The Columbia Dispatch is reporting that a state employee with access to a “test account” has been accessing Joe the Plumber’s government records:

“We’re trying to pinpoint where it came from,” she said. The investigation could become “criminal in nature,” she said. Brindisi would not identify the account that pulled the information on Oct. 16.

Records show it was a “test account” assigned to the information technology section of the attorney general’s office, said Department of Public Safety spokesman Thomas Hunter.

Brindisi later said investigators have confirmed that Wurzelbacher’s information was not accessed within the attorney general’s office. She declined to provide details. The office’s test accounts are shared with and used by other law enforcement-related agencies, she said.

Security best practices require that test accounts be removed before a system is put into production and loaded with real data. Otherwise there is no accountability to any one individual. Shared accounts such as test accounts are frequently abused so that the snooper can get away undetected. The investigation should look at what other data has been snooped on using this test account. Perhaps this has been going on for a long time and no one noticed.

It is still likely that the perpetrator can be tracked down if he or she accessed the data from an internal system and the records application logged the IP address that connected to it. Even if the IP address doesn’t connect back to an individual’s computer and to a shared machine, the search will have been narrowed down greatly.

Investigators are treating the explosions as acts of vandalism, not terrorism, Shields said.

"Under the Criminal Code, it would be characterized as mischief, which is an intentional vandalism. We don't want to characterize this as terrorism. They were very isolated locations and there would seem there was no intent to hurt people," he said.

It's not all good, though. Here's a story from Philadelphia, where a subway car is criticized because people can see out the front. Because, um, because terrorist will be able to see out the front, and we all know how dangerous terrorists are:

Marcus Ruef, a national vice president with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, compared a train cab to an airliner cockpit and said a cab should be similarly secure. He invoked post-9/11 security concerns as a reason to provide a full cab that prevents passengers from seeing the rails and signals ahead.

"We don't think the forward view of the right-of-way should be available to whoever wants to watch ... and the conductor and the engineer should be able to talk privately," Ruef said.

Pat Nowakowski, SEPTA chief of operations, said the smaller cabs pose no security risk. "I have never heard that from a security expert," he said.

At least there was pushback against that kind of idiocy.

And from the UK:

Transport Secretary Geoff Hoon has said the government is prepared to go "quite a long way" with civil liberties to "stop terrorists killing people".

He was responding to criticism of plans for a database of mobile and web records, saying it was needed because terrorists used such communications.

By not monitoring this traffic, it would be "giving a licence to terrorists to kill people", he said.

I hope there will be similar pushback against this "choice."

Setting the Web Application Security Agenda for 2009: OWASP Invites You to Join Our Summit in Portugal

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008

With the theme ‘Setting the AppSec agenda for 2009′, the OWASP Summit will be a worldwide gathering of OWASP leaders and key industry players to present and discuss the latest OWASP tools, documentation projects, and web application security trends. Join us in Portugal in just a few short weeks! This venue hosts a diverse selection of training courses along with technical and business tracks, making it THE place to learn about web application security and the resources OWASP has available for use today.

OWASP is a not-for-profit organization with the purpose of supporting the Web Application Security community around the world, and has granted $250,000 USD for web application security research. In addition to over 40 presentations from the OWASP Leaders and grant recipients, the OWASP Summit will host multiple Working Sessions designed to improve collaboration, achieve specific objectives and identify roadmaps for OWASP projects, chapters, and the OWASP community itself.

To facilitate this event, OWASP is investing $150,000 USD which will be used to cover air travel and accommodation expenses for OWASP leaders, active contributors, and select key industry leaders. With their confirmed presence, the OWASP Summit will provide a relaxed but professional environment to meet, discuss, influence and contribute to OWASP projects.

There are still funds available! If you are interested in attending and you meet the profile of the current OWASP supported attendees (see list here: http://spreadsheets.google.com/pub?key=pAX6n7m2zaTVLrPtR07riBA) contact Paulo Coimbra (paulo.coimbra@owasp.org). Please note that you should do so only if you meet the paid attendance criteria (see herehttps://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008_paid_participation_rules) and are unable to get corporate support to attend this event (for other corporate sponsorship opportunities see http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008_Sponsors).

The OWASP Summit will also host a large and diverse selection of training courses, covering multiple OWASP specific and Web Application Security Topics.

The remarkable impact of OWASP is made possible only by the collaboration of many dedicated people and organizations worldwide. In that spirit of cooperation, OWASP invites all its members (who have 20% discount + 1 VIP Ticket) and interested individuals and companies to attend this thrilling event. Please join us and help to set the Web Application Security Agenda for 2009!

Please see below for additional details about the OWASP Summit or visit the OWASP Summit website: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_EU_Summit_2008.

Projects

OWASP projects selected for Summit presentation include new documentation and innovative tools to help developers, architects, and security specialists ensure that applications are secure:

• Application Security Verification Standard,
• Code review guide, V1.1,
• Ruby on Rails Security Guide v2,
• Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity,
• Testing Guide v3,
• GTK+ GUI for w3af project,
• Access Control Rules Tester,
• AntiSamy .NET,
• Live CD & DVD Project,
• OpenPGP Extensions for HTTP,
• Orizon Project,
• Python Static Analysis,
• WebScarab-NG,
• And many, many others.

