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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: collect]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/collect</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Not Your Father's Data Breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am surprised this doesn't happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will


Corporate custodians of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am surprised <a href="http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/the-platform/published-editorials/2008/11/express-scripts-data-breach-is-bitter-medicine/"><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">this</span></a><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "> doesn&#39;t happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will:</span></p><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Corporate custodians</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events connected to a nightmarish computer security breach in the St. Louis region.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Express Scripts is one of the nation’s largest pharmacy benefits managers. The company, with headquarters in St. Louis County, handles approximately 500 million prescriptions per year for 50 million workers at 1,600 American companies. Early in October, it received an extortion letter, the details of which it released on Nov. 6.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The letter included personal information on about 75 Express Scripts clients — Social Security numbers, dates of birth and, in some cases, information about prescription medications. Whoever sent the letter demanded money from the company — the amount has not been disclosed — and threatened to use the Internet to reveal personal and medical information about millions of people if the demands were not met.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">...</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Beyond&#0160;</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">the scale of the problem for Express Scripts — and the potential impact on the company is enormous — the issue extends well beyond the mounting concerns about identity theft, a phenomenon with which most people have become at least somewhat familiar.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The greater problem is the unique nature of personal medical records, the importance of moving to computerization of such records to improve health safety and reduce costs and the irreversibility of the damage people can suffer if confidential medical information becomes public. The stakes are so high that a federal law establishes strict standards for maintaining the privacy of medical information and stiff fines for failing to do so.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Medical records of all kinds — paper and, especially, electronic — must be protected with the most sophisticated kinds of security systems available, including backup protections and automatic alerts of security violations. Yet Express Scripts learned of this breach in the “worst way,” as InformationWeek.com security correspondent George Hulme put it in an online report: “via an extortion letter.”</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The Express Scripts</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;breach raises many questions for all elements of the health industry: hospitals, clinics and doctors’ practices, benefits management firms, insurance companies, pharmacies, employers and government agencies:</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Are they using the most advanced information security technology possible? Do they minimize the amount of data they collect and keep it only as long as necessary? Do they have strict protocols governing access to personal and medical data — and systems to enforce those protocols? If criminals were to hack into their systems, how would the companies know? How soon? And are the systems capable of instantly cutting off illegal access as soon as a breach is discovered?</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Confronted</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;with a grave breach of electronic security, Express Scripts has responded by contacting law enforcement, establishing an informational website, offering a substantial reward and hiring a private consulting firm to help clients who have privacy concerns and investigate situations that “appear to be tied to identity theft” and provide “identity restoration services.” There is no question that the company is taking the situation extremely seriously.</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Given the ongoing criminal situation, information about how Express Scripts’ data systems were compromised — and whether it could have been avoided — has yet to be disclosed. But the American people have the right to expect that their sensitive personal and medical information is zealously protected and kept secure — not only by Express Scripts but also by every person or company entrusted with it.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The reason I am surprised this doesn&#39;t happen more often is that many Fortune 500 companies have oceans and oceans of personal data. Almost the only companies that have even tried to get to a medium level assurance are financial companies, yet many of the other companies have as much or even more data, with lower assurance. All that was lacking in the mix was an incentive and a bit of creativity and risk taking by the bad guys.</span></span></p><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">I posted this to the security metrics list and Andy Jaquith quoted it in his great book S<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/08/chicken-soup-fo.html">ecurity Metrics</a>:</span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; ">&quot;Customers and customer relationships...have tangible measurable value to businesses, and their value is much easier to communicate to those who fund projects. So in an enterprise risk management scenartio, their vlaue informs the risk management process...[For example, consider] a farmer deciding which crop to grow. A farmer interested in short term profits may grow the same high yield crop every year, but over time this would burn the fields out. The long term focused farmer would rotate the crops and invest in things that build the value of the farm and soil over time. Investing in security on behalf of your customers is like this. The investment made in securing your customer&#39;s data build current and future value for them. Measuring the value of the customer and relationships helps to target where to allocate security resources.&quot;</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">Of course this is the opposite of how most organizations do risk management and security architecture, and now, the fields have turned brown.