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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: car]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/car</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Clickjacking]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d0ea1f000cff44a5f2bfc35ef78afadf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d0ea1f000cff44a5f2bfc35ef78afadf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Good Q&amp;A on clickjacking: In plain English, clickjacking lets hackers and scammers hide malicious stuff under the cover of the content on a legitimate site. You know what happens when a carjacker...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9115818&source=NLT_SEC&nlid=38">Q&A</a> on clickjacking:</p>

<blockquote>In plain English, clickjacking lets hackers and scammers hide malicious stuff under the cover of the content on a legitimate site. You know what happens when a carjacker takes a car? Well, clickjacking is like that, except that the click is the car.</blockquote>

<p>"Clickjacking" is a stunningly sexy name, but the vulnerability is really just a variant of cross-site scripting.  We don't know how bad it really is, because the details are still being withheld.  But the name alone is causing dread.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=iifBM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=iifBM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=q9UeM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=q9UeM" border="0"></img></a>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 09:45:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stunningly sexy">stunningly sexy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plain english">plain english</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cross-site">cross-site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/car">car</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/carjacker takes">carjacker takes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dread">dread</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/content">content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/clickjacking.html">Clickjacking</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The asymmetry of data loss - data thief has an upper hand]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1279b28b3737ccdc02880482fc1987c9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1279b28b3737ccdc02880482fc1987c9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I read this awesome book by Dan Geer, Economics and Strategies of Data Security . This gave me structure for my thoughts about a complex topic such as data security
When a data owner's (a business)...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>I read this&nbsp;awesome book by Dan Geer, <A href="http://www.verdasys.com/thoughtleadership/">Economics and Strategies of Data Security</A>. This gave me structure&nbsp;for my thoughts about a complex topic such as data security. </P>
<P>When&nbsp;a&nbsp;data owner's (a business)&nbsp;sensitive data is breached it is&nbsp;difficult to quantify the monetary loss. According to respectable survey sources, the average cost of sensitive data breach for a large size company is about $50,000. I am attempting here to think about this in simple mathametical terms:</P>
<P>There is a data breach. From the data owner's perspective the loss is:</P>
<P><FONT color=#3366ff>Loss&nbsp;= Cost to protect data&nbsp;+ Loss of business due to data theft aka cost of competitive disadvantage</FONT></P>
<P>From the data thief's perspective</P>
<P><FONT color=#3333ff>Net Gain= [Cost of producing the data&nbsp; *&nbsp; Data freshness factor] - Cost to steal the data + Profit of business due to data aka gain of competitive advantage</FONT></P>
<P>From the above two equations it is very clear that this is not a zero sum game. There is a clear cost asymmetry for a data owner and for a data thief. When there is an asymmetry there is an opportunity. Data owner&nbsp;would not even know that the&nbsp;data is lost because&nbsp;the original copy of the data may be still intact - data thief could have simply copied the data.&nbsp;Data theft does not look like&nbsp;a car theft, there is no vacuum left behind.&nbsp;</P>
<P><STRONG><EM>This motivates a data thief to keep the cost to steal low, steal highly valuable data that has&nbsp;a long shelf life and in a way that data owner will never even be aware of theft.</EM></STRONG></P>
<P>From&nbsp;a data thief's perspective, the cost to steal data if kept high would disincentive him. Moreover, Data freshness factor, i.e. how valuable this data is over period of time plays an important role.&nbsp;A good example is content of today's newspaper is hardly valuable tomorrow, but the content of newspaper two days ahead (if can be procured)would be invaluable. Data relevance is a function of time and other marketplace variables - &nbsp;Data freshness Factor accounts for that variable. A good way to discourage data thief is to increase his/her cost to steal the data. There are other inferences from the above equation. If there exists&nbsp;no competitive advantage&nbsp;with the stolen data, hardly any thief would even venture&nbsp;to steal the&nbsp;data in the first place. If the cost of producing data is very low, then probably thief can just produce the data himself and would not attempt to steal the data. If the cost of&nbsp;theft is kept high, it would definitely deter the data thief from stealing data using technical mechanisms, then the data thief would&nbsp;exploit weak links in data security&nbsp;such as use of social engineering to get access to the data.</P>
<P>From data owner perspective protecting data becomes very important. How much would the owner be willing to spend? Not definitely the cost equal to cost of producing the data. 1% to 10% of cost of producing data is considered prudent. For a data owner it is difficult to estimate cost of data protection of a specific data, because it is not easy to chunkify data protection costs. Moreover, as Dan Geer says in his book, a data owner has to protect himself from number of intruders not just one.</P>
<P><EM><STRONG>It pays for a data owner to: be aware of data breaches (or data leaks), employ appropriate&nbsp;mechanisms to protect the data; the cost of protection which&nbsp;is fractional cost of&nbsp;the valuable&nbsp;data and&nbsp;enhance information security awareness of personnel who handle the data.</STRONG></EM></P>
<P><STRONG><EM>Data loss is not a zero sum game. The advantage is in favor of a data thief (data thieves rather).&nbsp;Data owner does not give much thought&nbsp;on&nbsp;the value of data&nbsp;unless&nbsp;there is a data theft.&nbsp;But,&nbsp;a&nbsp;data thief&nbsp;has every reason to think about economics of data theft before he acts to steal the data else data thief won't survive in this game and he is very well aware of his advantageous position.</EM></STRONG></P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 02:33:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data owner perspective">data owner perspective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data owner">data owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thief">thief</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/owner">owner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data freshness factor">data freshness factor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data protection costs">data protection costs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/discourage data thief">discourage data thief</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect data">protect data</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/10/1/3910766.html">The asymmetry of data loss - data thief has an upper hand</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[We will miss you Paul Newman]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0087551a911fab9d09a604e70f4ff977</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0087551a911fab9d09a604e70f4ff977</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[You did good Paul. Thanks for all the good you did. You have a great soul. Take care


