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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: commodity]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/commodity</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 12:09:25 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[I was right!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3c01ef2aba9e36c67875ce625f1aeb42</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3c01ef2aba9e36c67875ce625f1aeb42</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Allen does the dance-of-I-was-right

ahem

In my blog in July, I predicted that we would be seeing a perfect storm as cyber criminals start to see diminshing returns on PII (credit card info, mothers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Allen does the dance-of-I-was-right...<br /><br />*ahem*<br /><br />In my blog in July, I predicted that we would be seeing a <a href="http://securethink.blogspot.com/2008/07/perfect-storm.html">perfect storm</a> as cyber criminals start to see diminshing returns on PII (credit card info, mothers maiden names and the kind of things they have been going after up until now) and thus start looking at the business information that they have been ignoring.<br /><br />According to usatoday, <span class="inside-head"><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2008-11-11-thieves-cyber-corporate-data_N.htm">internet thieves are making big money stealing corporate info. </a><br /><br /></span><blockquote><span class="inside-head">"</span>Elite cybergangs can no longer make great money stealing and selling personal identity data. Thousands of small-time, copycat data thieves have oversaturated the market, driving prices to commodity levels. Credit card account numbers that once fetched $100 or more, for instance, can be had for $10 or less, says Gunter Ollmann, chief security strategist at IBM ISS, IBM's tech security division." </blockquote>As I said in my original article - the only problem with this is the establishment of a market. The cyber-criminals have established a very viable underground trading system but they now need businessed to want to dip their toes in something that is highly illegal. It seems this is happening.<br /><br />The scary thing is how much information is actually being pulled out of the organisation. The criminals are literally dumping everyone's My Documents directory with no real aim to a storage facility outside of the organisation and yet the companies are not aware of this.<br /><br />My advice? Take measures now while the enemy are just getting established. How you manage to protect your employees' and customers' PII will determine how well you survive the next part of the battle - your company secrets.<br /><br />Also, don't be tempted to get information on your competitors from shady people. They may just be doing the same thing to you.<br /><br />PS1: (PII = personally identifiable information - anything that can be linked to a person and is usually stuff you don't want the public to know like your credit card details, address, salary, health, etc)<br /><br />PS2: Thank you to <a href="http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2008/11/intellectual-property-develop-or-steal.html">TaoSecurity </a>for the story. Read <span class="entry-author-name">Richard Bejtlich's post for more information. His take on the story is that it is all to do with money. Of course it is, if you think information security is about antivirus and firewalls then you are truely wrong.<br /></span><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~4/460587609" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 06:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business information">business information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identifiable information">identifiable information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/start">start</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cyber criminals start">cyber criminals start</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/criminals">criminals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card info">credit card info</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/info">info</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~3/460587609/i-was-right.html">I was right!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hosting meets the cloud]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5ce6d3370e235e215b980a588e616472</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5ce6d3370e235e215b980a588e616472</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Im out at The 451 Group Client Conference in Boston, lovely Boston. Its been over ten years since I lived here, but somehow Boston always has a feel of home
After meetings and calls, I was finally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m out at <a href="http://clientconference.the451group.com/na/2008/" target="_blank">The 451 Group Client Conference</a> in Boston, lovely Boston. It’s been over ten years since I lived here, but somehow Boston always has a feel of home.</p>
