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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: comcast]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/comcast</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Sun, 15 Jun 2008 20:06:15 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Comcast cap may mean less snooping on your browsing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/da57495b3a6542fd456b1b16ad9279f5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/da57495b3a6542fd456b1b16ad9279f5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Comcast's move to limit its broadband customers' throughput to 250GB per month starting in October might anger those who want unlimited access, but it's actually good for privacy. Because the cap...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Comcast's move to limit its broadband customers' throughput to 250GB per month starting in October might anger those who want unlimited access, but it's actually good for privacy. Because the cap applies to all traffic equally, it doesn't require that Comcast snoop for particular types of application data. Contrast that with its previous (and initially undisclosed) practice of interfering with peer-to-peer traffic (in an effort to limit customers' downloading of huge, bandwidth-hogging files). The ISP says less than 1 percent of customers will be affected.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/broadband customers">broadband customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comcast">comcast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customers">customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/limit customers">limit customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/limit">limit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comcast snoop">comcast snoop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/peer-to-peer traffic">peer-to-peer traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traffic">traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cap applies">cap applies</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/093008-comcast-cap-may-mean-less.html?fsrc=rss-security">Comcast cap may mean less snooping on your browsing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Post Your Questions for Philadelphia Wireless Panelists]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4ffaea55de6513864702705b92a352d0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4ffaea55de6513864702705b92a352d0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Organizers of day-long discussion about ubiquitous mobile broadband want to know what you want to ask: In Philadelphia on 22-Sept-2008, panelists from AT&amp;T, Comcast, Sprint XOHM, The Wharton School,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/muni_icon.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://momo-ma.com/?p=28"><strong>Organizers of day-long discussion about ubiquitous mobile broadband want to know what you want to ask:</strong></a> In Philadelphia on 22-Sept-2008, panelists from AT&T, Comcast, Sprint XOHM, The Wharton School, and Network Acquisition Corporation (the folks who will be operating the former EarthLink network in Phila.) will be on one stage at 6 pm at The Franklin Institute's Planetarium (free, $5 contribution requested, advance registration recommended).</p>

<p>The panel will discuss fourth-generation (4G) networks, including both LTE and WiMax, and discuss what these networks might deliver, as well as how Wi-Fi networks fit into this future. </p>

<p>One of the organizers asked if I'd solicit questions--you can post them below--which they'll try to ask during the panel. The group would then write up responses which could posted in turn here.</p>

<p>The powerhouse that is <a href="http://werbach.com/about.html"><strong>Kevin Werbach</strong></a>, a professor at The Wharton School, is moderating the event. Werbach has been part of interesting thinking about spectrum for many years, a former editor of Release 1.0, and a former FCC staffer. He'll share the stage with a fairly high-powered crowd, including AT&T's enterprise architect for mobility, the president of NAC, and senior people from Comcast and Sprint Xohm.</p>

