to back loans were reduced. Of course, if borrowers could not repay loans, all or parts of the derivative securities would become worthless.</li>

<li><strong>Risk was aggregated at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and mortgage loan insurance companies</strong>. These companies bought or insured some mortgage loans, providing something of a backstop should loans fail. Government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie and Freddie in turn became over-leveraged and securities that they sold were in turn repackaged in the murky brew of mortgage-backed securities called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other exotic instruments returning generous yields. </li>

<li><strong>Non-Caveat Emptor.</strong> Institutional wealth funds and financial services firms who should have known better bought securities that had been deliberately structured to obfuscate risk. They bought securities they didn’t understand with buried tranches of toxic subprime loans..</li></ul>

<p>It was a great Ponzi scheme – one that kept working as long as housing prices were going up; the recipients of subprime loans could always flip that house to the next buyer. Everyone made money. As Chuck Prince of Citigroup famously put it during <a href="http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?sortBy=gadatearticle&amp;queryText=chuck+prince+dancing&amp;y=0&amp;aje=true&amp;x=0&amp;id=070710000610&amp;ct=0&amp;page=6&amp;nclick_check=1">a July, 2007 interview</a>: “So long as the music is playing, you’ve got to keep dancing. We’re still dancing.” But one month later, the music stopped. Since then, Citigroup and other financial institutions have taken massive writeoffs with more to come. Wall Street titans like Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG have fallen or been bought out.</p>

<p>What can we learn from this risk management debacle?</p>

<p>As business risk managers and investors, we should ask questions like these:</p>

<ul><li><strong>Does the executive incentive structure of the company encourage managers to dance around risk?</strong> Many Wall Street firms paid senior managers 5 times their salary in bonuses tied to annual growth alone.</li>

<li><strong>Is the company over-leveraged?</strong> Is it borrowing too much money and betting it on ventures with uncertain outcomes?</li>

<li><strong>Are financial models used for risk management realistic?</strong> Earlier, I described the mortgage market of the past few years as a Ponzi scheme, where risk management models must have assumed prices would keep rising. Unlike the dotcom boom whose demise many predicted, very few in the industry foresaw the sharp declines to come in housing prices and sales volumes. Historically, the U.S. housing market has been a steadily rising one, but on the other hand the 2000s saw unprecedented rates of price increases. In reality, what goes up must come down. </li>

<li><strong>Has your company’s risk council ever performed worst case scenario analysis and built adequate reserves?</strong> In the days before economics emerged as a would-be “hard” deterministic science, business leaders may have been more cautious, more aware of and more accepting of uncertainty. Events like the Great Tulip Bubble came once in decades or centuries – not every few years. Note that legendary investor George Soros has proposed a Theory of Reflexivity that, if true, helps explain the recent extremes of boom and bust cycles. This theory holds that market participants model market behaviors based on self-interest, and for a time, their manipulations change the reality of the market – until gravitational forces bring it back to earth. Has the music of ephemeral success played to the backbeat of deterministic-sounding economic models gone to your heads and infected your risk management models? </li>

<li><strong>Are cost cutting efforts pursued blindly?</strong> Outsourcing and other forays into treacherous global waters may be giving away the crown jewels. Smart companies cut costs, but they do it in smart ways. Smart companies think like intelligence agencies as they parcel out work to different partners with varying levels of dependability, and they check on those partners.</li></ul>

<p>Risk management failures can also occur at the more technical level of IT security. As IT risk managers, we might ask questions like these:</p>

<ul><li><strong>Are the accounting and financial systems your IT department supports under adequate control?</strong> As Fred Cohen wrote in <a href="http://www.burtongroup.com/Client/Research/Document.aspx?cid=750">one of our documents</a>: “Many companies use computers to manage financial systems, and despite the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claims about accounts being properly kept, there are many attacks on financial systems that remain. For example, most of the largest financial systems in the world running on common financial databases do not use <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-entry_bookkeeping">double-entry bookkeeping</a> and are thus susceptible to all manner of frauds by insiders.” We find it troubling that a prudent control dating back to the 12th century is going out of style in the name of convenience and cost cutting. Kind of like credit checking became anachronistic during the housing bubble, eh?</li>

<li><strong>Is the “separation” in your “separation of duty” (SoD) for real?</strong> Sure the SOX auditors are looking for SoD, and maybe you have different administrators with different accounts maintaining different systems or functions. But when they say Western civilization may be but one weak password from collapse they’re not lying. Look what happened to Sarah Palin’s email account! Weak and straggly SoD is a problem across all critical IT systems where deperimiterization and server consolidation may be bringing down protective barriers, identity management is weak, and strong process controls (e.g., where two people must sign on, one perform a critical operation such as backbone router reconfiguration, and the second observe) abandoned in the name of expediency. </li>

