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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: complexity]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/complexity</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 05:38:58 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Access control: The evolving tool set]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/37490aa9e2883a2a11c78340f7dedf5d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/37490aa9e2883a2a11c78340f7dedf5d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Enterprises struggle to find a sweet spot -- in cost, complexity and capability -- for user-centric access...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Enterprises struggle to find a sweet spot -- in cost, complexity and capability -- for user-centric access control.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/user-centric access control">user-centric access control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sweet spot">sweet spot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprises struggle">enterprises struggle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cost">cost</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complexity">complexity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capability">capability</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/supp/2008//100908-trendwatch-access-control.html?fsrc=rss-security">Access control: The evolving tool set</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5288692e82e0f23665e5086e43db9ed4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Between the fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic and the Inc 500 milestone, weve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Between the <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008" target="_blank">fifth anniversary for ScienceLogic</a> and the Inc 500 milestone, we’ve become very nostalgic about the beginnings of the company and EM7. For instance, did you know that EM7 was originally designed with managed service providers in mind? Not so surprising when 5 of the first 6 employees (including all 3 founders) came from hosting and MSP backgrounds and had first-hand experience with the daily trials and tribulations of MSP operations – and the tools that didn’t quite work for them.
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="John at Interop Vegas" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/john-at-interop-vegas-thumb.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"></a>Here we talk to John Proctor, who started out as one of our first customers (and the first MSP customer). And he believed in it so much, he eventually became part of the ScienceLogic team. (Remember &#8220;I&#8217;m not only the President, I&#8217;m also a client&#8221; from <a href="http://www.hairclub.com/inthenews_article1.php" target="_blank">the Hair Club for Men</a>?)
<p>John shares his perspectives about the service provider world and why he took a chance on a little-known product called EM7.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your background? How many years have you worked as a service provider and for what types of companies?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> I have been working with Service providers for over twelve years. I worked at a major regional service provider for six years and before that I designed and built national and international networks for ISP’s and Fortune 500 companies as a consultant for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and WorldComm.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You were one of the first customers of EM7 – why did you choose it and how did you get over the hurdles associated with using a start-up company’s product?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> We were actually customer number five. Back in 2004 when we evaluated and purchased EM7 we could see that EM7 provided about 80% of what we were looking for in one integrated solution right out of the box. One of the things that sold us on EM7 was that the ScienceLogic founders had all previously worked for a service provider, so we knew they understood our business and our challenges. But in the end, it comes down to features. Once we compared EM7 functionality to the alternatives, it was clearly a “no brainer.”
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What other alternatives were being considered?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Well, we had started with a few point solutions, but as our business and product offerings matured, this resulted in a growing number of point solutions. What started with 3 or 4 ended up as 14 separate tools. They all had strengths but what they didn’t have was integration and because of this they could not scale. And, if the tools could not scale, our business could not grow.
<p>So, naturally we started looking at framework solutions, but they are expensive to buy, expensive to implement, and expensive to maintain. At one point, we even considered some open source projects. There were several that showed promise, but we would still be stuck with tools that were not integrated. So then we considered hiring developers to cobble something together that would work for our business. The only problem with this alternative was that we felt it would take 6 to 8 months before we could have something viable to work with.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What products were you using before EM7? What were your goals?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Before we purchased EM7 we used 14 different point solutions to deliver our products and services to the marketplace. Tools like NetCool, Openview, Argent, Heat, What’s Up Gold as well as several other point solutions, vendor specific applications and manually updated spreadsheets. And, as I mentioned before, this does not scale. This also adds a great deal of complexity when you begin to consider business continuity and disaster recovery. All these tools were vital to the delivery of our products and services. Any service provider will tell you it is all about uptime. So if the product is uptime, the tools used to deliver it have to be available 24&#215;7x365.
<p>Our goals were simple: scale and redundancy. As it turns out, the solution was simple as well. EM7 provided a tool that could replace the functionality of almost half of the existing point solutions and the applications that could not be replaced were integrated with EM7 to provide our staff with a “single pane of glass” to see the status and performance of each area of the business from one application. We had visibility into everything from facility systems to applications using EM7.