<p>The event is part of the Mid-Atlantic Chapter series called MobileMonday, an interesting business group that's trying to provoke discussion and development around mobile technology and access. This particular event is sponsored by local business development organization Select Greater Philadelphia.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 06:10:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi networks fit">wi-fi networks fit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/networks">networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sprint xohm">sprint xohm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wharton school">wharton school</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/philadelphia">philadelphia</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mid-atlantic chapter series">mid-atlantic chapter series</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network acquisition corporation">network acquisition corporation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kevin werbach">kevin werbach</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008447.html">Post Your Questions for Philadelphia Wireless Panelists</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[In-Flight VoIP Ban: Against FCC Rules? Highly Desirable?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/04edfe3e5a28bd63c48bc3f4ded28db4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/04edfe3e5a28bd63c48bc3f4ded28db4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Think-tank wonders whether banning in-flight VoIP constitutes a violation of FCC rules about blocking services: The Progress and Freedom Foundation's Barbara Espin uses the ban on in-flight VoIP by...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/plane.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/09/does_disclosure.html"><strong>Think-tank wonders whether banning in-flight VoIP constitutes a violation of FCC rules about blocking services:</strong></a> The Progress and Freedom Foundation's Barbara Espin uses the ban on in-flight VoIP by American Airlines (facilitated by provider Aircell) to make a broader argument about what she calls the FCC's "ad hoc approach to broadband network management issues." It's clever. American discloses that calling isn't allowed, and VoIP isn't even technically within the FAA or FCC's purview, as far as I can determine. The FAA could choose to regulate it as a safety issue. PFF generally tilts anti-regulation, and has as what it calls its "supporters" a broad area of multiple system cable operators and telecom firms, including Comcast, which was singled out and fined by the FCC for its undisclosed network disruption of P2P connections.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/business/14essay.html?_r=2&ei=5070&emc=eta1&oref=slogin&oref=slogin"><strong>Espin references Joe Sharkey's excellent column on in-flight calling in Sunday's New York Times:</strong></a> Sharkey, a veteran travel writer, who survived a mid-air collision over the Brazilian Amazon a few years ago, looks at varying attitudes about calls made during flights. He quotes Aircell's Jack Blumenstein saying what I've telling folks for months: Aircell has a lot of techniques to block VoIP calls already, and "as we identify new ways that people are trying to do voice calls on the airplane, we just kind of zero in and knock those off." Many geeks have assumed Aircell is a bunch of unsavvy folks who wouldn't be able to figure out how to disrupt their clever workarounds for making VoIP. (I keep noting that introducing jitter for suspicious data connections wouldn't disrupt legitimate applications, but would destroy VoIP call quality.)</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:50:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/voip">voip</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/in-flight voip constitutes">in-flight voip constitutes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/in-flight">in-flight</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/in-flight voip">in-flight voip</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/block voip calls">block voip calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fcc rules">fcc rules</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fcc">fcc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/voice calls">voice calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/calls">calls</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008444.html">In-Flight VoIP Ban: Against FCC Rules? Highly Desirable?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[[OT rant] Are there any home WiFi routers that DON'T SUCK?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2110e94e736fbe5f32088eee09481bee</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2110e94e736fbe5f32088eee09481bee</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Warning: rant ahead, and names named
When I'm not traveling, I like to work from home some days rather than endure the trek from Seattle to Redmond (although it's much better now that our own employee...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Warning: rant ahead, and names named.</em></p>  <p>When I'm not traveling, I like to work from home some days rather than endure the trek from Seattle to Redmond (although it's much better now that our own <a href="http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/332970_msftbus25.html" target="_blank">employee transit service</a> has expanded into my neighborhood -- the existence of which is sad commentary on the availability and reliability of Seattle's public transit companies).</p>  <p>This means, of course, that I need fast and stable network connections. Comcast with their PowerBoost is working very well for me. But I just can't find a decent wireless router at all. My Lenovo T61p (with Intel 4965abgn adapter) just won't stay connected to my D-Link DIR-628 and IT'S DRIVING ME CRAZY! (Yes, I've tried various driver versions, from both Lenovo and Intel.)</p>  <p>My house is in an area with a lot of wireless activity -- sometimes I can see nine or ten SSIDs. I'm running draft N on 2.4GHz (which occupies two non-adjacent channels, currently 1 and 4), and I suspect the problem is collision interference. I could shift the router to 5.2GHz, which I probably would help, but then the rest of the computers in my house won't connect. Why, you ask? Well get this: the DIR-628 is part of <a href="http://www.dlink.com/products/category.asp?cid=1&amp;sec=1#cid_103" target="_blank">D-Link's RangeBooster N family</a>. So I stayed in the family and got two DWA-542 adapters for the desktop computers. Yet they only do 2.4GHz! Silly me, I assumed that being in the same family means full support of the router's capabilities.</p>  <p>I'm very tempted to replace my router again -- and I'm thinking that the best option is to get one with dual radios. That way I can move my T61p to 5.2GHz and replace the desktop adapters, while still having single-channel 802.11b/g on 2.4GHz for the Wii and my PlayStation Portable.</p>  <p>Now my request: tell me about your experience with home routers. What do you really like, and why? What should I buy?</p><img src="http://blogs.technet.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=3110595" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 20:12:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/decent wireless router">decent wireless router</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home">home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/router">router</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lenovo">lenovo</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/d-link dir-628">d-link dir-628</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lenovo t61p">lenovo t61p</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intel">intel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dir-628">dir-628</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intel 4965abgn adapter">intel 4965abgn adapter</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/08/22/ot-rant-are-there-any-home-wifi-routers-that-don-t-suck.aspx">[OT rant] Are there any home WiFi routers that DON'T SUCK?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Homer's Odyssey]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7b835d682976f83f9585f3a100ff7426</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7b835d682976f83f9585f3a100ff7426</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Well, it's been a pretty busy week here as Homer Simpson + Malware = quite the commotion