<p>After meetings and calls, I was finally able to slip into a conference session – just in time to catch uber-smart analysts Rachel Chalmers (<a href="http://the451group.com/" target="_blank">The 451 Group</a>) and Dan Golding (<a href="http://tier1research.com/" target="_blank">Tier1 Research</a>) engage in a lively and not-so-mock debate on “<a href="http://clientconference.the451group.com/na/2008/agenda.html" target="_blank">Hosting Meets the Cloud</a>”.</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/clip-image0021.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; margin: 5px; border-right-width: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/clip-image002-thumb.jpg" border="0" alt="clip_image002" width="240" height="157" align="left" /></a>Now this doesn’t cover the entire debate – and part II is coming tomorrow. But what it does cover is the most interesting questions (to me) and paraphrase the points made by the analysts. I thought they both had very interesting points and more similarities than differences in the end; the real difference is how they thought about the issues and through what lens – for Rachel it was the enterprise and for Dan it was managed hosting providers.<em> (</em><a href="http://images.inmagine.com/img/inspirestock/ispc037/ispc037046.jpg" target="_blank"><em>image from inmagine</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p><strong><em>Question: What is a cloud and why?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Dan:</strong> Shared infrastructure leveraged/run by third parties for the benefit of enterprises, developers, etc. This is not a new idea – just recently “rebranded.” Given all the discussion and disagreement over this now, what will the cloud end up looking like?</p>
<p><strong>Rachel:</strong> The cloud is “IT infrastructure as a service” down to the level of a server operating system. Take the example of <a href="http://www.cmswatch.com/Trends/1418-Cloud-computing---Ellison-rants,-others-reap?source=RSS" target="_blank">Amazon web services</a> – in this case it’s not just the infrastructure but also the internal processes built around service delivery, e.g., provisioning, that are being exposed as a commodity to external customers.</p>
<p><strong><em>Dan’s Question for Rachel: In your opinion, how much is the <a href="http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/devt/74F46C52ACB5316CCC2574F9007B3A37" target="_blank">cloud a fad versus CIOs</a> really trying to solve a problem?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Rachel:</strong> For the practical, roll-up-your-sleeves types of CIOs – those coming up from the engineering ranks – that I talk to, the cloud is real, as opposed to SOA and middleware.</p>
<p><strong><em>What about “internal” cloud computing – built and maintained by an enterprise versus a third-party provider?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Dan:</strong> Cloud computing is done by providers for customers. Certainly there are <a href="http://www.mashget.com/2008/11/02/salesforcecom-extends-cloud-computing-service/" target="_blank">enterprises that have made internal computing investments</a>, e.g., for publishing, large-scale phone systems, etc - but they were stupid ideas made by companies that have too much money. A better question here is does it make any sense for an enterprise to create their own cloud? While an enterprise can play at it, they can’t do it cost-effectively, not in a way that a third party provider can do it.</p>
<p><strong>Rachel:</strong> Many CIOs have “managed-hoster” envy – for things like chargeback and billing that hosters understand a do better. Of course there has been a rise in automation and virtualization tools in the enterprise which may not be as efficient and built for scalability as a hoster can achieve, but what is important is that they are customized/specialized for that business.</p>
<p><strong>Dan:</strong> Can you give a specific example of optimization to make it worthwhile for enterprises to do it themselves?</p>
<p><strong>Rachel:</strong> One example is sovereignty. The privacy laws around financial and healthcare information are not the same everywhere. Clouds and their geographically-dispersed data centers don’t necessarily have “national” borders. This is definitely a concern for the CIO that has to <a href="http://www.intomobile.com/2008/11/10/security-are-you-comfortable-sharing-your-information-with-%E2%80%98the-cloud%E2%80%99.html" target="_blank">comply with regulations in their industry around privacy protection</a>, for instance. Another example is security. Dow Chemical does a lot of work via joint ventures and has a need to provide but lock down desktops given to contractors as corporate workspaces. For their level of security, they need to “own” their computing resources.</p>
<p><strong>Dan:</strong> But why can’t someone like <a href="http://sungard.com/" target="_blank">SunGard</a> provide that as they do for many other large companies?</p>
<p><strong>Rachel:</strong> It comes down to a question of trust.</p>
<p><strong><em>Do people trust their hosting providers?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Dan</strong>: Yes. Whether it’s for a content delivery network or collocation, hosting the customers of hosting providers are some of the largest companies in the world in industries like energy and financial services. Give me a case when there was a major security issue with a hosting company. In fact, managed hosting providers usually provide better security than enterprises are capable of.</p>
<p><strong><em>And a question provided by an attendee from EMC: A few years ago, this would have been <a href="http://www.symmetrymagazine.org/breaking/2008/10/24/computing-in-a-grid-or-a-cloud/" target="_blank">a grid discussion. How is the cloud different</a>?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong>Rachel</strong>: Grid computing ended up being applicable only for niches – which I predicted. The real opportunity for everyone else with the cloud only comes up when you combine the kinds of automation tools (originally developed for grid computing) with x86 virtualization.</p>
