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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: commercial]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 03:03:53 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links List 10.10.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e68ccc27eb670a14c5008d0e963a10e2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e68ccc27eb670a14c5008d0e963a10e2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[You cannot turn around without bumping into another bad news story about the economy. From layoffs (10% of eBays workforce, 7.5% of HPs ) to the bailouts to the $7 billion loan the state of California...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You cannot turn around without bumping into another bad news story about the economy. From layoffs (10% of <a href="http://www.webguild.org/2008/10/ebay-layoffs-announced.php" target="_blank">eBay&#8217;s</a> workforce, 7.5% of <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/151102/hp_announces_24600_layoffs_in_wake_of_eds_acquisition.html" target="_blank">HP&#8217;s</a>) to the bailouts to the <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/oct2008/db2008103_878150.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index+-+temp_news+%2B+analysis" target="_blank">$7 billion loan</a> the state of California needs to make payroll this month. Really, 7 beeeellllyon dollars? How many people shook their heads and felt sorry for the people working at financial services companies, all the while thinking that the tech sector was a pretty secure place to be (as long as you weren&#8217;t in the IT department at a financial services company)? Well, now apparently comes the wake up call for tech. Oh yeah, a bunch of those startups and not-so-young-anymore startups are FUNDED. They&#8217;re not making MONEY &#8211; or at least certainly not enough to actually be PROFITABLE, given the way they&#8217;ve been spending on payroll, sales and marketing to grow as quickly as possible. To get to that visibility and magic number of customers which means a big payoff for the investors and the founders. From the reports, it&#8217;s back to basics time, or at least that&#8217;s what the <a href="http://valleywag.com/5061391/its-always-darkest-before-its-pitch-black" target="_blank">VCs are telling their portfolio companies</a>. Cut costs. Layoff people. Focus on selling. And get profitable. Duh.</p>
<p>So can <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/open-source/?p=2972" target="_blank">open source weather out the economic storm</a>? Emerging from the dot-com bust, open source has matured, its legal framework and values are established, and serious players are in the game. But as this post on ZDNet points out, consolidation is on the way. &#8220;IDC renamed its LinuxWorld Show in San Francisco next year Open Source World &#8211; a clear shot across the bow at O&#8217;Reilly&#8217;s OSCON.&#8221; Will open source (from free to lower-cost alternatives to commercial software) flourish in a time of tightening budgets or will projects quietly go away for lack of funding (VC and that pesky business model thing) and, let&#8217;s face it, the &#8220;extra time&#8221; of IT pros tasked yet again to do more with less?</p>
<p>It&#8217;s October 2008 and Charles Babcock writes, &#8220;<a href="http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/server_virtualization/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210800267" target="_blank">CA Embraces Virtualization As Future of Data Center Management</a>&#8221;. Beyond keeping up with what competitors are doing, I enjoy this article for the masterful way it depicts the nightmare that is working with traditional frameworks. Too slow, too expensive, too complex, too many modules &#8211; it&#8217;s all in here. And somehow, I don&#8217;t think that was the point of it. So, $154,000 for CA Data Center Automation Manager &#8211; which can &#8220;consult&#8221; the CA CMDB (pricing starting at what do you think, something like $500K to a million &#8211; don&#8217;t forget those services) plus CA Wily APM (Introscope 8 and Wily Customer Experience Manager 4.2; pricing anyone?) metrics that get fed back into Data Center Automation Manager to help determine the virtual machine resources that are needed. Plus can also integrate info from CA Endeavor&#8217;s software change management tracking and CA SysView and in future with CA Management Suite for Mainframe Linux, potentially. I am not kidding about this list. And, we&#8217;ve been hearing this for a while &#8211; &#8220;Unicenter&#8221; the brand goes away and is replaced by &#8220;CA NSM&#8221;. The brand goes away. Why retire a successful brand? Ah.</p>
<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="110" alt="joe_tucci" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/joe-tucci1.jpg" width="170" align="left" border="0" />I love this post on EMC, &#8220;<a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/c/Data-Storage/Eleven-Things-You-Didnt-Know-about-the-Worlds-Largest-External-Disk-Storage-Company/?kc=EWKNLNAV10102008STR2" target="_blank">Eleven Things You Didn&#8217;t Know About the World&#8217;s Largest External Disk Storage Company</a>.&#8221; Although I guess I really don&#8217;t know much about Joe Tucci, since #11 says:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Contrary to conventional thought, it is not true that the EMC President/CEO is the older, gentler brother of the fictional patriarch of HBO&#8217;s hit television series.&#8221; Hunh. I just googled him, thinking maybe it was a resemblance thing. Nope.&quot;</p>
</blockquote>
<p> And on a much lighter note. A funny from Dell. 2 years later, I just stumbled across this Proprietaryville , Jibjab-ish video, called <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOAunpk54PA&amp;eurl" target="_blank">Dell the Journey</a>. Legacy systems being escorted onto the Retirement Home bus. Michael Dell as knight in shining armor, singing no less. Joe Tucci and Larry Ellison showing up as heroes leading the charge against Proprietaryville (yes, funny in and of itself). And my favorite, &#8220;Now let&#8217;s go kick some proprietary apps.&#8221;</p>
<p> <img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="146" alt="delljibjab" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/delljibjab1.jpg" width="240" border="0" /></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 17:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services company">financial services company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source">source</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source weather">source weather</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extra time">extra time</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful brand">successful brand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/joe tucci">joe tucci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dell">dell</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/links-list-101008/10/2008">Links List 10.10.08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["Catch Me, Yes YOU Can": Realized Threats at the Corner Store]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cfe4e6883d78190bc8fc3d36305bf27f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cfe4e6883d78190bc8fc3d36305bf27f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[just returned from the Payment Card Industry's 2008 Members Council Meeting in Orlando, Florida. We had a blast despite the mood being somewhat dampened as a result of the uncertainty of the global...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[ just returned from the <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pr_080930_PCIDSSv1-2.pdf" target="_blank">Payment Card Industry's</a> 2008 Members Council Meeting in Orlando, Florida.  We had a blast despite the mood being somewhat dampened as a result of the uncertainty of the global financial markets (heartfelt thanks to those wise souls who've been living outside of their means and taking undue personal and commercial financial risk...).  Anyhew, I met so many interesting people from both merchants and from the card brands like Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover & JCB International Co., Ltd.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/payment card industry">payment card industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial financial risk">commercial financial risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global financial markets">global financial markets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wise souls">wise souls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/card brands">card brands</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/american express">american express</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jcb international">jcb international</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/undue personal">undue personal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/orlando">orlando</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1364">"Catch Me, Yes YOU Can": Realized Threats at the Corner Store</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["New Attack" Against Encrypted Images]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d53a9071459b26f731fbd3ec643dbde8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d53a9071459b26f731fbd3ec643dbde8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In a blatant attempt to get some PR : In a new paper, Bernd Roellgen of Munich-based encryption outfit PMC Ciphers, explains how it is possible to compare an encrypted backup image file made with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a blatant attempt to get some <a href="http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?newsid=105263">PR</a>:</p>

