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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: call]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/call</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 11:08:38 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2009)]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d1f9c5c63e96cff3264722a39926652a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d1f9c5c63e96cff3264722a39926652a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am on the program committee for the 9th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2009) , to be held in Seattle, WA, USA, 57 August 2009. PETS is the leading venue for research on privacy and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am on the program committee for the 9th <a href="http://petsymposium.org/2009/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2009)</a>, to be held in Seattle, WA, USA, 5&ndash;7 August 2009. PETS is the leading venue for research on privacy and anonymity, offering an enjoyable environment and stimulating discussion. If you are working in this field, I can strongly recommend submitting a paper.</p>
<p>This year, we are particularly looking for submissions from topics other than anonymous communications, so if work from your field may be applied, or is otherwise related, to the topic of privacy, I&#8217;d encourage you to consider PETS as a potential venue.</p>
<p>The submission deadline for the main session is <strong>2 March 2009</strong>. As with last year, we will also have a &#8220;HotPETS&#8221; event, for new and exciting work in the field which is still in a formative state. Submissions for HotPETS should be received by <strong>8 May 2009</strong>.</p>
<p>Further information can be found in the <a href="http://petsymposium.org/2009/">call for papers</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 04:14:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy">privacy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pets">pets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/9th privacy">9th privacy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technologies symposium">technologies symposium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotpets">hotpets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/field">field</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hotpets event">hotpets event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/venue">venue</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potential venue">potential venue</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/10/08/pets-2009/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2009)</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Do-Not-Call Lists]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1d97f48fe3acc2f6696968268a3884a0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1d97f48fe3acc2f6696968268a3884a0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Turns out you can add anyone's number -- or remove anyone's number -- to/from the Canadian do-not-call list. You can also add (but not remove) numbers to the U.S. do-not-call list , though only up to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Turns out you can <a href="https://www.lnnte-dncl.gc.ca/">add anyone's number</a> -- or remove anyone's number -- to/from the Canadian do-not-call list. You can also add (but not remove) numbers to the <a href="https://www.donotcall.gov/register/reg.aspx">U.S. do-not-call list</a>, though only up to three at a time, and you have to provide a valid e-mail address to confirm the addition.</p>

<p>Here's my idea.  If you're a company, add every one of your customers to the list.  That way, none of your competitors will be able to cold call them.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=czAmM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=czAmM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=loLhM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=loLhM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2008 11:51:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/canadian do-not-call list">canadian do-not-call list</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/list">list</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/do-not-call list">do-not-call list</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/valid e-mail address">valid e-mail address</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/remove">remove</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cold call">cold call</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tofrom">tofrom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/competitors">competitors</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/the_canadian_do.html">Do-Not-Call Lists</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Innovators, Imitators and Idiots]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9f0fb5a40e7304e54d82bd150f69993b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9f0fb5a40e7304e54d82bd150f69993b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Charlie Rose interviews Warren Buffett


Charlie Rose