clipped from www.mercurynews.com

Legendary actor Paul Newman dies at age 83

WESTPORT, Conn.Paul Newman, the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > You did good Paul. Thanks for all the good you did. You have a great soul.<br/>Take care. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/5D83C440-CC1C-4870-A9E0-B7B49CCA5528/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/89c5be95-3408-428a-ac0d-fdc150777ba8/5D83C440-CC1C-4870-A9E0-B7B49CCA5528/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.mercurynews.com/movies/ci_10576339" href="http://www.mercurynews.com/movies/ci_10576339" style="font-size: 11px;">www.mercurynews.com</a></td>
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<div style="margin: 4px 0px; color: #000000; font-size: 20px;">Legendary actor Paul Newman dies at age 83</div>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.mercurynews.com/movies/ci_10576339 -->WESTPORT, Conn.—Paul Newman, the Academy-Award winning superstar who personified cool as the anti-hero of such films as &#8220;Hud,&#8221; &#8220;Cool Hand Luke&#8221; and &#8220;The Color of Money&#8221;—and as an activist, race car driver and popcorn impresario—has died. He was 83. </td>
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<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/5D83C440-CC1C-4870-A9E0-B7B49CCA5528/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content6.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 27 Sep 2008 10:57:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paul newman">paul newman</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paul">paul</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cool hand luke">cool hand luke</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cool">cool</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/race car driver">race car driver</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popcorn impresariohas">popcorn impresariohas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/moneyand">moneyand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/westport">westport</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/films">films</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=630">We will miss you Paul Newman</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[California hacker charged with stealing, extortion]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d6f19db8fe816cbe4124df66e912c436</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d6f19db8fe816cbe4124df66e912c436</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A resident of Solana Beach, Calif., has been charged with stealing customer data from luxury car seller Maserati North America Inc. and then trying to extort money from the company by threatening to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A resident of Solana Beach, Calif., has been charged with stealing customer data from luxury car seller Maserati North America Inc. and then trying to extort money from the company by threatening to publicly disclose the details of the system intrusion.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solana beach">solana beach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer data">customer data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/publicly disclose">publicly disclose</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system intrusion">system intrusion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extort money">extort money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/calif">calif</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/resident">resident</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/092308-california-hacker-charged-with-stealing.html?fsrc=rss-security">California hacker charged with stealing, extortion</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[GPS Spoofing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting : Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://philosecurity.org/2008/09/07/gps-spoofing">Interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for testing. They are available as commercial off-the-shelf products. You can also rent them for less than $1K a week -- peanuts to anyone thinking of hijacking a cargo truck and selling stolen goods.

