<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: clicks]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/clicks</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 15:29:17 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Massive Spam Campaign Spreads False CNN News Items With Fake Flash Player Malware]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a225a716b4a000ec8b1b874643067ce6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a225a716b4a000ec8b1b874643067ce6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Known social engineering tactic involving Adobe Flash Player is exploited in currently active malware campaign. Spammed user is encouraged to click on a site with a fake news item in order to install...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Known social engineering tactic involving Adobe Flash Player is exploited in currently active malware campaign. Spammed user is encouraged to click on a site with a fake news item in order to install a fake Flash player update (file names might be flashupdate.exe, get_flash_update.exe, watchmovie.mpg.exe). If user clicks &#8220;Cancel&#8221; in the dialog that prompts for [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 05:28:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flash">flash</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake flash player">fake flash player</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adobe flash player">adobe flash player</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user">user</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user clicks cancel">user clicks cancel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake news item">fake news item</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/active malware campaign">active malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exe">exe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file names">file names</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/massive-spam-campaign-spreads-false-cnn-news-items-with-fake-flash-player-malware/">Massive Spam Campaign Spreads False CNN News Items With Fake Flash Player Malware</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Easy Google Income]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/78a5400adaadfa51b7dc44e905a348a8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/78a5400adaadfa51b7dc44e905a348a8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Here's an interesting piece of spam trying to cash in on the Google name that could wind up being quite costly for anyone willing to take a chance and see what it's all about. This was sent to one of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        Here's an interesting piece of spam trying to cash in on the Google name that could wind up being quite costly for anyone willing to take a chance and see what it's all about. This was sent to one of my friends:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer0.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer0.html','popup','width=537,height=530,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer0-thumb-337x332.jpg" alt="goffer0.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="332" width="337" /></a></span><br /> </div><div><div align="center"><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />Is it a good thing or a bad thing that the office is based in the West Indies and to unsubscribe your email goes to Romania? At any rate, they don't seem to <a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer1.jpg">want my patronage</a> - unfortunately, I'm not particularly interested in free iPods or a Nintendo Wii so a few clicks later and I'm where I should be:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer2.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer2.html','popup','width=878,height=697,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/goffer2-thumb-378x300.jpg" alt="goffer2.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="300" width="378" /></a></span><br /></div></div><div><div align="center"><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />At the bottom of the page, it says <i>"Google does not sponsor, endorse, and is no way affiliated with Easy Net Income or this promotion."</i><br /><br />Well, they could have fooled me what with all the Google material they've splashed across the site. The quote in the box is interesting, too: <i>"Riches range from a few hundred dollars a month to $50,000 or more a year".</i><br /><br />Go hunting on USA Today though, and the quote doesn't have anything to do with something called "Easy Google Income" - it's to do with <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-03-10-google-ads-usat_x.htm">Adsense</a>. Bits missing have been reinserted and bolded:<br /><br />"<b>Tales of AdSense</b> riches range from a few hundred dollars a month to
$50,000 or more a year, <b>though high-dollar paydays are rare. They
require a Web site with tons of traffic and the ability to put in
18-hour days working the system</b>.<br /><br />I think the missing parts are kind of important, don't you? Of course, the CD title clearly makes you think you're going to get some mysterious money magnet, but stops short of telling you whether it would be a program, ebook or magical leprechaun.<br /><br />In fact, what happens is you apparently sign up for the CD at the cost of subscribing yourself to some kind of "free trial" - at the end of which, you have to pay $39.90 a month for access to training courses to "Internet Wealth University" (I swear I'm not making this up). There's also an "activation fee" charged immediately to the card you subscribe with, though I'm guessing you only enter your details once you've entered your name / address and moved onto the second page (which I'm not about to do, in case you were wondering).<br /><br />Internet Wealth University must have an awful lot of poor students, going by the problems people are having <a href="http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/0/356/RipOff0356749.htm">unsubscribing</a>.<br /><br /><i>"When you try to call the company, you get an automated answering system
that tells you all representatives are busy and then puts you on
hold-forever, or they disconnect you after 5 minutes!"</i><br /><br />Indeed, there's quite a lot of people <a href="http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080630072422AA4Irmi">wondering</a> what this is all about, including the <a href="http://www.friendsinbusiness.com/board1/index.cgi/noframes/read/136859">inevitable concern</a> over <a href="http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080419232112AAh35aR">billing issues</a>.<br /><br />Our advice? Steer well clear. There is a lot of money up for grabs here, but it's all being netted by the people running these websites. Their customers don't appear to be so lucky...<br /><br /></div>