And so when you look at where we are going, there seems to be two issues that are apparent to me at least, risk and leverage. We just lost sight...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong><div><span style="font-weight: normal;">Charlie Rose <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/26982338/page/2/">interviews</a> Warren Buffett:</span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div></strong></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Charlie Rose:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">And so when you look at where we are going, there seems to be two issues that are apparent to me at least, risk and leverage.&#0160; We just lost sight of risk and leverage of what was appropriate?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Warren Buffett:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">Yeah.&#0160; Again, because it pays off for a while.&#0160; You know, you can lose leverage, and it&#39;s the only way a smart guy can go broke.&#0160; If you owe money, you can&#39;t pay them out.&#0160; You just pay for everything, you do smart things, you eventually get very rich.&#0160; If you do smart things and use leverage and do one wrong thing along the way, it could wipe you out, because anything times zero is zero.&#0160; But it&#39;s reinforcing when the people around you are doing it successfully, you&#39;re doing it successfully, and it&#39;s a lot like Cinderella at the ball.&#0160; I mean you know at midnight everything is going to turn to pumpkins and mice; right?&#0160; But if the evening goes along, I mean, you know, the guys look better all the time, the music sounds better, it&#39;s more and more fun, you think why the hell should I leave at quarter of 12.&#0160; I&#39;ll leave at two minutes to 12.&#0160; But the trouble is, there are no clocks on the wall.&#0160; And everybody thinks they&#39;re going to leave at two minutes to 12.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;">Its effectively the job of leadership to know when to take the punch bowl away and to have the credibility to do this. This is also the risk-reward balance that infosec must try to strike, part of the answer is differentiating <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/11/dhandho-infosec.html">risk and uncertainty</a>. As our current financial situation shows, its a hard thing to pull off</span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div></strong></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Charlie Rose:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">And should wise people have known better?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Warren Buffett:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">People should always know better.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Charlie Rose:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">Yeah.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Warren Buffett:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">I mean people -- people don&#39;t get -- they don&#39;t get smarter about things that get as basic as greed and you can&#39;t stand to see your neighbor getting rich.&#0160; You know you&#39;re smarter than he is, and he&#39;s doing these things, you know, and he&#39;s getting rich, and your spouse is getting unhappy with you because you aren&#39;t doing -- pretty soon you start doing it.&#0160; And so you get what I call the natural progression, the three Is.&#0160; The innovators, the imitators, and the idiots.&#0160; And that&#39;s what happens.&#0160; Everybody just kind of goes along.&#0160; And you look kind of silly if you disagree.&#0160; I mean, you know, you could have these crazy Internet valuations in the late 1990s, but they prove themselves out in the market.&#0160; The next day they were selling for more than they were the day before, and people said, you know, you&#39;re crazy if you don&#39;t get in on this.&#0160; So it&#39;s very human.&#0160; Now, with housing it&#39;s something even more dramatic than that, because most people aspire to own their own home.&#0160; And if you really think that houses prices are going to go up next year and the year after, you feel if I don&#39;t buy it this year, I&#39;m going to have to buy it next year.&#0160; That&#39;s not true of an Internet stock.&#0160; But it&#39;s true of a home.&#0160; And when somebody makes it very easy for you to do it by saying you don&#39;t really have to put up my money, you can lie about your income a little, or we&#39;ll give you 100 percent mortgage, you&#39;re going to do it, because everybody that&#39;s done it has been proven right.&#0160; You have what they call social tools, and, you know, you&#39;re going to feel like an idiot if you didn&#39;t do it, because the house cost more.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;">And this is why its hard to pull off. There is a lot of human emotion and envy (*). I think the point Buffett raises about innovators, imitators and idiots is a useful one for infosec. We see all kinds of new projects and technologies that have risks and rewards associated with them, its helpful to categorize these under innovation (high risk but possible game changer), imitators (so called best practices), and idiots (sheep mode - blind risk acceptance). We can get some traction here to use these concepts to understand what to do when assessing say the architectural and oeprational risk of a system.