<li><strong>Are risks being aggregated to unacceptable levels in centralized control systems?</strong> There are many ways that risks aggregate within enterprise IT infrastructures as we pursue automation and cost cutting. Network risks aggregate when centralized domain name system control is implemented. Application risks aggregate when common infrastructure is shared among applications. And enterprises aggregate platform risks when they use low-assurance endpoints, authentication, and directory systems with single sign-on to access large numbers of resources and don’t separate high consequence systems. </li>

<li><strong>Non-caveat emptor:</strong> Has IT security really done the worst case consequence analysis, attack graphs, and vulnerability analysis to know when putting more eggs in a supposedly stronger basket aggregates risks to an unacceptable level? Or are you depending only on vendor claims about some black box appliance equivalent of a risk-obfuscated CDO security? Caveat emptor (buyer beware) again! (The good news is we’ll keep talking about promoting vendor and product rating systems so you don’t have to do all the detailed product analysis yourself, but that’s another post.)</li></ul>

<p>There are many parallels between the monumental risk management failure in the financial markets, and the probable weaknesses in our day to day business risk management and IT risk management. Abandonment of prudent practices for profit; excessive leverage and centralization; ill-constructed risk analysis models; risk obfuscation; and a failure of caveat emptor seem to be common problems. Please take this as a wakeup call to sharpen up the risk management thinking, process, and execution.</p></div>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~4/397240912" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 06:11:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management debacle">risk management debacle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management failure">risk management failure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/failure">failure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management realistic">risk management realistic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business risk management">business risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management models">risk management models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management situations">risk management situations</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityAndRiskManagementStrategiesBlog/~3/397240912/wakeup-call-for.html">Wakeup Call for Risk Management</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cisco 7600 OSR Backbone Router]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a447dc34e61d2770ab6d723a54abcb31</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a447dc34e61d2770ab6d723a54abcb31</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For our confused CEO blogger over at StreamBase, who thinks an Internetbackbone router is the small $30 device he set up in his home office, here is a photo of a the Cisco 7600 OSR which of course...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: left;">For our confused CEO blogger over at StreamBase, who thinks an Internet backbone router is the small $30 device he set up in his home office, here is a photo of a the <a href="http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/prod_022001b.html" target="_blank">Cisco 7600 OSR</a> which of course runs <a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/products_ios_cisco_ios_software_category_home.html" target="_blank">CISCO IOS</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><img style="vertical-align: middle;" src="http://newsroom.cisco.com/ts_images/Cisco-7600-OSR-high.jpg" alt="Cisco 7600 OSR" height="600" /></p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The Cisco 7600 OSR consists of a 256 Gbps switching fabric and a 30 million packets per second (mpps) forwarding engine. Its breadth of IP services comes from Cisco IOS, which provides features such as security, enhanced QoS, and destination sensitive services. In addition, the Cisco 7600 OSR allows the migration of existing port adapters from Cisco 7500 series routers, via the Cisco FlexWAN module, giving service providers one the industry&#8217;s widest array of interface options in any single platform. This provides service providers great flexibility in deploying the Cisco 7600 OSR for a variety of applications, protects their investment in existing systems, and gives them a practical migration path to the New World Optical Internet.</p>
<h3>A Revolutionary Platform For Evolving Networks</h3>
<p>The Cisco 7600 OSR helps service providers break through service and bandwidth barriers today, while designing networks to scale for future growth. The Cisco 7600 OSR achieves this through &#8220;adaptive network processing,&#8221; or the ability to evolve the platform for new IP services without hardware upgrades. Unlike fixed, ASIC-based platforms, which are hardware encoded, the Cisco 7600 OSR relies on the highly flexible Parallel eXpress Forwarding (PXF) technology for scalable performance of services. PXF is a patented, Cisco-developed network processor capable of line-rate IP services delivery that can support new IP services through periodic software upgrades. Each OSM has two PXF processors capable of 12 mpps of IP services delivery per interface card.</p>
<p>&#8220;IP+Optical combines the dynamism of the Internet world with the foundation of the transport world, creating an infrastructure that can deliver the services that service providers need,&#8221; said Lele Nardin, vice president of the Internet Systems Business Unit at Cisco. &#8220;Cisco will continue to add innovative solutions on top of this solid foundation to make service providers better equipped to meet the constantly escalating and changing customer demands for new networking services.&#8221;</p>
<h3>Pricing and Availability</h3>
<p>The base Cisco 7600 OSR system is list priced at $73,000 and the entry level system, with interfaces, start at $100,000. The interfaces modules are priced between $27,000 to $180,000. The Cisco 7600 OSR is available now worldwide.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 06 Sep 2008 07:25:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco">cisco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco flexwan module">cisco flexwan module</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/osr">osr</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/runs cisco ios">runs cisco ios</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/base cisco">base cisco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco ios">cisco ios</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/destination sensitive services">destination sensitive services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/osr system">osr system</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/06/cisco-7600-osr-backbone-router/">Cisco 7600 OSR Backbone Router</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9f1f804e00135ef904eb97970171c32e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9f1f804e00135ef904eb97970171c32e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.Here is my first post on this challenging topic
First of all, as background information, I learned the Thai alphabet(script with 44 consonants and 32...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.  Here is my first post on this challenging topic:</p>
<p>First of all, as background information, I learned the Thai alphabet (script with 44 consonants and 32 vowels) nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty decent foundation for the Thai language compared to most foreigners visting or working in Thailand.   I can read (slowly) and speak better than 99.99+ percent of all foreigners in Thailand.  For this reason, I thought it was &#8221;the right thing to do&#8221; to redirect my career to a &#8220;new challenge&#8221; in the business climate of Thailand as I continue to improve my foreign language skills.   I wanted to help Thailand progress in IT and IT security, so where else would I go but where I have second language skills?</p>
<p>This was no small decision as you can imagine.  Your career and life changes quite dramatically when you give up a long established consulting practice in the US and dive into business in a foreign land, seeking a new challenge.  I can frankly tell you thatit is more difficult to do business in Thailand (as a foreigner) than I expected, for a number of reasons.  Here is my first off-topic post on this topic.</p>
<p>First of all, it is not legal for foreigners to directly own land in Thailand.  Foreigners can &#8221;own&#8221; land using a variety of legal loopholes, proxy owners and shell companies; but all of this is risky and not advised.  Many foreigners lose a lot of money coming to Thailand and attempting to buy land via various &#8220;structures&#8221;.  Some get lucky, but the entire process of foreigners buying and selling land is quite risky and not recommended.</p>
<p>Foreigners can legally own condominiums, under certain conditions, but this &#8220;foreign market&#8221; results in inflated prices for condos in Thailand that are traded in an &#8220;artificial market place&#8221; designed for foreigners.   Condos in Bangkok and major resort areas that are up-to-par with condos in the US can easily cost more than condos in major cities in the US.  Hence, the cost of living in Thailand is not as economical as some might believe when you visit Thailand as a tourist.</p>