<p><strong>Dan</strong>: I agree. Grid was a niche play. There were very few orgs that needed it and that the economics worked for. There were very few enterprises for whom it made sense to build their own for. The cloud is shared/leveraged versus grid computing. It economically makes sense in a way grid never did.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2008 18:38:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal cloud">internal cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/grid">grid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/grid discussion">grid discussion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rachel">rachel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dan">dan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprise">enterprise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versus grid">versus grid</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/hosting-meets-the-cloud/11/2008">Hosting meets the cloud</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[DIY Phishing Pages With Command and Control Interfaces]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/78a81ce667063a0a1268788bb3f66128</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/78a81ce667063a0a1268788bb3f66128</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The day when DIY phishing pages start coming with manuals is the day when consciously or subconsciously a phisher is lowering down the entry barriers into phishing for yet another time. A much more...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRIwl6hmo2I/AAAAAAAACa8/_1fYFgW0kzk/s1600-h/rapidshare_phishing_admin_panel.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRIwl6hmo2I/AAAAAAAACa8/_1fYFgW0kzk/s200/rapidshare_phishing_admin_panel.jpg" /></a>The day when DIY phishing pages start coming with manuals is the day when consciously or subconsciously a phisher is lowering down the entry barriers into phishing for yet another time. A much more user-friendly compared to the old-fashioned -- yet effective -- <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">rock phish directory listing</a>, a recently released command and control interface for Rapidshare phishing campaigns aims to empower its users with easy dynamic link generation for their campaigns.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRLdeRIJEbI/AAAAAAAACbE/ta5F-iiF2gg/s1600-h/DIY_phishing_scripts.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRLdeRIJEbI/AAAAAAAACbE/ta5F-iiF2gg/s200/DIY_phishing_scripts.JPG" /></a>What they've managed to achieve is another trust factor since Rapidshare generates a second dynamic link upon clicking on the original one. The script not only generates a dynamically looking link, but also, actually logs in the victim into their account in order to avoid suspicion whereas it still logs all the accounting data.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRLhzGDKcrI/AAAAAAAACbM/5-CHdeukArk/s1600-h/rapidshare_phishing_insecure_directory_permissions.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SRLhzGDKcrI/AAAAAAAACbM/5-CHdeukArk/s200/rapidshare_phishing_insecure_directory_permissions.JPG" /></a></div>Scammers also tend to be ironic every then and now. For instance, in this particular case, one of the users finds it ironic that the Rapidshare phishing page is hosted at Rapidshare itself. Is the script actually working? It appears so at least going through a misconfigured accounting data dump left by one of the phishers.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">Phishing Pages for Every Bank are a Commodity</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/diy-phishing-kits.html">DIY Phishing Kits</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-phishing-kit-goes-20.html">DIY Phishing Kit Goes 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/diy-phishing-kits-introducing-new.html">DIY Phishing Kits Introducing New Features</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">209 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/2091-host-locked.html">209.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/661-host-locked.html">66.1 Host Locked</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=5kY3N"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=5kY3N" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=r8EaN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=r8EaN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Qtrtn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Qtrtn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=qM6qn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=qM6qn" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=T3U6N"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=T3U6N" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=YwrRN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=YwrRN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=nQNrn"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=nQNrn" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/444324371" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2008 03:31:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/diy">diy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pages">pages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rapidshare">rapidshare</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data dump">data dump</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaigns">campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dynamic link">dynamic link</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pages start">pages start</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/link">link</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/444324371/diy-phishing-pages-with-command-and.html">DIY Phishing Pages With Command and Control Interfaces</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Given the Current Economic Turmoil, What Should IT Managers Do?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c3cb795253913d9e8117ca429595355f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c3cb795253913d9e8117ca429595355f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Gartner's Compliance &amp; Risk Management Research Community met recently and considered what IT managers should do given the economic turmoil spreading around the world

What started as a problem with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Gartner's Compliance & Risk Management Research Community met recently and considered what IT managers should do given the economic turmoil spreading around the world.<br />