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 13:58:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/easy google income">easy google income</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google material">google material</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adsense riches range">adsense riches range</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet wealth university">internet wealth university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adsense">adsense</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/riches range">riches range</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mysterious money magnet">mysterious money magnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/awful lot">awful lot</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/easy-google-income.html">Easy Google Income</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5f5fba7cc0fecccc9eec606ee322456a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5f5fba7cc0fecccc9eec606ee322456a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It gets very ugly when someone owns both, the botnet, and the portfolio of parked domains actively participating in PPC (pay per click) advertising programs, where the junk content, or the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2zsqetKuI/AAAAAAAAB9k/tEKkNsDYkC8/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2zsqetKuI/AAAAAAAAB9k/_l257acyNMg/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>It gets very ugly when someone owns both, the botnet, and the portfolio of parked domains actively participating in PPC (pay per click) advertising programs, where the junk content, or the typosquatted domain names is aiming to attract high value and expensive keywords in order for the scammer to year higher on per click percentage. This is among the very latest tactics applied by those engaging in click fraud. Hypothetically, the cost to rent the botnet and commit click fraud would be cheaper than sharing revenue on per click basis with "human clickers" who earn money based on how many ads they click given a set of scammer's owned sites, where the customer supports represents a DIY proxy switching application changing their IP on the fly. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1555">Click Forensics's recent Q2 2008 report indicates that botnets were responsible for over 25% of all click fraud</a> activity they were monitoring during Q2. Not surprising, given that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1200">botnets have long been observed to commit blick fraud, using a common traffic exchange scheme</a>. What's new is the <a href="http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticleHomePage&amp;art_aid=86914">use and abuse of parked domains</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i><span class="articleText">Despite indication that some of the clicks from parked domains were invalid, Google failed to disclose to the plaintiff specific domain names in which these ads were clicked on, making detection of invalid clicks difficult and even worse concealing any evidence of invalid clicks," the lawsuit alleges. RK West eventually went through its server logs and discovered the source of the clicks, said Alfredo Torrijos, one of the company's attorneys.</span></i>"<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI25xjFW2JI/AAAAAAAAB9s/I0B4dL0kNKs/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI25xjFW2JI/AAAAAAAAB9s/yO_zUYYDmDM/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based1.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>Will cybersquat security vendors for improving the chances of attracting high-valued keywords to later on click fraud? <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/brandjacking-index.html">The trend has been pretty evident</a> for a while, with <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1240">cybersquatting increasing</a> on an yearly basis <a href="http://www.domaintrading360.com/2008/July/Cybersquatting-has-Increased-48-since-25.htm">according to multiple sources</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Rise in pay-per-click advertising where cybersquatters link the domain name they have registered with a website containing ads promoting a variety of competing brands.&nbsp; The cybersquatter receives money every time internet users access this website and click on one of the ads.</i>" <br />
<br />
However, the "internet users who are supposed to click on one of the ads on the parked domains owned by the scammers" will get clicked by a botnet owned or cost-effectively rented by the scammer. Here's a sample of currently parked domains attracting Symantec ads :<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2_iieZvEI/AAAAAAAAB90/vBXDvrmIQ3Y/s1600-h/symantec_parked.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2_iieZvEI/AAAAAAAAB90/75_WIDckWa4/s200-R/symantec_parked.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><b>symentec .com<br />
symantek .com<br />
symanteck .com<br />
symantac .com<br />
symantaec .com<br />
symantic .com<br />
symmantec .com <br />
symanntec .com<br />
ssymantec .com<br />
symanthec .com<br />
symanzec .com<br />
symanttec .com<br />
sjmantec .com<br />
saimantec .com<br />
seymantec .com<br />
symanrec .com <br />
symantrc .com<br />
symantwc .com<br />
aymantec .com<br />
dymantec .com<br />
sxmantec .com<br />
symantex .com<br />
symantev .com<br />
symabtec .com<br />
symamtec .com<br />
synantec .com<br />
stmantec .com<br />
symanyec .com<br />
sumantec .com<br />
symant3c .com<br />
syman5ec .com<br />
wwwsymantec .com<br />
symanteccom .com<br />
ymantec .com<br />
syantec .com<br />
symntec .com<br />
symanec .com<br />
symantc .com<br />
symante .com<br />
symattec .com<br />
symantcc .com<br />
syman-tec .com<br />
syymantec .com<br />
symaantec .com<br />
symanteec .com<br />
symantecc .com<br />
ysmantec .com<br />
syamntec .com<br />
symnatec .com<br />
symatnec .com <br />
symanetc .com<br />
symantce .com</b><br />
<br />
As well as recent sample brandjacking Kaspersky :<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3BgYCnt9I/AAAAAAAAB98/06ZAB3dzbCI/s1600-h/kaspersky_cybersquatted.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3BgYCnt9I/AAAAAAAAB98/GQ6jI4aBdFM/s200-R/kaspersky_cybersquatted.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><b>kespersky .com<br />
kasparsky .com<br />
kaspaersky .com<br />
kaspasky .com<br />
kasperscky .com<br />
gaspersky .com<br />
kasbersky .com <br />
kasppersky .com<br />
kasperrsky .com<br />
kasperssky .com<br />
kasperskj .com<br />
kasperskey .com<br />
kaapersky .com<br />
kasperaky .com<br />
kasperdky .com<br />
laspersky .com<br />
kaspersly .com<br />
kasperskt .com<br />
kaspersku .com<br />
kasp3rsky .com<br />
kaspe4sky .com<br />
kas0ersky .com<br />
wwwkasperskycom .com<br />
wwwkaspersky .com<br />
kasperskycom .com<br />
aspersky .com<br />
kspersky .com<br />
kasersky .com<br />
kaspesky .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
kaspersy .com<br />
kaspersk .com<br />
kappersky .com<br />
kaspessky .com<br />
kas-persky .com <br />
kasp-ersky .com<br />
kasper-sky .com<br />
kasperskyy .com<br />
akspersky .com<br />
ksapersky .com<br />
kapsersky .com<br />
kaseprsky .com<br />
kaspesrky .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
kaspersyk .com<br />
kaspersky24 .com<br />
kasperskyonline .com<br />
