The problem is that (Chris’ analysis is) completely impractical. I’ll take a recent, and fairly typical situation as an example. I was taking issue with the manner in which remote access was being provisioned for a third party vendor to connect to a system hosted by one of our European business units. To cut a long story short, it was not only a breach of policy but highly insecure. I wanted the access to be disconnected, the business unit director wanted my risk assessment. And he didn’t want to wait for it.

To quote Chris Hayes, spending time on working out the expected effectiveness of controls, over a given timeframe, as measured against a baseline level of force was not going to pacify an angry Italian fearful that my decision was going to cost him money. He wanted my explanation of the risk and more importantly, what I was going to offer as a solution to keep his business functioning

As Chris is someone who actually does this for a living in a large company, and this is typical of his actual day job, I really find Stuart’s “impractical” comment to be, um, misinformed.

Also, I think Stuart mistakes the purpose of a risk analysis.  The purpose of the risk analysis is not to force someone to be “secure”, but to provide knowledge for decision making.  Using it as a “hammer” to knock in the nail of your personal risk tolerance impairs efficiency and in the long run retards “security” as it creates political resentment.  Seriously, who cares if something might violate policy or not in a pre-implementation discussion?  Policies are not stone tablets handed down from on high, they are state-in-time codification of the data owners risk tolerance.  This risk tolerance changes sometimes, and that’s OK.

To that extent, I appreciate (and I’m sure Chris does, as well) that risk analysis does not create rationality in the data owner.  Someone who sees you as a speedbump on the route to progress they may not be ready to appreciate your point of view even if it is stated in the most rational manner possible.   But it’s worth noting (and Stuart’s example is indicative of this point) that risk analysis does not create rationality in the analyst, either.  If one is being so “security minded” as to ignore the risk tolerance of the business owner - we’re bound to get a reaction similar to that Stuart encountered.  In fact, a practical risk analysis like Chris performed on his blog, done in 30 minutes, should identify the critical point of disagreement between Stuart and the data owner (again, Stuart doesn’t own the data, the agitated Italian does).

But let’s stay rational and open to alternatives to what Chris offers.  Stuart states his approach to risk analysis as:

When I need to document a risk assessment I use a very simple form: list the threats, state the level of vulnerability, list the associated operational costs and potential revenue hits. High, medium, or low risk? Describe the controls and options. Write up who needs to do what, and how much of their time it’s going to take. Job done.

At first glance, I don’t think what Chris has done is any less efficient, and it provides greater insight (using Frequency and Capability instead of just ‘listing the threats’).  But what is key here is that Chris’ approach is consistent and defensible.  Less generous risk geeks and CSO’s I know would have no little difficulty with Stuart’s approach.  But to particularly answer Stuart’s main objection (impracticality) I would offer that with practice, Chris’ work is probably quicker and easier than Stuart’s described process as it eliminates much of the ambiguity an immature risk analysis creates - reducing the need for further discussion and arguments with data owners (regardless of disposition or nationality).

Finally the irony of Stuart’s post is that the reason he had this confrontation may in fact be because he was incapable of bringing a salient model for risk to the table, one that identified the factors that create risk and developed a defensible belief statement concerning risk.   We’ll never know if one would have helped him in this isolated instance, but I can tell you that in organizations like Chris’, good risk models and strong risk anlayses create operational efficiencies, reduce costs, and streamlines intra-departmental communications.

The analysts paired up today:
Antonio Piraino (Tier1 Research)
William Fellows (The 451 Group)

My usual disclaimers on live-blogging: doesn’t include everything covered (just what was most interesting to me) and had to paraphrase some answers because I simply cannot type that fast.