<blockquote>In a new paper, Bernd Roellgen of Munich-based encryption outfit PMC Ciphers, explains how it is possible to compare an encrypted backup image file made with almost any commercial encryption program or algorithm to an original that has subsequently changed so that small but telling quantities of data 'leaks'.</blockquote>

<p><a href="http://www.turbocrypt.com/vpics/9a8f098c615a425eab6d17c804dd67ae/whitepapers/backup_attack.pdf">Here's</a> the paper.  Turns out that if you use a block cipher in Electronic Codebook Mode, identical plaintexts encrypt to identical ciphertexts.</p>

<p>Yeah, we already knew that.</p>

<p>And -1 point for a security company requiring the use of Javascript, and not failing gracefully for a browser that doesn't have it enabled.</p>

<p>And -- ahem -- what is it with that photograph in the paper?  Couldn't the researchers have found something a little less adolescent?</p>

<p>For the record, I <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0303.html#4">doghoused</a> PMC Ciphers back in 2003:</p>

<blockquote>PMC Ciphers. The theory description is so filled with pseudo-cryptography that it's funny to read. Hypotheses are presented as conclusions. Current research is misstated or ignored. The first link is a technical paper with four references, three of them written before 1975. Who needs thirty years of cryptographic research when you have polymorphic cipher theory?</blockquote>