kaspersky-online .com</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3CDCHUR8I/AAAAAAAAB-E/CNtqkpXkdQY/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3CDCHUR8I/AAAAAAAAB-E/gwyx6ceVeec/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based2.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What's most disturbing is that instead of having cybersquatting taken care take of a long time, and scammers emphasizing on the junk content in order to attract the relevant ads on the bogus domains, the still trendy cybersquatting still does the magic by including the targeted word in the domain name itself.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/cybersquatting-security-vendors-for.html">Cybersquatting Security Vendors for Fraudulent Purposes</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/cybersquatting-symantecs-norton.html">Cybersquatting Symantec's Norton AntiVirus</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/state-of-typosquatting-2007.html">The State of Typosquatting - 2007</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wafTVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wafTVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xOMD9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xOMD9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=8ZGBqj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=8ZGBqj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wdaQsj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wdaQsj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=v3m4OJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=v3m4OJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9nz2nJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9nz2nJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Vplsvj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Vplsvj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/348369914" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 03:58:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click">click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click fraud">click fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click percentage">click percentage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click basis">click basis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pay-per-click">pay-per-click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click forensics">click forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click fraud activity">click fraud activity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/invalid">invalid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/invalid clicks difficult">invalid clicks difficult</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/348369914/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday we featured our initial Q&amp;A with Doug McClure , who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday we featured <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008" target="_blank">our initial Q&amp;A</a> with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies and how his stint in the U.S. Navy helped shape his future passion for BSM.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Can you share any of the strategies/advice that you give to companies embarking on their BSM journeys?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Well, first they&#8217;ve got to have a BSM strategy. Nearly all the clients I talk to or hear about wanting to do BSM do not have a BSM strategy. I talk a lot about this on my blog and with clients and it is relevant whether you&#8217;re going to think about &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; or &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; approaches.</p>
<p>Once we have a BSM strategy, we need to establish a BSM roadmap that guides us in how we’ll implement the BSM strategy in a more tactical manner, focusing on short term iterative quick wins and 30-60-90 day projects. For more of my thoughts on BSM strategy and roadmapping, see the following blog posts.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/03/elements-of-business-service-management-part-3-getting-business-service-management-on-the-radar-screen/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 3: Getting Business Service Management on the Radar Screen</a></h3>
</li>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/09/elements-of-business-service-management-part-4-what%e2%80%99s-your-business-service-management-strategy/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 4: What’s your Business Service Management Strategy?</a></h3>
</li>
</ul>
<p>As I&#8217;ve alluded to previously, a client first must define and understand what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may mean to them. Don&#8217;t take what the analysts or the vendors pitch for what you should do to achieve BSM or what value you should get from it.</p>
<p>For any type of BSM to be successful, each client must define what BSM means to them and state what they expect to get from BSM. They must make it personal, make it a part of their company culture and elevate it to be as an important initiative as compliance, risk management, SOA, ITIL, or other initiatives may be within the company.</p>
<p>Please don&#8217;t get scared off from this strategy thing. Please don&#8217;t blow this off as something that the secret enterprise architecture council should be doing. If you&#8217;re unable to get an audience in these areas within your company, start within your own sphere of influence.</p>
<p>Your strategy could be as simple as enabling the local operations center to more efficiently classify, triage and resolve problems based on a simple business service or application contextual understanding. Focus on how this changes the game within your environment. Come up with your own metrics and measures to assess the value this has to this organizational use. Trust me, you&#8217;ll need to justify your investment some time in the future.</p>
<p>Another trait of successful BSM implementations is that of the formal monitoring and management tools group has established some sort of database or knowledge repository that enables them to &#8220;manage the business of IT management and monitoring&#8221; if you will. In my opinion, the vendor community has let their clients down significantly in this area. The CMDB may be the correct answer, but most companies just don’t value monitoring enough to demand that this be included in their formal CMDB initiatives.</p>
<p>In my last job, we developed an application that I referred to as the &#8220;Service Management Database&#8221; or &#8220;SMDB&#8221;. Others may call it something else, but in essence, it was the database that captured what was monitored, how it was monitored, who owned it, what business services and applications it supported, the impact an outage or event from it had on the business services or applications, etc.</p>
<p>One key component of this “SMDB” was establishing the relationships of real and synthetic user and transaction monitoring steps to associated servers and applications. This is a significant gap area in many tools and vendor CMDBs.</p>
<p>Clients who have instituted something formal such as this generally have a very good handle on management and monitoring within their environment. Far too many clients do not have adequate monitoring (read visibility) in place to begin their BSM journey.</p>