<br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">(Thanks to Chris for pointing me to this story)</span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 06:37:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical information">medical information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal">personal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal medical records">personal medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical records">medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security systems">security systems</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/11/not-your-fathers-data-breach.html">Not Your Father's Data Breach</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Information security in bad economy]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/724237a8203417ab862d25e018912170</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/724237a8203417ab862d25e018912170</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Economy looks grim. The headlines are very discouraging. Capitalism does not guarantee wealth and success all the time. The talking heads on TV blame the greed in the stock market. I wish stock market...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>Economy looks grim. The headlines are very discouraging. Capitalism does not guarantee wealth and success all the time. The talking heads on TV blame the&nbsp;greed in the stock market. I wish stock market is made of just computers that are not greedy human beings. These are bound to happen when there are human beings that participate! Money flows will eventually correct itself&nbsp; I hope, capitalism will be healthy again. This will take time. I am not an economist, but I do understand that people part with money for a period of time to collect higher return in the horizon based on their aptitude for risk.&nbsp; Simple is it not! But, all these complex financial instruments and its machinations seem to blur the reality and make even the brainiest act dumb - or are they just plain greedy?</P>
<P>Setting the context for this post, it is a tough economic situation all over the world. IT spending has reduced and will reduce significantly. In one of earlier posts, I&nbsp;had referred&nbsp;to information security as an overhead of an overhead (IT).&nbsp;What is a good approach for&nbsp;security practice in this type of economy? </P>
<P>I don't have a magic wand to pull a rabbit out of a hat. I have always been told&nbsp;that: tough economy is the time for&nbsp;real smart people to&nbsp;make money. Coming back to information security topic,&nbsp;with a bit of common sense, it is wise for&nbsp;information security professionals to offer services in&nbsp;those&nbsp;areas&nbsp;that does not involve capital expenditure. As a Security Manager, you may be already aware that your people are willing to&nbsp;go&nbsp;an extra mile in the current economic times.</P>
<P>- No budget or lack of budget,&nbsp;means no&nbsp;new capital expenditure. Spend time wisely in building a future technology strategy and keep it in the back pocket when the economy turns around.</P>
<P>- This is a good time to create roles/responsibilities and ownership for various areas. Create operating procedures.&nbsp;Make your team to automate tasks. This will help your operations become more efficient.</P>
<P>- This is time for security awareness&nbsp; education. Create pamphlets/brochures/presentations for an online or classroom training. Engage your and your team's time to impart training.</P>
<P>- Leverage already invested&nbsp;technology platforms. Leverage utilized features that reduce costs. If you have already invested in technology such as VMware, this is the time to get the best out of it. You can use VMware's toolkit to build your lab and staging&nbsp;environment and optimize on hardware cost.</P>
<P>- Off shoring has been the mantra of senior executives, this is the time to revisit those services and measure their performance closely&nbsp;and assess&nbsp;your satisfaction level. This is a good time to build a case for not off shoring if it makes sense.</P>
<P>- Companies are more vulnerable in bad economic times. You are in a better position&nbsp;to&nbsp;influence senior management about information security risks under these circumstances and drive home the value of protecting your intellectual property under these kinds of circumstances. management will be all ears&nbsp;for such a pitch.</P>
<P>- Time to engage your architect to optimize your security architecture, revisit standards and optimize design for cost efficiency.</P>
<P>- Revisit various controls and see if there are some risks that you could optimize spending on.</P>
<P>- Training budget&nbsp;is an unfortunate victim of&nbsp;this type of economy. Encourage employees to take free webinars offered by various security vendors and encourage them to share the summary across the team. This will put your employees in touch with latest happenings in security at the same time there is some learning that is imparted&nbsp;despite&nbsp;zero training budget.</P>
<P>- Since there are very few projects in action, this is a good time to have conversations with cross functional teams and educate them about your services and solicit feedback on how to do better.</P>
<P>- Revisit your vendor logistics and identify whether you can renegotiate some of your already existing contracts.</P>
<P>The above are some good&nbsp;ways by which you can optimize costs, this will also enhance&nbsp;your team's competence level in the long run. And this approach is better than letting people go, if you can pull this.</P>
<P>&nbsp;</P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Oct 2008 16:37:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security risks">information security risks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risks">risks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security professionals">information security professionals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security manager">security manager</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security topic">information security topic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architecture">security architecture</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/10/26/3948897.html">Information security in bad economy</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[ANSI Cyberrisk Calculation Guide]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5778bf3f47110e5f78b066a4e09dc5b3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5778bf3f47110e5f78b066a4e09dc5b3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting : In a nutshell, the guide advocates that organizations calculate cyber security risks and costs by asking questions of every organizational discipline that might be affected: legal,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=166276&WT.svl=news1_1">Interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>In a nutshell, the guide advocates that organizations calculate cyber security risks and costs by asking questions of every organizational discipline that might be affected: legal, compliance, business operations, IT, external communications, crisis management, and risk management/insurance. The idea is to involve everyone who might be affected by a security breach and collect data on the potential risks and costs.

