To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer."

Doesn't it just make sense?!

The problem is self-signed certificates.

A CA is not a great solution:

Using a Certification Authority (CA) could solve the attack but at the same time introduces a new set of attack vectors:

1. The CA becomes a single point of failure. It becomes the juicy/high-value target for the attacker. Single point of failures are not good. Attractive targets are not good.

   Any person with access to the CA key can undetectably fake passports. Direct attacks, virus, misplacing the key by accident (the UK government is good at this!) or bribery are just a few ways of getting the CA key.

2. The single CA would need to be trusted by all governments. This is not practical as this means that passports would no longer be a national matter.

3. Multiple CA's would not work either. Any country could use its own CA to create a valid passport of any other country. Read this sentence again: Country A can create a passport data set of Country B and sign it with Country A's CA key. The terminal will validate and display the information as data from Country B.This option also multiplies the number of 'juicy' targets. It makes it also more likely for a CA key to leak.

   Revocation lists for certificates only work when a leak/loss is detected. In most cases it will not be detected.

So what's the solution? We know that humans are good at Border Control. In the end they protected us well for the last 120 years. We also know that humans are good at pattern matching and image recognition. Humans also do an excellent job 'assessing' the person and not just the passport. Take the human part away and passport security falls apart.

You can read all the details on their website (except for the part about the certification not being a measure of practical skills). From what I can tell, the CSSLP is just the CISSP with different CBKs, or Common Bodies of Knowledge. As with the CISSP, they are going for broad knowledge, not depth. Starting in June 2009, you can get certified by taking a paper exam, likely a multiple choice test similar to the CISSP. Why June? Because the test isn’t even written yet — I’ve heard from several sources that they are actively soliciting their existing pool of CISSPs to help write test questions.

Ah, but what if you can’t wait that long and want to get certified right away? You’re in luck. If you act before March 31, 2009, you can get grandfathered in without even having to take the exam! That’s right, they call it the CSSLP Experience Assessment, and here are the requirements:

• Upload a resume showing three years of experience related to software security, or four years if you don’t have a college degree
• Write short essays (500 words maximum) discussing four CBKs of your choice
• Get a CISSP to vouch for you
• Pay $650

Let’s examine these requirements one at a time.

Three years of experience. (ISC)2 doesn’t provide any requirements on depth of experience, other than citing the broadly-defined CBKs. Considering they are targeting everyone from software developers to security assessors to business analysts (yes, really), chances are they are going to accept any experience that is even tangential to the SDLC or software security.

Short essays on four of the CBKs. I asked the (ISC)2 exhibitors specifically what they are looking for to satisfy this requirement, and they said the essays should be a general discussion of the CBK topic, optionally citing your personal experience in that area if you have any. This messaging is not quite aligned with the website guidance, which states that the essays should be “Accomplishment Records” which are self-reported descriptions of experience. Either way, with a maximum essay length of 500 words, it’s pretty obvious that substance is not (ISC)2’s first priority. Here’s one data point for you: I spoke to someone who has already submitted the CSSLP Experience Assessment, and he said it took about an hour to write the essays.

Get a CISSP to vouch for you. Actually this can be any (ISC)2 certified person, not just CISSPs. Contrary to what you’d expect, though, the person isn’t vouching for your skillset so much as they are confirming that the attestations on your resume are accurate.

Pay $650. You knew it was coming. After all, there is money to be made. How is it that qualifying for the CSSLP through professional experience should cost $650? If you’re taking the written exam, fair enough, (ISC)2 does incur the cost of administering and grading that exam (even though the Scantron machine is probably paid off by now). But $650 for the submitted-online Experience Assessment? If we assume that the person reading these essay submissions makes a rather generous $100k per year, then $650 accounts for roughly a day and a half. Will it really take that long to read a maximum of 2,000 words and pass judgment? Of course not. (ISC)2 wants to get as many people as possible to qualify based on “experience”, seeding the initial pool of CSSLPs and netting them $650 per head for doing next to nothing.

As Lee Kushner stated during his OWASP AppSec presentation (7 Habits of Highly Effective Career Managers), “the more people who own a cert, the less relevant it becomes.” Irrelevant — that’s exactly what the CISSP has become, and it’s exactly where the CSSLP is headed. Meanwhile, (ISC)2 will sit back and watch while you and your employers continue to fill their coffers.

In closing, let me acknowledge that this blog entry probably comes across as judgmental. I accept that. I’m not ranting against the idea of certifications, though admittedly I’m not a fan of them either. I am disappointed that (ISC)2, an organization with tremendous influence, could have created something more meaningful but chose not to. Why bother when people will just fork over the cash anyway?

There are two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane. This difference is important: Making security screeners confiscate anything from that second class is a waste of time. All it does is harm innocents; it doesn't stop terrorists at all.