It started off with USA Today , VNUNet and CNET , then appeared on Slashdot over the weekend. After that, the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        Well, it's been a pretty busy week here as Homer Simpson + Malware = quite the commotion.<br /><br />It started off with <a href="http://blogs.usatoday.com/technologylive/2008/07/hackers-take-ov.html">USA Today</a>, <a href="http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2221476/homer-simpson-accused-spreading">VNUNet</a> and <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-9989313-83.html?hhTest=1">CNET</a>, then appeared on <a href="http://it.slashdot.org/it/08/07/12/1157244.shtml">Slashdot</a> over the weekend. After that, the sheer joy at being able to use <a href="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/13/homer-simpson-is-a-hacker-botnet-pusher-chunkylover53aolcom/">Homer</a> <a href="http://news.softpedia.com/news/Homer-Simpson-Recruited-to-Spread-Malware-89813.shtml">Simpson</a> <a href="http://www.itsnotacon.co.uk/2008/07/12/doh-homer-falls-in-with-the-malware-crowd/">pictures</a> in <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/14/homer_simpson_botnet_hack/">tech-related writeups</a> was evident. Who would have thought it would finish off with Matt Selman himself (the Simpsons scriptwriter responsible for the whole "Chunkylover53" phenomenon) <a href="http://time-blog.com/nerd_world/2008/07/defending_chunkylover53.html?xid=rss-nerdworld">writing about the situation</a>.<br /><br />Pretty nuts. Heck, I even got to do a <a href="http://www.publicradio.org/columns/futuretense/2008/07/15.shtml#019464">four minute Podcast</a> that (from what I've been told) goes out to around 100 radio stations in the States. I think the closest I got to crossing security with popular culture previously was <a href="http://digg.com/security/Lindsay_Lohan_causes_massive_DoS_war">ye olde net-war</a> (that revolved around a "stolen" picture of Lindsay Lohan - long story), but this one has Homer Simpson in it so clearly it wins by default.<br /><br />However, what a lot of people might have missed - in fact, I nearly missed it myself - was something that appeared shortly before the plug appeared to be pulled on poor old Homer. Here's a screenshot of his previous message history - you can see how many times it was constantly changing:<br /><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/hmess1.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/hmess1.html','popup','width=773,height=539,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/hmess1-thumb-373x260.gif" alt="hmess1.gif" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="260" width="373" /></a></span><br />Click to Enlarge<br /><br /><div align="left">Here's the final message I saw before the lights seemingly went out on Homer:<br /></div><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><a href="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/krhomer.html" onclick="window.open('http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/krhomer.html','popup','width=917,height=400,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/krhomer-thumb-317x138.jpg" alt="krhomer.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="138" width="317" /></a></span>
<br /><br />Click to Enlarge<br /></div><br />That message is particularly interesting, because it refers to a group of individuals who were involved in this <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/comcast-servers.html">Comcast hack</a> not so long ago. Were they involved here? Or are the real culprits simply blaming someone else?<br />
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 12:52:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/homer">homer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/homer simpson pictures">homer simpson pictures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/homer simpson">homer simpson</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous message history">previous message history</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/message">message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular culture previously">popular culture previously</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/final message">final message</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pretty busy week">pretty busy week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real culprits simply">real culprits simply</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/07/homers-odyssey.html">Homer's Odyssey</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wait a min, I use Comcast!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e6910e178cb8848fa30c13f64299bd81</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e6910e178cb8848fa30c13f64299bd81</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Cmon Comcast, Im ashamed ! I use your service. On another note, way to go Verizon, Im a user with you too