<p>Second, business in Thailand can best be described as protectionism with discrimination where the government has placed many barriers to entry to foreigners working and competing in Thailand.     Every foreigner must have a work permit and these work permits are expensive and time consuming to maintain.   If you own a business you must pay high professional service fees for &#8220;auditors&#8221; to perform annual and semiannual audits regardless of how much income you have (including zero).   Firms in Thailand charge thousands of dollars for these &#8221;audits&#8221;.      </p>
<p>Third, if you operate a business in Thailand, you must have a place of business (you cannot legally work from your condo you bought at high prices!), so you are forced, by law, to lease office space.   Foreigners from the US, for example, must be paid a minimum of 50,000 Thai Baht per month, so the government will take 10 percent of that each month as their share of tax withholdings.  Startups with no income simply pay income taxes against their personal savings to comply with the law.  Therefore, to start a company and maintain the business in Thailand, you are required to pay significant startup, monthly, semi-annual and annual fees, permits, tax, leases, visas, etc. </p>
<p>Forth, generating incoming revenue in Thailand can be quite difficult in a climate of both protectionism and discrimination.   In Thailand, it is easy when you are spending money.  This is the &#8221;Land of Smiles&#8221; that tourists see and experience.   However, when you are legally permitted to work in Thailand and trying to generate in-country income, you cannot help but notice the protectionism and discrimination against foreigners working and living here.  Many foreigners working in Thailand just &#8220;give up&#8221; because the barriers to business success are quite high.</p>
<p>Fifth, on top of the challenges of protectionism/discrimination regarding foreigners and foreign investments, which I have only just scratched the surface here, is the overall global business slowdown combined with a climate of political instability which I am sure you have seen in the news.  Thailand has seen 18 coups since 1932.   Currently, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/state-of-emergency-declared-in-thailand-916866.html" target="_blank">Thailand is under a State-of-Emergency </a> which negatively impacts business even more.  Sound challenging? </p>
<p>Most people who live and work in Thailand have the opinion that it is far better to enjoy being a tourist here. Working in Thailand is very difficult for many reasons.   Being a tourist in Thailand is completely different than working here.  When you are a tourist, foreign currently flows from you into Thailand, so life in Thailand as a tourist is fun and friendly, hence the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; you have heard about or experienced.     However, when you are working in Thailand and trying to generate income from Thailand versus bringing in foreign currency, you don&#8217;t see the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; quite the same anymore.</p>
<p>Without getting into too many details in this post, I can simply say that a foreigner doing business in Thailand experiences both protectionism and discrimination.  I came to Thailand hoping to contribute my experience to help the Kingdom.  However, sometimes it feels like foreigners are only welcome if you are working for free, giving seminars for free, and bringing in lots of foreign currency here.</p>
<p>In a future post on business in Thailand I will dive into some details on a number of topics that might be of interest to readers who will never have a chance to come and work here.   </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 10:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand">thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/visit thailand">visit thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand progressin">thailand progressin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand chargethousands">thailand chargethousands</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lifein thailand">lifein thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foreigners">foreigners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foreigners canown">foreigners canown</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/businessin thailand">businessin thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/05/business-in-thailand-part-1-the-challenge/">Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ea0ac16a8a09729fec092a6a2c0a7e21</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ea0ac16a8a09729fec092a6a2c0a7e21</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.Here is my first post on this topic
First of all, I learned the Thai alphabet nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty good foundation for the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently someone asked about business in Thailand.  Here is my first post on this topic:</p>
<p>First of all, I learned the Thai alphabet nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty good foundation for the Thai language.   I can read (slowly) and speak better than 99.99+ percent of all foreigners in Thailand; so, I thought it was time to redirect my career to a &#8220;new challenge&#8221; in the business climate of Thailand.   </p>
<p>This was no small decision.  Your career changes dramatically when you give up a successful consulting practice in the US and dive into business in a foreign land for a new challenge.  I can frankly tell you that often the challenge is sometimes overwhelming.    It is quite difficult as a foreigner to do business in Thailand.</p>
<p>First of all, it is not legal for foreigners to own land in Thailand.  Foreigners can &#8221;own&#8221; land using a variety of legal loopholes, proxy owners and shell companies; but all of this is risky and not advised.  Foreigners lose a lot of money coming to Thailand and attempting to buy land.  Some get lucky, but the entire process of foreigners buying and selling land is quite risky.</p>
<p>Foreigners can own condos, under certain conditions, but this results in  inflated prices for condos in Thailand that are traded in an artificial market place.   Condos that are up-to-par with condos in the US can easily cost more than condos in major cities in the US.  Hence, the cost of living is not as cheap as some might believe.</p>
<p>Business can best be described as &#8220;protectism&#8221; where the government has placed many barriers to entry to foreigners working in Thailand.     Every foreigner must have a work permit and these work permits are expensive and time consuming to maintain.   If you own a business you must pay high professional service fees for auditors to perform annual and semiannual audits even if your business has no income yet.   Firms in Thailand charge thousands of dollars for these &#8221;audits&#8221;.      </p>
<p>In addition, if you operate a business, you must have a place of business, so you are forced to lease office space.   Foreigners from the US must be paid a minimum of 50,000 Thai Baht per month, so the government will take 10 percent of that each month as their share of tax withholdings.   Therefore, to start a company, you will pay a lot of money in startup fees, permits, tax, leases, visas, etc.  The entire system is designed to secure money from you, even if you do not have a penny of incoming revenue.</p>
<p>Of course, generating incoming revenue can be quite difficult in a climate of protectionism.   In Thailand, it is easy when you are spending money.  When you are trying to generate income from Thailand, as a foreigner the challenge can seem overwhelming at times.   Many foreigners here give up because the barriers to business here are very high.</p>
<p>On top of all these challenges, which I have not described in detail, is the overall global business slowdown combined with a climate of political instability, which I am sure you have seen in the news.  </p>
<p>Most people I know say it is better to be a tourist here.   Being a tourist is completely different.  Money flows from you, so life in Thailand is fun and friendly, complimentary to the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; you have heard about.     However, when you are working to have money flow the other direction, flow to you versus away from you, you don&#8217;t see the &#8220;Land of Smiles&#8221; as tourists experience.</p>
<p>Without getting into too many details, I can simply say that a foreigner doing business in Thailand experiences protectionism and, to a certain degree, discrimination, and sometimes I wonder if coming here for a &#8220;business challenge&#8221; was a good idea.    I was seeking a &#8220;new challenge&#8221; and I got more than I bargained for!</p>
<p>In a future post on business in Thailand I will discuss issues regarding how little value is placed in intellectual property in Thailand and how this adversely impacts professional services.    I will also touch on how this lack of regard for intellectual property impacts a consulting practice.   Also, I will touch on some cultural differences in how Thais appear to view teamwork, which is very different than in the US.</p>