<p>ScienceLogic also delivers an extensible configuration that addressed uptime and redundancy. We deployed collectors throughout our network that reported back to a central pair of redundant database servers and with this configuration we were able to perform backups and add capacity without taking the system down.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Why are service providers different from enterprises? How are their needs different?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> First and foremost, service providers face the same challenges that only the largest enterprises ever face and they also have many unique challenges that only service providers experience.
<p>One challenge we faced was that we had multiple datacenters in different states. They were all interconnected with plenty of bandwidth between each site, but the tools were not designed to be used across the WAN. Our staff in our remote data center did not have the same access as our staff in the corporate office. Since EM7 is web-based, it immediately eliminated this problem.
<p>Another challenge is that service providers must manage systems across multiple domains. Back in the early version of a specific tool we were using before EM7, the only way you could implement it across multiple domains was to put the same username and password on every computer that you monitored. Beyond the security concerns, maintenance was a nightmare. Anytime we had to change the password, we would get locked out of dozens upon dozens of systems. When the password was changed on the monitoring server, it would attempt to login to the remote machines and fail. Repeated attempts would result in the account getting locked. I think that vendor eventually addressed this issue, but service providers seldom find tools that were designed for their unique situations.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How is EM7 geared to service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Enterprise IT is a trusted part of the business; they are one of the team. Service providers are outsiders that must earn trust by showing the customer exactly what they are doing.
<p>EM7 provides a multi-tenant environment that allows service providers to manage systems across many different customers while at the same time providing the customer access to see the same information but only what’s relevant to them.
<p>EM7 was built by service providers and even includes a few features just for them. Two of my favorites are bandwidth billing and the emergency notification system. Take bandwidth billing, for instance. EM7 provides a way to collect bandwidth utilization, store subscription information, and calculate a bill from any one of about 10 different methodologies. And at the end of the billing period, EM7 sends the completed report out to whomever you chose via email.
<p>Another unique service provider feature is the emergency notification system. EM7 allows the provider to track what customers used their unique infrastructure components. If they have to perform maintenance on the infrastructure component or have a problem they can send an email to all of the impacted customers in a matter of minutes.
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What trends do you see for service providers? What about big trends such as virtualization and cloud computing – how will they impact service providers?
<p><strong>John Proctor:</strong> Virtualization is really hot for service providers right now and for the same reasons as in the enterprise. Service providers run data centers and data centers must be powered and cooled. So, anytime they can use a virtual server instead of adding physical equipment it is a good thing. But then you add the complexity that multiple customers reside on the same host and you must track things like bandwidth utilizations by guest OS, and it all gets a little harder. Lucky for us this is not a problem for EM7.
<p>I still think it’s early days for cloud computing. Depending on who you talk to, much of what service providers (especially the big ones) have already been doing with SAAS offerings and hosted applications could be described as cloud computing already. In which case, service providers are ahead of the game. But whatever the “final” definition, cloud computing actually shares many similarities with virtualization – in that service providers (or enterprises) will need to be able to manage far more “devices” in real-time with “zero downtime” expectations by customers. What this really means is that you’re going to see much more automation in provisioning and IT monitoring tools to handle the scale and speed with which things can change in the data center given vm migration and the talked-about switching between “clouds” that can be used for high availability. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 12:51:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers">service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers experience">service providers experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service providers seldom">service providers seldom</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact service providers">impact service providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 functionality">em7 functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 sends">em7 sends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider">service provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service provider world">service provider world</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/msp-snapshot-monitoring-with-em7/10/2008">MSP Snapshot Monitoring with EM7</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[I/O for Virtual Machine Monitors: Security and Performance Issues]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5ab1056e9e9cde053ca48e03f1c13cbb</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5ab1056e9e9cde053ca48e03f1c13cbb</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Modern I/O architectures are quite complex, so keeping a virtual machine monitor (VMM), or hypervisor, small is difficult. Many current hypervisors move the large, complex, and sometimes proprietary...