<br />
What started as a problem with risky mortgages in hot real estate markets in the United States has spread to Wall Street with a devastating impact on the financial health and well being of a number of banks and an insurance company. Each day, the turmoil spreads, first to the equity and commodity markets where investors and speculators attempt to preserve what capital remains. Next, the central banks and governments rush in with an infusion of liquidity in an attempt to keep the money flowing through the world's financial market.<br />
<br />
The media commentary on the current financial crisis sounds the tone that all the laws of economics and free markets no longer apply. The reporters sound as if the next developments will be Mother Nature suspending the laws of physics and gravity. Against this backdrop, CIOs and IT managers wonder, "What do we do?"<br />
<br />
There is no denying that business as usual is not currently happening. To speculate or attempt to deal with the regulatory fallout that will follow this financial crisis is currently a waste of time. The central focus that CIOs must address now is what impact will this financial crisis have on IT in the next budget cycle. Also, how can IT help the enterprise demonstrate trustworthiness to key stakeholders, maintain critical functions that drive revenue and cash flow, and focus on the needs of the people who work for your organization.<br />
<br />
At the heart of the current financial crisis is a lack in confidence in the credit markets. Government officials report that interbank lending has ground to a halt, which prompted the U.S. Federal Reserve to step in on 7 October 2008 and offer direct short term lending to U.S. corporations. <br />
<br />
First, to combat this lack of confidence permeating the market, enterprises should take extraordinary means to increase their financial transparency and demonstrate that they have the ability to meet their obligations to creditors, customers, and the communities where they are located. Senior management must develop and exercise a voice in the public policy dialog immediately - and voluntarily. Do not wait for Congressional subpoenas, shareholder meetings, or ambush interviews by the media. Tell the world, honestly, about the state of your company and its plans for the near term and the long view.<br />
<br />
Second, everyone must develop a laser-like focus on the organization's value proposition, those intangible reasons that define why your enterprise exists. To leverage an old cliché, every oar must be in the water and pulling in the same direction. The goal is not just to make it to the finish line, but to survive. Ancillary or tertiary projects must be postponed for a later time; and tasks that improve customer service, remove friction from processes, and increase cash flow should be top priorities.  <br />
<br />
Finally, think about the people who work for you. No doubt they are scared by the uncertainty about the future. Management must be honest and open in keeping the rank and file apprised of the organization's situation. They should be encouraged to communicate that information in a timely fashion with friends and neighbors in the community. Management should be extremely sensitive to non-work related issues that may have an impact on employee morale and well being. The most obvious is related to housing, mortgage default and potential foreclosure. However, it can extend beyond the most obvious issues. The problem with short-term lending is also having an impact on some governmental agencies, and some school districts are cutting back to only four days of instruction, forcing many parents to scramble and find new daycare arrangements. ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 07:38:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial crisis">financial crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current financial crisis">current financial crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/increase cash flow">increase cash flow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/increase">increase</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/central focus">central focus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cash flow">cash flow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/focus">focus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/senior management">senior management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obvious issues">obvious issues</category>
      <source url="http://blog.gartner.com/blog/security.php?x=0&amp;itemid=3968">Given the Current Economic Turmoil, What Should IT Managers Do?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d357b72fd1cde8f737f42b6043955d6b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d357b72fd1cde8f737f42b6043955d6b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Is it a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) or is it malware ? That's the rhetorical question , since RATs are not supposed to have built-in Virustotal submission for the newly generated server,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1nh-1oqdI/AAAAAAAACJc/FJtmUCHs730/s1600-h/anti_debugging_rat_malware.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1nh-1oqdI/AAAAAAAACJc/m8B4yux3_5I/s200-R/anti_debugging_rat_malware.png" /></a>Is it a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/shark2-rat-or-malware.html">Remote Administration Tool</a> (RAT) or is it <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/rats-or-malware.html">malware</a>? That's the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/shark-2-diy-malware.html">rhetorical question</a>, since <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/shark-malware-new-versions-coming.html">RATs are not supposed</a> to have built-in Virustotal submission for the newly generated server, antivirus software "killing" and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">firewall bypassing capabilities</a>.<br />