<p>Once all of the involved parties have weighed in, the guide offers a mathematical formula for calculating financial risk: Essentially, it is a product of the frequency of an event multiplied by its severity, multiplied by the likelihood of its occurrence. If risk can be transferred to other organizations, that part of the risk can be subtracted from the net financial risk.</blockquote></p>

<p>Guide is <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org/cybersecurity.aspx">here</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=O3WVM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=O3WVM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=WzSEM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=WzSEM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2008 03:04:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/net financial risk">net financial risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial risk">financial risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/guide">guide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/guide offers">guide offers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cyber security risks">cyber security risks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/external communications">external communications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mathematical formula">mathematical formula</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security breach">security breach</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/ansi_cyberrisk.html">ANSI Cyberrisk Calculation Guide</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[UK slows down plan for sweeping electronic surveillance]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8b3c1657483ae1798a9fd9d7715bdb1d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8b3c1657483ae1798a9fd9d7715bdb1d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The British government is slowing down a proposal that would give law enforcement sweeping power to collect electronic data as a measure to prevent...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The British government is slowing down a proposal that would give law enforcement sweeping power to collect electronic data as a measure to prevent terrorism.<p><A href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=87760?">
<IMG src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=87760?" border="0" width="468" height="60"></A>
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collect electronic data">collect electronic data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prevent terrorism">prevent terrorism</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/british government">british government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/law enforcement">law enforcement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proposal">proposal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/measure">measure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/power">power</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/101608-uk-slows-down-plan-for.html?fsrc=rss-security">UK slows down plan for sweeping electronic surveillance</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Credit Card Protections Abroad]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/15312f4bced87019b30fb55ceb94fd45</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/15312f4bced87019b30fb55ceb94fd45</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When you pay by credit card in a restaurant, have you ever wondered what they do with your card when they take it from you to collect payment? Although you may trust the restaurant, theres still the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="entry-body">
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<p>When you pay by credit card in a restaurant, have you ever wondered what they do with your card when they take it from you to collect payment? Although you may trust the restaurant, there&#8217;s still the possibility the waiters can write your credit card and verification number down and sell the info later.</p>
<p>Apparently in the UK and other European areas, this is not the case. <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://365.rsaconference.com/blogs/ira_winkler/2008/10/09/the-us-has-a-lot-to-learn">Ira Winkler </a>at the RSA blog recently wrote about an experience traveling and noticing other credit card customs and security -</p>
<blockquote><p>If you are at a restaurant and pay with a credit card, they bring over a system and swipe your card in front of you. Additionally, all the credit card readers I came in contact with assumed that credit cards were smart cards with readable chips. This adds another level of security, and PINs were required as well. When I was in The Netherlands a few months ago, I couldn&#8217;t even use my American credit card on the ticket machines for their train system.</p>
<p style="padding:0px;min-height:8pt;height:8pt;">
<p>With all of the credit card fraud going on, I wonder when the US will finally get its act together and follow the European credit card security measures.</p></blockquote>
<p>Read the full article<a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="https://365.rsaconference.com/blogs/ira_winkler/2008/10/09/the-us-has-a-lot-to-learn"> here.</a></div>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 06:59:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card customs">credit card customs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/american credit card">american credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card">card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card fraud">credit card fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card readers">credit card readers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rsa blog recently">rsa blog recently</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/restaurant">restaurant</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/train system">train system</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/417034108/">Credit Card Protections Abroad</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Between the fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic and the Inc 500 milestone, weve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008" target="_blank">fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic</a> and the Inc 500 milestone, we’ve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally designed with managed service providers in mind? Not so surprising when 5 of the first 6 employees (including all 3 founders) came from hosting and MSP backgrounds and had first-hand experience with the daily trials and tribulations of MSP operations – and the tools that didn’t quite work for them.
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="John at Interop Vegas" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas-thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></a>Here we talk to John Proctor, who started out as one of our first customers (and the first MSP customer). And he believed in it so much, he eventually became part of the ScienceLogic team. (Remember &#8220;I&#8217;m not only the President, I&#8217;m also a client&#8221; from <a href="http://www.hairclub.com/inthenews_article1.php" target="_blank">the Hair Club for Men</a>?)
