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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: brick-level]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/brick-level</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2007 07:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Get Involved Now In Cloud Computing Discussions]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a06cd0de4e69f284cadf864ed07e11a2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a06cd0de4e69f284cadf864ed07e11a2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This week Amazons Simple Storage Service (S3) suffered a major outage that affected several websites that rely on the service. This is actually the second major outage for Amazon S3 this year. As a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img border="0" title="Stephanie Balaouras" alt="Stephanie Balaouras" src="http://www.forrester.com/role_based/images/author/imported/forresterDotCom/Analyst_Photos/Silhouette/Color/Stephanie-Balaouras.gif" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman">This week Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (S3) suffered a major outage that affected several websites that rely on the service. This is actually the second major outage for Amazon S3 this year. As a result of these and other reported outages, some companies will come to question whether they should pursue these new cloud-based services in the future. I agree with </span><a href="http://www.roughtype.com/archives/2008/02/amazons_s3_util.php"><span face="Times New Roman">Nick Carr</span></a><span face="Times New Roman">, whether you’re a startup looking to rely on the cloud almost exclusively for computing power and storage capacity or you’re a brick and mortar company who may want to use SaaS services for CRM or an </span><a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=42947"><span face="Times New Roman">online backup service</span></a><span face="Times New Roman">, these outages should not scare companies away from cloud-based services. Outages are inevitable; no one, not the most sophisticated internal IT shops on Wall Street, or the largest service providers can offer 100% availability all the time. </span><a href="http://status.aws.amazon.com/"><span face="Times New Roman">Amazon threw everything it had to fix the problem</span></a><span face="Times New Roman"> and was able to address the outage in several hours. How well would you be able to execute on your disaster recovery plan if you had a major outage?</span></p>

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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman">Instead of avoiding cloud-based services, organizations need to be savvier about security and resiliency of the service provider. In fact, your organization may already be in pursuit of these services. Online backup is becoming a viable alternate to premise-based solutions for PC backup as well as remote office backup. Next will be a number of services related to information management such as </span><a href="/t/app/Local%20Settings/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/OLKF5/The%20Forrester%20Wave:%20Message%20Archiving%20Hosted%20Services,%20Q1%202008"><span face="Times New Roman">online archiving</span></a><span face="Times New Roman"> and online records management and more online storage offerings to support low cost storage. Further down the road, there will also be hosted, multi-tenancy Exchange solutions. Get involved in these discussions. Don’t take it for granted that the potential service provider has hardened data centers that meet Tier III or Tier IV classifications (these classifications describe data center site infrastructure and topology, Tier IV is the highest rating), that your data is replicated to another data center, that your data is encrypted in flight and at rest and that the service provider has strong security measures in place so that administrators can support the infrastructure but not access or even see your organization’s information.<span style="text-decoration: underline;">&nbsp;</span></span><a href="http://www.forrester.com/go?docid=43849"><span face="Times New Roman">Organizations should have consistent processes before, during and after the contracts have been signed. </span></a><span face="Times New Roman"><br /></span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman"><br /></span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman">And, when you ask about SLAs regarding resiliency, keep in mind that there will be some downtime for routine maintenance and that some unplanned downtime is inevitable. Consider a service provider that might boast about 99.9% availability (8 hours/year outage for 24x7). What is the difference between the following?</span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"></p>





<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 90pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal;">&nbsp;</span></span><span face="Times New Roman">8 AM to 4 PM on the last Friday of the quarter </span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 90pt; text-indent: -18pt;"><span style="font-family: Symbol;">·<span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 7pt; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal;">&nbsp;</span></span><span face="Times New Roman">Biweekly outages of 30 min at 4 AM local time</span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"></p>





<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman">Timing and duration are more important than total downtime/outage.</span></p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman"><br /></span></p>