<p>In his first experiments, Jon placed his desktop computer and GPS satellite simulator in the cab of his small truck, and powered them off an inverter. The VAT used a second truck as the victim cargo truck. "With this setup," Jon said, "we were able to spoof the GPS receiver from about 30 feet away. If our equipment could broadcast a stronger signal, or if we had purchased stronger signal amplifiers, we certainly could have spoofed over a greater distance."</p>

<p>During later experiments, Jon and the VAT were able to easily achieve much greater GPS spoofing ranges. They spoofed GPS signals at ranges over three quarters of a mile. "The farthest distance we achieved was 4586 feet, at Los Alamos," said Jon. "When you radiate an RF signal, you ideally want line of sight, but in this case we were walking around buildings and near power lines. We really had a lot of obstruction in the way. It surprised us." An attacker could drive within a half mile of the victim truck, and still override the truck's GPS signals.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 03:03:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps">gps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake gps signal">fake gps signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/signal">signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps satellite simulator">gps satellite simulator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/truck">truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim truck">victim truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim cargo truck">victim cargo truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stronger signal amplifiers">stronger signal amplifiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cargo truck">cargo truck</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/gps_spoofing.html">GPS Spoofing</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[VMWare is Better Than Microsoft]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a030161b183f83f292761020fb04b7d9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a030161b183f83f292761020fb04b7d9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[After barely surviving the VMworld registration process, my first session was From Hypervisors to VMware Infrastructure What Matters? or as I would have called it why VMware is so much better than...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After barely surviving the <a href="http://www.vmworld.com/conferences/2008/" target="_blank">VMworld</a> registration process, my <a href="https://vmworld2008.wingateweb.com/scheduler/eventguide/publicScheduleByType.jsp?ts=1221517325133" target="_blank">first session</a> was “From Hypervisors to VMware Infrastructure – What Matters?” – or as I would have called it “why VMware is so much better than Microsoft…and if you don’t believe that we can help you make even more money on top of your already successful Microsoft business.” (I know, that title is way too long but quite descriptive.)</p>
<p>The session took place at the beginning of Partner Day. The “regular” conference sessions actually begin tomorrow. Today is spent focusing on partner issues and enablement.</p>
<p>The panel for this session included:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mark Chuang <small>Group Manager, Product Marketing, </small>VMware, Inc.</li>
<li>Kenon Owens <small>Staff Systems Engineer, </small>VMware, Inc.</li>
</ul>
<p>You have to remember that <a href="http://www.virtualization.info/2008/09/more-than-20-partners-announces-support.html" target="_blank">most of the Partners here</a> are not vendors like ScienceLogic, but big and small shops that are selling IT, networking and now virtualization solutions into end-customer environments. For these guys, understanding what virtualization partner programs and tools are at NetApp, for example, is very useful. And many of these companies are already selling Microsoft software and surrounding services for Microsoft products. So if you’re VMware, what’s the message to these partners in the face of the Microsoft juggernaut?</p>
<blockquote><p>Microsoft to partners: “You may not like to admit it, but you’re probably already in bed with us.”</p>
<p>VMware to partners: &#8220;Our hypervisor technology outperforms Hyper-V and Xen, especially at scale. And anyway, it’s not about the battle at the hypervisor. It’s about the V-services on top of the hypervisor – VMotion, Storage VMotion, DRS, etc.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting and what we all already know, or think we know. The scale issue is an interesting one – too soon for <a href="http://blogs.technet.com/virtualization/archive/2008/09/12/pre-vmworld-check-out-hyper-v-server-and-live-migration-demos.aspx" target="_blank">Hyper-V</a> and who uses Xen? But also interestingly enough, no announcement or even talk about extending VMware management tools to other hypervisors. The point, as the VMware product marketing guy made a point of saying, is that the question they needed to answer used to be “Why Virtualization?” and now it’s “Why VMware?&#8221;.</p>
<p>One more tidbit – this survey run by VMware asking their customers:</p>
<p><strong>What are the top 6 apps you are running on VMware today</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>IIS</li>
<li><em>Apache</em></li>
<li>Active Directory</li>
<li>SQL Server</li>
<li>Sharepoint</li>
<li>Exchange</li>
<p><em></em></ul>
<p><strong>That means, 5 of 6 are Microsoft applications. </strong>Certainly it makes it even more challenging for VMware to navigate a path here.</p>
<p>The change since 2004 – would have talked about why virtualize. And now why VMware. (Duh.)</p>