<p>EDITED TO ADD (10/9):  I didn't realize it, but last year PMC Ciphers <a href="http://www.ciphers.de/eng/content/Backround-Info/Bruce-Schneiers-comments.html">responded</a> to my doghousing them.  Funny stuff.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=oYuwM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=oYuwM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=jkURM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=jkURM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2008 02:44:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pmc ciphers">pmc ciphers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper">paper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical paper">technical paper</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial encryption program">commercial encryption program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/polymorphic cipher theory">polymorphic cipher theory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funny">funny</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup image file">backup image file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identical plaintexts encrypt">identical plaintexts encrypt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/funny stuff">funny stuff</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/new_attack_agai.html">"New Attack" Against Encrypted Images</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hardening the Target]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5b2f7f22bb5f7efb4b18ba02d56bf8de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5b2f7f22bb5f7efb4b18ba02d56bf8de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As enterprises increasingly depend on digitized data and seek commercial opportunities from accelerated digital access and transmission, senior management and boards of directors haven't sufficiently...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[As enterprises increasingly depend on digitized data and seek commercial opportunities from accelerated digital access and transmission, senior management and boards of directors haven't sufficiently updated their enterprises' security protections on digitally stored information. Consequently, new and increasingly frequent attacks have occurred against their digital information assets. Enterprises must "harden the target" to protect against attacks against these assets.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=7d625c6c2025d2da5000c2cb29568517" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=7d625c6c2025d2da5000c2cb29568517" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 00:42:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital information assets">digital information assets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprises increasingly depend">enterprises increasingly depend</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprises">enterprises</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assets">assets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/increasingly frequent attacks">increasingly frequent attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/seek commercial opportunities">seek commercial opportunities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security protections">security protections</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=7d625c6c2025d2da5000c2cb29568517">Hardening the Target</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[FileAdvisor: software file search engine]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/856af459093a6fe1d8cb8a725ef66103</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/856af459093a6fe1d8cb8a725ef66103</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Troy Larson sent me a heads up on Bit9's FileAdvisor , a service they describe as &quot;a comprehensive catalog of executables, drivers, and patches found in commercial Windows applications and software...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://www.itsec.e-symposium.com/speakers/troy-larson.php" target="_blank">Troy Larson</a> sent me a heads up on Bit9's <a href="http://fileadvisor.bit9.com/services/search.aspx" target="_blank">FileAdvisor</a>, a service they describe as "a comprehensive catalog of executables, drivers, and patches found in commercial Windows applications and software packages. Malware and other unauthorized software that affects Windows computers is also indexed." <br />I immediately checked the FileAdvisor db for malware results as well non-Windows binaries and was pleasantly surprised with immediate and comprehensive results. You do have to register, but I was further impressed with the fact that they offered the option for a short or full <a href="http://fileadvisor.bit9.com/services/register.aspx" target="_blank">registration</a>.<br />This appears to be worthy of a bookmark in your incident handler/malware researcher/forensic investigator toolkit.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html&title=FileAdvisor:%20software%20file%20search%20engine " title="FileAdvisor: software file search engine ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html" title="FileAdvisor: software file search engine ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 10:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fileadvisor">fileadvisor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial windows applications">commercial windows applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware results">malware results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software packages">software packages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/affects windows computers">affects windows computers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comprehensive results">comprehensive results</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/incident handlermalware">incident handlermalware</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/10/fileadvisor-software-file-search-engine.html">FileAdvisor: software file search engine</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Commercialization of Anti Debugging Tactics in Malware]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/91955d7bc08228b99c0f5fa478c039b5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/91955d7bc08228b99c0f5fa478c039b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Commoditization or commercialization, Themida or Code Virtualizer, individually crypting or outsourcing to an experienced malware crypting service offering discounts on a volume basis next to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SN0BFks8GsI/AAAAAAAACMQ/J_vLiffz110/s1600-h/figure_multiple.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="128" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SN0BFks8GsI/AAAAAAAACMQ/bz624nz5JbE/s200-R/figure_multiple.jpg" width="200" /></a><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/09/commoditization-of-anti-debugging.html">Commoditization</a> or commercialization, Themida or Code Virtualizer, individually crypting or outsourcing to an experienced malware crypting service offering discounts on a volume basis next to detection rates of the crypted binary offered by a trusted online scanner that is NOT distributing the samples to the vendors? These are just some of the questions malware authors often ask themselves, while others distribute pirated copies of Code Virtualizer urging everyone to start taking advantage of commercial anti-reverse engineering tools to make their malware harder to analyze. Once again, just like we've seen before, a legitimate commercial application can come handy in the hands of the wrong people :<br />
<br />