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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0pt;"><span face="Times New Roman">Get involved in these discussions but be careful not to come off as the obstacle or as the doomsayer. Quite the opposite, you want to be seen as the enabler. Help the organization understand some of the potential risks but then help the organization define its resiliency requirements, security requirements, and risk tolerance. When the organization knows this, it can more confidently go out and select the right service provider, negotiate the appropriate SLAs and be prepared ahead of time with contingency plans for any potential service outages.</span></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 06:55:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online backup service">online backup service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online">online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential service provider">potential service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online storage offerings">online storage offerings</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online records management">online records management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online backup">online backup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential service outages">potential service outages</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.forrester.com/srm/2008/07/get-involved-no.html">Get Involved Now In Cloud Computing Discussions</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Follow the Yellow Brick Road]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/887593779bb99c69b570648c6cdcc8d6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/887593779bb99c69b570648c6cdcc8d6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Marc Adlerfollows on from Muddy Waters to The First Annual Fluffies for CEP where Marc also calls into question the transparency, credibility and accuracy of the various fluffy awards we see from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Marc Adler follows on from <a title="Muddy Waters" rel="bookmark" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/16/muddy-waters/"><span style="color: #105cb6;">Muddy Waters</span></a> to <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-annual-fluffies-for-cep.html" target="_blank">The First Annual Fluffies for CEP</a> where Marc also calls into question the transparency, credibility and accuracy of the various fluffy &#8220;awards&#8221; we see from time-to-time.</p>
<p>When I discussed this openly with Waters in <a title="Muddy Waters" rel="bookmark" href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/16/muddy-waters/"><span style="color: #105cb6;">Muddy Waters</span></a> comments they kindly replied that &#8220;customers are loath to be a reference client for a vendor,&#8221;  like this fact somehow justifies having 600 people, most who have never actually used the software in practice, vote on how great it is.  </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Or, as Mark Adler pointed out in his well written blog post <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-annual-fluffies-for-cep.html" target="_blank">The First Annual Fluffies for CEP</a> , a secretive &#8220;panel of renowned judge&#8221; is going to tell us, via Jolt, who has the better solution?  Holy Cow Batman!   Let me buy a nice layout in your magazine  or web site,  please, so &#8220;my software company&#8221; will be on the short list for the &#8220;the awards&#8221;.  </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>All this smoke-and-mirrors. share-the-love, marketing reminds me of The Matrix a bit, where the world as we observe it, is a complete artificial construction, where most people in the Matrix believe they are &#8220;real&#8221; because they do not know that they really just a computer generated program designed to keep humans happy as they sleep in some cold goop with electrodes stuck up their you-know-what, really just bio-batteries insuring the light bill is paid.</p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>Or better yet, these fluffies are similar to most of the Webinars we see where there are questions from &#8220;the audience&#8221; but we know that most of these questions did not come from the &#8220;audience&#8221; - yet we all seem to continue &#8221;the  audience&#8221; myth just like Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny! </p>
<blockquote><p><em>Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>The Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy and the Fluffy Awards are real, if you want them to be real.  Just close your eyes and click your heels three times&#8230;.</p>
<blockquote><p>Follow the Yellow Brick Road. Follow the Yellow Brick Road.<br />
Follow, follow, follow, follow,<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick Road.<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick, Follow the Yellow Brick,<br />
Follow the Yellow Brick Road.</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>We&#8217;re off to see the Wizard, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.<br />
You&#8217;ll find he is a whiz of a Wiz! If ever a Wiz! there was.<br />
If ever oh ever a Wiz! there was The Wizard of Oz is one because,<br />
Because, because, because, because, because.<br />
Because of the wonderful things he does.<br />
We&#8217;re off to see the Wizard. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 19 Jul 2008 15:57:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/yellow brick">yellow brick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/yellow brick road">yellow brick road</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/follow">follow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wonderful wizard">wonderful wizard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wizard">wizard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/awards">awards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fluffy awards">fluffy awards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wonderful">wonderful</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/audience">audience</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/19/follow-the-yellow-brick-road/">Follow the Yellow Brick Road</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[I took the plunge for an iPhone 3G]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/389c083718c7ae00aed268a97aa61378</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/389c083718c7ae00aed268a97aa61378</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When the original iPhone came out I thought it was pretty cool, but at the end of the day it did not do for me what my Windows Mobile Smartphone did. Namely gave me 3G access speed and Exchange...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>When the original iPhone came out I thought it was pretty cool, but at the end of the day it did not do for me what my <a class="zem_slink" title="Windows Mobile" href="http://microsoft.com/windowsmobile/" rel="homepage">Windows Mobile Smartphone</a> did.&nbsp; Namely gave me 3G access speed and Exchange integration.&nbsp; Those two things alone were enough to keep me a Windows smarthphone user. </p>

<p>As I wrote earlier July 4th my phone got wet in my backpack and though I have blown dried it often since than, it has just never come back. I can make a call now and than and use, but you never know when it is going to whig out and I have to reboot (actually it was like that before it got wet, but it is much worse now).&nbsp; So having had this phone over a year, it really was time for a new phone.&nbsp; </p>

