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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: communities]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/communities</link>
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    <pubDate>Sat, 31 May 2008 00:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title><![CDATA[Boston Court's Meddling With 'Full Disclosure' Is Unwelcome]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b65bde3bbcffdced12efa1287ce8e1e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b65bde3bbcffdced12efa1287ce8e1e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In eerily similar cases in the Netherlands and the United States, courts have recently grappled with the computer-security norm of &quot;full disclosure,&quot; asking whether researchers should be permitted to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>
In eerily similar cases in the Netherlands and the United States, courts have recently grappled with the computer-security norm of "full disclosure," asking whether researchers should be permitted to disclose details of a fare-card vulnerability that allows people to ride the subway for free.
</p><p>
The "Oyster card" used on the <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-229.html">London Tube</a> was at issue in the Dutch case, and a similar fare card used on the <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/injunction-requ.html">Boston "T"</a> was the center of the U.S. case. The Dutch court got it right, and the American court, in Boston, <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/computer-scient.html ">got it wrong</a> from the start -- despite facing an open-and-shut case of First Amendment prior restraint.
</p><p>
The U.S. court has since <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/federal-judge-t.html ">seen the error</a> of its ways -- but the damage is done. The MIT security researchers who were prepared to discuss their Boston findings at the DefCon security conference were <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/eff-to-appeal-r.html ">prevented</a> from giving their talk.
</p><p>
The <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-146.html">ethics</a> of <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0111.html#1">full disclosure</a> are intimately familiar to those of us in the computer-security field.  Before full disclosure became the norm, researchers would quietly disclose vulnerabilities to the vendors -- who would routinely ignore them. Sometimes vendors would even threaten researchers with legal action if they disclosed the vulnerabilities. 
</p><p>
Later on, researchers started disclosing the existence of a vulnerability but not the details.  Vendors responded by denying the security holes' existence, or calling them just theoretical.  It wasn't until full disclosure became the norm that vendors began consistently fixing vulnerabilities quickly.  Now that vendors routinely patch vulnerabilities, researchers generally give them advance notice to allow them to patch their systems before the vulnerability is published.  But even with this "responsible disclosure" protocol, it's the threat of disclosure that motivates them to patch their systems.  Full disclosure <a href="http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/MBTA_v_Anderson/letter081208.pdf">is the mechanism</a> (.pdf) by which computer security improves.
</p><p>
Outside of computer security, secrecy is much more the norm.  Some security communities, like locksmiths, behave much like medieval guilds, divulging the secrets of their profession only to those within it.  These communities <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10002138-83.html?tag=mncol">hate</a> <a href="http://www.slate.com/id/2195862/">open</a> <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080711.wlpicking11/EmailBNStory/lifeMain/">research</a>, and have <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0302.html#1">responded</a> with <a href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/kiss.html">surprising vitriol</a> to <a href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/flattery.html">researchers</a> who have found serious vulnerabilities in <a href="http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2004/09/64987">bicycle locks</a>, <a href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/safelocks.pdf">combination safes</a> (.pdf), <a href="http://www.crypto.com/masterkey.html">master-key systems</a> and <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/medeco-locks-cr.html">many</a> other <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lock_bumping">security devices</a>.  
</p><p>
Researchers have received a similar reaction from other communities more used to secrecy than openness.  Researchers -- sometimes <a href="http://compsci.ca/blog/lanschool-threatens-compscica-with-legal-actions/">young students</a> -- who discovered and published flaws in copyright-protection schemes, <a href="http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1265">voting-machine security</a> and now wireless access cards have all suffered recriminations and sometimes lawsuits for not keeping the vulnerabilities secret.  When Christopher Soghoian created a website allowing people to print fake airline boarding passes, he got <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/11/forge_your_own.html">several unpleasant visits</a> from the FBI.
</p><p>
This preference for secrecy comes from confusing a vulnerability with information <em>about</em> that vulnerability.  Using <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#1">secrecy as a security measure</a> is fundamentally fragile.  It assumes that the bad guys don't do their own security research.  It assumes that no one else will find the same vulnerability.  It assumes that information won't leak out even if the research results are suppressed.  These assumptions are all incorrect.
</p><p>
The problem isn't the researchers; it's the products themselves.  Companies will only design security as good as what their customers know to ask for.  Full disclosure helps customers evaluate the security of the products they buy, and educates them in how to ask for better security.  The Dutch court got it exactly right when it <a href="http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=BD7578&u_ljn=BD7578">wrote</a>: "Damage to NXP is not the result of the publication of the article but of the production and sale of a chip that appears to have shortcomings."
</p><p>
In a world of forced secrecy, vendors make inflated claims about their products, vulnerabilities don't get fixed, and customers are no wiser.  Security research is stifled, and security technology doesn't improve.  The only beneficiaries are the bad guys.
</p><p>
If you'll forgive the analogy, the ethics of full disclosure parallel the ethics of not paying kidnapping ransoms.  We all know why we don't pay kidnappers: It encourages more kidnappings.  Yet in every kidnapping case, there's someone -- a spouse, a parent, an employer -- with a good reason why, in this one case, we should make an exception. 