Let me explain. If you're caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren't just going to take it away from you. They're going to call the police, and you're going to be stuck for a few hours answering a lot of awkward questions. You may be arrested, and you'll almost certainly miss your flight. At best, you're going to have a very unpleasant day.

This is why articles about how screeners don't catch every -- or even a majority -- of guns and bombs that go through the checkpoints don't bother me. The screeners don't have to be perfect; they just have to be good enough. No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there's decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too great.

Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-ounce bottle of liquid. There's no evidence that the London liquid bombers actually had a workable plot, but assume for the moment they did. If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them -- like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce -- the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there's no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

I have to admit that I was already a fan of Collins’ quantitative style blended with clever insight, but this was the first time that I had seen him in person, and he was just spectacular. He has a vivid, animated way of telling a story, and had a great sense of humor. This combination of presentation skill was put to immediate use with his first statement drawing a hearty laugh from the audience full of entrepreneurs.

“How many of you in the room are constitutionally unemployable?”

Much of his remaining presentation provided interesting stories and insight from the research that he has done to understand the make-up of exceptional companies.

As Jim said, he has spent years studying the contrast between average companies and exceptional companies. They faced the same set of variables… similar economic conditions, similar competition for top human resources, and a similar set of huge unknowns.

What is the single biggest element of difference?

Not a function of the cards you are dealt, or circumstance… it is conscious choice and discipline.

Jim’s key principles & disciplines that have come from the studies we have worked on:

1. Building greatness is a cumulative never ending process! The idea that no matter how exceptional, you are always only relatively as good as to what you can do next.
2. Most overnight successes are 20 years in the making…. Wal-mart  took 13 years to get to 125 stores. Starbucks required 17 years to get to 38 stores.

“If you start to break Packard’s law, and there are very few laws of business, it is like breaking a law of physics for building great companies.” - David Packard (Co-founder of HP)

If you allow growth to exceed your ability to get enough of the right people to fill the key seats to execute on the growth brilliantly, you will fall as surely as a stone dropped from your hand. This is one of those timeless truths that extends beyond technology and economics.

The number one constraint on growth and sustained success…

An ability to get enough of the right people in the key seats to achieve that sustained growth.

The discipline that WHO comes before WHAT. Collins always kept coming back to the “who” thing over and over again. He said, “The more turbulent the world, (given the great current economic uncertainty of our financial system) the more important this issue is.”

A question from the audience came near the end of his session… How do you figure out who are the right people to put in key seats on the bus?

Collins responded with “Given that I stand here amidst a room full of unmotivated people… the right people are self motivated, self disciplined, self managed, The task is not to motivate unmotivated people, the task is not to have to manage people… self motivated, figured it out from there… self motivated people don’t need tons of management … when you have to start managing, you know that you have the wrong person at the task.”

Final thoughts:

Greatness is not a function of circumstance. Greatness is a function of conscious choice and discipline. It is not a matter of circumstance, it is one of choices.

I believe that every one of the Inc. 500 companies that I met at this conference achieved the list because they did not embrace the status quo. Incredible passion, an unwillingness to accept failure and an excessive and compulsive willingness to solve customer’s problems were key ingredients in the business building formula for the entrepreneurs that were at the conference.

There are two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane. This difference is important: Making security screeners confiscate anything from that second class is a waste of time. All it does is harm innocents; it doesn't stop terrorists at all.

Let me explain. If you're caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren't just going to take it away from you. They're going to call the police, and you're going to be stuck for a few hours answering a lot of awkward questions. You may be arrested, and you'll almost certainly miss your flight. At best, you're going to have a very unpleasant day.

This is why articles about how screeners don't catch every -- or even a majority -- of guns and bombs that go through the checkpoints don't bother me. The screeners don't have to be perfect; they just have to be good enough. No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there's decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too great.

Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-ounce bottle of liquid. There's no evidence that the London liquid bombers actually had a workable plot, but assume for the moment they did. If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them -- like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce -- the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there's no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

---

Bruce Schneier is chief security technology officer of BT. His new book is Schneier on Security.

Now I’ve been “accused” of being a quant in the past (hi rybolov!) but in reality the only dogs I have in this fight are the model and the application of scientific method - and really, ethically speaking, I have to be tied to the latter while applying the former.

And I see a false dichotomy in this whole Quant vs. Qual thing.  We, as a profession, tend to create a political divide between the two which, if it even exists, I’d say is based more on our ignorance rather than our expertise.  After all, we are the profession that regularly multiplies across ordinal scales and uses wonderful models like R=VxTxI.   As someone  learning to deal in probabilities and rationalism, I have to recognize that this discussion is really just about the act of observation using different metrics of measurement.