<p>I&#8217;d strongly recommend a good hard look at how well the client&#8217;s monitoring and management practices are implemented and managed. Simply put, if they don&#8217;t have adequate visibility into how well those business services and applications are performing, you can&#8217;t expect to manage what you can&#8217;t “see” that may be impacting the business, clients, revenue, etc.</p>
<p>Just ask yourself this – can you explicitly state what monitoring is in place for a given business service or application? Can you quantify the impact of a simple event to a business service or application? Can you explain why something is red, yellow, purple or green and what causes it to change from one color to another? If you can’t, your BSM journey will be challenging.</p>
<p>Those with formal CMDB initiatives have their hands full with high risk, long time to value projects to just get a handle with traditional configuration management models. Taking these low level configuration items (CI&#8217;s) and establishing application and service dependencies comes after a lot of work getting through the organizational challenges of getting systems access to populate the CMDB.</p>
<p>I strongly recommend that the formal monitoring and management tools group create an authoritative database that enables them to establish end-to-end visibility into the service and application delivery chain and the impacts it has on the business, customer, etc. This ultimately becomes part of a more realistic federated CMDB within the business.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Can you provide an example of a successful implementation of BSM? Were there specific factors that especially contributed to its success?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I&#8217;ve touched on the highlights of the most successful BSM implementations throughout my previous answers. Clients that have rallied around an organizational change or transformation focusing every team member’s efforts and energy towards ensuring that the business goals and objectives are being met through the delivery of highly available business services and applications.</p>
<p>Far too often the “change” never happens and it’s the “talking heads” that are preaching to the choir about what should be done. Every person on the front line, in the support teams, at the help desk, etc. must understand how they support or impact the business in business terms. Try putting this simple phrase after job titles “Hi, my name is Doug. I’m a Systems Administrator, Supporting the Business”.</p>
<p>That was a mouthful, but simply put, these clients have an impressively instrumented business and IT environment with the right amount of visibility into each area, joined together with an organization that thinks, operates and responds based on their understanding of the business goals and objectives and how these business services and applications enable business success.</p>
<p>The operational model for an organization fully adopting BSM identifies ways to establish a service management mentality across the entire business service and application delivery and support chain. The delivery, operations and support organizations must be incented to manage the services and applications being delivered with this end-to-end context.</p>
<p>A leading, outside the box “service management organization” may include the traditional IT silos but within a matrixed fashion focused on one or more key business services and applications. The &#8220;service management organization&#8221; is then incented to work together, as a team, for the end-to-end delivery and support of these services or applications.</p>
<p>It’s no longer one’s job to just be the systems administrator, database administrator or network engineer, their job is now to support specific business services and applications. They provide the subject matter expertise needed to support the services and applications together, as a team, eliminating the finger pointing or “not my problem” attitudes that exist in the majority of IT organizations today.</p>
<p>Overall, the KISS approach is what will enable BSM of any type (lite, heavy) to be the most successful. If it just feels natural, doesn&#8217;t take any additional effort, clicks or tasks to do then it&#8217;s going to work. BSM should be transparent and not just another buzz word. It&#8217;s not a form that gets filled out or a special process to follow in the run book. It&#8217;s doing the right thing for the business, no matter what the situation, crisis, buzz word or technology initiative of the day is.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How did you get involved in BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the foundations of my service management background and passion were initially established during my service in the US Navy. Today, I relate that experience to what I call BSM for the Military or Mission Services Management (MSM).</p>
<p>We had been taught over and over that extreme attention to the details of the mission at hand (aka &#8220;the business&#8221;) was the number one priority and that all of our technology, services, and applications existed for those Sailors and Marines on the other end (the &#8220;customer&#8221;). I can recall countless instances where mission critical communications services (telephony, orderwires, teletypes, command and control systems, etc.) were impacted in one way or another. It was extremely critical that we understood who was impacted and to what degree so that contingency plans could be activated. We weren’t just talking about lost revenue, poor sales or customer experience; we were talking about human lives and the security of the United States.</p>
<p>It is that military bearing, attention to detail and real world experience that drives me with many of my modern day BSM endeavors. That migration from &#8220;Mission Services Management&#8221; to BSM was honed working for over 10 years working in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and datacenter, hosting and colocation business.</p>
<p>In those rapid growth businesses during the Internet boom, service differentiation was what &#8220;made you millions&#8221; or paved your way to bankruptcy. The companies I worked for had an extreme passion and focus on ensuring that their services, applications and Internet access products were of the highest quality, highly reliable and just plain better than the competition.</p>
<p>Again, the IT infrastructure, service quality and customer experience relationship was ingrained in all of our heads. It was all hands on deck when Webmail, Internet access, DNS, or the network experienced problems. We were measured in terms of how many customers experienced a busy signal or dropped connection or if you couldn’t log in fast enough to read your email. Companies like Keynote Systems and LionBridge/Veritest/Inverse tested the quality of our networks, services and applications and publicly ranked us against our competition. We thought in terms of customer experience and impact every minute of the day, 24&#215;7.</p>