</span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;">Finally, we should always spend some time to consider infosec decisions in a broader long term economic context and this is also true of our current financial crisis</span></div><div><span style="font-weight: normal;"><br /></span></div></strong></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; "><strong>Warren Buffett:</strong>&#0160;&#0160;</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal; ">Oh, I think confidence will come back.&#0160; I will tell you this.&#0160; This country is going -- be living better ten years from now than it is now.&#0160; It will be living better in 20 years from now than ten years from now.&#0160; The ingredients that made this country, you know, the miracle of the world -- I mean we had a seven for one improvement in the average American standard of living in the 20th century.&#0160; Now, we had the great depression, we had two world wars, we had the flu epidemic.&#0160; You know, we had oil shock.&#0160; You know, we had all these terrible things happen.&#0160; But something about the American system unleashed more and of a potential to human beings over that hundred years so that we had a seven for one improvement in -- there&#39;s never been any -- I mean, you have centuries where if you&#39;ve got a 1 percent improvement, then it&#39;s something.&#0160; So we&#39;ve got a great system.&#0160; And we&#39;ve got more productive capacity now than we ever have.&#0160; The American worker is more productive than he&#39;s ever been.&#0160; We&#39;ve got more people to do it.&#0160; We&#39;ve got all the ingredients for a sensational future.&#0160; It&#39;s just that right now the athlete&#39;s on the floor.&#0160; But we -- this is a super athlete.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;">Again, we want to look at risk events in a broader, long term context. In Buffett&#39;s words its - &quot;be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful.&quot; As the world panics and Jim Cramer is melting down on TV, Buffett is quietly writing checks with both hands, buying $3B of GE, $5B of Goldman, $6.5 of Wrigley/Mars and so on. Uncertainty is one thing, it could be 6 months it could be 5 years until this thing turns around, but risk is another - you hedge your risk with price and long term advantages, i.e. moats. People will still eat candy in a bad economy.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 12px; line-height: normal;">* Buffett&#39;s partner Charlie Munger calls envy the stupidest of the seven deadly sins, because only you feel bad, there is an upside to all the others. He said you can pay someone on Wall St $2 million a year and they will be perfectly happy until they find out someone across the hall is making $2.1 million and then they will be miserable. Which is an insane way tolive.</span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2008 04:32:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oeprational risk">oeprational risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk events">risk events</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk-reward balance">risk-reward balance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wise people">wise people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/buffett raises">buffett raises</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/buffett">buffett</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blind risk acceptance">blind risk acceptance</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/10/innovators-imitators-and-idiots.html">Innovators, Imitators and Idiots</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hacking Your VoIP Box From The Net]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ddef0bbead6572419deccb8cf4914ce6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ddef0bbead6572419deccb8cf4914ce6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Do you do penetration testing of your own network? Is it comprehensive enough? Read this recent blog from McAfee's Avert Labs and you may wonder. An Avert analyst, reading about vulnerabilities in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Do you do penetration testing of your own network? Is it comprehensive enough? Read <a href="http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2008/09/29/the-lack-of-attention-in-voip-devices/">this recent blog from McAfee's Avert Labs</a> and you may wonder.

An Avert analyst, reading about vulnerabilities in the Cisco IP phone model 7960 then used Google to try to find publicly-accessible 7960 phones. He found "almost 10" (does that mean 9? awkward turn of phrase). 1 of them had the vulnerable firmware version  And the vulnerability was that the phone's web interface reveals a lot of sensitive network information, so the company that holds that phone has a vulnerable network.

What was revealed by the phone? "...the IP addresses of the TFTP server/router/DNS server/DHCP server/Cisco Call Manager, as well as some application links, internal device configuration, and debugging information. If there are any exploitable vulnerabilities in one of these linked servers, attackers could use this information to stage further attacks."