</p><p>
The reason we want researchers to publish vulnerabilities is because that's how security improves. But in every case there's someone -- the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the locksmiths, an election machine manufacturer -- who argues that, in this one case, we should make an exception.
</p><p>
We shouldn't.  The benefits of responsibly publishing attacks greatly outweigh the potential harm. Disclosure encourages companies to build security properly rather than relying on shoddy design and secrecy, and discourages them from promising security based on their ability to threaten researchers.  It's how we learn about security, and how we improve future security.
</p>
<p>---</p>

<p>
<em>Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT Global Services and author of </em><a href="http://www.schneier.com/bf.html">Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World</a><em>. You can read more of his writings on his <a href="http://www.schneier.com/">website</a>.</em>
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      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/370586609/securitymatters_0821">Boston Court's Meddling With 'Full Disclosure' Is Unwelcome</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ae553b37ba0ec150b5a4c344ba27652b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ae553b37ba0ec150b5a4c344ba27652b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In between the massive SQL injections , that as a matter of fact remain ongoing, copycats taking advantage of the very same SQL injection tools using public search engine's indexes as a reconnaissance...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2ac7mO18I/AAAAAAAAB9c/usiNWVgrooU/s1600-h/chinese_sql_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2ac7mO18I/AAAAAAAAB9c/97ckqqWaQ14/s200-R/chinese_sql_injection.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>In between the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">massive SQL injections</a>, that as a matter of fact remain ongoing, copycats taking advantage of the very same SQL injection tools using public search engine's indexes as a reconnaissance tools, are also starting to take advantage of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">localized and targeted attacks</a>, attacking specific online communities. Among these is <b>mx.content-type.cn /day.js </b>using <b>day.js</b> to attempt multiple exploitation using publicly obtainlable exploits such as Adodb.Stream, MPS.StormPlayer, DPClient.Vod, IERPCtl.IERPCtl.1, GLIEDown.IEDown.1, and targeting primarily Chinese web communities.<br />
<br />
Compared to a bit more sophisticated <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/diy-exploit-embedding-tool-proprietary.html">attack tactics applied by Chinese hackers</a>, taking advantage of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">localized versions</a> of the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">de facto web malware exploitation kits</a>, those who don't have access to such continue using cybercrime 1.0 <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-exploits-embedding-tools.html">DIY exploit embedding tools</a> at large. The rest of the SQL injected domains as well as the exploits themselves are parked on the same plaee - <b>222.216.28.25</b>, also responding to :<br />
<br />
<b>down.goodnetads .org<br />
ads.goodnetads .org<br />
real.kav2008 .com<br />
hk.www404 .cn<br />
err.www404 .cn<br />
mx.content-type .cn<br />
sun.63afe561 .info<br />
ads.633f94d3 .info<br />
ads.1234214 .info<br />
ad.50db34d5 .info<br />
ads.50db34d5 .info<br />
ad.8d77b42a .info<br />
web.adsidc .info<br />
free.idcads .info<br />
free.cjads .info<br />
ads.adslooks .info<br />
list.adslooks .info<br />
ad.5iyy .info</b><br />
<br />
The SQL injected domains :<br />
<b>ads.633f94d3.info/day .js<br />
ad.8d77b42a.info/day .js<br />
ad.5iyy.info/day .js<br />
free.idcads.info/day .js<br />
efreesky.com/day .js<br />
v.freefl.info/day .js</b><br />
<br />
The internal structure :<br />
<b>free.idcads.info/f/index .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/014 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/real11 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/real10 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/lz .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/bf .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/kong .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/f/swfobject .js<br />
ad.50db34d5.info//rm%5C/rm .exe</b><br />
<br />
Parked domains responding to the command and control locations, <b>60.191.223.76 </b>and <b>222.216.28.100</b> :<br />
<b>ftp.gggjjj .info<br />
live.ads002 .net<br />
log.goodnetads .org<br />
dat.goodnetads .org<br />
root.51113 .com<br />
sun.update999 .cn<br />
abb.633f94d3 .info<br />
up.50db34d5 .info</b><br />
<b>web.cn3721 .org&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
dat.goodnetads .org<br />
cs.rm510 .com<br />
sb.sb941 .com<br />
k.sb941 .com<br />
info.sb941 .com<br />
day.sb941 .com<br />
post.ad9178 .com<br />
v.91tg .net</b><br />
<br />
Centralizing their scammy ecosystem always makes it easier to monitor, keep track of, and of course, expose. <br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-massive-sql-injection.html">Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-hacking-for-vulnerabilities.html">Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1394">Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1118">Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9XdgSJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9XdgSJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3nv7jJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3nv7jJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3DXSvj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3DXSvj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=exadYj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=exadYj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=kp9u0J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=kp9u0J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=y5pfDJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=y5pfDJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Lkbwwj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Lkbwwj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/348288922" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 01:51:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection tools">sql injection tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injections">massive sql injections</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection">sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injection">massive sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site