<p>It was in my last job managing a traditional enterprise management and monitoring development group for a nationwide ISP where I was able to work with emerging technology to help get a handle on the complexities of these rapidly growing IT environments filled with emerging technologies and products. Applying this early technology to complex service problems in our environment proved to me that the technology, coupled with the right emphasis on how the technology was implemented and an emphasis on the people and processes within the organization could bring BSM to life.</p>
<p>Where I felt left out in the cold was with my vendor relationship. While their technology gave me the potential, they didn&#8217;t teach me how to work through the organizational and technological problems to successfully implement the BSM strategy. My very first end-to-end BSM pilot was extremely successful and provided visibility into the IT environment and business service impact that have never been available before.</p>
<p>And here I am today, working at a software vendor for the first time. Welcome to the &#8220;dark side&#8221; as they say. The approach and methodology we followed for BSM has become the basis of the core BSM Methodology that I teach IBMers and our clients around the world today.</p>
<p>My personal mission and drive here at IBM Tivoli is to ensure that BSM is something that the typical monitoring tools administrator can actually implement and that our BSM story is something that any of our clients can be successful with. The sales and marketing slicks must be backed up by something like this whomever you are these days. Clients shouldn&#8217;t put up for “marketecture”, me too and gee whiz buzz words.</p>
<p>BSM takes a partnership and commitment to every client&#8217;s success, and I want to be involved in those BSM efforts in every industry or market worldwide. We need more thought leaders collaborating together in an open and public forum to change legacy attitudes about BSM and do what we can to enable client’s to be as successful as they can be.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+What+Makes+BSM+Successful%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management database">service management database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management tools">management tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management mentality">service management mentality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service management">business service management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service">business service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service impact">business service impact</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mission services management">mission services management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database">database</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fast Track to Botnet Central]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d62636e855a8a6846b44ec6cafe10519</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d62636e855a8a6846b44ec6cafe10519</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its true, you too can finally get into the botnet you always wanted. Finally the ability to be a zombie computer under some losers control is yours

Seriously though, becoming a victim to a hacker's...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        Its true, you too can finally get into the botnet you always wanted.&nbsp; Finally the ability to be a zombie computer under some losers control is yours!<br /><br />Seriously though, becoming a victim to a hacker's botnet is incredibly easy.&nbsp; These attacks are not typical to other forms of destruction found on the internet.&nbsp; There true intent is usually to remain hidden from view until called upon.&nbsp; In the case of <a href="http://www.spywareguide.com/spydet_31297_fasttrackbot.html">FastTrackBot</a> however there is a new objective.&nbsp; <a href="http://www.spywareguide.com/spydet_31297_fasttrackbot.html">FastTrackBot</a> downloads several executable files that keep your computer clicking on the attacker's affiliate links.&nbsp; These executable files keep the webpages in hidden iexplore.exe windows in order to hide the application from suspicious eyes.&nbsp; If you're using X-cleaner, I suggest you take a look at the Expert Tab.&nbsp; The Show All Hidden Windows function is great for showing you exactly what is open at the time.<br /><br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/replace%20ad.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/replace%20ad.html','popup','width=488,height=332,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/replace%20ad-thumb-488x332.png" alt="replace ad.png" class="mt-image-center" style="margin: 0pt auto 20px; text-align: center; display: block;" width="488" height="332" /></a></span>FastTrackBot phones home to several of these sites in order to keep the user clicks through affiliate links.<br /><br />Aside from creating invisible windows to hog your bandwidth up, it also attempts to install a rogue anti-spyware application.&nbsp; This is a popular technique when attempting to fraud the victim into leaking credit card information when actually attempting to purchase the fake product.&nbsp; FastTrackBot inserts a fake security center that appears identical to the one found in Windows XP.<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/securitycenter.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/securitycenter.html','popup','width=786,height=576,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/securitycenter-thumb-500x366.png" alt="securitycenter.png" class="mt-image-center" style="margin: 0pt auto 20px; text-align: center; display: block;" width="500" height="366" /></a></span>As you can see in the address bar, this is not the actual security center.&nbsp; Clicking anywhere on this window means almost certain doom in the worst way possible...a never ending stream of fake "YOU ARE INFECTED!!!!" alerts.<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/infect.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/infect.html','popup','width=764,height=523,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/fasttrack/infect-thumb-500x342.png" alt="infect.png" class="mt-image-center" style="margin: 0pt auto 20px; text-align: center; display: block;" width="500" height="342" /></a></span><br />In order to kill the actual application, you have to remove it from memory first, then remove its autostart which is found in 5 different locations - or simply remove with our free <a href="http://www.spywareguide.com/onlinescan.php">Microscanner</a>.<br />