<p>I was not totally sold on the iPhone and it was not my only choice. I wanted no part of the lines and crowds, so I waited until Saturday to go to the ATT store and see what my options were.&nbsp; Frankly, I didn't have many options.&nbsp; The upgrade for my current phone is the <a class="zem_slink" title="High Tech Computer Corporation" href="http://www.htc.com/" rel="homepage">HTC</a> Tilt.&nbsp; Nice phone and I would consider it, but not at the $450 dollars that they wanted to charge me.&nbsp; After that, there was the Blackjack, not interesting.&nbsp; A few others and than Blackberries. I need the Exchange integration.&nbsp; So when it came down to it, you could not beat the $199 price for the iPhone. The 2 year contract didn't scare me, as I am at ATT wireless user for about 10 years already.&nbsp; The only bad part is that they did not have any in stock and I had to order mine. It should come within 5 to 7 days, but all set up for me to just plug in to iTunes and away I go!</p>

<p>So a few more days of this water logged brick and than on to joining the &quot;mod squad&quot;.</p>

<fieldset class="zemanta-related"><legend class="zemanta-related-title">Related articles by Zemanta</legend><ul class="zemanta-article-ul"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/07/10/HTCs_iPhone_3G_rival_the_Touch_Diamond_1.html?source=rss&amp;url=http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/07/10/HTCs_iPhone_3G_rival_the_Touch_Diamond_1.html">Hands on: HTC's iPhone 3G rival, the Touch Diamond</a></li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://www.reghardware.co.uk/2008/07/11/round_up_iphone_rivals/">The Top Ten 3G iPhone beaters</a></li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://www.beet.tv/2008/07/apple-iphone-3g.html">Apple iPhone 3G has Easy Set-up with Microsoft Exchange</a></li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/zimbra_mobile_for_the_iphone_2_0.php">Zimbra Mobile for the iPhone 2.0</a></li></ul></fieldset> <div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/74d5be89-2d28-46f1-9ba2-6e0cd0199c68/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=74d5be89-2d28-46f1-9ba2-6e0cd0199c68" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=are1zz"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=are1zz" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zEbZJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zEbZJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=RxWIoJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=RxWIoJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=blJi0J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=blJi0J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=3QttHJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=3QttHJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=8WSKlj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=8WSKlj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=pXYanj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=pXYanj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/334681866" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Jul 2008 16:56:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iphone">iphone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original iphone">original iphone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apple iphone">apple iphone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current phone">current phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iphone beaters">iphone beaters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nice phone">nice phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exchange integration">exchange integration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/att wireless user">att wireless user</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/334681866/i-took-the-plun.html">I took the plunge for an iPhone 3G</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CBAC & Medical Identity Theft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/02105d066a63c57c66a00f92ef63e99d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: askelizabeth
The Sopranokovs
The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good story to keep in mind for those of you working on CBAC. Claims neeed protection and verification. Why steal an identity when you can capture a claim? (hattip: <a href="http://askelizabeth.typepad.com/weblog/2008/07/medical-identity-theft-the-new-frontier-for-organized-crime.html">askelizabeth</a>)

</p><blockquote><p>
	The Sopranokovs 
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The Russian mob comes to town with a new scam—medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>When FBI special agent Ted Price peered through the window of a dingy brick storefront on Southwest Morrison Street in March, it was what he didn’t see that caught his attention. 	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The business, called UnimedCorner, claimed to provide ailing seniors with orthotics—braces and other devices to correct foot, joint and back problems. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Price and other federal investigators were skeptical. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>On Unimed’s showroom floor, Price saw wheelchairs, motorized scooters, a variety of canes and, on the walls, a selection of amateurish paintings and framed photographs. There was no evidence, however, of the kinds of equipment for which Unimed had billed Medicare nearly $2 million in the previous couple of months. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“I observed wheelchairs and canes through the window but did not see any orthotics in the store,” Price later wrote in a search-warrant affidavit. “It is a sign of fraud that the store is not stocking the items [for which] it is billing.” 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>By the time Price arrived on the scene, the company’s owner, a shadowy Russian immigrant named Alexandr Shcherbakov, was long gone. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Today, Shcherbakov’s store sits undisturbed. The message light on the phone blinks, dead potted plants droop and a stuffed toy monkey slumps in a glass display case. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>And behind the cash register hangs a framed poster of television’s best-known mobsters, the Sopranos. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>From interviews and information presented in federal affidavits, it is clear Shcherbakov moved to Oregon to commit a crime elegant and lucrative enough to make Tony Soprano envious: medical identity theft. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>... 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>“Medical identity theft is the new frontier for organized crime,” says Alex Johnson, a former FBI agent who investigates fraud for Regence BlueShield. “Pretty much anybody can set up a mom-and-pop operation and start cranking out claims.”
	