<br />
Taking a peek into some of commodity features aiming to make it harder to analyze the malware found in pretty much all the average DIY malware builders available at the disposal at the average script kiddies, one of the latest releases pitched as RAT while it's malware clearly indicates the commoditization and availability of such modules :<br />
<br />
" <i>- FWB (DLL Injection, The DLL is Never Written to Disk)<br />
&nbsp;- Decent Strong Traffic Encryption<br />
&nbsp;- Try to Unhook UserMode APIs<br />
&nbsp;- No Plugins/3rd Party Applications<br />
&nbsp;- 4 Startup Methods (Shell, Policies, ActiveX, UserInIt)<br />
&nbsp;- Set Maximum Connections<br />
&nbsp;- Built In File Binder<br />
&nbsp;- Multi Threaded Transfers<br />
&nbsp;- Anti Debugging (Anti VMware, Anti Sandboxie, Anti Norman Sandbox, Anti VirtualPC, Anti Anubis Sandbox, Anti CW Sandbox)</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL6CyJQUdnI/AAAAAAAACJk/b4Erkx13fpg/s1600-h/anti_debugging_rat_malware_stats.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL6CyJQUdnI/AAAAAAAACJk/Lum7M48FdSQ/s200-R/anti_debugging_rat_malware_stats.png" /></a>Malware coders or "malware modulators"? With the currently emerging <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">malware as a web service</a> toolkits porting common malware tools to the web, drag and drop web interfaces for malware building are <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">definitely in the works</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2qWlBL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2qWlBL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BQjJaL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BQjJaL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6b1sjl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6b1sjl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=CVEqWl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=CVEqWl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=BzubfL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=BzubfL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=7ZXFYL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=7ZXFYL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LhD8dl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LhD8dl" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/382311481" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 03:46:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti">anti</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti vmware">anti vmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti norman sandbox">anti norman sandbox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/common malware tools">common malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti virtualpc">anti virtualpc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coders">malware coders</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti anubis sandbox">anti anubis sandbox</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware modulators">malware modulators</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/382311481/commoditization-of-anti-debugging.html">The Commoditization of Anti Debugging Features in RATs</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ba56aabae03bad418cbbf5ae497d3769</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ba56aabae03bad418cbbf5ae497d3769</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For the cheap cybercriminals not wanting to invest a couple of thousand dollars into purchasing a cutting edge web malware exploitation kit -- a pirated copy of which they would ironically obtained...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1mWgfY_TI/AAAAAAAACJU/u4h7TuozLDI/s1600-h/copycat_web_malware_exploitation_kit.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL1mWgfY_TI/AAAAAAAACJU/H8HQ-QzSBfg/s200-R/copycat_web_malware_exploitation_kit.gif" /></a>For the cheap cybercriminals not wanting to invest a couple of thousand dollars into purchasing a cutting edge web malware exploitation kit -- a pirated copy of which they would ironically obtained several moths later -- with all the related and royalty free updates coming with it, there are always the copycat malware kits like this one offered for $100.<br />
<br />
Taking into consideration the proprietary nature of some of the kits, the business model of malware kits was mostly relying on their exclusive nature next to the number, and diversity of the exploits included in order to improve the infection rate. This simplistic assumption on behalf of the coders totally <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598">ignored the possibility of their kits leaking to the general public</a>, or copies of the kits ending up as a bargain in particular underground deal where the once highly exclusive kit was offered as a bonus.<br />
<br />
"Me too" web malware kits were a faddish way to enjoy the popularity of web malware kits like MPack and Icepack and try to cash in on that popularity by coming up average kits lacking any significant differentiation factors in the process. But just like the original and proprietary kits, whose authors didn't envision the long term growth strategy of integrating different services into their propositions or the kits themselves, the authors of copycat malware kits didn't bother considering the lack of long-term growth strategy for their releases. Branding in respect to releasing a Firepack malware kit to compete with Icepack which was originally released to compete with Mpack, has failed to achieve the desired results as well.<br />
<br />