clipped from tech.blorge.com
AOL, AT&amp;T join child porn battle
clipped from tech.blorge.com
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > Cmon Comcast, Im ashamed ! I use your service.<br/>On another note, way to go Verizon, Im a user with you too. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/3AEB931C-33D8-4D87-824B-6DE7626D4EB8/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/35f7e0ef-70fb-42c2-b759-a20bce05fec3/3AEB931C-33D8-4D87-824B-6DE7626D4EB8/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/" href="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/" style="font-size: 11px;">tech.blorge.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/ --><H3><A title="Permanent Link: AOL, AT&#038;T join child porn battle" rel="bookmark" href="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure: /2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/">AOL, AT&#038;T join child porn battle</A></H3></td>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/3AEB931C-33D8-4D87-824B-6DE7626D4EB8/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content8.clipmarks.com/images/clip-icon.gif" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/" href="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/" style="font-size: 11px;">tech.blorge.com</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/07/10/aol-att-join-child-porn-battle/ --><P>AT&#038;T and AOL (the largest and third-largest ISPs respectively) committed to blocking access to all newsgroups with child porn, along with offending websites stored on their servers. Verizon, Time Warner and Sprint had already agreed to this action.</P></td>
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<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/3AEB931C-33D8-4D87-824B-6DE7626D4EB8/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content9.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Jul 2008 12:09:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blorge">blorge</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon">verizon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/child porn">child porn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tech">tech</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/aol">aol</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time warner">time warner</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comcast">comcast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/att">att</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sprint">sprint</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=503">Wait a min, I use Comcast!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Maybe the NAC used car salesman can claim them as a customer too? In NAC quality counts!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d80f68ce6e6808f9d06f6e7946e4e4a0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d80f68ce6e6808f9d06f6e7946e4e4a0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Dark Reading had a good article today talking about GuideWorks , the TV Guide/Comcast joint venture's 2 year odyssey with NAC, which finds them finally starting to see some good results. I immediately...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dark Reading had a <a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=157719&amp;f_src=darkreading_section_296">good article today</a> talking about <a class="zem_slink" title="GuideWorks" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GuideWorks" rel="wikipedia">GuideWorks</a>, the TV Guide/Comcast joint venture's 2 year odyssey with NAC, which finds them finally starting to see some good results. I immediately went to the website of the <a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/the-used-car-sa.html">NAC used car salesman</a> to see if they claimed them as a NAC customer too, but didn't see anything yet. But with those guys you never know. <br><br>Seriously though folks, this story is a classic NAC story. GuideWorks had guests and unmanaged users visiting their offices all the time. When they would ask to plug in they were told sorry, wait till you get back to your hotel. Over time this answer became unacceptable and they realized they needed a way to give these people a way to get on the net and get their email while keeping their network secure. This very same need drives many initial NAC deployments.<br><br>Like many other NAC customers they wanted something easy, not add major overhead or network changes and easy to administer. Again straight out of the NAC playbook. In the Summer of '06 they began a pilot of the Tipping Point NAC product which is based on the old Roving Planet technology. Now Roving Planet was more of a wireless security company, but near the end they rebranded themselves as NAC and Tipping Point uses that with their IPS devices to enforce. Best of all for GuideWorks the price was sub 10k. <br><br>Here is where the other side of NAC comes in. This is what the article says:</p><blockquote><p><em><p>While NAC tools are often advertised as plug-and-play, GuideWorks found that the NAC setup required a high level of networking expertise. Fortunately, the Inglewood site had plenty of technical expertise because that’s where many of the company’s developers are stationed. In addition, GuideWorks put one of its front-desk employees in charge of setting up new accounts. But because her technical background was limited, the company had to walk her through a learning curve. </p>