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2008 05:41:45 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fasttrackbot">fasttrackbot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fasttrackbot inserts">fasttrackbot inserts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows">windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/invisible windows">invisible windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake">fake</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/actual application">actual application</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake security center">fake security center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fasttrackbot phones home">fasttrackbot phones home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application">application</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/fast-track-to-botnet-central.html">Fast Track to Botnet Central</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Circumvented: My Anti-Virus]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5704ba277530cbbd6aec5c9efb9863d9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5704ba277530cbbd6aec5c9efb9863d9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I recently needed to renew the anti-virus subscription on my tablet PC. Of course, Symantec popped up and let me know well in advance, and of course, I waited until the almost-last-day before I...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>I recently needed to renew the anti-virus subscription</strong> on my tablet PC. Of course, Symantec popped up and let me know well in advance, and of course, I waited until the almost-last-day before I renewed. </p><p>When my renewal options appeared, there was a selection to upgrade to the shiny new Norton 360. Woo hoo! It listed all these great new security features&#8230; I don&#8217;t remember what they were&#8230; but, they sounded REALLY great (I promise).</p><p>So I went with the upgrade, instead of the anti-virus signature renewal. <em>Okay</em>. </p><p>It did <strong>seem</strong> like a good idea at the time. However, in addition to my overly-protective Vista popups eeeevvvvery time I want to run something, connect somewhere, or wipe my nose&#8230; Now, I have the Vista pop up AND the Norton 360 popup.&nbsp;<em>Okay</em>.</p><p>Except, the Norton pops up with flagrantly ambiguous information like &#8220;An application is trying to access your Internet.&#8221; Do I want to allow it? I don&#8217;t know. How am I supposed to know-&nbsp;<strong>which</strong> application wants to access my Internet? Oh, it&#8217;s not going to tell me. <em>Okay</em>.</p><p>Well, I guess I&#8217;ll click &#8216;Allow&#8217; because I have no clue <strong>what</strong> is trying to access my Internet, but I&#8217;ll assume it&#8217;s something that I have somehow asked to access my Internet&#8230; and I&#8217;ll be quite upset if whatever I clicked on doesn&#8217;t work. So YES, ALLOW. <em>Okay again.</em></p><p>And what was the point in that? One click has transformed to three, and I&#8217;m no more secure than I was before, I&#8217;m just being forced to make more clicks to <u>earn</u> my insecurity. So today I am the poster child of what NOT to do. </p><p><strong>Security circumvented</strong> is quite possibly worse than no security at all. I see visions of &#8216;invalid browser certificate&#8217; notices dancing in my head. </p><p># # #</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 23:31:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/norton pops">norton pops</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/norton">norton</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security features">security features</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access">access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flagrantly ambiguous information">flagrantly ambiguous information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti-virus signature renewal">anti-virus signature renewal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/possibly worse">possibly worse</category>
      <source url="http://www.securityuncorked.com/security-uncorked/2008/6/20/security-circumvented-my-anti-virus.html">Security Circumvented: My Anti-Virus</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Ethical Phishing to Evaluate Phishing Awareness]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/534124c2d8e2441fb919ed2d449acba7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/534124c2d8e2441fb919ed2d449acba7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is the most efficient and cost-effective way of both, measuring your employees awareness of phishing threats, and building awareness of the threat simultaneously? By sending them ethical phishing...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SCDVVNDpjYI/AAAAAAAABrE/cTxXciMtNMw/s1600-h/phishme_demo_ethical.JPG"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SCDVVNDpjYI/AAAAAAAABrE/cTxXciMtNMw/s200/phishme_demo_ethical.JPG" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5197388530244488578" border="0" /></a>What is the most efficient and cost-effective way of both, measuring your employees awareness of phishing threats, and building awareness of the threat simultaneously? By sending them ethical phishing emails to see which department based on which social engineering campaign is more susceptible to phishing attacks, at least that's what <a href="http://phishme.com">PhishMe.com</a> is all about :<br /><br />"<span style="font-style: italic;">Effective, memorable, and secure user awareness testing and training is now available with just a few clicks. Using PhishMe.com’s built-in templates and WYSIWYG functionality, you can emulate real phishing attacks against your employees within minutes. Focus your training efforts on the most susceptible employees by providing immediate feedback to anyone that falls victim to these exercises. Phish your employees before hackers do!</span>"<br /><br />Once watching the <a href="http://phishme.com/demo.html">demo online</a>, you'll get the feeling that it's actually a real phisher's web interface to spamming out phishing emails, so I guess the bad guys can in fact learn from the good guys standardizing approach and metrics mentality applied.<br /><br />For the time being, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">Rock Phish</a> represents the most <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/phishing-emails-generating-botnet.html">efficiency centered phishing approach</a>, with a single IP hosting numerous domains, each of those hosting over ten different phishing campaigns on average each of these with a dedicated cybersquatted subdomain. However, with the ongoing <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">commoditization of phishing pages</a>, the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/segmenting-and-localizing-spam.html">localization and segmentation of phishing campaigns</a>, the next logical development would be the public release of a point'n' click web interface for managing real phishing campaigns.<br /><br />Or perhaps a public leak, given that someone out there might have already came up with such an interface, without the sexy layout? And by the time there hasn't been a release or a leak, spamming tools would continue getting adapted for phishing purposes, and log parsers would be a phisher's best friend in respect to evaluating the success rate of a phishing campaign.