sql">site sql</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/348288922/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SSO Summit Wrap Up]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f95d236237bbd04ba2c6565ed7ec3dca</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f95d236237bbd04ba2c6565ed7ec3dca</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[More notes from SSO Summit - to recap I can't stress enough how a 50-200 person conference comprised of around 50-60% enterprise folk (instead of just vendors and *cough* consultants) is ideal. Real,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>More notes from <a href="http://">SSO Summit</a> - to recap I can't stress enough how a 50-200 person conference comprised of around 50-60% enterprise folk (instead of just vendors and *cough* consultants) is ideal. Real, in depth conversations instead of just "where is the party" a la RSA. Also, this conference has a laser focus on SSO, so all 150 of us are able to look through the prism from lots of angles.</div><br><div>Some additional takeaways<a href="http://vquill.com/"></a></div><br><div><a href="http://vquill.com/">Dave Kearns</a> has serious moderator skillz. </div><br><div>You can tell all the Mac users because they have to have their laptops plugged in at all times (Mr. Jobs paging <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2006/tc20060109_432937.htm">Mr. Clayton Christensen</a>)<a href="http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/"></a></div><br><div><a href="http://www.xmlgrrl.com/blog/">Eve Maler</a> can really sing</div><br><div>One of the prettiest drives through Colorado is <a href="http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&amp;hl=en&amp;geocode=10530055749613058705,39.629820,-106.417830%3B5743054738505757598,39.099384,-106.292979%3B17892979726654583514,39.186180,-106.809980%3B853448514458598310,39.365980,-107.052220%3B9267843558044898835,38.885840,-107.587610&amp;saddr=idaho+springs,+co&amp;daddr=39.612036,-105.913696+to:I-70+W+%4039.629820,+-106.417830+to:US-24+%4039.099384,+-106.292979+to:CO-82%2FE+Cooper+Ave+%4039.186180,+-106.809980+to:CO-82+%4039.365980,+-107.052220+to:CO-133+%4038.885840,+-107.587610+to:Mesa+Verde,+Dolores,+CO&amp;mra=dpe&amp;mrcr=0&amp;mrsp=1&amp;sz=10&amp;via=1,2,3,4,5,6&amp;doflg=ptm&amp;sll=39.298174,-105.578613&amp;sspn=0.664203,0.954437&amp;ie=UTF8&amp;ll=39.298174,-105.578613&amp;spn=0.664203,0.954437&amp;z=10">here</a></div><br><div>I did my presentation on Security Token Servers today. Bob Brandt from 3M spoke on Federation at 3M, its quite interesting to think about the mix of all these technologies the same way 3M's products are composed from a grid of technologies. I see STS playing role here, enabling us to get interop across multiple token types. Bob also mentioned that the business doesn't _ask_ for SSO any more; they expect it. He mentioned (and I have seen the same) much greater SAML adoption and awareness by customers and partners. And I quite liked his quote - "If you are a SAAS vendors and you  are not supporting SAML you won't be in business very long."</div><br><div>Kent Beck says programs are not things, they are shadows of communities. If you look at a big vendors' IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT SUITE - its not a cohesive product so much as a shadow of the big vendors' Visio org chart. Ping's SSO community is fast, light and Ninja; SSO functionality enabling real pros to get stuff done for real use cases. </div><br><div>Its a lot of fun to be at a 1.0 conference, I am pretty sure this will be 2x-3x next year.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Jul 2008 09:41:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso">sso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso summit">sso summit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso functionality">sso functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sso community">sso community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendors">vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saas vendors">saas vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/person conference">person conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conference">conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real">real</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/sso-summit-wrap-up.html">SSO Summit Wrap Up</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Network Firewall is a Consensual Hallucination]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c05f6f72f82ab4c25ddc9c804d1973ec</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c05f6f72f82ab4c25ddc9c804d1973ec</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[James McGovern asks why we don't see enterprisey folks focusing on SOA *and* security? Well there are a lot of reasons here, but lets look at some facts. Most enterprisey folks look at security in...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>James McGovern <a href="http://duckdown.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-come-enterprise-architects-are.html">asks</a> why we don't see enterprisey folks focusing on SOA *and* security? Well there are a lot of reasons here, but lets look at some facts. Most enterprisey folks look at security in binary terms - inside the firewall or outside the firewall. When a transaction is "inside the firewall" they can do silly things like load all their transaction on to something like MQ Series with no authentication, send it to the mainframe which runs their entire book of business, and in essence run their transactional backbone on anonymous ftp. Because its "inside the firewall"</p><br><div>Problem is - its just a Visio drawing, its not reality, its historical baggage. We were trained to think about things in these terms in the 90s</div><br><div><a style="display: inline;" href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553a923008833-pi"><img  class="at-xid-6a00d83451c75869e200e553a923008833 selected " alt="Goodstuffbadstuff" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553a923008833-320pi" title="Goodstuffbadstuff"></a>
<br></div><br><div>But the business and software worlds have changed a bit from the early 90s, even if security tooling hasn't</div><br>
<p><br>
<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png"><img  alt="Innovatecompare_2" title="Innovatecompare_2" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png" width="300" height="167" border="0"></a></p>