There's always more to test for, and mistakes you in device configuration can have dire consequences.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/KqezZ8B5wlQOthXrTY4hSBEoKXo/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/KqezZ8B5wlQOthXrTY4hSBEoKXo/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/sIcbcZ5FSGQ" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 04 Oct 2008 13:06:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive network information">sensitive network information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/device configuration">device configuration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal device configuration">internal device configuration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone model">phone model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exploitable vulnerabilities">exploitable vulnerabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerable network">vulnerable network</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/sIcbcZ5FSGQ/hacking_your_voip_box_from_the_net.html">Hacking Your VoIP Box From The Net</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links List 10.3.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bfa12b1f280cc26f4ffcd92a791acc11</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bfa12b1f280cc26f4ffcd92a791acc11</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Well finally, an upside to the financial crisis more students in computer science. After the dot-com crash, enrollment went down in computer science, almost 50% since 2003. Many students shifted their...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/africa-map.jpg" border="0" alt="africa-map" width="204" height="240" align="left" /> Well finally, an upside to the financial crisis – more students in computer science. After the dot-com crash, <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&amp;articleId=9066659" target="_blank">enrollment went down</a> in computer science, almost 50% since 2003. Many students <a href="http://www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/33584-1.html" target="_blank">shifted their interest from the technology field</a> to banking and finance because they thought they’d make more money. And now the financial crisis could scare them into <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&amp;articleId=9115616&amp;source=rss_news" target="_blank">choosing majors and careers that are “safer alternatives”</a>, like IT. And perhaps the trend is reversing for those already on Wall Street as well. Ben Worthen writes about the influx of resumes Kodiak Venture Partners has been getting: <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/?s=wall+street+jobs" target="_blank">from financial-services vets who want to work at tech startups</a>, – not to “strike it rich” this time around, but just to make a living. And it’s not just the tech workers. Seems like the ones that don’t even have any real IT experience are looking too – for jobs as VPs of marketing (harrumph). (<a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/docs/rst/Sect6/africa-map.jpg" target="_blank"><em>img from www.fas.org</em></a>)</p>
<p>I’m sure you already know about the other “network management” – where ISPs and carriers get their hands publicly slapped for limiting bandwidth to high-traffic offenders. But when is this kind of “network management” a good thing? At a panel sponsored by the FCC in DC, reps from carriers and ISPs discussed what steps they’ve been taking <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091808-telcos-pandemic.html?hpg1=bn" target="_blank">to prepare for a pandemic</a> or other major global crisis – that would force workers to stay at home or work from more remote locations to limit exposure.</p>
<p>Are people paying attention to ICANN? They’re saying that IPv4 will be fully <a href="http://blog.icann.org/?p=365" target="_blank">allocated in the next two or three years</a>. Does anyone care? In their bid to make people care, ICANN talks about the state of IPv6 adoption and <a href="http://www.thestandard.com/news/2008/09/30/africa-faster-adopting-ipv6-according-icann">touts Africa as the most rapid adopter</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/service-oriented/?p=1187" target="_blank">SOA soon part of the ‘cloud’</a>? No, please no.</p>
<p>Microsoft – The Silver Lining in Every Cloud. Joe Wilcox over at eWeek’s Microsoft Watch, has been <a href="http://www.microsoft-watch.com/content/corporate/steve_ballmer_sure_has_lots_to_say.html?kc=EWWHNEMNL10022008STR4" target="_blank">following Steve Ballmer</a> around and collecting some nice quotes on how the company is transitioning. “For many years, we had kind of what I would call the all-encompassing mission, vision and scorecard statement: a computer on every desk and in every home. …Well, our footprint and portfolio is broader than that. “ [In every hand and of course, in every cloud…] “So, as a vision statement we talk about creating seamless experiences that combine the magic of software, the power of the Internet across a world of devices.” The magic of software – something I haven’t thought about for a while. And:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;You need a real platform in the cloud. When we wanted to go after the PC, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the phone, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the enterprise, we built an operating system. We&#8217;ll announce a new operating system, one that runs in the cloud and has a wide variety of capabilities.”