<p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 10:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/challenge">challenge</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand">thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business challenge">business challenge</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global business slowdown">global business slowdown</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand chargethousands">thailand chargethousands</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/foreigners">foreigners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money flows">money flows</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/04/business-in-thailand-part-1-the-challenge/">Business In Thailand - Part 1: The Challenge</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled &quot; There is No Free...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/wxZZ1xFCjPk/s1600-h/phishing_pages.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/TiCS7pP_jF0/s200-R/phishing_pages.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled "<a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/woot08/tech/full_papers/cova/cova_html/">There is No Free Phish:An Analysis of “Free” and Live Phishing Kits</a>".<br />
<br />
Cybercriminals attempting to scam other cybercriminals has been happening for years, with old school cases where backdoored malware tools such as crypters and binders are offered for free, or a newly released RAT whose client is in fact infected with a third-party malware. Realizing and definitely not enjoying the fact that the lowered entry barriers into cybercrime are empowering yesterday's script kiddies will malware kits that used to be utilized by a set of people who invested time and money into the process several years ago, this unethical competitive practice is only going to get more common. Backdooring phishing pages is one thing, <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1641">backdooring entire web malware exploitation kits, next to the possibility to remotely exploit a competitor's command and control server is entirely another</a> : <br />
<br />
"<i>Taking a more strategic approach, a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal would backdoor <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598" title="The Neosploit cybercrime group abandons its web malware exploitation kit">a highly expensive web malware exploitation kit</a>, then start distributing it for free, and in fact, there have been numerous cases when such kits have been distributed in such a fraudulent manner. The result is a total outsourcing of the process of coming up with ways to infect hundreds of thousands of users though client side exploits <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122" title="Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet">embedded or SQL injected at legitimate sites</a>, and basically collecting the final output - the stolen E-banking data and the botnet itself.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's to come in the long term? Why just backdoor the phishing page, when you can embedd it with a live exploit URL in an attempt to both, infect the cybercriminal about to use and obtain all of the already stolen virtual assets has has already stolen, and also, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/skype-phishing-pages-serving-exploits.html">have a third-party maintain a blended attack campaign without even knowing it</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook </a><b><br />
</b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">Phishing Pages for Every Bank are a Commodity</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/inside-botnets-phishing-activities.html">Inside a Botnet's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/large-scale-myspace-phishing-attack.html">Large Scale MySpace Phishing Attack</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/update-on-myspace-phishing-campaign.html">Update on the MySpace Phishing Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/myspace-phishers-now-targeting-facebook.html">MySpace Phishers Now Targeting Facebook</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/myspace-hosting-myspace-phishing.html">MySpace Hosting MySpace Phishing Profiles</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/diy-phishing-kits.html">DIY Phishing Kits</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-phishing-kit-goes-20.html">DIY Phishing Kit Goes 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/paypal-and-ebay-phishing-domains.html">PayPal and Ebay Phishing Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/average-online-time-for-phishing-sites.html">Average Online Time for Phishing Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/phishing-ecosystem.html">The Phishing Ecosystem</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/assessing-rock-phish-campaign.html">Assessing a Rock Phish Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/taking-down-phishing-sites-business.html">Taking Down Phishing Sites - A Business Model?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/take-this-malicious-site-down.html">Take this Malicious Site Down - Processing Order..</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">209 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/2091-host-locked.html">209.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/661-host-locked.html">66.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/confirm-your-gullibility.html">Confirm Your Gullibility</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/phishers-spammers-and-malware-authors.html">Phishers, Spammers and Malware Authors Clearly Consolidating</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/economics-of-phishing.html">The Economics of Phishing</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=adzwcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=adzwcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=r3qKtK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=r3qKtK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=lKP1Kk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=lKP1Kk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=kwEXWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=kwEXWk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vKtnuK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vKtnuK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=hxAsFK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=hxAsFK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3CLAFk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3CLAFk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/358721854" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phishers">phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace phishers">myspace phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace">myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock phish campaign">rock phish campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free phish">free phish</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kits">kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/358721854/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through credit card cloning or ATM skimming ) put into the process of obtaining the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/9rHV8A0Ggz4/s1600-h/ccz.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/WQG5_Cal0xY/s200-R/ccz.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/credit-card-data-cloning-tactic.html">credit card cloning</a> or <a href="http://www.snopes.com/fraud/atm/atmcamera.asp">ATM skimming</a>) put into the process of obtaining the details, or can we even talk about investments being made where an experienced scammer has just purchased 1GB of raw credit cards data from a novice botnet master who isn't really aware of the actual value of his "botnet output"?<br />
<br />
Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.<br />
<br />
The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :<br />
<br />
"<i>Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. <b>It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.</b></i>"<br />
<br />
This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=827#SecurityTrendsReport">A recently released report by Finjan</a>, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080715/wr_nm/cybercrime_finjan_dc">touches this very same topic</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world.</i>"<br />
<br />