<div>If you sent an alien from outer space to observe what an enterprise looks like today, and asked that alien to file an objective report as to the actual connections and message exchanges it wouldn't look like the idyllic, clear separation of good stuff from bad stuff, it would look like this</div><br><br><p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/thenetwork.jpg"><img  class="image-full " alt="Thenetwork" title="Thenetwork" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/thenetwork.jpg" border="0"></a></p><br><div>There is no firewall in any meaningful sense, there are links, federations, communities of interest, business units, integration points, outsourcing arrangements, business processes. In short, there is information and commerce in all its messy vitality. </div><br><div>Inside the firewall and outside the firewall is not a security architecture, its historical <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruft">cruft</a> a Victorian, industrial age artifact that snuck into your Visio, not something that protects your businesses' applications and data.</div><br><div>If you want to let the world access your maifnrame, SAP, Siebel, or whatever so they can buy things from you, that is probably a really good idea. But don't assume that RACF or what have you came down on stone tablets from Moses. Just because your transaction is "inside the firewall" doesnt mean that your security model can only focus on resources and objects in isolation. It has to focus on how your business just broke everything apart and then re-connected everything. The subjects are different, the sessions are different, and the transactions are different. Just because the objects and resources are the same and are "inside the firewall" means little when all the context and all the relationships are different.</div><br><div>The world is not firewalled, its federated. Just because its convenient for enterprisey folks to buy into the same hallucination doesn't make it reality.</div><br><div>Next week, I am speaking at <a href="http://www.ssosummit.com/program/Agenda-at-a-Glance.cfm">Ping's SSO Summit</a> on Web Services SSO basically everything that happens after you press <span style="font-family: Arial; line-height: normal; ">"SUBMIT" on a website. Your data has a journey as dangerous as Frodo Baggins' travels through Mordor. The talk traces the path from the website through the perils that lurk in the enterprise and legacy systems, we will look at ways to get Frodo and Sam home safely and we won't rely on Visio firewalls where Mithril is required.</span></div><div><span><br></span></div><div><span><a style="display: inline;" href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c410e98834-pi"><img  class="at-xid-6a00d83451c75869e200e553c410e98834 " alt="Ghostseparationwall" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c410e98834-320wi"></a>
<br></span></div><br><div>(Note - Thanks for reminding me of the analogy <a href="http://radar.oreilly.com/jims/">Jim</a>)</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 07:04:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firewall">firewall</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security model">security model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business units">business units</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/inside">inside</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprisey folks">enterprisey folks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architecture">security architecture</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business processes">business processes</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/the-network-firewall-is-a-consensual-hallucination.html">The Network Firewall is a Consensual Hallucination</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[NAPA Shows How the Government is Using Web 2.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c2382eef0b0cdb073ef226ac74ecee5b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c2382eef0b0cdb073ef226ac74ecee5b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Back in April, we attended a session at the FOSE conference that highlighted Web 2.0 usage in the public sector . We also found through a survey of government workers that 65% of government IT workers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Back in April, we attended a session at the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/fose-session-web-20-for-the-public-sector/04/2008" target="_blank">FOSE conference that highlighted Web 2.0 usage in the public sector</a>. We also found <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/web-20-adoption-by-the-federal-government-shouldnt-be-a-surprise/06/2008" target="_blank">through a survey of government workers</a> that 65% of government IT workers surveyed said that Web 2.0 tools are important to their operations. The overall message was that all IT, government included, have too many projects they could be taking on for the amount of resources they have. For much of the IT topics we covered in the survey, importance was high but actual deployment was lower.
<p>Dan Munz, project manager of the <a href="http://www.collaborationproject.org/" target="_blank">Collaboration Project</a> commented on <a href="http://www.collaborationproject.org/display/home/Collaboration+Project+Blog" target="_blank">the unique work</a> that the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) is doing to bring together government leaders. The Collaboration Project seeks to innovate across government not just down the silos and create a safe place for leaders to have discussions around innovation.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> What is the National Academy of Public Administration?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> The Academy is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to tackling government&#8217;s most complex challenges. We were founded in 1967 by James Webb, the NASA administrator who took us to the moon – he saw that he could consult the National Academy of Sciences for expert technical advice, but had no counterpart in government for expert management advice. That&#8217;s been our mission ever since.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> What is the Collaboration Project? How long has it been around?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> The Collaboration Project is the Academy&#8217;s response to two parallel trends we see in government. The first is the government’s need to transform the way it does business. There is a strong demand for change out there driven by a number of challenges that are forcing the government to rethink its mission and structure. Challenges include a public disconnected from government; a multi-sector workforce and increasing reliance on contractors; financial instability; and new types of security threats, just to name a few. More and more, the challenges facing government reach across the traditional boundaries of agency and mission. But government isn&#8217;t configured to work that way.