</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 16:55:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer">computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer science">computer science</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people care">people care</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial crisis">financial crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network management">network management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/care">care</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/eweeks microsoft">eweeks microsoft</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/links-list-10308/10/2008">Links List 10.3.08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[XRumer Spambot Cracks Captchas]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8e16e4882509e89db49f04e7c4d2deb7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8e16e4882509e89db49f04e7c4d2deb7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Weve known CAPTCHAs are insecure for some time, but now even the CAPTCHA-alternatives (often based on identifying cats from dogs or other animals) have proven insecure. Gmail, Windows Live hotmail and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;ve known CAPTCHAs are insecure for some time, but now even the CAPTCHA-alternatives (often based on identifying cats from dogs or other animals) have proven insecure. Gmail, Windows Live hotmail and other popular sites were hacked as early as <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080415-gone-in-60-seconds-spambot-cracks-livehotmail-captcha.html">February</a>. Recently another defeat has come in the form of <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xrumer">XRumer,</a> a <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081002-right-back-at-ya-captcha-bad-guys-crack-gmail-hotmail.html">spam bot</a> that posts messages on blogs and through email in order to boost search engine rankings.</p>
<p>What&#8217;s the solution? Ars Technica suggests there might not be a good one, in part because malware distributors can go so far as to hire real people to do their dirty work:</p>
<blockquote><p>Instead of trying to build better CAPTCHA-cracking programs, the malware industry went out and got itself some humans of its own. This effectively bypasses the primary security strength of the CAPTCHA system and leaves it entirely dependent on what we&#8217;ll call secondary security characteristics. CAPTCHAs are often complex (particularly these days), which does increase the chance that they&#8217;ll be misread (and returned incorrectly), while the font and display of the characters themselves are at least somewhat unfamiliar to the CAPTCHA crackers sitting on the other side of the world.</p></blockquote>
<p>Sometimes those captcha phrases are pretty incoherent to me too. When I post over at Craigslist sometimes it says I&#8217;ve gotten its Captcha wrong, and I end up wondering if secretly I&#8217;m a bot?? Apparently not a very smart one either.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 07:40:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/captchas">captchas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bot">bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/primary security strength">primary security strength</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows live hotmail">windows live hotmail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam bot">spam bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ars technica suggests">ars technica suggests</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hire real people">hire real people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular sites">popular sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xrumer">xrumer</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/410515365/">XRumer Spambot Cracks Captchas</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fun Reading on Security - 8]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot; Fun Reading on Security .&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008
Great...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Fun Reading on Security</a>.&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008.</p>  <ol>   <li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=162936">Great paper</a> that complements the whole &quot;SIEM is dead?&quot; saga - &quot;Most enterprises are looking for a product that <em>will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle</em>, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. &quot; </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001093.html">The Mess: looking for someone to blame?</a>&quot; is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up (&quot;<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html">If a tree falls in someone else's silo...</a>&quot;) </li>    <li>Mike call to &quot;<a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/rise-up-against-mediocrity">Rise up against Mediocrity</a>.&quot;&#160; - &quot;Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear.&quot;; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do &quot;Security FIRST!&quot; (and compliance second) </li>    <li>A great piece from Burton: &quot;<a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">On Response</a>&quot; - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. <a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">This</a> is definitely a good one for those still in the &quot;we'll just block the threat world&quot; - &quot;we will not win a continuing war of escalation&quot; and &quot;using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2008/08/security-metric.html">More on metrics</a>, including the highly-awaited ISO27004. </li>    <li><a href="http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64598.html">Pretty dumb paper</a> by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read <a href="http://treasuryinstitute.org/blog/index.php?itemid=174">this</a>). PCI doesn't &quot;fall short,&quot; it helps people who will otherwise not do <em>anything</em> and their systems will &quot;power&quot; those botnets of the future... </li>    <li>While we are on this subject: <a href="http://pcianswers.com/2008/10/01/pci-dss-version-12-differences-and-updates/">a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes</a>, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/11/recap-cso-executive-seminar-on-pci-compliance-by-james-deluccia/">here.