Excluding the presence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/price-discrimination-in-market-for.html">price discrimination</a> for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by<a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/citibank-atm-se.html"> embedding the valid information into plastic cards</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=c5gmVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=c5gmVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=yABcqJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=yABcqJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iuXpaj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iuXpaj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Ctkd2j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Ctkd2j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=KJLEOJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=KJLEOJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6teEcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6teEcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=XpeGzj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=XpeGzj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/336435935" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:36:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price">price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/average market price">average market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market price">market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/competitive market equilibrium">competitive market equilibrium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card basis">credit card basis</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/336435935/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/183e734958786a07b2c4d4b988eb60cc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We had the opportunity to chat with Doug McClure , who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-right-width: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/dougmcclurefeb2008-web.jpg" border="0" alt="dougmcclureFeb2008-web" width="105" height="156" align="left" /> We had the opportunity to chat with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who is currently the Senior Managing Consultant for Business Service Management (BSM) and IT Service Management (ITSM) for the IBM Software Services for Tivoli (ISST) team at IBM Tivoli (part of Software Group (SWG)). He currently leads the Virtual BSM Practice within IBM Software Services for Tivoli.</p>
<p><em><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong></em> What is “BSM Lite” and how is it different from “heavy” BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the concepts that <a href="http://netforecast.com/" target="_blank">Peter Sevcik from Net Forecast</a> initially <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/27818" target="_blank">outlined in his blog post</a> sum up what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; is all about: a simpler, less expensive, more responsive way of achieving the goals and objectives of Business Service Management (BSM).  He&#8217;s contrasted this nicely against what he termed &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; being the larger investments in time and resources to deploy domain specific tools and solutions each providing a view into the business service delivery with some aggregation and consolidation to tie up all of the disparate tool&#8217;s information into a concise end-to-end business service management story.</p>
<p>I&#8217;m pleased that he leveraged some of my thinking around a better working definition of what BSM really is from the <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/business-service-management-bsm-defined/" target="_blank">BSM Defined page on my blog</a>. Of course, these definitions are going to vary depending on whom you talk with and how they see the overall BSM Maturity Model.  I&#8217;ve created a BSM Maturity Model that aligns with the famous Gartner IT maturity model.  I&#8217;d like to think that a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution is one attacking the low hanging fruit, enabling one to achieve value quicker, and in a more tactical manner.  The &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solutions are capable of the same, but span all along the BSM Maturity Model by adding additional point solutions, products and technologies from their broader portfolio. </p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Does “BSM Lite” just refer to the tools, or can it refer to the process and methodology as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think that BSM is as much a philosophy as it is technology, process, people and methodology.  If we can get people to think, operate and respond differently than they do today with a focus on the business, customers, quality, revenue, or whatever else is most important to their business goals and objectives, than that is Business Service Management and could be &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; if you will. </p>
<p>Being that I work for IBM Tivoli, one of my personal objectives is to identify ways to use our key BSM enabling products in a more efficient, effective and BSM centric way. This was a huge driver for trying to hold DevCampTivoli focused on &#8220;Collaborative Development of End-to-End BSM Solutions&#8221;. </p>
<p>In my opinion, we don’t make things very easy for our clients and the answer can’t be to “buy this product, module or widget” to fill in the gaps.  In my opinion, we must establish a BSM overlay within IBM Tivoli’s development and product management organization that ensures that we have clearly thought about how to enable BSM with the hundreds or products that we sell.  In my opinion, every product release must incorporate the fundamentals of enabling BSM in addition to the core domain specific functionality intended. I hope to keep this spirit alive and get our smartest IBMers and clients thinking about the best way to take a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution and make it &#8220;lighter&#8221;. I hope to share more about my plans here and guidance for the industry in general soon.</p>
<p>That said, I am always interested in consulting with clients and collaborate with peers in the industry to figure out how to get the focus on the people, process and technology as key components of their BSM strategies.  I am absolutely convinced that without a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship within the business and IT, the chances of BSM success greatly diminish.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Given the complexities involved in implementing a BSM strategy and dealing with the people and processes components of any business, how does “BSM Lite” really work? Should the expectations and outcomes be “lite” as well?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Time will tell if &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; will work.  I&#8217;m seeing emerging companies that are already breaking down some of the barriers to BSM success.  I do not expect that those choosing to begin with a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; approach should expect &#8220;lite&#8221; outcomes. </p>
<p>The outcomes are the same regardless of the approach IF you&#8217;ve got a documented BSM strategy, roadmap and top level sponsorship in place before you begin. New features, capabilities and technologies will be needed as the needs of the business change and companies mature in BSM and fundamental IT management. This will likely force companies to move in more &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; directions to fill those gaps. </p>
<p>In my opinion, this is the ideal scenario now as it gives &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; vendors opportunities to grow their products and solutions. It also GREATLY improves the chances for success with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution because the organization would have already had matured enough to approach a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; solution than if they hadn&#8217;t done a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution in the past.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Is “BSM Lite” more appropriate for a small or midsized organization, or does it apply equally to large companies? Is there an ideal profile for a company that can successfully implement a BSM strategy? Is there a different profile for “BSM Lite”?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> From an economic perspective, the concepts of &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; are appropriate for all companies.  Remember, with &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; we&#8217;re focused on identifying ways to make the goals and objectives of BSM easier to implement and in a more cost effective way.  Any company concerned about their IT cost overhead should care about this, especially when the risks of starting out with a &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; type deployment are much greater and the time to value generally much longer.</p>
<p>The &#8220;ideal&#8221; profile for any company is one where the BSM initiative begins by establishing top level buy in through creation of a formal BSM strategy for the company. This BSM strategy personalizes how the company defines what BSM is, what value the company expects from it, and how it will use BSM as a competitive differentiator for delivery of its business and IT services, products, etc.</p>
<p>The organizational &#8220;profile&#8221; I&#8217;ve seen most successful is when implementing a BSM strategy originates from within or actively includes a group that many companies have now that serves as a liaison or relationship management role between the various lines of business and IT. Sometimes this group is often seen as the gatekeeper to filter (and hinder) business driven requirements into the IT organization. In the ideal scenario, this group works very closely with the business and IT (usually staffed by business people and not IT people) to understand both the business side and IT side of complex business services and applications. </p>