<p>Talking to partners – many of which already have a successful Microsoft business. How VMware <a href="http://gigaom.com/2008/09/14/for-vmware-an-uncertain-future/" target="_blank">enhances your existing Microsoft business</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Top 6 apps running on VMware today (5 of 6 are Microsoft applications)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>IIS</li>
<li><em>Apache</em></li>
<li>AD</li>
<li>Sql server</li>
<li>Sharepoint</li>
<li>Exchange</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Source: VMware survey</em></p>
<p>Esxi - VMware – true thin hypervisor; maximizes resources utilization (over 100% memory commitment – allows avg of 2:1 memory overcommit) – host system memory is usually the resource bottleneck – plus Advanced Scheduler runs VMs better under load and to a greater capacity (hard to show this part); performance acceleration – using binary translation (32bit), para-virtualization and Hardware Assist (for 64-bit)</p>
<p>(rvi – rapid virtualization indexing)</p>
<p>No parent partition that all hypervisors have to go through</p>
<p>Vs ms/xen</p>
<p>Parent partition – dom 0 =&gt; potentially problem at scale; i/o that could be a bottleneck</p>
<p>Hyper-v SPECjbb comparison</p>
<p>= 9 vms on VMware and hyper-v hypervisors</p>
<p>Outperform (CPU) by 50% - general purpose scheduler isn’t able to keep up? “got to be”</p>
<p>(cpu only test)</p>
<p>Also used VMmark – to demonstrate again that VMware is performance tuned and designed to run at scale vs Hyper-V</p>
<p>Size Does Matter:</p>
<p>Vmware ESXi: 32MB</p>
<p>Hyper-v – 2.6 GB</p>
<p>Xen – 1.2 GB</p>
<p>Hyper-V uses Microsoft Server Core – so the last two Patch Tuesdays had to make changes to Server Core (nothing to do with Hyper-V) but service interruption for Hyper-V.</p>
<p>VMware VMsafe – “Provides an unprecedented level of security” “virtual is more secure than Real” (uh oh – clearly didn’t read about the</p>
<p>*****************</p>
<p>VMware TEST:512 mb vms on server w/ 4gb ram –</p>
<p>7 vms - xensource (w/no memory overcommit)</p>
<p>6vms – hyper-v before error (w/no memory overcommit)</p>
<p>14vms - w/memory overcommit and management</p>
<p>Running sql io sim – heavy workloads</p>
<p>TCO – not just license; now ESXi is free – so hardware</p>
<p>809 - ESXi</p>
<p>871 – vi3 foundation ($995)</p>
<p>1168- vi3 enterprise ($5750)</p>
<p>1621 – hyper-v – 2x cost because of hw</p>
<p>Xen – 1618</p>
<p>Memory overcommit (89% in production vs. test/dev)</p>
<p>Survey – 37% of respondents at 2:1 RATIO OR HIGHER; real average is around 1.8: 1</p>
<p>*********************</p>
<p>This guy Mark sounds like a used car salesman:</p>
<p>“Always On, On Demand Data Center”</p>
<blockquote><p>Hypervisor is very important but what is more important are the v-services on top of this. Manage shared, pooled resources. “Value Above the Hypervisor”</p></blockquote>
<p>How does all this save “your customers” $$?</p>
<p><strong>VMotion – saves cost on planned maintenance: no more overtime, no more time scheduling maintenance windows (see cost framework below)</strong></p>
<p>10 (# of servers) x 6 (@ of updates) x [ (overtime cost 2hrs x $150/hr) + (scheduling downtime # of apps per server 15 x time spend scheduling per app 0.75 hr x $50/hr)] = $58,500</p>
<p>Same thing with using VMware Storage VMotion</p>
<p>Overtime cost + scheduling downtime + planning move + alternative tool cost - $68,750 (2.5 TeraBytes)</p>
<p><strong>The Value of High Availability</strong></p>
<p>- cost of lost business, lost work</p>
<p>- cost of lost productive time</p>
<p>4 hours of downtime x # of users per vm 10 x number of vms per host 15 x cost of user productive time $50/hr x failures per year in 10-host cluster 2 = $60K</p>
<p>(10 servers, 150 vms)</p>
<p><strong>SAVINGS (using enterprise version)</strong></p>
<p>Update management 149,760</p>
<p>HA 60K</p>
<p>DRS, VMotion Storage VMotion 187,250</p>
<p>808,259 – hw, power cooling, etc.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 19:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware">vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/survey">survey</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware survey">vmware survey</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware enhances">vmware enhances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware infrastructure">vmware infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/test">test</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware test">vmware test</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/overtime cost 2hrs">overtime cost 2hrs</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/vmware-is-better-than-microsoft/09/2008">VMWare is Better Than Microsoft</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assets Good Until Reached For]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b4259e9d1ccfa754480b062e7acb4e32</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b4259e9d1ccfa754480b062e7acb4e32</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A few months back Minyanville wondered whether this subprime mess would end up as a cancer or a car crash. Guess we know the answer now. The question is - should we be at all surprised? Some smart...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">A few months back </span></span><a href="http://www.minyanville.com/articles/football-bears-bulls-Credit-equities-fannie/index/a/18769"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Minyanville</span></span></a><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> wondered whether this subprime mess would end up as a cancer or a car crash. Guess we know the answer now. The question is - should we be at all surprised?