<p>John shares his perspectives about the service provider world and why he took a chance on a little-known product called EM7.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your background? How many years have you worked as a service provider and for what types of companies?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> I have been working with Service providers for over twelve years. I worked at a major regional service provider for six years and before that I designed and built national and international networks for ISP’s and Fortune 500 companies as a consultant for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and WorldComm.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You were one of the first customers of EM7 – why did you choose it and how did you get over the hurdles associated with using a start-up company’s product?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> We were actually customer number five. Back in 2004 when we evaluated and purchased EM7 we could see that EM7 provided about 80% of what we were looking for in one integrated solution right out of the box. One of the things that sold us on EM7 was that the ScienceLogic founders had all previously worked for a service provider, so we knew they understood our business and our challenges. But in the end, it comes down to features. Once we compared EM7 functionality to the alternatives, it was clearly a “no brainer.”
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What other alternatives were being considered?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Well, we had started with a few point solutions, but as our business and product offerings matured, this resulted in a growing number of point solutions. What started with 3 or 4 ended up as 14 separate tools. They all had strengths but what they didn’t have was integration and because of this they could not scale. And, if the tools could not scale, our business could not grow.
<p>So, naturally we started looking at framework solutions, but they are expensive to buy, expensive to implement, and expensive to maintain. At one point, we even considered some open source projects. There were several that showed promise, but we would still be stuck with tools that were not integrated. So then we considered hiring developers to cobble something together that would work for our business. The only problem with this alternative was that we felt it would take 6 to 8 months before we could have something viable to work with.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What products were you using before EM7? What were your goals?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Before we purchased EM7 we used 14 different point solutions to deliver our products and services to the marketplace. Tools like NetCool, Openview, Argent, Heat, What’s Up Gold as well as several other point solutions, vendor specific applications and manually updated spreadsheets. And, as I mentioned before, this does not scale. This also adds a great deal of complexity when you begin to consider business continuity and disaster recovery. All these tools were vital to the delivery of our products and services. Any service provider will tell you it is all about uptime. So if the product is uptime, the tools used to deliver it have to be available 24&#215;7x365.
<p>Our goals were simple: scale and redundancy. As it turns out, the solution was simple as well. EM7 provided a tool that could replace the functionality of almost half of the existing point solutions and the applications that could not be replaced were integrated with EM7 to provide our staff with a “single pane of glass” to see the status and performance of each area of the business from one application. We had visibility into everything from facility systems to applications using EM7.
<p>ScienceLogic also delivers an extensible configuration that addressed uptime and redundancy. We deployed collectors throughout our network that reported back to a central pair of redundant database servers and with this configuration we were able to perform backups and add capacity without taking the system down.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Why are service providers different from enterprises? How are their needs different?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> First and foremost, service providers face the same challenges that only the largest enterprises ever face and they also have many unique challenges that only service providers experience.
<p>One challenge we faced was that we had multiple datacenters in different states. They were all interconnected with plenty of bandwidth between each site, but the tools were not designed to be used across the WAN. Our staff in our remote data center did not have the same access as our staff in the corporate office. Since EM7 is web-based, it immediately eliminated this problem.
<p>Another challenge is that service providers must manage systems across multiple domains. Back in the early version of a specific tool we were using before EM7, the only way you could implement it across multiple domains was to put the same username and password on every computer that you monitored. Beyond the security concerns, maintenance was a nightmare. Anytime we had to change the password, we would get locked out of dozens upon dozens of systems. When the password was changed on the monitoring server, it would attempt to login to the remote machines and fail. Repeated attempts would result in the account getting locked. I think that vendor eventually addressed this issue, but service providers seldom find tools that were designed for their unique situations.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How is EM7 geared to service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Enterprise IT is a trusted part of the business; they are one of the team. Service providers are outsiders that must earn trust by showing the customer exactly what they are doing.
<p>EM7 provides a multi-tenant environment that allows service providers to manage systems across many different customers while at the same time providing the customer access to see the same information but only what’s relevant to them.
<p>EM7 was built by service providers and even includes a few features just for them. Two of my favorites are bandwidth billing and the emergency notification system. Take bandwidth billing, for instance. EM7 provides a way to collect bandwidth utilization, store subscription information, and calculate a bill from any one of about 10 different methodologies. And at the end of the billing period, EM7 sends the completed report out to whomever you chose via email.