Quick definition of Cloud Computing
WF: The cloud is a continuum of grid, virtualization and utility done right. It is about provisioning services instead of servers; flexible computing instead of fixed assets. Done right, the cloud abstracts users from the complexity of grid. Cloud computing is IT as a service. Cloud computing is the Third Way – not entirely in-house or outsourced, but an optimized hybridized version of both. In light of the Goldman Sachs report out resetting IT spending forecast from up 6% to down 1%, don’t underestimate the ability for enterprises to move from capex to opex by buying cloud computing instead of building it themselves.

The 451 Group conducted a survey on cloud computing in March, and then revisited it a month ago. Some interesting results:

• 84% have no plans to develop an internal cloud. 5% had no answer to this question. And for the 10% who did answer – the uses for a private/internal cloud were the same as those for a public cloud.
• Top 6 vendors they look to help them develop an internal cloud: Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, HP, Oracle, VMware

Is it all “upside” when it comes to cloud computing?

WF: Watch out for the Trojan horse, the red flag. What about the software needed to manage all this stuff? Any management software needs to take a holistic approach to solve the problem.

AP: Increased management requirements and capability – this is actually a great story for managed hosters who can hold your hand while getting you up into the cloud. Hosters alleviate the pain points, and this is why we’re going to see continued growth and focus in the managed hosting sector.

WF: I would argue that they’re too expensive. Look at Amazon – 10 cents a hit adds up.

AP: It’s almost impossible to do an apples-to-apples comparison between cloud providers. One reason is that they charge differently. I’d say that when you’re talking about the big cloud providers, you are right – that they are expensive over the long-term, but for use in the short-term, they can be optimal.

WF: The cloud is setting big expectations. Can IT deliver? It’s nice to talk about “shared resources for the greater good” but in any organization, you will still run into issues of power and control! Plus it’s still early days for resolution of regulatory issues and compliance around the cloud.

Final Thoughts

AP: Think of the opportunities of using cloud computing resources in the areas of testing and pre-production – short-term use/environment (quick up/quick down), inexpensive, opex not capex. We’re already seeing the cloud fostering much innovation.

WF: “It’s okay to fall in love with the term.” It is real but keep the expectations lower and realistic.

AP: I agree with you. The reality is that the cloud is driving a very fundamental underlying platform change. This is not just a term or something that will fall out of fashion. There’s a real need to build trust in the cloud and leveraging shared resources in this way – so use the cloud computing term cautiously; don’t abuse it and make the cloud seem like IT’s new toy.

I’ve often read people who say that we (security, risk management) need to “think like the attacker”.  And when you read this sort of article, that usually alludes to trying to anticipate the tactics an attacker might use to mess with your C, I, or A.  Smart stuff, that, and very useful when architecting security solutions.  But as I was training some folks Monday, I was thinking in the back of my head about Threat Capability (TCap) in FAIR.  As you might know, we like to estimate the capability of a threat to apply some level of “force” against our assets.  This ability to apply force is a byproduct of the attacker’s skills and resources.  And thinking of how an attacker applies skills and resources, I came across another way we might “think” like an attacker.

Traditionally, I’ve thought of “skills” as being a byproduct of the toolset an attacker has.  This mindset probably stems from my time with Penetration Testing teams, where in the process of scoping the  PenTest I would ask our clients to select the level of effort that they wanted us to throw at them.  If a client chose “high” we’d throw every ‘spoit we had at them.  If they chose “low” we’d limit ourselves to a more commonly available toolset.

But while the resources part of TCap is time & materials (money) - the skills are really more than just the toolset.  Skills would include the ability of the attacker to be creative and innovative.    As an example of that innovation from those PenTesting days - when we got a “high” effort request, we would always try to couple that with some “social engineering”-type of attack, or some unique means of delivering an existing exploit.  Our creativity was not necessarily a byproduct of a unique exploit or tool we had, but the process by which we might deliver pre-existing or commonly available exploits.  I remember when we first got ahold of a handful of 32mb thumb drives (hey, 32mb was huge back then) and “dropped” a few in the lobby of a client’s retail space.  The keystroke loggers and phone-home script weren’t new, but using the thumb drive as delivery vehicle certainly was.