<p>The second trend is the unprecedented opportunity collaborative technology offers to drive transformational change in government. Tools like blogs, wikis, and mashups are changing the way leaders think about problems. They&#8217;re focusing not on what they can do just within their offices or agencies, but what voices they need to pull together across government, non-profits, the general citizenry, and other stakeholders to solve these problems. The Collaboration Project’s goal is to encourage this type of thinking and empower leaders committed to use collaborative technology to:
<ul>
<li>strengthen citizen civic engagement;</li>
<li>enhance government transparency;</li>
<li>improve service delivery and operational efficiency; and</li>
<li>facilitate coordination and innovation within and between agencies.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Why focus on Web 2.0 in the government?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> The question of how web 2.0 will impact federal IT departments is a critical one. Our view is that &#8220;the era of big systems&#8221; is basically over. Things like disk space, bandwidth, and computing power are basically shifting from being assets to being commodities.
<p>There&#8217;s also a shift in expectations. People both inside and outside government – especially Gen-X and Gen-Y – are incredibly frustrated by being able to use lightning-fast apps like Flickr, YouTube, and Facebook <i>that don&#8217;t even live on their hard drives</i> while the government and other large organizations still operate clunky PCs, space-limited e-mail accounts, and sluggish e-mail servers.
<p>So aside from the opportunity for transformative leadership, the idea of web 2.0 at a government level is very appealing in terms of getting the most out of the IT infrastructure we already have, rather than embarking on costly, large-scale projects in an era of diminishing budgets.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How do you build a sense of community at the Collaboration Project?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> Some community feel emerges naturally, from a sense that mass collaboration really is a tool for &#8220;doing government&#8221; in a whole new way.
<p>The more formal community building mechanisms we have include <a href="http://www.collaborationproject.org" target="_blank">our web page</a>, where we share insights, news, case studies, and other content – The virtual space serves as an anchor for people, whether they&#8217;re experts or beginners, to learn about what we do.
<p>Finally, we are conducting an ongoing series of in-person meetings, usually featuring a leader who has harnessed collaborative technology in what we think is a truly revolutionary new way.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How do you hear about cool new government Web 2.0 projects?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> That&#8217;s a key question, because part of our mission is to inspire action by finding leaders who have succeeded and highlight their accomplishments. We&#8217;ve done that with folks like Kip Hawley, TSA, Molly O&#8217;Neill, EPA, and Jim Walker, Alabama DHS.
<p>We also feel that the Academy&#8217;s position as a &#8220;safe space&#8221; for leaders means that we&#8217;re a place people can turn to when they hear about an emerging trend or project and want some help making sense of it.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> What are the most innovative uses of Web 2.0 technology you&#8217;ve seen in the government?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> It&#8217;s important to distinguish between agencies that are simply adjusting to the reality of web 2.0, and those that are &#8220;using&#8221; it. Getting a YouTube account for your agency, or putting some photos on Flickr, is a great first step, but we want to inspire leaders to really transform their normal ways of doing business. At the moment a few that come to mind are the EPA Puget Sound Mashup, ODNI&#8217;s Intellipedia, TSA IdeaFactory, the PTO Peer-to-Patent Project, and Virtual Alabama, to name a few.
<p>The <a href="http://www.fcw.com/print/22_5/features/151791-1.html" target="_blank">TSA launched the IdeaFactory</a> in February 2008. TSA set up a collaboration platform with commenting, voting, etc. to form communities in a way to bring people to consensus and <a href="http://www.collaborationproject.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=5668923&amp;navigatingVersions=true" target="_blank">offer ways to improve the agency&#8217;s performance</a>.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Do you see a difference between state and local versus federal adoption of Web 2.0?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> That&#8217;s a hard generalization to make – at all levels you see leaders who recognize the potential in this technology to bring new voices into the governance process.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> What are the obstacles to Web 2.0 adoption by government agencies?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> The three main challenges that we see are in the areas of technology, culture, and policy/governance.
<p>The technology issue is probably the simplest to solve – it&#8217;s important to choose a technology that fits the problem you&#8217;re trying to solve, but these technologies are usually inexpensive and almost never very complex.
<p>The question of culture is harder, particularly given the way that baby boomers, gen-xers, and millenials are beginning to interact in the workforce. How do you gain acceptance and buy-in among groups that have very different comfort levels with collaborative tools and environments?
<p>Finally, the most daunting challenge might be the questions of policy and governance, if only because those are the things that most commonly prevent leaders from even dipping a toe in the waters of collaboration. Most of the policies, regulations, and statutes governing the way government does business don&#8217;t anticipate things like wikis, blogs, or instant messaging. One of our most important missions is helping leaders who just want to get to action navigate these obstacles.
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Is there any advice you can give to government employees getting started with Web 2.0? Or any places you would point them to for more info?
<p><strong><em>Dan Munz:</em></strong> It&#8217;s shameless plug time! I&#8217;d of course point them to our web page, <a href="http://collaborationproject.org/">collaborationproject.org</a>, where, among other things, we&#8217;ve collected a case library of over 40 instances of collaborative technology being used in the government and non-profit sectors. The library is growing every day and is a sort of &#8220;database of record&#8221; for what is and isn&#8217;t working in terms of collaborative government. I think that would be a great place to start for anyone looking to get started but not really knowing the way.