"<i>Code Virtualizer will convert your original code (Intel x86 instructions) into Virtual Opcodes that will only be understood by an internal Virtual Machine. Those Virtual Opcodes and the Virtual Machine itself are unique for every protected application, avoiding a general attack over Code Virtualizer. Code Virtualizer can protect your sensitive code areas in any x32 and x64 native PE files (like executable files/EXEs, system services, DLLs , OCXs , ActiveX controls, screen savers and device drivers).</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SN0CPwG9MzI/AAAAAAAACMY/lB8WtKqycj4/s1600-h/cvprotopt.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="149" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SN0CPwG9MzI/AAAAAAAACMY/kgSYpWIHW2E/s200-R/cvprotopt.png" width="200" /></a><i>Code Virtualizer can generate multiple types of virtual machines with a different instruction set for each one. This means that a specific block of Intel x86 instructions can be converted into different instruction set for each machine, preventing an attacker from recognizing any generated virtual opcode after the transformation from x86 instructions. The following picture represents how a block of Intel x86 instructions is converted into different kinds of virtual opcodes, which could be emulated by different virtual machines.</i><br />
<br />
<i>When an attacker tries to decompile a block of code that was protected by Code Virtualizer, he will not find the original x86 instructions. Instead, he will find a completely new instruction set which is not recognized by him or any other special decompiler. This will force the attacker to go through the extremely hard work of identifying how each opcode is executed and how the specific virtual machine works for each protected application. Code Virtualizer totally obfuscates the execution of the virtual opcodes and the study of each unique virtual machine in order to prevent someone from studying how the virtual opcodes are executed.</i>"<br />
<br />
With Cyber-as-a-Service business model becoming increasingly common, the entire <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">quality assurance model in respect to malware</a> is slowly maturing from individual malware crypting propositions, where the seller of the service is basically taking advantage of a diverse set of public/private tools, into DIY web services offering crypting discounts on a volume basis, and perhaps most importantly - improving the customer's experience by letting him take advantage of the inventory of crypting tools and bypassing verification services. Within the tool's inventory are naturally lots of (pirated) commercial anti-reverse engineering tools.<br />
<br />
As we've seen before, whenever someone starts commercializing what used to be a self-selving process, others will either follow, or disintermediate their services by persistently releasing crypting tools for free in the wild. At the end of the day, it's all a matter of how serious they're about commercializing this market segment, and taking into consideration that a spamming vendor is offering malware crypting services "in between" the rest of the services in their portfolio, this underground cash cow is yet to prove itself in the long term.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wJDSL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wJDSL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=QoCNL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=QoCNL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=e4uxl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=e4uxl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=sXqbl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=sXqbl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=khiOL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=khiOL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2cQ2L"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2cQ2L" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=HiSTl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=HiSTl" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/406651187" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 12:55:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/machine">machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific virtual machine">specific virtual machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal virtual machine">internal virtual machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code">code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive code">sensitive code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unique virtual machine">unique virtual machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/original code">original code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/code virtualizer">code virtualizer</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/406651187/commercialization-of-anti-debugging.html">The Commercialization of Anti Debugging Tactics in Malware</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Of Planes and Ships]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/47dfbf92b3eaba317f07cfa2064d0a9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/47dfbf92b3eaba317f07cfa2064d0a9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Tom Barnett is consistently the most interesting writer on globalization and econo-security seam. This weeks piece confronts a problem every security architect can relate to (emphasis added on the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/09/column_121.html">Tom Barnett</a> is consistently the most interesting writer on globalization and econo-security seam. This weeks piece confronts a problem every security architect can relate to (emphasis added on the &quot;nail it to the wall&quot; quote at the end):</p><p><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">One of the main problems in counterterrorism today is that there are so many people and vehicles, and so much data and material, moving through globalization&#39;s myriad networks that it seems virtually impossible to track it all effectively. Nowhere has this problem been more acute than on the high seas.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">In 2006, Adm. Harry Ulrich, then U.S. commander of NATO Naval Forces Europe, decided to do something about it. Despite having virtually no resources, his dream was to transpose the global air-traffic control system onto sea traffic.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Worldwide, aircraft are transparent, because they&#39;re all required to carry an identification beacon that allows them to be tracked leaving and entering airports, and monitored between airports, by a global network of sensors. Act suspiciously and somebody&#39;s fighter aircraft will soon be on your tail.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">No such pervasive system currently exists globally for maritime traffic. While bigger ships carry an ID beacon similar to aircraft, without a shared monitoring network, that&#39;s like tracking only selected commercial jets and giving everyone else a pass.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">So Ulrich, upon taking command, asked a simple question: &quot;If we can do that in the air, why can&#39;t we do it on the sea?&quot; He made a point of pioneering his sea-traffic-control effort first inside the Mediterranean, where NATO&#39;s southern naval forces have historically been concentrated, but his real target was waters off Africa -- the most ungoverned maritime space in the world.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Ulrich knew the U. S. Navy couldn&#39;t do it alone, much less bring Africa&#39;s meager coast-guard-like navies up to snuff so they could do it on their own. So he quickly created a network of assets -- both public and private -- to manage that space, modeling his monitoring system on international air-traffic control.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Ulrich began stitching together a network of shore-based sensors ringing the Mediterranean. His naval command then began initial monitoring by tapping into the International Maritime Organization&#39;s existing Automated Identification System, transforming NATO&#39;s ability to track ship traffic in the Med.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Almost overnight, NATO went from tracking dozens of ships on the Mediterranean to thousands, and instead of getting the data sometimes up to 72 hours late, now the contacts were being tracked in one to five minutes -- to an accuracy within 50 feet on the earth&#39;s surface.