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Modern I/O architectures are quite complex, so keeping a virtual machine monitor (VMM), or hypervisor, small is difficult. Many current hypervisors move the large, complex, and sometimes proprietary device drivers out of the VMM into one or more partitions, leading to inherent problems in complexity, security, and performance.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=2a4251bf23918d29f36c87a357c33ed2" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=2a4251bf23918d29f36c87a357c33ed2" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 00:42:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proprietary device drivers">proprietary device drivers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current hypervisors move">current hypervisors move</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual machine monitor">virtual machine monitor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex">complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmm">vmm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/performance">performance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/inherent">inherent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complexity">complexity</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=2a4251bf23918d29f36c87a357c33ed2">I/O for Virtual Machine Monitors: Security and Performance Issues</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[TriCipher launches hosted identity federation service]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32106da905a4d380d6b3bebff87edb37</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32106da905a4d380d6b3bebff87edb37</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Identity management vendor TriCipher this week rolled out a hosted service that lets companies pass-on the complexity of sharing identities with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Identity management vendor TriCipher this week rolled out a hosted service that lets companies pass-on the complexity of sharing identities with partners.<br style="clear: both;"/>
    <a style='font-size: 10px; color: maroon;' href='http://www.pheedo.com/hostedMorselClick.php?hfmm=v3:1795cc1b118603b4392c56de05b1756c:CpmAFRiKdku59qwTT2mLecFHHYae4OSNZNJd%2FvdgDxVHwnTWsXRv%2BNQZ%2BVUAFygwoTcDLqeFc00N'><img border='0' title='Add to digg' alt='Add to digg' src='http://www.pheedo.com/images/mm/digg.gif'/></a>
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<br style="clear: both;"/>      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=a47ba9880b31bb330d4899ceca328588"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=a47ba9880b31bb330d4899ceca328588"/></a>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies pass-on">companies pass-on</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complexity">complexity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identities">identities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partners">partners</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/click.phdo?i=a47ba9880b31bb330d4899ceca328588">TriCipher launches hosted identity federation service</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[TriCipher launches hosted identity federation service]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/eb96178aedf439964c49be69bc619a8f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/eb96178aedf439964c49be69bc619a8f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Identity management vendor TriCipher this week rolled out a hosted service that lets companies pass-on the complexity of sharing identities with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Identity management vendor TriCipher this week rolled out a hosted service that lets companies pass-on the complexity of sharing identities with partners.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies pass-on">companies pass-on</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complexity">complexity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identities">identities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partners">partners</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/100308-tricipher-identity-federation.html?fsrc=rss-security">TriCipher launches hosted identity federation service</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-10-01 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2e61bbf8f65cea7668e676362729b6b6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2e61bbf8f65cea7668e676362729b6b6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Behavioral Monitoring | securosis.com
Dana Gardner's BriefingsDirect: Improved insights and analysis from IT systems logs helps reduce complexity risks from virtualization
E-Commerce News: ID...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/23/behavioral-monitoring/">Behavioral Monitoring | securosis.com</a></li>
<li><a href="http://briefingsdirectblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/improved-insights-and-analysis-from-it.html">Dana Gardner's BriefingsDirect: Improved insights and analysis from IT systems logs helps reduce complexity risks from virtualization</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64598.html">E-Commerce News: ID Security: New PCI Security Standard Falls Short</a></li>