<p>Another unique service provider feature is the emergency notification system. EM7 allows the provider to track what customers used their unique infrastructure components. If they have to perform maintenance on the infrastructure component or have a problem they can send an email to all of the impacted customers in a matter of minutes.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What trends do you see for service providers? What about big trends such as virtualization and cloud computing – how will they impact service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Virtualization is really hot for service providers right now and for the same reasons as in the enterprise. Service providers run data centers and data centers must be powered and cooled. So, anytime they can use a virtual server instead of adding physical equipment it is a good thing. But then you add the complexity that multiple customers reside on the same host and you must track things like bandwidth utilizations by guest OS, and it all gets a little harder. Lucky for us this is not a problem for EM7.
<p>I still think it’s early days for cloud computing. Depending on who you talk to, much of what service providers (especially the big ones) have already been doing with SAAS offerings and hosted applications could be described as cloud computing already. In which case, service providers are ahead of the game. But whatever the “final” definition, cloud computing actually shares many similarities with virtualization – in that service providers (or enterprises) will need to be able to manage far more “devices” in real-time with “zero downtime” expectations by customers. What this really means is that you’re going to see much more automation in provisioning and IT monitoring tools to handle the scale and speed with which things can change in the data center given vm migration and the talked-about switching between “clouds” that can be used for high availability. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 12:51:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers experience">service providers experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers seldom">service providers seldom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact service providers">impact service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 functionality">em7 functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 sends">em7 sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider world">service provider world</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/msp-snapshot-monitoring-with-em7/10/2008">MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Online Privacy Education is working, But.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b1cb1795e643c5b852d75e53cfdd120c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b1cb1795e643c5b852d75e53cfdd120c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[If you want to be safe people, then educate yourselves in how to do it! Dont trust that all is warm and fuzzy out there in the ones and zeros place


clipped from www.webpronews.com
Americans Anxious...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > If you want to be safe people, then educate yourselves in how to do it!<br/>Dont trust that all is warm and fuzzy out there in the ones and zeros place. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/25c3f381-1ed4-4420-8c0d-a615edba6247/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy" href="http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy" style="font-size: 11px;">www.webpronews.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><H2>Americans Anxious Over Online Privacy </H2></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>The majority (61%) believe what they do online is private and not shared without their permission. Just over half (57%) falsely believe that companies are required to identify themselves and indicate why they are collecting data.</P></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>Just under half (48%) incorrectly believe their consent is required for companies to use personal information they collect from online activities and 43 percent wrongly believe a court order is needed to monitor activities online.</P></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/09/25/americans-anxious-over-online-privacy --><P>People are aware that information about their surfing habits is being collected online, but many do not know what companies do with their information.</P></td>
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<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/4B87F6A2-F51E-412E-ABD1-7AE10DFEF398/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content8.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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<BR/><MAP name="bdv_RSS_Ad_270908041010"><AREA alt="Feed Ads By BidVertiser.com" shape="poly" coords="0,0,467,0,467,45,315,45,315,59,0,59" href="http://secure.bidvertiser.com/performance/bdv_rss_rd.dbm?pid=165886&amp;bid=400950&amp;PHS=270908041010&amp;click=1" target="_blank" /><AREA alt="Feed Ads By BidVertiser.com" shape="rect" coords="315,45,467,59" href="http://www.bidvertiser.com/bdv/bidvertiser/bdv_ref.dbm?Ref_PID=165886&amp;Ref_Option=main&amp;source=90614506" target="_blank" /></MAP><P><a href="http://secure.bidvertiser.com/performance/bdv_rss_rd.dbm?pid=165886&amp;bid=400950&amp;PHS=270908041010&amp;click=1" target="_blank"><IMG src="http://bdv.bidvertiser.com/BidVertiser.dbm?pid=165886&amp;bid=400950&amp;PHS=270908041010&amp;rssimage=1&amp;rSRC=2" border="0" usemap="#bdv_RSS_Ad_270908041010" /></a></P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 27 Sep 2008 12:10:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online">online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online privacy">online privacy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online activities">online activities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monitor activities online">monitor activities online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safe people">safe people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=632">Online Privacy Education is working, But.</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Around The Web For Friday]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Were frequently asked what were reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed
COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;re frequently asked what we&#8217;re reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.itskeptic.org/node/692"><strong>COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Everyone is tiptoeing around the fact that COBIT offers a significant competitive body of knowledge (BOK) to ITIL. Sure ITIL goes into more depth in places, but to say COBIT sits over the top is to grossly understate the overlap. COBIT extends a long way down into the &#8220;how&#8221; and it does it with an intellectual rigour that ITIL lacks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting stuff that.  A detailed mapping might help some folks.  Either way, the good news for those keen on understanding risk management is that governance metrics, done right, allow us to understand a part of that &#8220;capability to manage risk&#8221; we&#8217;re always looking for.   Assurance, verification and the acquisition and interpretation of knowledge is king.   Speaking of which&#8230;.</p>
<p><a href="http://spiresecurity.typepad.com/spire_security_viewpoint/2008/09/how-to-tell-when-nothing-happens.html"><strong>How To Tell When &#8220;Nothing Happens&#8221; by Pete Lindstrom</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;&#8230;problem is that, it isn&#8217;t really true that &#8220;nothing happens&#8221; when you employ some specific security control to prevent an exploit. Not only that, but even when it is difficult to collect data on what didn&#8217;t happen, one can devise experiments to tell how frequently that nothing occurred.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Good</em> analysis is all about the uncertainty.   Speaking of accounting for uncertainty&#8230;</p>