	Someday, most Americans will need a cane, wheelchair, home hospital bed or another of the items healthcare professionals call “durable medical equipment,” or DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>For those over 64 and without private insurance, there’s a good chance federally funded Medicare will pick up the tab for that equipment. Last year, according to federal statistics, Medicare spent $8.6 billion on DME. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Here’s the way the system is supposed to work: A doctor prescribes a device such as a wheelchair for a patient, who presents his prescription to a DME supplier. The supplier provides the equipment and bills Medicare, which typically pays 80 percent of the cost.
	
	Unlike pharmacists, who fill prescriptions under strict scrutiny of state and federal watchdogs, DME suppliers are lightly regulated.
	
	“DME is very vulnerable to fraud,” says Consuelo Woodhead, the chief healthcare fraud prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles. “It doesn’t require any background in medicine, any kind of professional licensure or appreciable capital. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>There are barriers of entry in other medical fields, but not in DME.”
	
	To operate, DME suppliers simply need a place of business, a business license and liability insurance. Unlike pharmacists, DME suppliers operate under an honor system: The feds count on them to supply the equipment they claim to provide to the beneficiaries who need it. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>That honor system is not working. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>The epicenter of DME fraud, according to the federal Department of Health and Human Services, is South Florida, where Medicare billing for DME quadrupled from 2002 to 2006 to $1.7 billion.
	
	Investigators found much of that increase was due to fraud. In 2006, federal inspectors revoked the licenses of 634 DME suppliers in South Florida, nearly half the DME dealers in the region. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Later the same year, raids in Southern California yielded similar results: The feds shut down 95 DME suppliers.
	
	Many of the DME suppliers shut down around Los Angeles were run by immigrants from the former Soviet Union. It’s probably no coincidence that when the feds raided Los Angeles DME suppliers, some Angelenos fled to cities where there was less scrutiny—such as Portland.</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 06:09:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers simply">dme suppliers simply</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme suppliers">dme suppliers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme fraud">dme fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme">dme</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical identity theft">medical identity theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme dealers">dme dealers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dme supplier">dme supplier</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/cbac-medical-identity-theft.html">CBAC &amp; Medical Identity Theft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another brick in the wall to limit blogging]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/938d64252078beb3e8e96d82052b0dc3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/938d64252078beb3e8e96d82052b0dc3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[First it was the EU looking at passing a law that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the AP is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=300,height=300,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg"><img title="Brick_in_the_wall" height="200" alt="Brick_in_the_wall" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/images/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg" width="200" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px" /></a> First it was the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/eu-bloggers-und.html">EU looking at passing a law</a> that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the <a class="zem_slink" title="Associated Press" href="http://ap.org/" rel="homepage">AP</a> is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a blogger puts an excerpt from an AP article in their blog.&nbsp; My friend <a href="http://www.crn.com/software/208700252">Kevin McLaughlin blogged on this over at Channel Web blog</a> today. Basically the AP says that if you excerpt more than 5 words you need to start paying them fees.&nbsp; Kevin reached out to me and I gave him my views on this one.</p>

<p>I think that it is a really short sighted move by the AP.&nbsp; First of all it shows they really don't understand blogging.&nbsp; Blogging is about taking an idea which often comes from another source and putting the bloggers own spin and ideas behind it. In this way topics are built on one blog at a time with each blogger adding a bit more to the conversation. Each additional blog on topic enriches those blogs and articles that preceded it.&nbsp; As I said in the Channel Web article, it is like a jazz musician playing a riff on top of a line already laid down.</p>

<p>In real terms blogging on the AP content will only generate more views and interest in the AP content.&nbsp; AP is just a dinosaur with this type of view and will soon go the way of dinosaurs if they try to enforce this. In the meantime bloggers can talk about an AP article, but don't link to it and don't excerpt from it. I suspect that the next thing is we will have a replay of the inbound links litigation we had 8 years ago.&nbsp; In the meantime blogging will continue to march on with AP or not. </p>