<p>Apart from the traditional IT components, what this group can do is help IT really understand the business perspective.  Analysis of the impact on the business in business terms is only possible by collaborating with a group such as this.  True value oriented BSM becomes attainable when we get to this level of IT and business alignment, cooperation, collaboration and communication.</p>
<p>If BSM is an IT only initiative, this will likely result in an IT centric perspective severely lacking in the necessary business perspective.  In these cases where IT doesn&#8217;t invest their BSM efforts with the business as an equal partner, the implementation ultimately becomes a &#8220;CYA&#8221; tool for IT and not achieve the desired value oriented expected.</p>
<p>To some degree &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may have an entirely different profile. If we see the price points, complexity and time to value change significantly we may see these types of deployments originate exclusively within the Line of Business. The possibility may exist where large enterprises operating in a shared IT services or IT outsourcing type model that the Line of Business brings in a &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; solution to gain the visibility, checks and balances needed to ensure that the LoB’s needs are being met from the internal/external provider. I&#8217;d envision that &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may even be capable of operating within a &#8220;SaaS&#8221; model or other managed service type offering where the price points are below the signing levels triggering broader IT involvement and review.</p>
<p><em>To Be Continued&#8230;</em></p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+Is+BSM+Lite+the+Answer%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2008 20:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lite">lite</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy">bsm heavy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy directions">bsm heavy directions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm">bsm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outcomes">outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expect lite outcomes">expect lite outcomes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm lite approach">bsm lite approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/approach">approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bsm heavy solution">bsm heavy solution</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: Is BSM Lite the Answer?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ae9fa7925137e6a71a690ef3b705294d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ae9fa7925137e6a71a690ef3b705294d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just like web malware exploitation kits and phishing pages turned into a commodity underground good , allowing easy localization to different languages , and of course, the natural lowering of entry...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHZZ6zTOnOI/AAAAAAAAB5c/3Sqe37mACns/s1600-h/fake_video_codec_template.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHZZ6zTOnOI/AAAAAAAAB5c/Rsu1-EiUFlY/s200-R/fake_video_codec_template.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Just like web <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">malware</a> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/icepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">exploitation</a> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">kits</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">phishing pages turned into a commodity underground good</a>, allowing easy <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">localization to different languages</a>, and of course, the natural lowering of entry barriers into web malware and phishing in general, the very same thing is happening with fake ActiveX templates like the ones used on <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">the majority of fake porn and celebrity sites I've been assessing recently</a>.<br />
<br />
The increase of these bogus ActiveX templates is due to the fact that despite they are currently available for sale, buyers appear to be leaking them for everyone to use so that they can continue maintaining their current business models, namely, the services they offer with the ActiveX templates. Unethical competitive practices among cybercriminals and scammers are only to starting to take place with one another trying to ruin or extend the lifecycle of their services.<br />
<br />
Talking about prevalence, the <b>TonsOfPorn ActiveX</b> remains the most widely used rogue ActiveX in the majority of fake codec campaigns for the last couple of months. The ActiveX is largely abused by using another <b>fake porn site template for PornTube</b>, which in combination result in nothing more than huge domain portfolios with no content at all if we exclude the Zlob variants.<br />
<br />
And while template-tization means more efficient malware campaigns, it also results in a common pattern for generic detection of such sites. For instance, the folks at <a href="http://www.finjan.com/MCRCblog.aspx?EntryId=1993">Finjan did an experiment by verifying the signature based detection of the common javascript file</a> that was used in the ongoing waves of SQL injection attacks. Their conclusion :<br />
<br />
"<i>Can it be that Anti-virus products are now holding more signatures for domains and URLs rather than trying to identify a malicious code they never inspected before? As my research found, just by changing the domain names, some AVs did not find this code as malicious...... surprisingly enough.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHaFBlIm7bI/AAAAAAAAB5k/lXlcCbD2H78/s1600-h/inthecloud3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHaFBlIm7bI/AAAAAAAAB5k/wABNqH2-Sz0/s200-R/inthecloud3.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>When assessing malware campaigns in general, I usually do the same for the record. Storm Worm's use of <b>ind.php</b> for executing its set of exploits has the same detection rate - <b>scanners result: 10/33 (30.30%)</b> and is detected as JS.Zhelatin.zb.<br />
<br />
Getting back to the <b>TonsOfPorn ActiveX</b>, it's structure is more static than a Red Army statue in Estonia, making it easy to proactively protect against, no matter the domain, no matter the exploits served. It's detection rate is close to the javascript from the SQL injection attacks - <b>Scanners Result: 9/33 (27.28%) </b>and is detected as <b>Trojan.HTML.Zlob.L</b>.<br />
<br />
From my personal experience, blocking an IP address where a couple of hundred malicious domains remain parked, is just as useful as blocking a single domain acting as the main redirector behind a huge domains portfolio of malicious domains. However, the most beneficial approach on a large scale remains the practice of taking care of the most obvious patterns that still remain faily easy to detect, at least for the time being, due to the efficiency the people behind them aim to achieve, making them easily susceptible to generic detection approaches.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=60LvHJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=60LvHJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=TvxsiJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=TvxsiJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=UeK86j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=UeK86j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AHP63j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AHP63j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ci9jvJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ci9jvJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=mQuV1J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=mQuV1J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=FGm2Yj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=FGm2Yj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/332106839" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 12:59:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious domains remain">malicious domains remain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious domains">malicious domains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tonsofporn activex remains">tonsofporn activex remains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tonsofporn activex">tonsofporn activex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domains">domains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/generic detection approaches">generic detection approaches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/generic detection">generic detection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/activex">activex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake activex">fake activex</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/332106839/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[CBAC & Medical Identity Theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: askelizabeth
The Sopranokovs
The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: <a href="http://askelizabeth.typepad.com/weblog/2008/07/medical-identity-theft-the-new-frontier-for-organized-crime.html">askelizabeth</a>)