So I’ve started to really think about this concept of innovation, and how if “thinking like an attacker” means to be innovative, we ought to do the same.  I’ve been thinking of two main categories of innovation this morning.

INNOVATION

The first I’ll call Technology Innovation.  And by Technology Innovation, I mean some new, unique, “ahead of the curve” technology that an attacker can use against us.  The obvious example of which is a zero-day.  It’s that “high” tool set our PenTesters would use against the clients.  For security departments, this might be the latest security product designed to enhance our ability to P, D, and/or R.

Alternately, we can be creative in the way we deliver (manage) existing technology.  I think of this as Process Innovation.  It’s doing more with what we already have, just like the PenTest team would be creative in the delivery of an existing exploit.

Unfortunately for us - attackers have traditionally had quite a leg up on us in terms of Process Innovation.  It is much easier fro them to be creative, as they are free of political constraints and bureaucracy.  In contrast, when the security industry tries Process Innovation, the results are checklists and “standards”.  It’s committees and consensus.  An extreme example of which might be something like SABSA - a great work if you want to understand some very smart people’s comprehensive understanding of organizational security  - but the “adoption”of which will do very little to help you be innovative in P/D/R.

It’s worth noting that ultimately, this is one reason I don’t like regulatory compliance efforts - they simply serve to prove how mundane your security department is,  wasting valuable resources that could be spent on creating ways to be more effective.

PROCESS INNOVATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

As we come to the close of 2009, some surveys suggest that security spending isn’t horribly impacted yet by the economy (the latest from E&Y points to only 5% of their respondents getting budget cuts).  But if this is a protracted downturn, and because InfoSec is an operational expense, I would expect cash to become more and more difficult to keep.  And regardless if technology spends do slow, I believe it makes sense to think about Process Innovation because I see Process Innovation as a means to increase effectiveness without significant capital expenditures (effectiveness increases because our ability to manage risk has a direct correlation to the amount of risk we have).

The bad news is, of course, that great innovation is hard.  It is R & D.  Failure is usually a pre-requisite to success.

The good news is, our current state is so bad that many of us don’t need to come up with a whizbang new way of reducing software defects in the SDLC as innovation.  Simply inserting a risk analyst into the PMO’s processes might count as a big enough victory. Be cautioned, though,  that if we’re substituting the risk reductions provided by technology acquisition - Process Innovation might actually be even more “expensive” as it requires us to expend political capital.   But there are (forgive the term) innovative ways to spend this political capital.

For example, by taking a second now and figuring out the 3 things that the rest of the organization can do to make your life easier, when that “I need to reduce your budget” talk comes, you can be prepared to negotiate.  Get a political capital “loan” or “investment” from the C-Suite reducing your budget.  Something to the effect of: “I expected this, and am happy to give up my budget.  But if our tolerance for risk hasn’t changed, what I’d like to do is get you to personally back my office on three projects I’ve identified that can reduce our risk without requiring significant capital expenditure.”

…the FBI and the Secret Service came to the campaign with an ominous warning: “You have a problem way bigger than what you understand,” an agent told Obama’s team. “You have been compromised, and a serious amount of files have been loaded off your system.” The following day, Obama campaign chief David Plouffe heard from White House chief of staff Josh Bolten, to the same effect: “You have a real problem … and you have to deal with it.” The Feds told Obama’s aides in late August that the McCain campaign’s computer system had been similarly compromised.

This information demonstrates that the US government has a sophisticated intrusion detection capability. This is likely part of the NSA internet surveillance system that was made public by an AT&T technician in 2006.

It is likely that the system has a set of watch IP ranges that are sensitive from a national security perspective. The campaigns’ computers were probably on this list. The traffic between foreign IP addresses and these watch IPs is then scrutinized for espionage. The pattern of activity flagged would be Microsoft Office documents and PDFs being retrieved or other intruder signs such as an encrypted tunnel with a foreign endpoint.