<p>In terms of advice, the best thing to say is that, once you&#8217;ve settled on a problem you want to solve and an audience you want to reach out to, <b>just do it</b>! We believe strongly that there are a lot of organizational and leadership issues that still need to be addressed regarding collaboration in government, but our biggest mantra is about getting leaders to action. The most successful projects we&#8217;ve seen are ones that try something daring and new, and discover the true power of what they&#8217;ve done as it catches on more and more widely.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=NAPA+Shows+How+the+Government+is+Using+Web+2.0&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fnapa-shows-how-the-government-is-using-web-20%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2008 16:45:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web page">web page</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government web">government web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collaboration">collaboration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mass collaboration">mass collaboration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/collaboration project seeks">collaboration project seeks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government employees">government employees</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enhance government transparency">enhance government transparency</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/napa-shows-how-the-government-is-using-web-20/07/2008">NAPA Shows How the Government is Using Web 2.0</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Weekend-Fi in NYC, Oakland County Halts, Helio Sold to Virgin]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f7875a955754aa3098400ceb3d84b7a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f7875a955754aa3098400ceb3d84b7a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The New York Times takes guided Wi-Fi tour: An interesting article by Seth Kugel avoids the usual, &quot;here's where you find Wi-Fi approach.&quot; Rather, he tours the city, pairing Wi-Fi with historical and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/weefi.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/travel/29weekend.html?ref=travel"><strong>The New York Times takes guided Wi-Fi tour:</strong></a> An interesting article by Seth Kugel avoids the usual, "here's where you find Wi-Fi approach." Rather, he tours the city, pairing Wi-Fi with historical and political details you can find around you. Kugel, like our faithful correspondent Klaus Ernst, has found that CBS MobileZone is a no-show. The advertising group told him that they were improving the signal. I love the idea of super-local information, too. With Google Maps, Google Earth, Flickr, Dopplr, and other services, you can pair your current location with what's happening right around you in the past or right now.</p>

<p><a href="http://detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080627/METRO/806270373"><strong>Oakland County, Mich., project officially "on hold":</strong></a> For "on hold," read, "never going to be built." The pilot area in seven communities has been turned off, and MichTel has been unable to obtain the $70-odd million they project needed to build out the county-wide service. The state's ongoing reliance on the automotive industry makes it a hard sell to commit public dollars in advance of a return on those dollars, too.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Virgin-Mobile-Helio.html?_r=1&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&oref=slogin"><strong>Virgin Mobile buys Helio:</strong></a> The last vestiges of EarthLink's three-pronged approach to fighting the wireline monopoly appears to be at an end. EarthLink pushed its 50-50 partnership with SK Telecom in mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) Helio as one prong; its municipal Wi-Fi division as another; and its DSL business as a third. The muni division is nearly out of operation, and DSL lines continue to fall in quantity quarter over quarter. Dial-up is still their cash cow. Helio lost hundreds of millions to obtain just 170,000 subscribers (that number down from 200,000 at the start of 2008). EarthLink will receive a pittance for its investment, part of the $39 million in stock that Virgin will pay for Helio; SK Telecom will invest in Virgin Mobile to obtain a total 17 percent state. Virgin itself makes just a very tiny sliver of profit. MVNOs buy minutes and data from carriers, and Virgin Mobile involves Sprint as a partner, making it the only tolerably successful MVNO.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2008 06:33:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helio">helio</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi approach">wi-fi approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi">wi-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virgin">virgin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/municipal wi-fi division">municipal wi-fi division</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helio lost hundreds">helio lost hundreds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dollars">dollars</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oakland county">oakland county</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mvno">mvno</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008381.html">Wee-Fi: Weekend-Fi in NYC, Oakland County Halts, Helio Sold to Virgin</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Some of the other noteworthy breaches last week, 6/16/08 - 6/22/08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/807b1e3ccc47c175a72b57ee98773462</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/807b1e3ccc47c175a72b57ee98773462</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

The Breach Blog

Just SOME of the other noteworthy breaches from the past week (6/16/08 - 6/22/08

Citibank Hack Blamed for Alleged ATM Crime Spree
By Kevin Poulsen,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/tbblogo.jpg" width="192" align="right" height="96"><font size="2"><font size="3"><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Breach Blog</span></font><br><br>Just <span style="font-weight: bold;">SOME </span>of the other noteworthy breaches from the past week (6/16/08 - 6/22/08)<br><br><font style="font-weight: bold;" size="3"><a href="%20http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/citibank-atm-se.html">Citibank Hack Blamed for Alleged ATM Crime Spree</a></font><br>By Kevin Poulsen, Wired.com, 6/18/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">A computer intrusion into a Citibank server that processes ATM withdrawals led to two Brooklyn men making hundreds of fraudulent withdrawals from New York City cash machines in February, pocketing at least $750,000 in cash, according to federal prosecutors. </font><br><br><font size="2">The ATM crime spree is apparently the first to be publicly linked to the breach of a major U.S. bank's systems, experts say. </font><br></div><font size="2"><br><font style="font-weight: bold;" size="3"><a href="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/061808-security-firm-finds-server-with.html">Security