<li><a href="http://duckdown.blogspot.com/2008/09/how-many-fingers-are-required-to-count.html">Enterprise Architecture: From Incite comes Insight...: How many fingers are required to count the number of clueless IT Security Professionals?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/print/450190">IT Security: Can We Be Compliant and Yet Insecure?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://blogs.gartner.com/greg_young/2008/09/30/get-rich-quick-with-network-security/">Get Rich Quick With Network Security</a></li>
<li><a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/09/ids-vitamins-or-prophylactic.html">Rational Survivability: IDS: Vitamins Or Prophylactic?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://treasuryinstitute.org/blog/index.php?itemid=174">PCI DSS News and Information &raquo; Great Expectations?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.estoregfoa.org/StaticContent/staticpages/TM0508.htm#1c">GFOA Treasury Management</a></li>
<li><a href="http://forensics.sans.org/community/top7_forensic_trends.php">SANS - Computer Forensics - Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008</a><br/>
SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008</li>
<li><a href="http://securitybuddha.com/2008/09/30/you-might-be-a-pm-if/">You Might be a PM if&hellip; &laquo; Mark Curphey - SecurityBuddha.com</a></li>
<li><a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/security_is_not_a_solution">Security is not a solution | Computerworld Blogs</a><br/>
Security is not a solution</li>
<li><a href="http://www.andrewhay.ca/archives/385">Andrew Hay &raquo; Blog Archive &raquo; Secure Life Ep 3</a></li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/408931097" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security professionals">security professionals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computerworld blogs security">computerworld blogs security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sans top">sans top</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/irforensic trends">irforensic trends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sans">sans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/top">top</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss news">pci dss news</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/408931097/anton18">Links for 2008-10-01 [del.icio.us]</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY Keynotes: Novell]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ed3e3cadb42982e0cf29b0c202baba08</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ed3e3cadb42982e0cf29b0c202baba08</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Novell President and Chief Executive Officer Rob Hovsepian learned what interoperability meant when he had a large retailer client who wanted all his businesses to connect and close-out at the same...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Novell <a href="http://www.novell.com/company/bios/rhovsepian.html" target="_blank">President and Chief Executive Officer Rob Hovsepian</a> learned what interoperability meant when he had a large retailer client who wanted all his businesses to connect and close-out at the same time.</p>
<p><strong>Making IT work as One</strong></p>
<p>How does my company stay efficient while we&#8217;re using technologies around interoperability? How can innovation help my business?</p>
<p>Top business needs:</p>
<ul>
<li>Reduce cost</li>
<li>Manage complexity</li>
<li>Mitigate risk</li>
</ul>
<p>Mixed IT environments are a reality for almost all organizations. Different environments, architectural strategies, desktop profiles, etc. There are benefits to having mixed source environments, although homogenous environments are ideal. On average 46,000 hours in an organization are spent on Sarbanes-Oxley standards.</p>
<p>Some considerations to make IT work as one:</p>
<ul>
<li>Strategy</li>
<li>Solutions</li>
<li>Ecosystem</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategy</strong></p>
<p>Actionable strategy is key. The emergence of three silos (applications, systems and infrastructure, and operations) are now moved into one. There is a lot of pressure to make these pieces come together.</p>
<p><strong>Solutions</strong></p>
<p>You need focused solutions to solve problems today while keeping an eye to the future. There are three main needs: the data center, end-user computing, and identity and security. This is also what is the most important to the market right now. The end goal is the agility of the data center.</p>
<p>Data Center Challenges</p>
<ul>
<li>Create an agile IT infrastructure</li>
<li>Address power and space constraints</li>
<li>Deliver performance, security and availability</li>
<li>Manage hardware, software and labor costs</li>
<li>Meet service level agreements</li>
</ul>
<p>Data Center Solutions</p>
<ul>
<li>Workload management - green IT and server efficiency, unified physical and virtual environment</li>
<li>Virtualization and Consolidation - business continuity and disaster recovery</li>
<li>Enterprise Servers</li>
</ul>
<p>End-User Computing Solutions</p>
<ul>
<li>Collaboration</li>
<li>Enterprise desktops - Novell uses Linux and Open Office, interesting to note</li>
<li>Endpoint management</li>
</ul>
<p>Identity and Security Challenges</p>
<ul>
<li>Minimize risk, uncertainty and policy violations</li>
<li>Provide timely and secure access to information</li>
<li>Ensure, document and prove information security</li>
<li>Reduce the cost of proving compliance</li>
<li>Reduce the cost and complexity of governance</li>
</ul>
<p>Identity and Security Solutions</p>
<ul>