Some smart folks have been warning for a long time. Warren Buffett famously called derivatives financial weapons of mass destruction.</span></span></p><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Charlie Munger, as he is wont to do, went a bit further (from 2004):</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">I think a good litmus test of the mental and moral quality at any large institution [with significant derivatives exposure] would be to ask them, &quot;Do you really understand your derivatives book?&quot; Anyone who says yes is either crazy or lying.</span></span></p></blockquote><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">They have many other statements in the same direction, based on their own experience from buying companies that used deriviatives where they were unable to to unwind the books and figure out who owed who. At the last Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting someone asked Charlie Munger what we could learn from past blow ups about the present crisis</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">It was a particularly foolish mess. We talked about an idiot in the credit delivery grocery business, Webvan. Internet based delivery service for groceries -- that was smarter than what happened in mortgage business. I wish we had those Webvan people back.</span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
What can we learn from all this?
<br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Well Dan Geer launched a revolution with his </span></span><a href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/risks/20.06.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">famous speech</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> about risk management. He got the big picture part right on the security industry evolving into more risk management practices, however the examples we assumed that were right at the time, the financial industry are proving wrong. For one thing you can&#39;t manage a risk if you don&#39;t know the assets (back to Charlie Munger, emphasis added):</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div></div></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; "><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">It is crazy to allow things to get too big to fail, run with knavery. As an industry, there is a crazy culture of greed and overreaching and overconfidence trading algorithms. It is demented to allow derivative trading such that clearance risks are embedded in system. Assets are all “good until reached for” on balance sheets. We had $400m of that at general re, </span></span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">“good until reached for”</span></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 20px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. In drug business you must prove it is good. It is a crazy culture, and to some extent an evil culture. Accounting people really failed us. Accounting standards ought to be dealt with like engineering standards.</span></span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So, yes it is about risk management, but if you build too many abstractions on top of your assets through derivative accounting and such you may find you don&#39;t have any assets when you need them. Don&#39;t fall in love with your abstractions, </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/04/security-rules.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">manage your assets</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">There are some clear lessons for us in Information Security, err I mean Information Risk Management.</span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Margin of safety</span></span><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
Its our job to manage risk, but this doesn&#39;t mean that we have to build layers and layer of abstraction on top of it. It also means that we help to design, build, deploy, and operate systems with margins of safety. Understanding the failure modes and accounting for this in design. Developers (because they are supposed to) and architects (because they haven&#39;t been properly trained) focus on functional requirements, building features, but on security not so much. There are many ways to improve security in a system and they are all inadequate by themselves, but we can help find </span></span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/06/cost_effective_.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">cost effective improvements</span></span></a><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. </span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Don&#39;t fall in love with abstractions</span></span><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">
</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2005/12/the_road_to_ass.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">abstraction assurance</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">.&#160;</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><a href="https://financialcryptography.com/"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Ian Grigg</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html#comments"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">commented</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"> on an earlier post</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div></div></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">There are distinct parallels between phishing / retail payments, and the bigger investment mess. In both cases, banks would argue these are core business. In both cases, they have applied risk-based security models, and accepted some loss. In both cases, they have the ability to apply substantial experience to the monitoring, allocating and absorbing risks and losses.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 19px; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">In both cases, they watched and did nothing as the risks started from low, and migrated upwards. Are we at the point where regulation has killed the ability of banks to apply their (arguable) one core skill, to whit, risk-based analysis? Are banks that far out of banking that they no longer have it?</span></span></p></blockquote><div><div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So you have to remember that top down and bottom up need to be combined.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Design for failure</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Dan Geer has also told the story that he sat in a large bank&#39;s risk management training, and the trainer said &quot;you may wonder why this works so well. it works because there is zero ambiguity over who owns what risk.&quot; Dan&#39;s thought was - &quot;in my field we have nothing but ambiguity.&quot; Turns out the second part was right, we have nothing but ambiguity over who owns what risk; unfortunately the financial people have much more ambiguity than they thought! So we do have a lesson here after all, and it this - when the thing you thought was true isn&#39;t, the failure mode is very ugly. </span></span><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2006/01/design_for_fail.html"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Design for failure - a</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">dd layers of protection. </span></span><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="font-size: 12px; white-space: pre-wrap; "><span style="font-style: italic; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Keep it simple.</span></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">They have some smart engineers at Google to be sure, but even they had </span></span><a href="http://www.identityblog.com/?p=1011"><span style="font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">incredibly basic errors in their SSO</span></span></a><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">. I have seen other obvious fails like people signing WS-Security messages, and the recipient checks for a signature but not if they trust the signer! There are so many ways to shoot yourself in the foot in a loosely coupled systems, and we have so many abstractions layered on top of each other, part of the mantra of protecting assets has to be keeping it simple.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">So that is my list, to do all these things it requires that Infosec get in the game, understand the use cases, understand the business value (it should be abundantly clear that you can&#39;t simply rely on &quot;business people&quot; to be &quot;business experts&quot;), and that you not lose sight of the asset amidst all the abstraction. Finally, the systems we build security on are very primitive, a firewall and SSL are fine, a seatbelt was fine in 1935 and its still fine today, but there are lots of other safety controls in cars. ABS, airbags, traction control, they all protect the assets far better than in 1935, that&#39;s what we need to build.</span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;"><br /></span></span></div><div><span style="line-height: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap; font-size: 12px; "><span style="font-family: Arial;">Anyone can make bad assumptions (assume you know who owns what risk) and its easy to make bad abstractions (the firewall protects the information system), but when you combine bad assumptions with bad abstractions you&#39;ll get assets that are good until reached for sooner or later</span></span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2008 05:41:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information risk management">information risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management practices">risk management practices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assets">assets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business people">business people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security industry">security industry</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html">Assets Good Until Reached For</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Movie Plot Threats in The Guardian ]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/44fad18176882cd40d3a3632e2971eda</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/44fad18176882cd40d3a3632e2971eda</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We spend far more effort defending our countries against specific movie-plot threats, rather than the real, broad threats. In the US during the months after the 9/11 attacks, we feared terrorists with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We spend far more effort defending our countries against specific movie-plot threats, rather than the real, broad threats. In the US during the months after the 9/11 attacks, we feared terrorists with scuba gear, terrorists with crop dusters and terrorists contaminating our milk supply. Both the UK and the US fear terrorists with small bottles of liquid. Our imaginations run wild with vivid specific threats. Before long, we're envisioning an entire movie plot, without Bruce Willis saving the day. And we're scared.</p>