This shows that the US Government has the capability to detect some types foreign attacks although they probably have to be selective of the IP ranges they monitor. It’s nice to know that if the White House computers were leaking documents to China or Russia that there is some detection capability, but the fact that this is done at the Internet backbone level means any IP could be targeted and it might not just be to look for foreign intrusions.

Skein is our submission (myself and seven others: Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, and Jesse Walker). Here's the paper:

Executive Summary

Skein is a new family of cryptographic hash functions. Its design combines speed, security, simplicity, and a great deal of flexibility in a modular package that is easy to analyze.

Skein is fast. Skein-512 -- our primary proposal -- hashes data at 6.1 clock cycles per byte on a 64-bit CPU. This means that on a 3.1 GHz x64 Core 2 Duo CPU, Skein hashes data at 500 MBytes/second per core -- almost twice as fast as SHA-512 and three times faster than SHA-256. An optional hash-tree mode speeds up parallelizable implementations even more. Skein is fast for short messages, too; Skein-512 hashes short messages in about 1000 clock cycles.

Skein is secure. Its conservative design is based on the Threefish block cipher. Our current best attack on Threefish-512 is on 25 of 72 rounds, for a safety factor of 2.9. For comparison, at a similar stage in the standardization process, the AES encryption algorithm had an attack on 6 of 10 rounds, for a safety factor of only 1.7. Additionally, Skein has a number of provably secure properties, greatly increasing confidence in the algorithm.

Skein is simple. Using only three primitive operations, the Skein compression function can be easily understood and remembered. The rest of the algorithm is a straightforward iteration of this function.

Skein is flexible. Skein is defined for three different internal state sizes -- 256 bits, 512 bits, and 1024 bits -- and any output size. This allows Skein to be a drop-in replacement for the entire SHA family of hash functions. A completely optional and extendable argument system makes Skein an efficient tool to use for a very large number of functions: a PRNG, a stream cipher, a key derivation function, authentication without the overhead of HMAC, and a personalization capability. All these features can be implemented with very low overhead. Together with the Threefish large-block cipher at Skein core, this design provides a full set of symmetric cryptographic primitives suitable for most modern applications.

Skein is efficient on a variety of platforms, both hardware and software. Skein-512 can be implemented in about 200 bytes of state. Small devices, such as 8-bit smart cards, can implement Skein-256 using about 100 bytes of memory. Larger devices can implement the larger versions of Skein to achieve faster speeds.

Skein was designed by a team of highly experienced cryptographic experts from academia and industry, with expertise in cryptography, security analysis, software, chip design, and implementation of real-world cryptographic systems. This breadth of knowledge allowed them to create a balanced design that works well in all environments.

Here's source code, text vectors, and the like for Skein. Watch the Skein website for any updates -- new code, new results, new implementations, the proofs.

NIST's deadline is Friday. It seems as if everyone -- including many amateurs -- is working on a hash function, and I predict that NIST will receive at least 80 submissions. (Compare this to the 21 submissions NIST received -- five were rejected as not being complete -- for the AES competition in 1998.) I expect people to start posting their submissions over the weekend. (Ron Rivest already presented MD6 at Crypto in August.) Probably the best place to watch for new hash functions is here; I'll try to keep a listing of the submissions myself.

The selection process will take around four years. I've previously called this sort of thing a cryptographic demolition derby -- last one left standing wins -- but that's only half true. Certainly all the groups will spend the next couple of years trying to cryptanalyze each other, but in the end there will be a bunch of unbroken algorithms; NIST will select one based on performance and features.

NIST has stated that the goal of this process is not to choose the best standard but to choose a good standard. I think that's smart of them; in this process, "best" is the enemy of "good." My advice is this: immediately sort them based on performance and features. Ask the cryptographic community to focus its attention on the top dozen, rather than spread its attention across all 80 -- although I also expect that most of the amateur submissions will be rejected by NIST for not being "complete and proper." Otherwise, people will break the easy ones and the better ones will go unanalyzed.