firm finds server with health-care data</a></font><br>By Jeremy Kirk, NetworkWorld, 6/18/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">Security researchers with <a href="http://www.finjan.com/">Finjan Software</a> are seeing a growing thirst from cybercriminals for data other than credit-card numbers, with the latest findings including servers containing passwords leading to heath-care records and airline systems data. </font><br><br><font size="2">The problem is two-fold: sensitive data is being stolen after PCs are infected with malicious software, and then that data sent to unprotected remote servers, said Yuval Ben-Itzhak, chief technology officer for Finjan. The content of those servers is then indexed by search engines, leaving it open to anyone who uses the right query terms. </font><br></div><font size="2"><br><font size="3"><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://www.wsbt.com/news/local/20465589.html">Bank scam spreads as institutions look for possible source of breach</a></font><br>By Leanne Tokars, WSBT Channel 22 News, 6/18/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">SOUTH BEND - An international bank scam is spreading, and there is some idea how that information may have gotten out.</font><br><br><font size="2">Hundreds of people and dozens of banks and credit unions across our area are trying to recover from a major security breach.</font><br><br><font style="font-style: italic;" size="2">[Evan] This story is related to the "<a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/05/1stsource.aspx">1st Source Bank reissues all debit cards in response to breach</a>" posting on 5/30/08.&nbsp; Another supporting story;<a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&amp;taxonomyId=17&amp;articleId=9101158&amp;intsrc=hm_topic"> Fraudulent ATM transactions overseas could be tied to Indiana bank breach</a></font><span style="font-style: italic;">&nbsp; This is a winding storyline.</span><br></div><font size="2"><br><font size="3"><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://www.topnews.in/parents-livid-over-database-putting-student-profiles-pictures-online-247747">Parents livid over database putting student profiles, pictures online</a></font><br>By Mohit Joshi, Top News, 6/16/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">Melbourne, June 16: With the State government planning to post the profile of every state school student on its intranet database, called OneSchool, parents in Australia are livid over the fact that it will make their kids vulnerable to paedophiles.</font><br><br><font size="2">OneSchool, will provide each and every detail of the state's 480,000 public school students enrolled from Prep to Year 12, for which, the photographs, personal details, career aspirations, off-campus activities and student performance records are already being collected from all 1251 state schools.</font><br><br><font style="font-style: italic;" size="2">[Evan] I think I’d be livid too.&nbsp; Are parents given the opportunity to opt out, without penalty or lost opportunities?</font><span style="font-style: italic;">&nbsp; "According to Education Minister Rod Welford, if the parents refuse to
give their consent to their child being profiled, they could also be
denied access to public education."</span></div><font size="2"><br><font size="3"><a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7459579.stm">Blears PC loss - officials blamed </a></font><br>BBC News, 6/17/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">Information on a computer stolen from Communities Secretary Hazel Blears' office had been sent in breach of data security rules, it has emerged. </font><br><br><font size="2">The Communities and Local Government department admitted its officials had "not fully" complied with guidance on handling sensitive data. </font><br><br><font size="2">Its top civil servant Peter Housden said "no damage had been done" as the documents were not secret.</font><br><br><font size="2">The computer contained a combination of constituency and government information relating to defence and extremism.</font><br><br><font style="font-style: italic;" size="2">[Evan] It is disappointing to read about breaches where the government does not follow its own laws and regulations.&nbsp; Mr. Housden claims that the files were "not secret".&nbsp; They certainly weren’t public, were they?</font><br></div><font size="2"><br><font style="font-weight: bold;" size="3"><a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1027457/Personal-details-20-000-patients-stolen-hospital-new-security-blunder.html">Personal details of thousands of patients stolen from hospital in new security blunder</a></font><br>By James Tozer, The Daily Mail, 6/18/08<br><br></font><div style="margin-left: 40px;"><font size="2">Laptops holding tens of thousands of patients' records have been stolen from a hospital and a GP's home, it emerged yesterday. </font><br><br><font size="2">In the latest lost personal data scandal, the information was stored on the machines in contravention of NHS guidelines. </font><br><br><font size="2">It was revealed that details of 20,000 patients were on six laptops stolen earlier this month from filing cabinets at St George's Hospital, in Tooting, South West London. </font><br><br><font style="font-style: italic;" size="2">[Evan]&nbsp; This is six stolen laptops in one month, and the four breaches in one year?!&nbsp; The exposed information in this breach was "names, postcodes, hospital numbers and dates of birth".&nbsp; Check out the excuse for storing confidential information on these poorly secured laptops; "Normally such information is stored on the hospital's central network, but because of technical problems it was being stored temporarily on the laptops."</font><br></div><font size="2"><br><br><b>To Readers:</b>&nbsp; I am testing this weekly "Other noteworthy breaches" post.&nbsp; I am using this first one to gauge interest and decide if it is something we should continue.&nbsp; Please feel free to comment.<br></font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/062308.aspx%E2%80%9D%20type=" text="" javascript="" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2008 04:11:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/major security breach">major security breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security breach">security breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/airline systems data">airline systems data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breaches">breaches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/noteworthy breaches">noteworthy breaches</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/indiana bank breach">indiana bank breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive data">sensitive data</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/23/062308.aspx">Some of the other noteworthy breaches last week, 6/16/08 - 6/22/08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Sometimes danger lurks right under our nose.