</a> And more <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">here</a> (&quot;<a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths</a>&quot;). And, <a href="http://www.estoregfoa.org/StaticContent/staticpages/TM0508.htm#1c">more PCI myths</a>. And <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-29-2008">more good ideas</a> on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-)&#160; - also <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/19/the-inside-story-of-pci-confessions-of-a-qsa-commentary-by-james-deluccia/">this is good.</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/23/behavioral-monitoring/">Adrian on behavioral monitoring</a>; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security. </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://www.darkreading.com/blog.asp?blog_sectionid=327&amp;doc_id=164144">Premature Chasm-Crossing</a>&quot;&#160; - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and&#160; their easily-excitable PR teams...) - &quot;Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?&quot; (Mike R <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-24-2008">also comments</a> on that). A related - and&#160; just as interesting point is made here: &quot;<a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/security_is_not_a_solution">Security is not a solution</a>&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/print/450190">More</a> on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: &quot;I think this is a dangerous trend unless the &quot;checklist&quot; is all inclusive.&quot; (how can a checklist include <strong>ALL? :-)</strong>) </li>    <li><a href="http://forensics.sans.org/community/top7_forensic_trends.php">&quot;SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008&quot;</a> </li>    <li>Read &quot;<a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/09/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html">The three approaches to computer security!</a>&quot;&#160; Why? Come on, it is from <a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com">Joanna</a>! :-) </li>    <li><a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/09/ids-vitamins-or-prophylactic.html">A fun discussion</a> about a hot new technology:<em> network IDS. </em>Is IDS <em>absolutely</em> indispensable to <em>ALL</em> companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion. </li>    <li>On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/why-lasers-wont.html">Some say no.</a> </li>    <li>Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): &quot;<a href="http://blogs.gartner.com/greg_young/2008/09/30/get-rich-quick-with-network-security/">Get Rich Quick With Network Security</a>&quot; </li> </ol>  <p>Enjoy!</p>  <p><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Previous security reading.</a></p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/409462346" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 06:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security managers">security managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous security">previous security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss exists">pci dss exists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci fun">pci fun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security checklists">security checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/409462346/fun-reading-on-security-8.html">Fun Reading on Security - 8</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modelling The Global Financial Meltdown]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/15c8ebf58fa47d569eb7cdbc4039c683</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/15c8ebf58fa47d569eb7cdbc4039c683</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday I received a call from Penny Grosman , Senior Editor, Wall Street &amp; Technology . Penny was interested in my opinion, Will risk management applications be the next killer app for CEP on Wall...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday I received a call from <a href="http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/penny-crosman/" target="_blank">Penny Grosman</a>, Senior Editor, <a href="http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/" target="_blank">Wall Street &amp; Technology</a>.   Penny was interested in my opinion, &#8220;Will risk management applications be the next killer app for CEP&#8221; on Wall Street.    I enjoyed talking with Penny.  She caught up with me leaving a tailor&#8217;s shop in Chiang Mai, so I hope she did not mind hearing my stories of buying unique Northern Thai cotton fabric and designing my own casual shirts in the economic turndown.</p>
<p>We read many stories on the net where folks claim that the current financial crisis could have been avoided with more or better use of technology.     This is expected, as software companies and IT professionals will often try to piggy-backtheir business development strategy on the &#8220;crisis of the day&#8221; to sell more goods and services.    Honestly, in this current situation, the main technology that we needed was simple, accurate financial models.</p>
<p>For example, in the chart above, the US economy was doing quite well with US federal funds rates low.   Housing prices in the US were skyrocketing and there was a concern about inflation.    There was an understandable concern the sustainability of that economy.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><img class="aligncenter" style="vertical-align: bottom;" src="http://www.thewrittenblog.com/main_1/images/97kcpv16xjh0uvsi8k7kdhaw.gif" alt="" width="277" height="415" /></p>
<p>So, in perhaps one the most ill-advised Federal Reserve actions of many decades, the folks at the helm of the Fed decided to raise their lending rates around 500 percent over a two year period.</p>