<fieldset class="zemanta-related"><legend>Related articles</legend><ul class="zemanta-article-ul"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.marketingvox.com/ap-blogging-group-to-create-unified-guidelines-039294/?camp=rssfeed&amp;src=mv&amp;type=textlink">AP, Blogging Group to Create Unified Guidelines</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.socialmediatoday.com/SMC/37470">AP to Restrict Content Use on Blogs</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://billhobbs.com/2008/06/bet_on_the_bloggers.html">Bet on the Bloggers</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.paidcontent.org/entry/419-ap-wants-change-in-blog-excerpting-just-not-sure-what/">AP Wants Change In Blog Excerpting, Just Not Sure What</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/6/16/145135/241">AP's clash with bloggers, fair use</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://techdirt.com/articles/20080616/0635571413.shtml">Associated Press Digs Its Own Grave Deeper; Wants To Create Its Own Fair Use Rules</a> [via Zemanta]</li></ul></fieldset> <div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_a.png?x-id=41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 20:36:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime">meantime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web blog">channel web blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime bloggers">meantime bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bloggers">bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zemanta">zemanta</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional blog">additional blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web article">channel web article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/require bloggers">require bloggers</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/another-brick-i.html">Another brick in the wall to limit blogging</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another brick in the wall to limit blogging]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7e611d432f89d17bbd84446e9ed804d5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7e611d432f89d17bbd84446e9ed804d5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[First it was the EU looking at passing a law that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the AP is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=300,height=300,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg"><img title="Brick_in_the_wall" height="200" alt="Brick_in_the_wall" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/images/2008/06/17/brick_in_the_wall.jpg" width="200" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px" /></a> First it was the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/eu-bloggers-und.html">EU looking at passing a law</a> that would require bloggers to disclose their identity and affiliation. Now the <a class="zem_slink" title="Associated Press" href="http://ap.org/" rel="homepage">AP</a> is looking to enforce a new license that would require payments when a blogger puts an excerpt from an AP article in their blog.&nbsp; My friend <a href="http://www.crn.com/software/208700252">Kevin McLaughlin blogged on this over at Channel Web blog</a> today. Basically the AP says that if you excerpt more than 5 words you need to start paying them fees.&nbsp; Kevin reached out to me and I gave him my views on this one.</p>

<p>I think that it is a really short sighted move by the AP.&nbsp; First of all it shows they really don't understand blogging.&nbsp; Blogging is about taking an idea which often comes from another source and putting the bloggers own spin and ideas behind it. In this way topics are built on one blog at a time with each blogger adding a bit more to the conversation. Each additional blog on topic enriches those blogs and articles that preceded it.&nbsp; As I said in the Channel Web article, it is like a jazz musician playing a riff on top of a line already laid down.</p>

<p>In real terms blogging on the AP content will only generate more views and interest in the AP content.&nbsp; AP is just a dinosaur with this type of view and will soon go the way of dinosaurs if they try to enforce this. In the meantime bloggers can talk about an AP article, but don't link to it and don't excerpt from it. I suspect that the next thing is we will have a replay of the inbound links litigation we had 8 years ago.&nbsp; In the meantime blogging will continue to march on with AP or not. </p>

<fieldset class="zemanta-related"><legend>Related articles</legend><ul class="zemanta-article-ul"><li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.marketingvox.com/ap-blogging-group-to-create-unified-guidelines-039294/?camp=rssfeed&amp;src=mv&amp;type=textlink">AP, Blogging Group to Create Unified Guidelines</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.socialmediatoday.com/SMC/37470">AP to Restrict Content Use on Blogs</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://billhobbs.com/2008/06/bet_on_the_bloggers.html">Bet on the Bloggers</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.paidcontent.org/entry/419-ap-wants-change-in-blog-excerpting-just-not-sure-what/">AP Wants Change In Blog Excerpting, Just Not Sure What</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/6/16/145135/241">AP's clash with bloggers, fair use</a> [via Zemanta] </li>