<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html"><strong>Assets Good Until Reached For by Gunnar Peterson</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need abstraction assurance.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And there&#8217;s the trick.  We might call &#8220;abstraction assurance&#8221; an analog to &#8220;confidence&#8221; or &#8220;uncertainty&#8221; in certain priors (metrics) or posteriors (calculated values based on those metrics).  The stronger that abstraction assurance is, the less uncertainty we have in our knowledge and the better our ability to create wisdom from that knowledge (you know, make decisions).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2005/12/epstein_snow_an.html"><strong>Epstein, Snow and Flake: Three Views of Software Security by Adam Shostack</strong></a></p>
<p>Adam&#8217;s focus is on software security, but the discussion here can be abstracted out into the broader realm of risk management quite nicely.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/825?ref=rss"><strong>Two-thirds of firms hit by cybercrime from Security Focus</strong></a></p>
<p>The US DoJ says that in 2005 (there&#8217;s some timely data) 2/3 of their surveyed firms detected at least one cybercrime.  &#8220;Cybercrime&#8221; is &#8220;classified &#8230; into cyber attacks, cyber theft, and other incidents.&#8221;  Pretty general.  Also from the report:  &#8220;Computer viruses made up more than half of all cyber attacks.&#8221;</p>
<p>(That sound you hear is me tapping my forehead lightly on large iron object)</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.ca-grc.com/2008/09/lessons-learned-from-%E2%80%9Cpersonal%E2%80%9D-risk-management/"><strong>Lessons Learned from “Personal” Risk Management By: Christopher Daugherty</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;This process is what I call “personal risk management.”  All of us have done it and will continue to do so.  Why is it, then, many companies have ignored following similar principles with the on-going health of the business?  This is a debate with many different answers so I ask you to select the best answer for your employer:</p>
<p>a) Have not ignored as this keeps me awake at night!</p>
<p>b) Please restate the problem, I cannot hear well with my head buried in the sand.</p>
<p>c) We passed our SOX audit so we checked this off the list!</p>
<p>d) We are informed of the challenge but we have a business to run and profits to make</p>
<p>e) Is this what internal audit and risk management has been telling us?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 08:56:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call abstraction assurance">call abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abstraction assurance">abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal risk management">personal risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assurance">assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil">itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil lacks">itil lacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cobit rivals itil">cobit rivals itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=450">Around The Web For Friday</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[French gov't resists police database protests]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e2c88d64b7908ce0595697973ab348ed</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e2c88d64b7908ce0595697973ab348ed</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The French government will not reverse a decree allowing French police to record the sexuality and religion of suspects in their files, the French Minister of the Interior has said, despite calls from...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The French government will not reverse a decree allowing French police to record the sexuality and religion of suspects in their files, the French Minister of the Interior has said, despite calls from a parliamentary commission on Thursday not to collect some of that information.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/parliamentary commission">parliamentary commission</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/french police">french police</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/french government">french government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/french minister">french minister</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/calls">calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/religion">religion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/files">files</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reverse">reverse</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091808-french-govt-resists-police-database.html?fsrc=rss-security">French gov't resists police database protests</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
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<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
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<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
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<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
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<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
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<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
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<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
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In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
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Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
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<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
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<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
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Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
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Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
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<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
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<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
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<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
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<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
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<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
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<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
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<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
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<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
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<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
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<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
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<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
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<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
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<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
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<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
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The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kits">banker malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy botnet kit">diy botnet kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
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