<p>It's not just terrorism; it's any rare risk in the news. The big fear in Canada right now, following a particularly gruesome incident, is random decapitations on intercity buses. In the US, fears of school shootings are much greater than the actual risks. In the UK, it's child predators. And people all over the world mistakenly fear flying more than driving. But the very definition of news is something that hardly ever happens. If an incident is in the news, we shouldn't worry about it. It's when something is so common that its no longer news - car crashes, domestic violence - that we should worry. But that's not the way people think.</p>

<p>Psychologically, this makes sense. We are a species of storytellers. We have good imaginations and we respond more emotionally to stories than to data. We also judge the probability of something by how easy it is to imagine, so stories that are in the news feel more probable - and ominous - than stories that are not. As a result, we overreact to the rare risks we hear stories about, and fear specific plots more than general threats.</p>

<p>The problem with building security around specific targets and tactics is that its only effective if we happen to guess the plot correctly. If we spend billions defending the Underground and terrorists bomb a school instead, we've wasted our money. If we focus on the World Cup and terrorists attack Wimbledon, we've wasted our money.</p>

<p>It's this fetish-like focus on tactics that results in the security follies at airports. We ban guns and knives, and terrorists use box-cutters. We take away box-cutters and corkscrews, so they put explosives in their shoes. We screen shoes, so they use liquids. We take away liquids, and they're going to do something else. Or they'll ignore airplanes entirely and attack a school, church, theatre, stadium, shopping mall, airport terminal outside the security area, or any of the other places where people pack together tightly.</p>

<p>These are stupid games, so let's stop playing. Some high-profile targets deserve special attention and some tactics are worse than others. Airplanes are particularly important targets because they are national symbols and because a small bomb can kill everyone aboard. Seats of government are also symbolic, and therefore attractive, targets. But targets and tactics are interchangeable.</p>