<li class="zemanta-article-ul-li"><a title="Open in new window" href="http://techdirt.com/articles/20080616/0635571413.shtml">Associated Press Digs Its Own Grave Deeper; Wants To Create Its Own Fair Use Rules</a> [via Zemanta]</li></ul></fieldset> <div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_a.png?x-id=41559f22-3b30-4fc0-8281-96493f59c454" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=xhThfi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=xhThfi" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=DAozrI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=DAozrI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=CTEbYI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=CTEbYI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=XuZl8I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=XuZl8I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=xe0kiI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=xe0kiI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=zkNEvi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=zkNEvi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=HIYt0i"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=HIYt0i" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/314331248" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 19:43:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime">meantime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web blog">channel web blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meantime bloggers">meantime bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bloggers">bloggers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zemanta">zemanta</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional blog">additional blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/channel web article">channel web article</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/require bloggers">require bloggers</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/314331248/another-brick-i.html">Another brick in the wall to limit blogging</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Starbucks, AT&T Brick Loyalty Card Service Launch]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7b29ed98f6b523f87ff75c3ab5bf5ff6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7b29ed98f6b523f87ff75c3ab5bf5ff6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Starbucks, AT&amp;T biff day one of the card loyalty program: After several hours of occasional attempts to register my Starbucks Card (actually, two) with the company for free Wi-Fi and other rewards,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://flickr.com/photos/matt-davis/2045538813/"><img src="http://wifinetnews.com//images/2008/coffee_stain.jpg" alt="coffee_stain.jpg" border="0" width="150" height="100" align="right" hspace="5" /><a href="https://www.starbucks.com/cardrewards/"></a><strong>Starbucks, AT&T biff day one of the card loyalty program:</strong></a> After several hours of occasional attempts to register my Starbucks Card (actually, two) with the company for free Wi-Fi and other rewards, seeing "Service Unavailable," long delays, errors, and a general failure to accept my card--now there's a message. "Due to overwhelming interest in Card Rewards we are currently experiencing difficulty accessing Starbucks Cards accounts. We are working to fix the problem and ask that you please try again later."</p>

<p>The Card Rewards program allows anyone with a Starbucks Card to register it with Starbucks for freebies, including Wi-Fi. There's an interesting choice (when it worked) where you can select whether to have freebies like free exotic milk options or brewed coffee refills by themselves or with Wi-Fi on top. If you choose Wi-Fi, you're redirected to SBC servers (for nostalgia's sake), at which point everything seems to fall apart.</p>

<p>Trying two separate cards, I was unable to set up an account and get the cards to take. The errors weren't clearly spelled out. Clearly, the system was neither designed to handle demand, nor designed to fail gracefully, blocking users until capacity was available.</p>