<p>Now the company is planning to deploy the system at its Radnor office, which will be a bit more challenging since there’s less technical expertise there, and that office gets a greater number of visitors. So GuideWorks has been on the search for employees to support the NAC system there. The company expects to have NAC up and running there by the end of the summer. </p></em></p>

</blockquote><p>So 2 years after trial they are rolled out in one office and have to hire employees to support the NAC system at the next office. This was a problem with many of the failed NAC companies over the last few years and I think the problem with this Tipping Point solution. Just providing guest access should not be that hard! Yes the StillSecure Safe Access solution would have been much easier and faster to implement, but to be fair, any of the leading NAC solutions would have been up and running easier as well. </p>

<p>While this article was supposed to serve as reference and case study for the Tipping Point NAC solution, it is far from inspiring. If I were a customer looking into NAC, I don't think this would make run out and look at the Tipping Point solution. Moral of the story is, just because you made a good IPS doesn't mean you have a very good NAC product. When it comes to something like NAC, quality counts and buying a 2nd tier solution can cost you in time to implementation and total cost of ownership.</p>

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<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=bjKsGI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=bjKsGI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=DxCrYI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=DxCrYI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=YQ1SAI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=YQ1SAI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=wD2I6I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=wD2I6I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=FSLeNi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=FSLeNi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=2QntYi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=2QntYi" border="0"></img></a>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 19:36:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customer">customer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solution">nac solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac solutions">nac solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac tools">nac tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac setup">nac setup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial nac deployments">initial nac deployments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac playbook">nac playbook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac companies">nac companies</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/321785853/maybe-the-nac-u.html">Maybe the NAC used car salesman can claim them as a customer too? In NAC quality counts!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[An Update to Photobucket's DNS Hijacking]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/757643fcf70bd2fb75f32ac324bd9a6f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/757643fcf70bd2fb75f32ac324bd9a6f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With Photobuckets recently hijacked DNS records by Turkish hacking group , the second high profile DNS hijack for the past two months next to Comcast.net's DNS hijacking in May , domain registrant...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SGDNLcUG8WI/AAAAAAAAB1M/OHd6QoarHK4/s1600-h/atspace_DNS_hijacking.JPG"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SGDNLcUG8WI/AAAAAAAAB1M/OHd6QoarHK4/s200/atspace_DNS_hijacking.JPG" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5215393964957823330" border="0" /></a>With <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1285">Photobucket’s recently hijacked DNS records by Turkish hacking group</a>, the second high profile DNS hijack for the past two months next to <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1213">Comcast.net's DNS hijacking in May</a>, domain <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1208">registrant impersonation attacks</a> seems to fully work, and Tier 1 domain registrars remain susceptible to them.<br /><br />So far, none of these DNS hijacks served any malware, live exploits, or bogus home pages aiming to steal accounting data. However, the DNS hijacking by itself resulted in a Denial of Service attack on Photobucket, one that would have required a great deal of bandwidth if it were executed in the old fashioned frontal attack approach.<br /><br />And with Photobucket still labeling the DNS hijacking as a "DNS error", their failure to admit what has actually happened is already sparkling quite a few negative comments across the Web - with a reason. Creating alternate realities when it comes to evidential proof of a hack isn't necessarily state of the art public relations. Photobucket.com's domain registrar, <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9973345-7.html">the Register.com comments on the DNS hijacking</a> :<br /><br />"<span style="font-style: italic;">The Photobucket site was down for a very short time and was restored immediately when we became aware of the issue." Roni Jacobson, general counsel of Register.com, said in a statement on Thursday. "We are currently investigating the source of the problem.</span>"<br /><br />As well as Atspace.com's (Zettahost.com) <a href="http://atspace.com/dedicated-web-server-hosting-domain-articles-news/">statement left on their site regarding the DNS hijacking</a> :<br /><br />"<span style="font-style: italic;">IMPORTANT! Photobucket.com problem read here: </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Last night Photobucket.com DNS at register.com was hacked by malicious people that are trying to compromise our business!  