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">When the classic big-firm systems integrators told Ulrich it would be too costly to pull it off, the admiral turned to the Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a U.S. Department of Transportation research center. Instead of hundreds of millions of dollars, Ulrich&#39;s initial network cost $900,000. The shore-based receivers are small, roughly the size of a radar dish you might find on a pleasure craft.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The strength of the system is a function of its reach: the more countries join, the larger the shared operational picture. By the time Ulrich retired at the end of 2007, he had enlisted 32 countries throughout the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, along the west coast of Africa, around the Black Sea, and in the Pacific. Today, the network continues to spread around the planet.</span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 14px; line-height: 20px; "><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">With Ulrich&#39;s system in place, local police, coast guards, and border patrols catch most bad guys, obviating American military responses. As Harry told me for an article I wrote about his work in a fall 2007 issue of Esquire, </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&quot;I don&#39;t do defense; I do security. When you talk defense, you talk containment and mutually assured destruction. When you talk security, you talk collaboration and networking. This is the future.&quot;</span></span><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The admiral&#39;s legacy program, the Maritime Safety and Security Information System, earned the Volpe Center a prestigious &quot;Innovations in American Government&quot; award this month from Harvard University&#39;s Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Security Collaboration + Networking &#160;= Federation. This is indeed the future - SAML came along just at the nick of time.</span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">When you assume that to do access control you must have &quot;Complete Mediation&quot; in Saltzer and Schroeder&#39;s terms of the subject (users), the objects (data), the session, and the roles, then you are going to have an interesting life trying to deliver anything. And if you do it will mucho expensive.</span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><div><span style="border-collapse: collapse; line-height: 20px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">if you take the federated autonomous nodes approach, agree upon an attribute schema plus a protection model for same, and basic protocol, you are then free to move about the country. Security doesn&#39;t have to equal centralization or high cost. Get the attributes from point a to point b securely.</span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2008 19:04:11 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architect">security architect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identification system">identification system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial network cost">initial network cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial">initial</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cost">cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ulrich">ulrich</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time ulrich">time ulrich</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/of-planes-and-ships.html">Of Planes and Ships</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/de1f0c5b81d2a653775eaade21547299</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/de1f0c5b81d2a653775eaade21547299</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was pleased to read the Paul Vincents post, TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0 . TIBCO has always had a forward thinking vision for distributed computing and this release of BE 3.0 is another step in the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was pleased to read the Paul Vincent&#8217;s post, <a title="Permalink" href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/09/22/tibco-businessevents-30/">TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0</a>.    TIBCO has always had a forward thinking vision for distributed computing and this release of BE 3.0 is another step in the right direction.  TIBCO now has the only commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) event processing platform on the market that supports distributed event processing, multi-agent architectures, distributed object caching, extensibility, continuous queries, state management and state-of-the-art rules.</p>
<p>Even thought TIBCO&#8217;s BusinessEvents does not yet support Bayesian Classifiers, Artificial Neural Networks and other advanced decision support algorithms, it is just a matter of time before TIBCO will add these advanced features &#8220;out of the box&#8221;.  On the other hand, the extensible nature of TIBCO&#8217;s BE makes it possible to add probabalistic computing functionality, however this requires quite a lot of programming and integration work.</p>
<p>When I see a great release like this for TIBCO, it makes me a little nostalgic for &#8220;the good old days&#8221; travelling the world in the front of the aircraft for TIBCO.   TIBCO has a rich and diverse customer base.  This customer base includes financial services companies; however, TIBCO is much less dependent on financial services than other event processing companies.   So, with TIBCO you not only get great technology, but rock-solid stability in an unstable and uncertain business world.</p>
<p>As a side note, an S&amp;P analyst recently <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/18/sp-downgrades-tibco-to-sell-on-financial-services-exposure/" target="_blank">downgraded</a> TIBCO&#8217;s stock <a href="http://online.barrons.com/quotes/main.html?symbol=tibx">(TIBX)</a>, primarily due to chao in the financial services sector.    Because of TIBCO&#8217;s global reach and stability, plus forward vision, advanced technologies and many years of commericial success, the S&amp;P downgrade will create a buying opportunity for TIBCO stock.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 01:54:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco businessevents">tibco businessevents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco">tibco</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibco stock">tibco stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos">tibcos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos businessevents">tibcos businessevents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tibcos global reach">tibcos global reach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services">financial services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial services sector">financial services sector</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vision">vision</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/24/tibco-businessevents-30/">TIBCO BusinessEvents 3.0</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Sprint May Launch WiMax in Baltimore 6-October]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f06a6b1aba46ec417e5ba7fda223fddd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f06a6b1aba46ec417e5ba7fda223fddd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[DSLReports has a tip that Sprint will launch its WiMax service in its first commercially available market on 6-Oct-2008: The site for the service should go live on 26-Sept, allowing sign ups. Pricing...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Xohm-Baltimore-Launch-October-6-97821"><strong>DSLReports has a tip that Sprint will launch its WiMax service in its first commercially available market on 6-Oct-2008:</strong></a> The site for the service should go live on 26-Sept, allowing sign ups. Pricing will likely be sub-$50. Speeds will likely be advertised as 2 to 4 Mbps with higher bursts. Long-time market watcher Karl Bode writes that backhaul issues appear to be sorted out, with Sprint having signed a number of new deals to ensure that their high-bandwidth WiMax sites can be fed with enough bites.</p>