• Network Level Monitoring and Management,
  
• Cyber Security: Network Intrusion Detection,
  
• Enterprise Monitoring and Management,
• Modeling and Simulation of Collaborative Business Processes,
• Business Policy Monitoring, and
• Analysis and Debugging of Distributed Systems.

In each of the CEP application examples above, the amount of event information available to software developers can be staggering; however, despite all the available information, the capability to sense-and-respond to threats and opportunities is crude, at best.

Folks who work in network and security management, for example, are bombarded with event information.  However, this deluge of event information is, for the most part, “noise” that is difficult to understand.   In network management one of the most difficult things to accomplish is to find the root cause of an outage or performance problem.   This is why researchers at Stanford were funded to focused on research topics such as (above), the Analysis and Debugging of Distributed Systems.

These are the classes of asymmetric event processing problems that define complex event processing, or CEP.   Processing events by mediating events, routing events, or running a rule-set against events and making a processing decision are all perfectly valid event processing applications.   However, the core reason to have “complex event processing” is to solve event processing problems where there exists a significant asymmetry between the deluge of “event noise”  (Professor Luckham called this phenomena the “event cloud”) and detecting business-relevant, actionable complex events in an climate of uncertainty and noise.

In my next post on this topic I will briefly the review motivation behind my 1999 ACM paper, Intrusion Detection Systems and Multisensor Data Fusion, where we were working on solving complex distributed security challenges based on real-world experiences with the problems of asymmetric processing capabiilities.  I will discuss why we evolved from an early rule-based expert system model to a more advanced inference model that was not dependent solely on rule-based thinking.   I will also explain why other researchers and developers experienced in complex event detection applications have come to the same conclusion.

Does Oracle run the world? I would have to say no but Raj (Larry Ellison is his idol) and the 40,000 Oracle customers that descended upon SF last week might beg to differ. What do James Carville and Mary Matalin have to do with enterprise software? Pretty much nothing, except for the fact that they delivered the opening keynote for Oracle OpenWorld. (And that’s the only and last politically-oriented thing you’ll hear from me as we run up to the election). For a surprisingly funny and extensive photo gallery of the eye-popping event, check out cdye1’s photostream on Flickr.

But UB40, Elvis Costello and Seal aside, Oracle OpenWorld did offer training, certifications, and always entertaining speeches by Ellison. Ben Worthen’s favorite – “Larry Ellison’s Brilliant Anti-Cloud Computing Rant” delivered to analysts on Thursday. From Ben’s slightly-edited excerpt:

“The interesting thing about cloud computing is that we’ve redefined cloud computing to include everything that we already do. I can’t think of anything that isn’t cloud computing with all of these announcements. The computer industry is the only industry that is more fashion-driven than women’s fashion. Maybe I’m an idiot, but I have no idea what anyone is talking about. What is it? It’s complete gibberish. It’s insane. When is this idiocy going to stop?

“We’ll make cloud computing announcements. I’m not going to fight this thing. But I don’t understand what we would do differently in the light of cloud computing other than change the wording of some of our ads. That’s my view.”

So did everyone catch that? Cloud computing is complete gibberish and idiocy, but apparently Oracle’s already been doing enough around it to advertise the fact. I will have my cake and eat it too!

We’ve been pumping out the posts from the shows we went to – let me tell you, live-blogging is hard when you’re trying to share apparently miniscule amounts of bandwidth with 14,000 other attendees – and we have even more to share as we step back, contemplate and describe how some of the announcements, info and especially roadmaps fit into our overall picture over here at ScienceLogic.