<p>For loyal Starbucks patrons, this doesn't come across very well at all.</p>

<p><span class="posted">[<a href="http://flickr.com/photos/matt-davis/2045538813/">Photo by Matt Davis</a>. Used under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en">Creative Commons license</a>.]</span></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 09:34:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/starbucks">starbucks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card">card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card rewards program">card rewards program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card rewards">card rewards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/starbucks cards accounts">starbucks cards accounts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cards">cards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/starbucks card">starbucks card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rewards">rewards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/choose wi-fi">choose wi-fi</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008340.html">Starbucks, AT&amp;T Brick Loyalty Card Service Launch</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hannaford Supermarkets]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fbe8450e5c7946e9f93d073d8580cb9c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fbe8450e5c7946e9f93d073d8580cb9c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is going to get very interesting. Hannaford Supermarkets announced on Mar 17 that they lost 4.2 million card numbers to a hacker (Began Dec 7, discovered on Feb 27) . They also claim to be...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/R-VMKMtklvI/AAAAAAAAAbo/t3tBmVEmc30/s1600-h/hannaford.JPG"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5180630684454393586" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_XTqu2iQGpYM/R-VMKMtklvI/AAAAAAAAAbo/t3tBmVEmc30/s400/hannaford.JPG" border="0" /></a><br />This is going to get very interesting. Hannaford Supermarkets announced on Mar 17 that they lost 4.2 million card numbers to a hacker (Began Dec 7, discovered on Feb 27) . They also claim to be certified as <a href="http://www.hannaford.com/Contents/Common/PrivacyStatement.shtml">compliant</a> with PCI DSS. So what value does the certification hold ?<br /><br />Instead of saying PCI is worthless, lets step back for a minute and think about this. If this was an inside job, PCI Co can't be blamed. Also, as it stands today, the QSAs/ASVs can claim that their assessment was a point in time and as such, they shouldn't be held responsible for a company getting hacked after they gave it a clean chit. Change <em>that</em> and watch the number of QSAs/ASVs drop like a brick, and PCI Co get better value out of these QSAs and ASVs.<br /><br />Lets see what the Hannaford CEO Ron Hodge said<br />"<br />Hannaford has contained a data intrusion into its computer network that resulted in the theft of customer credit and debit card numbers. No personal information, such as names or addresses, was accessed. Hannaford doesn’t collect, know or keep any personally identifiable customer information from transactions.<br /><p style="FONT-STYLE: italic">We sincerely regret this intrusion into our systems, which we believe, are among the strongest in the industry. The stolen data was limited to credit and debit card numbers and expiration dates, and was illegally accessed from our computer systems during transmission of card authorization.</p><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">"<br /><br /></span>Huh ?<br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">No personal information such as names or addresses was accessed. </span><br /><br />If that is the case, the authorizations should fail for most transactions of medium to high value when those numbers are reused since they don't have the name (I say most - because most auth engines typically use a complicated formula depending on location of purchase, amount of purchase, a margin for errors in reads during swipes etc before authorizing a transaction).<br /><br />[Interesting Update: According to <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2008/03/22/banks_move_to_protect_hannaford_breach_victims/">this</a> article, there are around 1800 cases of related fraud so far, and they talk about a $1270 charge going through. Which really means there <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">are </span>authorization engines out there that <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">don't seem to care about the customer name in a transaction. </span>Either that, or someone is lying.]<br /><br />Could there be a sniffer installed on the network ?<br /><br />Track data has your name, card number, expiration date and encrypted IPIN among other things. If a sniffer was present at the swipe location, it surely would've got the name. But he clearly states no names were accessed. But what if it was in the scenario described a few posts below - about the ATM authorizations ? If you look at the message formats, they have card numbers and expiration dates. What was compromised ? <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Card numbers and expiration dates. </span>(ISO 8583 seems to have track data in its message transmissions - but not until a long way into the stream, and for some reason, I didn't notice it in my raw transaction data log review. The attackers probably just captured the initial bytes of the transmission ?)<br /><br />"But they were PCI Compliant and hence would've had to encrypt their data in transmission" you say.<br /><br />Thanks to the vagueness of PCI, even if rule 4.1 were to be applied -<br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">Use strong cryptography and security protocols such as secure sockets layer (SSL) / transport </span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">layer security (TLS) and Internet protocol security (IPSEC) to safeguard sensitive cardholder data during transmission over open, public networks.<br /><br /></span>Could they have used the excuse that the network was not open or public ? And then - they could always use the <span style="FONT-STYLE: italic">compensating controls</span> excuse to not encrypt.<span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><br /></span><br />I'm willing to bet there was some form of sniffing involved - and this probably is sniffing of the POS/ATM transaction in the ISO8583 format. (a scenario I was afraid of in <a href="http://securitycoin.blogspot.com/2008/03/atm-communication.html">this</a> post)<br /><br /><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"></span></span></span><br /><br /></span><span style="FONT-STYLE: italic"></span>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 09:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card">card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/debit card">debit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/track data">track data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss">pci dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hannaford supermarkets">hannaford supermarkets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hannaford">hannaford</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci compliant">pci compliant</category>
      <source url="http://securitycoin.blogspot.com/2008/03/hannaford-supermarkets.html">Hannaford Supermarkets</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[When Will the Media Industry Embrace the BORA Principle?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bc3d37797069fd878ec5307ea2d0c0e8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bc3d37797069fd878ec5307ea2d0c0e8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was reading the WSJ this morning and came across an op-ed piece entitled Congress Must Make Clear Copyright Laws to Protect Consumers written by Walter S. Mossberg. I enjoyed the article and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">I was reading the WSJ this morning and came across an op-ed piece entitled &#8220;Congress Must Make Clear Copyright Laws to Protect Consumers&#8221; written by Walter S. Mossberg.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>I enjoyed the article and especially liked his fair use comparison between print and video (you can reprint a small section of a publication in another without permission, yet you can&#8217;t post a short clip of the &#8220;Daily Show&#8221; on YouTube).<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The one issue I had with his article was referring to Apple&#8217;s FairPlay as a &#8220;DRM system for music that has worked&#8221; (it&#8217;s not the DRM, but rather the void in the marketplace that made Apple successful).<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">While I would love for Congress to fix our copyright laws, I regard the notion as fantasy.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>They don&#8217;t appear capable of fixing any complicated issue and tend to muddy the waters making any situation worse off than when they began.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Secondly, the media industry will either collapse under the weight of their archaic business model or realize the impossibility of DRM and move in another direction.