<p>As we all know, primarily because of the action by the Fed, the world faces perhaps the worst economic disaster in modern times, while the US Executive Branch and the Congress fight over how to spend $700 Billion taxpayer dollars to inject liquidity into the markets to try to head off a global financial disaster.</p>
<p>It is amazing to me that the US Federal Government, or their advisors, does not have simple financial models with cause-and-effect analysis such as:</p>
<ul>
<li>Homeowners with adjustable rate mortuages will not be able to make payments;and</li>
<li>Housing prices will fall dramatically; then</li>
<li>Homeowners will default on loans where the collateral is much less than the asset value, and</li>
<li>Banks will suffer great losses, and</li>
<li>Lending will come to a halt, then</li>
<li>Banks will collapse, then</li>
<li>Wall Street will exit the markets in panic</li>
<li>&#8230; and more trouble&#8230;.. !!</li>
</ul>
<p>There are and continue to be a lot of discussion and opinions about how risk management needs improvement. and I agree.   We will also read folks talk about how technology can be used to help solve this problem, including CEP/EP and related software (see also <!-- This wrapper class appears only on Page and Single Post pages. --><a title="Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land" rel="bookmark" href="../2008/06/23/capital-market-cep-fantasy-land/">Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land</a>). However, as much I would be pleased to see more CEP/EP applications and use cases, I do not believe that event processing technology is really very useful to solve the core problem of the current financial crisis.</p>
<p>The core problem is, seemingly, that our &#8220;financial experts&#8221; do not even have simple models that will illustrate what will or could happen when you raise the fed lending rates 500 percent in two years in an economy pregnant with adjustable rate mortgages.</p>
<p>To me, this does not appear to be rocket science.  The negligence by the US Federal Reserve and their advisors is astonishing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 02:33:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple financial models">simple financial models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial models">financial models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current financial crisis">current financial crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crisis">crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple">simple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technology">technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall street">wall street</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/main technology">main technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/folks">folks</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/10/02/modelling-the-global-financial-meltdown/">Modelling The Global Financial Meltdown</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Gov. Palin, Yahoo! Email and SecurityA Call To Action?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/79da72f5c48bc03e7980047607f10b49</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/79da72f5c48bc03e7980047607f10b49</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The McCain-Palin campaign has offered a rather muted response to the Yahoo! email account breach of Gov. Palin, and so far, the grand jury has opted not to indict the hacker. Is this the end to this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The McCain-Palin campaign has offered a rather muted  response to the Yahoo! email account breach of Gov. Palin, and so far, the  grand jury has opted not to indict the hacker. Is this the end to this sordid  tale? Not quite. I believe that the average citizen has been left with a myriad  of questions as to the security in as basic a utility as free email. </p>
<p><strong>What&rsquo;s  going on? </strong></p>
<p>&ldquo;Rubico&rdquo;, as the hacker called himself, used an automated  password recovery tool where he was asked fairly simple questions to identify  himself as Gov. Palin [birthday, zip code, etc.]. Rubico found answers to these  within 45 minutes on Google and Wikipedia! Wow! <B>Is it really that easy to hack into email or messaging services  that the common person uses globally?...</b>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/palin">palin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free email">free email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mccain-palin campaign">mccain-palin campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fairly simple questions">fairly simple questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email account breach">email account breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gov">gov</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/palin birthday">palin birthday</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1355">Gov. Palin, Yahoo! Email and SecurityA Call To Action?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Earlier this week, during the OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference , the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation the Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week, during the <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=OWASP_NYC_AppSec_2008_Conference">OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference</a>, the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation &#8212; the <a href="http://isc2.org/csslp">Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional</a> (CSSLP).  In front of a captive audience waiting for a 42&#8243; plasma TV to be raffled, the <a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/tipton/index.html">Executive Director of (ISC)2</a> outlined this new certification designed to appeal to application security professionals.  To his credit, Mr. Tipton stated very clearly that the CSSLP is not intended to measure one&#8217;s technical skillset.  Unfortunately, it&#8217;s inevitable that employers will treat it as such.</p>