For example, we released the results of our annual industry IT survey last week. Twice a year – at FOSE (for Government IT) and at Interop NY (for enterprises) – we take advantage of the fact that we have a big beautiful booth at these shows and offer a fabulous ScienceLogic t-shirt in return for a couple of minutes time with attendees living the problems we try to solve. Instead of telling people what their problems and priorities are, we like to ask.
Interop NY Survey - Trends and Challenges
Detailed Reports on Trends and Comparison to Government IT

And I just had to share this one because it is so bizarre. Are VMware and Paul Maritz guilty of plagiarism? You have to check this out to get even part of the picture. Apparently this guy has posted his slides (we know they are from VMworld 2007 because it says so in the lower-right-hand corner…) which prove that the “virtual datacenter operating system” idea was his idea a year before it showed up on Maritz’s keynote this year. Hmmm. And then after posting all these slides and making all the connections between his presentation and Maritz’s, he says he’s just kidding about the plagiarism. Can anyone sort this out and let me know?

I’ll tell you who wasn’t kidding when I went by their booth at VMworld – a certain chargeback vendor and VMware “partner” who was quite shocked two months ago when they walked into a meeting with VMware about future roadmap. Apparently, the slides they saw (preview of VMware’s announcement re adding extended chargeback capability within vCenter management services) were mighty might similar to slides they had given in a presentation to VMware about their own roadmap. Coincidence? I’ll let you decide. And I’ll also say, their strategy to combat this – support for Hyper-V coming early in 2009.

Originally, researchers in CEP were not trying to solve a problem of streaming data or streaming events.   Often we read this mischaracterization by folks in the database/streaming domain, as they were focused on the low latency processing of streaming events.   A natural extension of this research has been stream processing software (often called “engines”) that process streaming data with continuous queries, for example market data feeds for algo-trading or best market order execution.  This mischaracterization is partly responsible for why we see many order processing applications in market data stream processing mislabled as “complex event processing” applications.

The genesis of complex event processing was not the stream processing need for “feeds and speed” but the processing capability to solve what can be characterized as the “problem of asymmetric capabilties”.   The term “asymmetric” has been used in the military domain. For example we often hear the term “asymmetric warfare.”  However, in general the concept of “asymmetrical processing capablities” is the true genesis for CEP and related processing concepts and domains.   It is this genesis that distinguishes CEP from EDA, SOA, SOR, and so many other technology oriented concepts.

In order to illustrate what I mean by “asymmetrical processing capablities” we will take the example of the evolution of rocketry.    In the early days, scientists learned how to make rockets, I assume with gunpowder and similar chemical compounds to launch rockets.   Over many years the application of rocketry advanced much faster than the ability to understand the situations created in the sky.    In other words, folks could fill the skies with rockets long before they had the capability to track and identify (or sense and respond to)  the rockets in real time.

Therefore, the concept of “asymmetrical processing capablities” is the situation where there is a capability, such as “launch a rocket, sense-and-respond,” that is asymmetric in nature.    In other words, the capability to detect multiple rocket launches creates an asymmetric situation where it is easy to launch rockets, but hard to detect and defend against those launches.

The same concept can be applied to everyday air travel.   If we could only fly airplanes, but did not have the capability to track the planes, understand situations in airspace, and then respond to changing situations, air travel would be quite difficult.   Lucky for us, the global traveller, there is symmetry in the capabilities to build and fly aircraft and the capabilities to detect, track and follow the evolving situations in the sky.

The genesis of CEP was to solve the problem of asymmetry in cyberspace, or if you prefer, distributed data networks.   The folks who identified, early on,  the problems associated with asymmetry in cyberspace were folks working the the field of network and security management.    This is because there has been, and is currently, a great asymmetry between the capablities to “launch a process or transaction” in cyberspace and the capabilties to detect and track what is going on in the same domain.

In my next post on this topic, we will go into some details of this asymmetry and review the first CEP projects from Stanford University in the context of asymmetric processing capabilities in cyberspace.