<p>The following three things are true about terrorism. One, the number of potential terrorist targets is infinite. Two, the odds of the terrorists going after any one target is zero. And three, the cost to the terrorist of switching targets is zero.</p>

<p>We need to defend against the broad threat of terrorism, not against specific movie plots. Security is most effective when it doesn't require us to guess. We need to focus resources on intelligence and investigation: identifying terrorists, cutting off their funding and stopping them regardless of what their plans are. We need to focus resources on emergency response: lessening the impact of a terrorist attack, regardless of what it is. And we need to face the geopolitical consequences of our foreign policy.</p>

<p>In 2006, UK police arrested the liquid bombers not through diligent airport security, but through intelligence and investigation. It didn't matter what the bombers' target was. It didn't matter what their tactic was. They would have been arrested regardless. That's smart security. Now we confiscate liquids at airports, just in case another group happens to attack the exact same target in exactly the same way. That's just illogical.</p>

<p>This essay <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/sep/04/terrorism.terrorismandtravel">originally appeared</a> in <i>The Guardian</i>.  Nothing I haven't already said elsewhere.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=BZifEL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=BZifEL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=YYA7cL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=YYA7cL" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 01:56:57 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists bomb">terrorists bomb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bomb">bomb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threats">threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists">terrorists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists attack wimbledon">terrorists attack wimbledon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific targets">specific targets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/targets">targets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security follies">security follies</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/movie_plot_thre_2.html">Movie Plot Threats in The Guardian </source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Anti-theft Protocols]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2a0b13fdcf3d76640c70ce857f0644c4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2a0b13fdcf3d76640c70ce857f0644c4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[At last Fridays Security Group meeting, we talked about security protocols that are intended to deter or reduce the consquences of theft, and how they go wrong
Examples include
GSM mobile phones have...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At last Friday&#8217;s Security Group meeting, we talked about security protocols that are intended to deter or reduce the consquences of theft, and how they go wrong.</p>
<p>Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li>GSM mobile phones have an identifier for the phone (separate from the identifier for the user) that can be blacklisted when the phone is stolen.</li>
<li>Some car radios will stop working when the battery is disconnected, and only start working again when a numeric code is entered. This is intended to deter theft of the radio.</li>
<li>In Windows Vista, Bitlocker can be used to encrypt files. One of  the intended applications for this is that if someone steals your laptop, it will be difficult for them to gain access to your encrypted files.</li>
</ul>
<p>Ross told a story of what happened when he needed to disconnect the battery on his car: the radio stopped working, and the code he had been given to reactivate it didn&#8217;t work - it was the wrong code.<br />
Ross argues that these reactivation codes are unecessary, because other measures taken by the car manufacturers - such as making radios non-standard sizes, and hence not refittable in other car models - have made them redundant.</p>
<p>I described how the motherboard on a laptop had needed to be replaced recently. The motherboard contains the TPM chip, which contains the encryption keys needed to decrypt files protected with Bitlocker. If you replace the motherboard, the files on your hard disk will become unreadable, even if the disk is physically OK. Domain-joined Vista machines can be configured so that a sysadmin somewhere within your organization is able to recover the keys when this happens.</p>
<p>Both of these situations suffer from classic usability problems: the recovery procedures are invoked rarely (so users may not know what they&#8217;re supposed to do), and, if your system is configured incorrectly, you only find out when it is <i>too late</i>: you key in the code to your radio and it remains a doorstop; the admin you hoped was escrowing your keys turns out not to have the private key corresponding to the public key you were encrypting under (or, more subtly: the person with the authority to ask for your laptop&#8217;s key to be recovered is not you, because the appropriate admin has the <i>wrong name</i> for the laptop&#8217;s owner in their database).</p>
<p>I also described what happens when an XBox 360 is stolen. When you buy XBox downloadable content, you buy <i>two</i> licenses: one that&#8217;s valid on any XBox, as long as you&#8217;re logged in to XBox live; and one that&#8217;s valid on just your XBox, regardless of who&#8217;s logged in. If a burglar steals your Xbox, and you buy a new one, you need to get another license of the <i>second</i> type (for all the other people in your household who make use of it). The software makes this awkward, because it knows that you already have a license of the <i>first</i> type, and assumes that you couldn&#8217;t possibly want to buy it again. The work-around is to get a new email address, a new Microsoft Live Account, and a new Gamer Tag, and use these to repurchase the license. You can&#8217;t just change the gamertag, because XBox live doesn&#8217;t let the same Microsoft Live account have two gamertags. And yes, I know, your buddies in the MMORPG you were playing know you by your gamertag, so you don&#8217;t want to change it.