</p><blockquote><p>
	The Sopranokovs 
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The Russian mob comes to town with a new scam—medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>When FBI special agent Ted Price peered through the window of a dingy brick storefront on Southwest Morrison Street in March, it was what he didn’t see that caught his attention. 	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The business, called UnimedCorner, claimed to provide ailing seniors with orthotics—braces and other devices to correct foot, joint and back problems. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Price and other federal investigators were skeptical. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>On Unimed’s showroom floor, Price saw wheelchairs, motorized scooters, a variety of canes and, on the walls, a selection of amateurish paintings and framed photographs. There was no evidence, however, of the kinds of equipment for which Unimed had billed Medicare nearly $2 million in the previous couple of months. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“I observed wheelchairs and canes through the window but did not see any orthotics in the store,” Price later wrote in a search-warrant affidavit. “It is a sign of fraud that the store is not stocking the items [for which] it is billing.” 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>By the time Price arrived on the scene, the company’s owner, a shadowy Russian immigrant named Alexandr Shcherbakov, was long gone. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Today, Shcherbakov’s store sits undisturbed. The message light on the phone blinks, dead potted plants droop and a stuffed toy monkey slumps in a glass display case. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>And behind the cash register hangs a framed poster of television’s best-known mobsters, the Sopranos. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>From interviews and information presented in federal affidavits, it is clear Shcherbakov moved to Oregon to commit a crime elegant and lucrative enough to make Tony Soprano envious: medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>... 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“Medical identity theft is the new frontier for organized crime,” says Alex Johnson, a former FBI agent who investigates fraud for Regence BlueShield. “Pretty much anybody can set up a mom-and-pop operation and start cranking out claims.”
	