But how we’re going about observing does not change the fact that there is measurement based on observation.  So if I’m working with you I can easily turn your qualitative scale into a quantitative one, and vice-versa.  Yes, Shrdlu, if we had the time, even your most seemingly Qual things could be Quant! (This flexible world view, btw, is an outcome of that new-fangled Bayesian thing).

COGNITIVE BIAS A-PLENTY

But back to what Rich is saying there about information security and risk - and he isn’t/won’t be the only one saying these sorts of things - we should try to understand what’s really going on rather than get caught up in the emotional hurricane.  Our profession suffers several forms of cognitive bias.  The nature of our jobs and what we do can cause us to be focused on the outcome and not the quality of the decision at the time it was made.  We want to bring in things from other professions that are useful, but at times we do view things outside our profession with false correlation to our own (unfortunately for those who write these sorts of articles, financial risk is completely different than operational risk).  We also have the tendency to focus on negative outcomes without acknowledging the positive outcomes (For example, I hear that Alan Greenspan’s new firm is up a couple of $billion in all this mess since he joined them, short sellers are doing quite well - must be because they have qualitative models or something -grin-).  The effect of these biases are compounded by the facts that proper correlation takes more work than we usually give it, and rational thought is not that easy when there’s a witch-hunt mentality.

What also floats in water? (link to Youtube)

WHAT SHOULD WE BE THINKING ABOUT?

So as you and I read opinions that seem to be the polar opposite of irrational exuberance (and there will be plenty between now and the election) we’ll have to ask ourselves, “what really failed here?”  At the risk (pun) of over-simplification:

• Was There an Error on the part of Probability Theory?

After all, Probability Science like all other fields of knowledge is always “advancing” as they say.  So perhaps probability theory is wrong somehow?

I’m personally disinclined to put the blame here, primarily because I would think that there would be evidence from other fields (like Quantum Mechanics) that something is amiss waaaaay before it hit a field like economics.

• Was There Error In The Model Used to Determine Risk?

Some people who understand real estate valuation and complex derivatives and financial risk want to put the blame here.  It’s a little too early to tell, but one thing is for sure - Financial risk is so different from operational risk I couldn’t begin to hazard an opinion on the subject.   But it would seem that this is really somewhere we might look.

• Was There Error In The  Scale Used (Quantitative vs. Qualitative)?

Honestly?  I find it extremely difficult to understand how this could be the source of financial ruin.

• Was There Error on the part of the Decision Maker?

What if all of the above were just fine, and the decision maker chose short term gain over long term stability?  What if this was (to simplify the matter greatly) a choice of “heads” over “tails” and the coin landed on tails?  What if the model represented the right risk (probability of negative outcome vs. positive outcome), but the complex derivative was sold to someone else who had poor “risk management” (ability to make a good decisions)?

Now I have no clue about complex derivatives, and I’m oversimplifying to be sure - chances are like most things, there are several problems that helped create the primary cause. But it seems to me that as we go into incident response mode for the economy, it’s more helpful to do so in a rational, logical manner.

OTHER THINGS WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER

Consider the Source
Some authors (who I think tend to exploit outcome and hindsight bias,and then combine those with indirect ad hominem attacks in order to sell their books), are actually putting forth arguments against the use of analytics.  The source of this is a current epistemic debate between those who believe that only falsification is certain, and those who maintain that neither proof nor falsification are certain, there are only probabilities.    So before you go believing any “quadrants” of usefulness on faith - I encourage you to understand what is at the heart of the discussion.

We All Have to Live In The Real World
The sun will rise tomorrow, and someone will try to find the source of the problem and do a better job.  Now chances are, they’ll be doing it in a quantitative manner.  Chances are also that at some point their models will fail and we’ll need to build new ones.  And this will happen whether the field is cosmology, economics, meteorology, information security, or professional baseball.

WHAT ABOUT YOU, ALEX?

I’m far from certain and subject to change, but these days I lean towards Robin Hanson & MIchael Lewis w/regards to placing blame.

Following in the footsteps of social networking projects like Intellipedia, A-Space, an online collaboration environment for intelligence analysts, will go live on September 22. A-Space allows analysts to share information, form communities, and work together all under one environment. The analysts from sixteen intelligence agencies will have access to shared and personal workspaces, wikis, blogs, widgets, RSS feeds and other tools, as well as be able to search for content on other agencies’ data sources and even on data that allied countries might share.

Karen Sage, Cisco’s director of product management for network management, said that it’s “actually a good thing when network management is struggling, because is say that innovation is really happening at a fast rate”.

Joe Weinman, Strategic Solutions Sales VP for AT&T Global Business Services, created The 10 Laws of Cloudonomics. Weinman expands upon his laws by comparing public utility cloud services, traditional data center environments and private enterprise clouds.

I’m not making this up. HP has a new reality show coming out. “Engine Room” will be broadcast on MTV and on the Web and will feature teams of designers from around the world who understake a series of challenges with the help of HP computers. Can’t hardly wait.