And with malware kits now a commodity, and underground vendors excelling in a particular practice with the long term objective to vertically integrate in their area of expertise -- think spammers offering localization of messages into different languages and segmented email databases from a specific country -- would we witness the emergence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">managed cybercrime services</a> charging a premium for providing fresh dumps of credit card numbers, PayPal, Ebay accounts or whatever the buyer is requesting?<br />
<br />
That may well be the case in the long term.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/small-pack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/11/nuclear-grabber-toolkit.html">The Nuclear Grabber Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">The Apophis Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese</a><br />
<span style="font-weight: bold;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"></span></span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/icepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/firepack-exploitation-kit-part-two.html">The FirePack Exploitation Kit - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/firepack-web-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The FirePack Web Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/webattacker-in-action.html">The WebAttacker in Action</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/nuclear-malware-kit.html">Nuclear Malware Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/random-js-malware-exploitation-kit.html">The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_7672.html">The Black Sun Bot</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_20.html">The Cyber Bot</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/google-hacking-for-mpacks-zunkers-and.html">Google Hacking for MPacks, Zunkers and WebAttackers</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/icepack-malware-kit-in-action.html">The IcePack Malware Kit in Action</a><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/382290326" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 03:18:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kits">malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web malware kits">web malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kits">kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/copycat malware kits">copycat malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proprietary kits">proprietary kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/term">term</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/long-term growth strategy">long-term growth strategy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icepack">icepack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icepack exploitation kit">icepack exploitation kit</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/382290326/copycat-web-malware-exploitation-kits.html">Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reputation Damage & Measurement]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around. In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well. Damage to things...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around.  In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well.  Damage to things like &#8220;corporate reputation&#8221; and &#8220;goodwill&#8221; and &#8220;brand equity&#8221; can be difficult to wrap even reasonable dollar estimates around (When I use FAIR, I really only care to use one metric when describing loss magnitudes - the almighty currency).</p>
<p>Complicating factors is the impact (or lack thereof) of incidents on stock price.  Many researchers who identify themselves with the <strong><a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-School-Information-Security/dp/0321502787">New School of Information Security</a></strong> (yours truly included) want to immediately look at stock price as a bell-weather metric for incident impact.  I think this stems from our days of slinging FUD, back when we could scream &#8220;Buy a firewall or we&#8217;ll have an incident and you&#8217;ll be on the front page of the paper and the stock price will go down!&#8221;  But these days notable incidents seem to suggest that the impact on stock price for an incident is short lived.  <em><strong>With qualifications, of course.</strong></em></p>
<p>So what would/should we make of this from <a href="http://www.money.co.uk/article/1001229-12-million-wiped-off-helphire-stock-after-malicious-gmail-sent-to-clients.htm">Money.co.uk</a>?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>£12million ($24m) Wiped off Helphire Stock after Malicious Email Sent to Clients</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Car hire firm Helphire have taken Google to court after a malicious email sent from a Gmail account saw their shares plummet £12million in a single day.</p>
<p>The Bath-based business who specialise in providing replacement cars to &#8216;no-fault&#8217; drivers involved in accidents on behalf of car insurance companies, initiated legal proceedings against the search engine giant as part of their attempt to find out who is responsible for sending the defamatory mailing.</p>
<p>Google are now known to have complied with the court order and have controversially supplied details of the email account and ISP used by the meddler.</p>
<p>Written under the psudoname Peter Franks, the 1200 word email is know to have been sent from a gmail account that was opened specifically for this purpose and closed a few minutes after the damage had been done&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230;The misdemeanour couldn’t have come at a worse time for the struggling firm who have undergone a £45million rights issue and seen a 75% drop in the value of their stock already this year.</p></blockquote>