	Someday, most Americans will need a cane, wheelchair, home hospital bed or another of the items healthcare professionals call “durable medical equipment,” or DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>For those over 64 and without private insurance, there’s a good chance federally funded Medicare will pick up the tab for that equipment. Last year, according to federal statistics, Medicare spent $8.6 billion on DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Here’s the way the system is supposed to work: A doctor prescribes a device such as a wheelchair for a patient, who presents his prescription to a DME supplier. The supplier provides the equipment and bills Medicare, which typically pays 80 percent of the cost.
	
	Unlike pharmacists, who fill prescriptions under strict scrutiny of state and federal watchdogs, DME suppliers are lightly regulated.
	
	“DME is very vulnerable to fraud,” says Consuelo Woodhead, the chief healthcare fraud prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles. “It doesn’t require any background in medicine, any kind of professional licensure or appreciable capital. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>There are barriers of entry in other medical fields, but not in DME.”
	
	To operate, DME suppliers simply need a place of business, a business license and liability insurance. Unlike pharmacists, DME suppliers operate under an honor system: The feds count on them to supply the equipment they claim to provide to the beneficiaries who need it. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>That honor system is not working. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The epicenter of DME fraud, according to the federal Department of Health and Human Services, is South Florida, where Medicare billing for DME quadrupled from 2002 to 2006 to $1.7 billion.
	
	Investigators found much of that increase was due to fraud. In 2006, federal inspectors revoked the licenses of 634 DME suppliers in South Florida, nearly half the DME dealers in the region. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Later the same year, raids in Southern California yielded similar results: The feds shut down 95 DME suppliers.
	
	Many of the DME suppliers shut down around Los Angeles were run by immigrants from the former Soviet Union. It’s probably no coincidence that when the feds raided Los Angeles DME suppliers, some Angelenos fled to cities where there was less scrutiny—such as Portland.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 06:09:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers simply">dme suppliers simply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers">dme suppliers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme fraud">dme fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme">dme</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical identity theft">medical identity theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme dealers">dme dealers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme supplier">dme supplier</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/cbac-medical-identity-theft.html">CBAC &amp; Medical Identity Theft</source>
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