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=OR5UGH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=OR5UGH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=GLseZH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=GLseZH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=K3us0h"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=K3us0h" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=MZvu2h"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=MZvu2h" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=aVRGlH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=aVRGlH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W8GTbH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W8GTbH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=5NFsKh"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=5NFsKh" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/284956197" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 May 2008 13:26:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/awareness">awareness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interface">interface</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click web interface">click web interface</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees awareness">employees awareness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web interface">web interface</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees">employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/susceptible employees">susceptible employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phisher">phisher</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/susceptible">susceptible</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/284956197/ethical-phishing-to-evaluate-phishing.html">Ethical Phishing to Evaluate Phishing Awareness</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Trojan Horses Still Kicking After All These Years]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9a1fd98a0b5cdd852e3fcbe4b3a2aef0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9a1fd98a0b5cdd852e3fcbe4b3a2aef0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[More than 3,000 years after Greek invaders tricked their way into Troy with a wooden horse, hackers still somehow manage to fool web users into clicks that result in stolen passwords and personal...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[More than 3,000 years after Greek invaders tricked their way into Troy with a wooden horse, hackers still somehow manage to fool web users into clicks that result in stolen passwords and personal details. The more judgmental among us might say that since we've learned nothing in three millennia, we are getting exactly what we deserve.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=1f4920d1efc81f8d3239a7d81905366d" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=1f4920d1efc81f8d3239a7d81905366d" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=xLlKOZG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=xLlKOZG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=nPkSfPg"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=nPkSfPg" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=MYWe7Jg"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=MYWe7Jg" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=E3igJGG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=E3igJGG" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=5Zh6kHG"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=5Zh6kHG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=SyZyY8g"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=SyZyY8g" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=QvxNFRg"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=QvxNFRg" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=6CzsfiG"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=6CzsfiG" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/276613843" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/276613863" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 23:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fool web users">fool web users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal details">personal details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greek invaders">greek invaders</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passwords">passwords</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/millennia">millennia</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/clicks">clicks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/troy">troy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/horse">horse</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/judgmental">judgmental</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/276613863/trojan_anniversary_feature">Trojan Horses Still Kicking After All These Years</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Obama site hacked, redirects clicks to Clinton's site]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/121748d8daca55bdac7bb05e4574b826</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/121748d8daca55bdac7bb05e4574b826</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A cross-site scripting flaw in the social networking section of Sen. Barack Obama's campaign site was exploited over the weekend to redirect users to the URL of rival Sen. Hillary...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A cross-site scripting flaw in the social networking section of Sen. Barack Obama's campaign site was exploited over the weekend to redirect users to the URL of rival Sen. Hillary Clinton.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=ZybpOi"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=ZybpOi" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/274841993" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Apr 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign site">campaign site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/barack obama">barack obama</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/redirect users">redirect users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hillary clinton">hillary clinton</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weekend">weekend</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cross-site">cross-site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rival">rival</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/section">section</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social">social</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/274841993/article.do">Obama site hacked, redirects clicks to Clinton's site</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/75812f9fda3843d3a9c570619e18d91f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/75812f9fda3843d3a9c570619e18d91f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Montego Networks Prediction
Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010
Neil McDonald of Gartner reported in 2007 that throughout 2009, 60% of virtual...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p class="MsoNormal">Montego Networks Prediction:</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical
counter parts by 2010.</p>



<p class="MsoNormal">Neil McDonald of Gartner reported in 2007 that throughout
2009, 60% of virtual environment deployments would be less secure than their
physical counter parts.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Although I tend to believe Neil’s prediction I’m a bit optimistic
about the markets awareness of the security concerns within virtualized
environments and feel companies will start to address those concerns by