<p>You can read all the details on their website (except for the part about the certification not being a measure of practical skills).  From what I can tell, the CSSLP is just the CISSP with different CBKs, or Common Bodies of Knowledge.  As with the CISSP, they are going for broad knowledge, not depth.  Starting in June 2009, you can get certified by taking a paper exam, likely a multiple choice test similar to the CISSP.  Why June?  Because the test isn&#8217;t even written yet &#8212; I&#8217;ve heard from several sources that they are actively soliciting their existing pool of CISSPs to help write test questions.</p>
<p>Ah, but what if you can&#8217;t wait that long and want to get certified <i>right away</i>?  You&#8217;re in luck. If you act before March 31, 2009, you can get grandfathered in without even having to take the exam!  That&#8217;s right, they call it the <a href="https://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?category=1691">CSSLP Experience Assessment</a>, and here are the requirements:</p>
<div style="float:right; margin-left: 15px"><a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money.jpg"><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money-191x300.jpg" alt="" title="101-hand_with_money" width="191" height="300" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-372 photoborder" /></a></div>
<ul>
<li>Upload a resume showing three years of experience related to software security, or four years if you don&#8217;t have a college degree</li>
<li>Write short essays (500 words maximum) discussing four CBKs of your choice</li>
<li>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</li>
<li>Pay $650</li>
<p>
</ul>
<p>Let&#8217;s examine these requirements one at a time.</p>
<p><b>Three years of experience</b>.  (ISC)2 doesn&#8217;t provide any requirements on depth of experience, other than citing the broadly-defined CBKs.  Considering they are targeting everyone from software developers to security assessors to business analysts (yes, really), chances are they are going to accept any experience that is even tangential to the SDLC or software security.</p>
<p><b>Short essays on four of the CBKs</b>.  I asked the (ISC)2 exhibitors specifically what they are looking for to satisfy this requirement, and they said the essays should be a general discussion of the CBK topic, <i>optionally</i> citing your personal experience in that area if you have any.  This messaging is not quite aligned with the website guidance, which states that the essays should be &#8220;Accomplishment Records&#8221; which are self-reported descriptions of experience.  Either way, with a maximum essay length of 500 words, it&#8217;s pretty obvious that substance is not (ISC)2&#8217;s first priority.  Here&#8217;s one data point for you: I spoke to someone who has already submitted the CSSLP Experience Assessment, and he said it took about an hour to write the essays.</p>
<p><b>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</b>.  Actually this can be any (ISC)2 certified person, not just CISSPs.  Contrary to what you&#8217;d expect, though, the person isn&#8217;t vouching for your skillset so much as they are confirming that the attestations on your resume are accurate.</p>
<p><b>Pay $650</b>.  You knew it was coming.  After all, there is money to be made.  How is it that qualifying for the CSSLP through professional experience should cost $650?  If you&#8217;re taking the written exam, fair enough, (ISC)2 does incur the cost of administering and grading that exam (even though the <a href="http://www.scantron.com/datacollection/scanners.aspx">Scantron machine</a> is probably paid off by now).  But $650 for the submitted-online Experience Assessment?  If we assume that the person reading these essay submissions makes a rather generous $100k per year, then $650 accounts for roughly a day and a half.  Will it really take that long to read a <i>maximum</i> of 2,000 words and pass judgment?  Of course not.  (ISC)2 wants to get as many people as possible to qualify based on &#8220;experience&#8221;, seeding the initial pool of CSSLPs and netting them $650 per head for doing next to nothing.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.ljkushner.com/about_mstr.html">Lee Kushner</a> stated during his OWASP AppSec presentation (<i>7 Habits of Highly Effective Career Managers</i>), &#8220;the more people who own a cert, the less relevant it becomes.&#8221;  Irrelevant &#8212; that&#8217;s exactly what the CISSP has become, and it&#8217;s exactly where the CSSLP is headed.  Meanwhile, (ISC)2 will sit back and watch while you and your employers continue to fill their coffers.</p>
<p>In closing, let me acknowledge that this blog entry probably comes across as judgmental.  I accept that.  I&#8217;m not ranting against the idea of certifications, though admittedly <a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/04/not-a-cissp/">I&#8217;m not a fan of them either</a>.  I am disappointed that (ISC)2, an organization with tremendous influence, could have created something more meaningful but chose not to. Why bother when people will just fork over the cash anyway?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 11:08:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp">csslp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp experience assessment">csslp experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience assessment">experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/certification">certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience">experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc">isc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal experience">personal experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ubiquitous cissp certification">ubiquitous cissp certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cissp">cissp</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/09/isc2s-newest-cash-cow-csslp/">(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification</source>
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