</p>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:18:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xbox">xbox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xbox downloadable content">xbox downloadable content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wrong code">wrong code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xbox live">xbox live</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wrong">wrong</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/car">car</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/car radios">car radios</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/files">files</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft live account">microsoft live account</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/09/03/anti-theft-protocols/">Anti-theft Protocols</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Real Artists Ship]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;, but they are at very, very different stages of development and more importantly are taking different paths. You can easily think of software security as an emerging discipline - despite a lot of talk and papers about Saltzer and Schroeder, we really don&#39;t have this stuff figured out.&#160;</p><br /><div>So China is following a well worn path similar to South Korea, Japan, and the early US. India is taking a totally different and unproven path towards growth. Tata Motors has been innovative in building the cheapest car - the Tata Nano which is a $2500 car, and<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/01/to-those-about.html"> engineering triumph</a>, driven by a mantra that an engineer would stand behind &quot;do we really need that?&quot;</div><br /><div>Now the progress to executing on this is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/asia/03tata.html?_r=1&amp;ref=world&amp;oref=slogin">held back</a> by India&#39;s dysfunctional environment:</div><br /><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In a tale rich with incongruities, the Communist-run government of West Bengal State invited the&#160;<a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/tata_group/index.html?inline=nyt-org" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; text-decoration: none; color: #006683; " title="More articles about the Tata Group.">Tata Group</a>, a symbol of Indian capitalism, to set up its plant in an area called Singur. It acquired 1,000 acres from farmers on the company’s behalf.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">As the project advanced, some farmers who had sold their land demanded it back. The main state-level opposition party, the Trinamool Congress, led protests demanding that the land be returned. Most people sympathetic to Tata accused the opposition of inducing the farmers to protest, while Tata’s critics said the farmers had legitimate grievances.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The issue simmered for months. But in recent days, protesters began surrounding the plant, blocking roads and preventing Tata workers from reaching the plant. “The existing environment of obstruction, intimidation and confrontation has begun to impact the ability of the company to convince several of its experienced managers to relocate and work in the plant,” Tata said in a statement on Tuesday.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The halt to the plant has caused many Indian business people to warn of a chilling effect on investment in the country. It is also unclear how Tata will be able to keep the Nano’s cost so low, since part of the affordable price reflects the company’s savings on the land in Singur.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /><div><span style="font-style: normal; "><a href="http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1585">Arvind Subramanian</a>&#160;compares China and India&#39;s trajectories:</span><br /></div><div><span style="font-style: normal;"><br /></span></div></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">There is a fundamental asymmetry between state and markets. It is easier to create markets than it is to create state capacity or to prevent its deterioration. Creating markets is a lot about letting go, establishing a reasonable policy framework, and allowing the natural hustling instinct to take over. In other words, hustling is the natural state. Building state capacity, on the other hand, is quite different. It involves overcoming collective action problems, mediating conflict, creating accountability mechanisms where outputs are multiple and fuzzy and links between inputs and outputs murky, and contending with the deep imprints of history. In Weber’s memorable words, building public institutions is like the “slow boring of hard boards”.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In that light, China’s task of improving its private sector seems easier to accomplish than India’s task of arresting institutional decline. So, while China and India can probably both count on more years of high growth, the odds still favour China pulling off that feat than India. That, and not just the meagre medal tally, should be what India mulls over after the Beijing Olympics.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">The Economist </span><a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2008/09/the_passion_of_the_tata.cfm">summarizes</a><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">It&#39;s easier to liberalise a functional state than it is to functionalise a dysfunctional one, of any ideological stripe.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></p><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;">What does all this have to do with ostensibly the topic at hand - Information Security? Well Tata Motors had the innovation but they didn&#39;t have the deployment model, at least not yet. More to the point, a lot of software security gets driven by infosec groups but real change is only coming when its driven by the development group. Why? Development groups are functional, they ship code.&#160;A lot of the success in software security is predicated by who you choose to partner with, it is more effective and easier to add security into a functional development group that ships code.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata">tata</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata workers">tata workers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata motors">tata motors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/india">india</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/india mulls">india mulls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/functional development">functional development</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/real-artists-ship.html">Real Artists Ship</source>
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