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/60d561dc35d92bd6e3f06ac8f71c0ba7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/60d561dc35d92bd6e3f06ac8f71c0ba7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When Executive Protecion Specialists think and speak about &quot;Threat Assessment&quot;, they are usually focusing on a known or suspected danger that may prove life-threatening. Sometimes, that danger may...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[When Executive Protecion Specialists think and speak about "Threat Assessment", they are usually focusing on a known or suspected danger that may prove life-threatening.  Sometimes, that danger may already have made itself at home and is silently destroying lives and eating away at victims like a cancerous growth. <br /><span id="fullpost"><br />One such story was highlighted by the "Washington Post Magazine" on May 25th, 2008.  It involved a young girl who had been molested and raped by her own father.  A man who was something of a hero to many.  A man who had walked side by side with Dr. martin Luther king and who was only a few feet away from the Civil Rights leader when he was assasinated.  That man is James Bevel.<br /></span><br /><br />I had the pleasure of listening to Col. Dave Grossman speaking at UCLA last April. He was eloquent in his description of how young lives are taken and families estroyed by School killings.  He also spoke about those who prey on the less suspecting.  He equated it to the Wolves hunting down and eating sheep.  Mr. Bevel appears to be one of those parasitic wolves.  <br /><br />For years he raped his little daughter, telling her it was something of an "experiment".  In his mind, he didn't think that it mattered.  His unfathomable belief (and apparently remains the same until this day) is that all women are prostitutes until they reach a certain age, when sex is set aside for procreation.  This beleif allowed him to allegedly rape his eight year old daughter on many occassions.<br /><br />His daughter, Aaralyn Mills, finally found the courage to step foward and contact the Police in 2005.  She assisted the Leesburg authorities to tape record her conversation with her father.  In that conversation, James Bevel admitted raoping his daughter and that it was part of a scientific process.  Unfortunately, her mother, like many other mothers, did not want or couldn't face the truth.  This gave the big, bad wolf all the space he needed to desecrate the little sheep.  <br /><br />Sadly, men like this are living throughout our communities.  they come in all shapes, sizes nd colors.  Some are Doctors, Community leaders, Priests, Police Officers, Electricians and Preachers.  If you have been entrusted with the job of protecting an innocent lamb, be a strong and fearful sheepdog and protect your flock, with your very life if need be.  Be brave like Aaralyn Mills.  She stepped forward at this time in her life because her father who has many children with many different women has now a young daughter and her half-siter is afraid that he will rape her too.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2008 18:23:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/daughter">daughter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/danger">danger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/aaralyn mills">aaralyn mills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/james bevel">james bevel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/allegedly rape">allegedly rape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/washington post magazine">washington post magazine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/parasitic wolves">parasitic wolves</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police">police</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police officers">police officers</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/06/sometimes-danger-lurks-right-under-our.html">Sometimes danger lurks right under our nose.</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Beware! $4 + a gallon is bringing out the thieves in our communities.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8bb1d3fd37e477eb37712dc88f797683</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8bb1d3fd37e477eb37712dc88f797683</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We recently alerted our readers to watch out for copper piping, wiring and even art pieces that were being stolen by thieves looking to cash in on the rising price of copper. It was only a matter of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[We recently alerted our readers to watch out for copper piping, wiring and even art pieces that were being stolen by thieves looking to cash in on the rising price of copper.  It was only a matter of time before the same thing happened to the fuel tanks on our vehicles.  <br /><br />Neil Cavuto ran a story on Fox's "Cavuto World" today about thieves who are even going so far as to drill into tanks in an effort to steal a vehicle's fuel. Gasoline, Dielsel and even greasy cooking oil is being stolen.  That's right - cooking oil. <br /></span><br />I first heard that old cooking oil could be used to run a car on from my brother in Northern Ireland about four or five years ago.  There was very little start-up costs involved and being the owner of a restaurant, he had a ready supply of used oil.  He told me at that at that time, people were converting their vehicles to run on the oil and were going around gathering up used oil from restaurants.  The owners of these establishments were thrilled since they used to pay to have the old oil removed previously.<br /><br />Apparently this recycling of cooking oil has become so popular, that restaurants are now selling it - last I heard for about $1.50 a gallon.  Thieves have discovered its worth and are now draining the oil tanks located at the rear of restaurants.  The report went on to say that SUVs are especially being targeted as their size gives the thieves plenty of good cover.  The fact that their tanks are larger and contain more fuel is an added advantage for them.<br /><br />What can you do?  For starters, if your fuel cap is not lockable, replace it with one that can be locked.  If at all possible, keep your vehicle in a locked garage.  If that is not an option, park it in a well lit area. Unfortunately, the higher the prices go at the pump, the more prevalent that fuel thefts will become.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 May 2008 00:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oil">oil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/oil tanks">oil tanks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thieves">thieves</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fuel">fuel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fuel cap">fuel cap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tanks">tanks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fuel tanks">fuel tanks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fuel thefts">fuel thefts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thieves plenty">thieves plenty</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/05/beware-4-gallon-is-bringing-out-thieves.html">Beware! $4 + a gallon is bringing out the thieves in our communities.</source>
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