2009.&nbsp;I also believe that by the end of 2009
the majority of companies virtualizing will have built virtualized environments
that are more secure than their physical counter parts.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Now, you may be thinking I’m either crazy or that I’m just one
of these guys that just states the opposite of what someone else says!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Well, not at all.&nbsp;I’ve
been studying the virtual security market for some time now and after talking with
many companies that are deploying virtualization I’m starting to get the sense that people
get it (security).&nbsp;It’s pretty evident that when
people are made aware of what seems to be the obvious (security), that something clicks
and they get it right away.&nbsp;In fact,
many times the light bulbs start turning on and people start thinking about
more creative ways to secure severs by taking advantage of virtualization which
enables them to do things they’ve never been able to do before.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">So, although I agree that there has been this issue of security
being once again forgotten and that 60% of virtual environments will be less
secure up until 2009, I’m not so sure I’m going to underestimate the market and
think that this pattern will continue much longer after that.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Take a look at the following graphic and it depicts the
various layers in a network.&nbsp;History has
proven itself time and time again that a new network layer is built first and
security always comes along afterwards. </p>



<p class="MsoNormal"><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=662,height=659,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/03/22/networklayers.jpg"><img width="200" height="199" border="0" src="http://vmwaresecurity.typepad.com/security_in_the_virtual_w/images/2008/03/22/networklayers.jpg" title="Networklayers" alt="Networklayers" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px; float: left;" /></a>
</p>

<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Well, one of the challenges we’ve seen with these physical
networks is that it’s pretty costly, time consuming and a burden to purchase,
install and administer security.&nbsp;Then
once it’s in place and being run, you have to fork lift upgrade certain parts
of your security infrastructure due to bandwidth demands and changes in
application security concerns.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">What virtualization brings to the table is not only cost
savings for server consolidation, power consumption and datacenter space but
the ability to do all of those things for parts of your security infrastructure
as well.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Imagine instead of having to deploy engineers to install 20
firewalls across your datacenter, you could sit from a single workstation with
a couple of guys and install 20 firewalls in hours vs. days.&nbsp;The reason this is possible is because now
firewalls have just went virtual!&nbsp;You
can roll them out as software images or virtual appliances without leaving the
comfort of your cubical.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Imagine being able to “virtual-lift upgrade” vs. “fork-lift
upgrade” a new firewall, UTM appliance, IPS or whatever by simply powering off
a Firewall Virtual Machine and powering on a new one.&nbsp; Imagine being able to improve your performance by taking advantage of the multi-core processing and blade server computing trends vs. waiting for the next super fast security ASIC chip.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">In the past it’s been difficult to get security as close as
possible to the servers and desktops without having to deploy host based
solutions.&nbsp;The reason for this is
because we have been constrained by the physical limitations of our hardware
purchases from the likes of Cisco, Extreme and Foundry.&nbsp;Then for vendors that have thought about
putting security in a switch there has always been the price per port
debate.&nbsp;Also, many don't want to take the risk and replace Cisco for a new startup building a new switch (ie. Force 10's Switch + IPS product).&nbsp; Typically switching ports are
cheap and security is more expensive and when trying to combine the two, you
end up with a switch that costs a lot of money.&nbsp;So imagine having a 200+ port switch with a Firewall built in for $300
bucks.&nbsp;How could this be so?&nbsp;Because its virtual, and because its 100%
software.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Did he just elude to a firewall for every port?&nbsp; Does each Server or Desktop have firewalling between every other Server &amp; Desktop on the same switch?&nbsp; Absolutely! all because of virtualization!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Software makes it easier to bring the price per port down.&nbsp;When things are in software you can deploy
multiple copies of them to scale your network capacity without breaking the
bank.&nbsp;Virtualization also allows you to
do things like “Freeze” and “Thaw” servers and desktops automatically when vulnerability
is detected.&nbsp;If a denial of service is occurring
against a Virtual Server you can always VMotion that server to a network with
more capacity without an administrator having to lift a finger.&nbsp;Imagine an attack happening on a machine and
instead of it being quarantined it makes a snapshot image of the infected
machine and freezes it in its current bad state so you can go back and analyze
how someone broke in.&nbsp;As you can see,
there are lots of new capabilities brought to the security round table.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">Virtualization will make security solutions even more
powerful and increase the adoption rate of security in general due to the massive
cost savings that can be appreciated through virtualization.&nbsp;For these reasons I see the market quickly
leveraging virtualization to make Virtual Environments more Secure than their
counter parts.&nbsp;Virtualization will
enable the innovations in security that has been since UTM and Reputation based
Anti-Spam.</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">VMWare, Virtual Iron, Citrix and others, thanks from the
security industry for the innovation!</p>

<p class="MsoNormal">John Peterson, Montego Networks, Co-Founder &amp; CTO</p>

</div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 22 Mar 2008 15:29:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security concerns">security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application security concerns">application security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concerns">concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual server">virtual server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual appliances">virtual appliances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security infrastructure due">security infrastructure due</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lift">lift</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityInTheVirtualWorld/~3/256197165/virtual-environ.html">Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