<p>Baltimore is one of what I believe are still three test markets that will go into commercial availability, albeit as much as a year after initial plans, and then months delayed after revised plans were announced. Still 2 to 4 Mbps is far above the level that current cell technology can achieve as a consistent range.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 05:30:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sprint">sprint</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wimax service">wimax service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/high-bandwidth wimax sites">high-bandwidth wimax sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current cell technology">current cell technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plans">plans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial plans">initial plans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sign ups">sign ups</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/commercial availability">commercial availability</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008450.html">Sprint May Launch WiMax in Baltimore 6-October</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[GPS Spoofing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/301910a8390d678e528ed1556dd2bb4e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting : Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://philosecurity.org/2008/09/07/gps-spoofing">Interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Jon used a desktop computer attached to a GPS satellite simulator to create a fake GPS signal. Portable GPS satellite simulators can fit in the trunk of a car, and are often used for testing. They are available as commercial off-the-shelf products. You can also rent them for less than $1K a week -- peanuts to anyone thinking of hijacking a cargo truck and selling stolen goods.

<p>In his first experiments, Jon placed his desktop computer and GPS satellite simulator in the cab of his small truck, and powered them off an inverter. The VAT used a second truck as the victim cargo truck. "With this setup," Jon said, "we were able to spoof the GPS receiver from about 30 feet away. If our equipment could broadcast a stronger signal, or if we had purchased stronger signal amplifiers, we certainly could have spoofed over a greater distance."</p>

<p>During later experiments, Jon and the VAT were able to easily achieve much greater GPS spoofing ranges. They spoofed GPS signals at ranges over three quarters of a mile. "The farthest distance we achieved was 4586 feet, at Los Alamos," said Jon. "When you radiate an RF signal, you ideally want line of sight, but in this case we were walking around buildings and near power lines. We really had a lot of obstruction in the way. It surprised us." An attacker could drive within a half mile of the victim truck, and still override the truck's GPS signals.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=XoEIL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=XoEIL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=JZqYL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=JZqYL" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 03:03:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps">gps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake gps signal">fake gps signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/signal">signal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/gps satellite simulator">gps satellite simulator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/truck">truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim truck">victim truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/victim cargo truck">victim cargo truck</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stronger signal amplifiers">stronger signal amplifiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cargo truck">cargo truck</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/gps_spoofing.html">GPS Spoofing</source>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