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Either of which nullifies the issue.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">DRM is impossible due to the fact that it falls under the BORA (break once run anywhere) principle.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>This principle is understood thoroughly by those of us in the security industry.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>When analyzing a threat, if it&#8217;s determined that an entity could be compromised once and then be exploited globally, you are faced with two choices: restrict access to the entity by limiting and hardening access points or decrease the exploitability of the entity once compromised.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Many industries have fought BORA, which is akin to fighting gravity.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>I can think of three this morning, namely the software, credit card, and media industries. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>It&#8217;s infuriating to think of all the revenue lost and the exorbitant externalities bore by an unassuming public all because these industries couldn&#8217;t understand simple logic.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>This is especially true when the solution requires only a trivial leap of faith. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The credit card industry is by far the clearest example of an industry that came to terms with the BORA principle.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Quite frankly, they delayed the success of ecommerce by about 5 years.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>I&#8217;ll even go so far as to say that we would not have had a dotcom bubble if not for their foolishness.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">In 1992, credit card fraud was at its peak (15.7 cents per $100 charged) due to fraudsters becoming more advanced. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>The internet allowed people with similar interests who would have never came into contact in the physical world to find one another digitally.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Fraudsters were able to share information and increase the sophistication of scams long before e-commerce was a reality.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Faced with a bleak economic picture, the credit card industry became paralyzed by fear as they imagined credit card numbers floating unprotected through cyber space.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>For 6 years their agenda was to spread fear in the hopes consumers (and brick and mortar retailers) wouldn&#8217;t embrace ecommerce until they created a process by which credit card numbers couldn&#8217;t be stolen online.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Their fear clouded their ability to approach the problem logically.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>If a credit card can easily be cloned by your waiter at a restaurant, then why protect the same card during an online transaction?<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Or better yet, why protect individual transactions while every brick and mortar retailer has a record of each credit card used for purchases?<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>As a criminal you target the warehouse, the delivery truck, the retailer, but never a single customer.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">The history of ecommerce between 1992 through 1997 is fairly interesting and comical.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The failure to realize what seems obvious today is not the fault of a single company.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>There were over 30 dotcom companies that were created during this period, all vying to be the payment processor for not only the web, but literally the future.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>In 1994, Visa and MasterCard turned to Microsoft and Netscape, respectively, for solutions.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>As any company would, these tech giants devised schemes that benefited them rather than serve the needs of their clients.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Fortunately for Visa and MasterCard, CNP (card not present) transactions were already allowed for mail order catalog purchases.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Despite their fear campaign and merchant agreements that left stores 100% liable for fraud, companies like Amazon accepted the increased risk and allowed the credit card industry to ultimately be successful.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>By 1998, Visa&#8217;s sales volume had tripled which cut fraud as a percentage nearly in half.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Credit cards went from being used for credit to being used for convenience (what they were originally designed for in the 1950&#8217;s when the banking system was fractured).<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>This was a massive shift in the financial industry.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Comparing one&#8217;s own experiences in the checkout line at a grocery store in 1992 and 2002 tells the story.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>It went from checks and cash to plastic.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Even the stigma of credit cards is completely different today.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>College students can&#8217;t survive without credit cards, a far cry from when they were counseled not to have one.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">With this shift, credit card companies began focusing on preventing fraudulent transactions.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>By using two sets of data, one for CNP and the other for in-store transactions, they were able to prevent cards that were cloned from being used on the web, and card numbers stolen on the web from being used in person.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>The other advent was address verification, which among other things allowed retailers (who are liable for fraud) to prevent highly liquid assets from being shipped to any address other than where the statements are delivered.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">They then began to promote ecommerce as if they never said anything bad about it in the first place.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Consumers were given zero fraud guarantees which created a perception of little to no risk.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>It wasn&#8217;t long before traditional brick and mortar retailers rushed to the web, displacing overnight dotcom sensations which lacked feasible business models.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Finally in 2003, we were at point that could have been accomplished in 1998.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">There are many parallels between what the credit card industry went through and where the media industry finds itself today.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Instead of focusing on preventing the Fair Use of their content, they should instead deliver it through open mediums creating additional revenue streams while increasing the popularity of their product.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Piracy can be handily defeated, not through the legal system but rather through a firm understanding of the economics of the environment.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN><o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">Today, credit card companies are at the peak of their success.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>In 2004, the fraud rate for credit cards dropped to an all time low of 4.7 cents per $100, while setting records for volume and profits.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>I know for a fact the same thing can be accomplished in the media industry because I&#8217;ve studied it.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>All it will take is a trivial leap of faith.<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
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<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial">-Eric Marvets<o:p></o:p></SPAN></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Arial"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></SPAN></P><img src ="http://marvets.com/blog/aggbug/2009.aspx" width = "1" height = "1" />]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2007 07:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit">credit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card industry">credit card industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card fraud">credit card fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/media industry">media industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cut fraud">cut fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit cards">credit cards</category>
      <source url="http://marvets.com/blog/archive/2007/03/22/2009.aspx">When Will the Media Industry Embrace the BORA Principle?</source>
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