Working Sessions

Expecting the presence of the application security industry key players, the Working Sessions will cover a wide range of issues such as:

• OWASP Top 10 2009,
• Browser Security,
• Web Application Framework Security,
• Enterprise Security API Project,
• Best Practices for OWASP Chapter Leaders,
• OWASP Documentation Projects,
• OWASP Tools Projects,
• OWASP Education Project,
• OWASP Strategic Planning for 2009,
• OWASP Certification,
• OWASP Winter of Code 2009
• Two-way Internationalization of OWASP Content
• And many more.

Training

These 2-day, 1-day or 1/2-day training courses cover a wide range of OWASP specific and Web Application Security Topics:

• OWASP Top 10 - What Developers Should Know on Web Application Security
• Uncovering WebScarab’s Secret Treasures
• Securing WebGoat with ModSecurity
• Secure Programming with Java
• Advanced Web Application Security Testing
• Building Secure Web 2.0 Applications
• Building Secure Web Services
• Building Secure Web Applications with OWASP’s Enterprise Security API (ESAPI)
• Classic ASP Security using OWASP tools
• Web Application Assessments
• Hacking Owasp Orizon Project v1.0
• Ajax Security
• Practical Penetration Testing: Think Like an Attacker to Stop Attacks
• Linux Software Exploitation
• Web server/services hardening using SELinux

Main Contact:

Kate Hartmann
OWASP Operations Director
9175 Guilford Road, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046, USA
Phone: +1-301-575-0189
Facsimile: +1-301-604-8033
Email: kate.hartmann@owasp.org

We write to express our firm belief that research on security vulnerabilities, and the sensible publication of the results of the research, are critical for scientific advancement, public safety and a robust market for secure technologies. Generally speaking, the norm in our field is that researchers take reasonable steps to protect the individuals using the systems studied. We understand that the student researchers took such steps with regard to their research, notably by planning not to present a critical element of a flaw they found. They did this so that their audience would be unable to exploit the security flaws they uncovered. . . .

The restraining order at issue in this case also fosters a dangerous information imbalance. In this case, for example, it allows the vendors of the technology and the MBTA to claim greater efficacy and security than their products warrant, then use the law to silence those who would reveal the technologies’ flaws. In this case, the law gives the public a false sense of security, achieved through law, not technical effectiveness. Preventing researchers from discussing a technology’s vulnerabilities does not make them go away - in fact, it may exacerbate them as more people and institutions use and come to rely upon the illusory protection. Yet the commercial purveyors of such technologies often do not want truthful discussions of their products’ flaws, and will likely withhold the prior approval or deny researchers access for testing if the law supports that effort. . . .

Yet at the same time that researchers need to act responsibly, vendors should not be granted complete control of the publication of such information, as it appears MBTA sought here. As noted above, vendors and users of such technologies often have an incentive to hide the flaws in the system rather than come clean with the public and take the steps necessary to remedy them. Thus, while researchers often refrain from publishing the technical details necessary to exploit the flaw, a legal ban on discussion of security flaws, such as that contained in the temporary restraining order, is especially troubling.

It will be interesting to see what arguments the MBTA uses to keep the students from speaking on a topic where all the important vulnerability information seems to have already disclosed. Sure the students haven’t presented a cookbook exploit tool but they have also stated they have no intention of doing so.

Perhaps the court will investigate what the MBTA’s and their technology vendors response has been to the MiFare card vulnerabilities that were disclosed responsibly. If there has been no vigorous response to responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities of many months ago how can they say with a straight face that are truly responding to new security information and just need more time.

We write to express our firm belief that research on security vulnerabilities, and the sensible publication of the results of the research, are critical for scientific advancement, public safety and a robust market for secure technologies. Generally speaking, the norm in our field is that researchers take reasonable steps to protect the individuals using the systems studied. We understand that the student researchers took such steps with regard to their research, notably by planning not to present a critical element of a flaw they found. They did this so that their audience would be unable to exploit the security flaws they uncovered. . . .

The restraining order at issue in this case also fosters a dangerous information imbalance. In this case, for example, it allows the vendors of the technology and the MBTA to claim greater efficacy and security than their products warrant, then use the law to silence those who would reveal the technologies’ flaws. In this case, the law gives the public a false sense of security, achieved through law, not technical effectiveness. Preventing researchers from discussing a technology’s vulnerabilities does not make them go away - in fact, it may exacerbate them as more people and institutions use and come to rely upon the illusory protection. Yet the commercial purveyors of such technologies often do not want truthful discussions of their products’ flaws, and will likely withhold the prior approval or deny researchers access for testing if the law supports that effort. . . .

Yet at the same time that researchers need to act responsibly, vendors should not be granted complete control of the publication of such information, as it appears MBTA sought here. As noted above, vendors and users of such technologies often have an incentive to hide the flaws in the system rather than come clean with the public and take the steps necessary to remedy them. Thus, while researchers often refrain from publishing the technical details necessary to exploit the flaw, a legal ban on discussion of security flaws, such as that contained in the temporary restraining order, is especially troubling.

It will be interesting to see what arguments the MBTA uses to keep the students from speaking on a topic where all the important vulnerability information seems to have already disclosed. Sure the students haven’t presented a cookbook exploit tool but they have also stated they have no intention of doing so.

Perhaps the court will investigate what the MBTA’s and their technology vendors response has been to the MiFare card vulnerabilities that were disclosed responsibly. If there has been no vigorous response to responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities of many months ago how can they say with a straight face that are truly responding to new security information and just need more time.