<p>That last paragraph, for me, explains some of the difficulty in tying reputation damage to stock decreases.  It&#8217;s like when you read the headlines from Bloomberg about why the days stocks (or commodity) prices are up or down.  You know, the &#8220;Oil closes $3 higher on news that a notable South American dictator has a rather unpleasant boil in a very uncomfortable area&#8221; type of headlines.  You really do have to question the causality and correlation.  So in the Helphire case above - is this new drop in stock really because of the email sent?  If so, should we view that $24mil number as an independent data point to describe this sort of attack on reputation, or is the magnitude aggravated due to the long-term trend of stock price?</p>
<p>Even when we have &#8220;Objective Data&#8221; (an in-joke for Adam S.) like this decline in stock price, it is really difficult to provide any sort of precise estimate or measurement - about the future, present or past.  The best we can do is use ranges, distributions, that are reasonable based on evidence and observation.</p>
<p>So it&#8217;s worth filing away this sort of datum for future use - while dutifully acknowledging the qualifiers we might place around it.</p>
<p>So the questions I ask here - what should we make of this new information, and how should we view the $24million drop - they&#8217;re not rhetorical.  I am very interested in your views and welcome your comments!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helphire stock">helphire stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation damage">reputation damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation">reputation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock price">stock price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/damage">damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email account">email account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious email">malicious email</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=387">Reputation Damage &amp; Measurement</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled &quot; There is No Free...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/wxZZ1xFCjPk/s1600-h/phishing_pages.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/TiCS7pP_jF0/s200-R/phishing_pages.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled "<a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/woot08/tech/full_papers/cova/cova_html/">There is No Free Phish:An Analysis of “Free” and Live Phishing Kits</a>".<br />
<br />
Cybercriminals attempting to scam other cybercriminals has been happening for years, with old school cases where backdoored malware tools such as crypters and binders are offered for free, or a newly released RAT whose client is in fact infected with a third-party malware. Realizing and definitely not enjoying the fact that the lowered entry barriers into cybercrime are empowering yesterday's script kiddies will malware kits that used to be utilized by a set of people who invested time and money into the process several years ago, this unethical competitive practice is only going to get more common. Backdooring phishing pages is one thing, <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1641">backdooring entire web malware exploitation kits, next to the possibility to remotely exploit a competitor's command and control server is entirely another</a> : <br />
<br />
"<i>Taking a more strategic approach, a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal would backdoor <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598" title="The Neosploit cybercrime group abandons its web malware exploitation kit">a highly expensive web malware exploitation kit</a>, then start distributing it for free, and in fact, there have been numerous cases when such kits have been distributed in such a fraudulent manner. The result is a total outsourcing of the process of coming up with ways to infect hundreds of thousands of users though client side exploits <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122" title="Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet">embedded or SQL injected at legitimate sites</a>, and basically collecting the final output - the stolen E-banking data and the botnet itself.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's to come in the long term? Why just backdoor the phishing page, when you can embedd it with a live exploit URL in an attempt to both, infect the cybercriminal about to use and obtain all of the already stolen virtual assets has has already stolen, and also, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/skype-phishing-pages-serving-exploits.html">have a third-party maintain a blended attack campaign without even knowing it</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook </a><b><br />
</b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">Phishing Pages for Every Bank are a Commodity</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/inside-botnets-phishing-activities.html">Inside a Botnet's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/large-scale-myspace-phishing-attack.html">Large Scale MySpace Phishing Attack</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/update-on-myspace-phishing-campaign.html">Update on the MySpace Phishing Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/myspace-phishers-now-targeting-facebook.html">MySpace Phishers Now Targeting Facebook</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/myspace-hosting-myspace-phishing.html">MySpace Hosting MySpace Phishing Profiles</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/diy-phishing-kits.html">DIY Phishing Kits</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-phishing-kit-goes-20.html">DIY Phishing Kit Goes 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/paypal-and-ebay-phishing-domains.html">PayPal and Ebay Phishing Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/average-online-time-for-phishing-sites.html">Average Online Time for Phishing Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/phishing-ecosystem.html">The Phishing Ecosystem</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/assessing-rock-phish-campaign.html">Assessing a Rock Phish Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/taking-down-phishing-sites-business.html">Taking Down Phishing Sites - A Business Model?