We are in no way affiliated with such bad deeds and cooperate with photobucket in capturing these individuals. They have pointed the domain photobucket.com to an account hosted on our systems! We have blocked that and photobucked techs have restored the domain pointing to its original location!ALL account information and pictures on photobucket.com are OK, please have patience! Unfortunately the complete DNS replication usually takes 24-48 hours and during this time caches DNS records might still point to us! </span><span style="font-style: italic;">The normal operation of Photobucket is restored and as soon as the replication is complete there should be no further such issues! We would like to emphasize that we are in now way responsible for what happens with photobucket and all users bumping across our systems! </span><span style="font-style: italic;">We are a legitimate web hosting company operating since 2003 and in no way tolerate such hacking attempts! If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us at abuse@zettahost.com! Thanks for your patience and understanding!</span>"<br /><br />When the affected company acts like nothing's happened, whereas multiple sources continue providing pieces of the puzzle, a statement on the measures taken to prevent that type of hijacking in the future would be better PR than denying the hijacking of the first place and the fact that they could have pointed Photobucket.com to anywhere they wanted to.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=pMvT6I"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=pMvT6I" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=GoYjJI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=GoYjJI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=QeP7ii"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=QeP7ii" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=mVn9wi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=mVn9wi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=e9X9fI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=e9X9fI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=lWuZEI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=lWuZEI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=TDB9oi"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=TDB9oi" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/318813375" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2008 02:08:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns">dns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/photobucket">photobucket</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complete dns replication">complete dns replication</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dns records">dns records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complete">complete</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/replication">replication</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/photobucket site">photobucket site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain photobucket">domain photobucket</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/318813375/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">An Update to Photobucket's DNS Hijacking</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Google has your back against your ISP]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9a8229e70a7834812614f5a434de3959</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9a8229e70a7834812614f5a434de3959</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its been a while now since word got out that Comcast for sure and possibly other large ISPs were filtering and throttling traffic to their customers. Now Steve Musil over on C/Net is reporting on a...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Its been a while now <a href="http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2007/10/19/financial/f061526D54.DTL&amp;feed=rss.business">since word got out</a> that <a class="zem_slink" title="Comcast" href="http://www.comcast.com/" rel="homepage">Comcast</a> for sure and possibly other large ISPs were filtering and throttling traffic to their customers. Now <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9968972-7.html?part=rss&amp;tag=feed&amp;subj=NewsBlog">Steve Musil over on C/Net is reporting</a> on a report <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/13/google_network_management_tools/">in the Register</a> that <a class="zem_slink" title="Google" href="http://www.google.com/about.html" rel="homepage">Google</a> will be releasing tools that they have developed which will allow users to monitor and identify this type of filtering by your broadband carrier. I am far from a Google fan boy, but I have to give Google a pat on the back for this one.&nbsp; </p>

<p>The ISPs have tried to stop the government from stepping in here and preventing them from limiting and filtering traffic like this. It is part of the whole net neutrality thing.&nbsp; The ISPs response is the government doesn't have to step in, the market will take care of itself. Yeah, just like the oil companies say about the price of gas.&nbsp; </p>

<p>Ultimately I think the ISPs know they are going to lose this fight. Their next play is to start charging you based upon how much bandwidth you use.&nbsp; We have already seen the noise around that one. It reminds me of my web hosting days.&nbsp; Some hosts charged you by the bandwidth you used per month. Others gave you unlimited bandwidth but put you on a crowded machine where you had to fight for CPU time and hooked that up to a small pipe that was saturated.&nbsp; So you did not pay for extra bandwidth, but you couldn't use any either.&nbsp; Bottom line after a long period of access being cheap and plentiful, the ISP game is back.&nbsp; You can pay them now or pay them later, but you will pay them.</p>

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]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Jun 2008 20:06:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google">google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google tools">google tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/connection google">connection google</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isp">isp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/google fan boy">google fan boy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isps response">isps response</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extra bandwidth">extra bandwidth</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isps">isps</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/06/google-has-your.html">Google has your back against your ISP</source>
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