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/take-this-malicious-site-down.html">Take this Malicious Site Down - Processing Order..</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">209 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/2091-host-locked.html">209.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/661-host-locked.html">66.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/confirm-your-gullibility.html">Confirm Your Gullibility</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/phishers-spammers-and-malware-authors.html">Phishers, Spammers and Malware Authors Clearly Consolidating</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/economics-of-phishing.html">The Economics of Phishing</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=adzwcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=adzwcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=r3qKtK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=r3qKtK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=lKP1Kk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=lKP1Kk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=kwEXWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=kwEXWk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vKtnuK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vKtnuK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=hxAsFK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=hxAsFK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3CLAFk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3CLAFk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/358721854" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phishers">phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace phishers">myspace phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace">myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock phish campaign">rock phish campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free phish">free phish</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kits">kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/358721854/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/813abe559b03df47822588023daf2295</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/813abe559b03df47822588023daf2295</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Neosploit Team are abandoning support for their Neosploit web exploitation malware kit , citing a negative return on investment as the main reason behind their decision. However, given Neosploit's...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI-DiMO21SI/AAAAAAAAB-U/9aly5A7EaNE/s1600-h/Finjan_Neosploit_stats.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI-DiMO21SI/AAAAAAAAB-U/AHkSBZ-vDq8/s200-R/Finjan_Neosploit_stats.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598">Neosploit Team are abandoning support for their Neosploit web exploitation malware kit</a>, citing a negative return on investment as the main reason behind their decision. However, given <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">Neosploit's open source nature</a> just like the majority of web malware kits, and the fact that it's slowly, but surely turning into a commodity malware kit just like MPack and Icepack did, greatly contribute to its extended "product lifecycle" :<br />
<br />
"<i>Let’s discuss their business model, how other cybercriminals disintermediated it thereby ruining it, and most importantly, how is it possible that such a popular web malware exploitation kit cannot seem to achieve a positive return on investment (ROI). The short answer is - piracy in the IT underground, and their over-optimistic assumption that high-profit margins can compensate the lack of long-term growth strategy, which in respect to web malware exploitation kits has do with the benefits coming from converging with traffic management tools. Let’s discuss some key points.</i>"<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1314">The end of Neosploit malware kit</a>, doesn't mean the end of Neosploit Team, or the sudden migration to other malware kits since they're no longer providing support in the form of new obfuscations and set of exploits to their customers. Their customers have been in fact self-servicing their needs enjoying the modular nature of the kit, the result of which is an unknown number of modified Neosploit kits.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/localizing-open-source-malware.html">Localizing Open Source Malware</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The FirePack Exploitation Kit Localized to Chinese</a><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br />
</span><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">MPack and IcePack Localized to Chinese</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/icepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">The Icepack Exploitation Kit Localized to French&nbsp;</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 12:09:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit">neosploit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kit">kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icepack exploitation kit">icepack exploitation kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kits">malware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web malware kits">web malware kits</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source malware">source malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/349806900/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</source>
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