<li>Identity and Access Management - user provisioning, role management, access management</li>
<li>Compliance Management - Audit, Governance, Risk Management and Compliance (GRC), IT controls automation, Security, Information and Event Management (SIEM)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ecosystem</strong></p>
<p>The ecosystem is powerful. Companies should challenge partners for innovation and interoperability.</p>
<p>Community Innovation - open source and open standards</p>
<p>IT Landscape - Mixed IT Environments</p>
<ul>
<li>Consulting, systems integration vendors</li>
<li>Application vendors</li>
<li>Systems software vendors (Novell)</li>
<li>Hardware, network vendors</li>
</ul>
<p>How does your ecosystem help your company? How do your partners help? What is their role in the industry to help you? How are all the vendors in the industry helping you?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 10:40:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security solutions">security solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solutions">solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center solutions">data center solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems integration vendors">systems integration vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendors">vendors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/homogenous environments">homogenous environments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/environments">environments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/application vendors">application vendors</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-keynotes-novell/09/2008">Interop NY Keynotes: Novell</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing August's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/01c05fcd5f209b7515be2cee57a93c9b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the previous summaries of June's and July's threatscape based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape

August's threatscape was dominated...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/LKtKpSt0igQ/s1600-h/ddanchev_august.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SL_ZoXre4vI/AAAAAAAACJ0/Phtgyl6rLXQ/s200-R/ddanchev_august.png" /></a>Following the previous summaries of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">July's threatscape</a> based on all the research published during the month, it's time to summarize August's threatscape.<br />
<br />
August's threatscape was dominated by a huge increase of rogue security software domains made possible due to the easily obtainable templates for the sites, several malware campaigns targeting popular social networking sites, Russian's organized cyberattack against Georgia with evidence on who's behind it pointing to "everyone" and a few botnets dedicated to the attack making the whole process easy to outsource and turn responsibility into an "open topic", several new web based botnet management kits and tools found in the wild, evidence that the 76service may in fact be going mainstream since the concept of cybercrime as a service is already emerging, and, of course, a peek at India's CAPTCHA solving economy, where the best comment I've received so far is that every site should embrace reCAPTCHA, so that while solving CAPTCHAs and participating in the abuse of these services in question, they would be also digitizing books. As usual, August was a pretty dynamic month for the middle of summer, with everyone excelling in their own malicious field.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</a><br />
False positives are rather common, especially when you're aiming to protect the end user from himself and not let him gain access to "hacking tools", but you're flagging security tools as badware and missing over half the SQL injected domains currently in the wild due to the fact that SiteAdvisor's community still haven't reviewed them - that's not good<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/twitter-malware-campaign-wants-to-bank.html">The Twitter Malware Campaign Wants to Bank With You</a><br />
Twitter, just like every Web 2.0 application, isn't and shouldn't be treated as a unique platform for dissemination of malware, since it's dissemination of malware "as usual". This particular malware campaign was not just executed by a lone gunman, but also, was taking advantage of a flaw allowing the author to add new followers potentially exposing them to the malicious links serving banker malware. For the the time being, MySpace, Facebook and Twitter accounts are the very last thing a malicious attacker is interesting in puchasing accounting data for, but how come? It's all due to the oversupply of automatically registered accounts at other popular services, whose ecosystem of Internet properties empower cybercriminals with the ability to launch, host and distribute malware in between abusing the very same company's services for the blackhat SEO campaign and redirection services. Theoretically, a distributed network build upon the services provided by a single company is faily easy to accomplish due to the single login authentication applied everywhere. A singly bogus Gmail account results in a blackhat SEO hosting blogspot account, flash based redirector hosted at Picasa, and a couple of thousands of spam emails sent automatically sent through Gmail in order to abuse it's trusted email reputation<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-web-servers-serving-fake.html">Compromised Web Servers Serving Fake Flash Players</a><br />
If aggressiveness matter, this campaign consisting of remotely injected redirection scripts at legitimate sites next to on purposely introduced malware oriented domains, was perhaps the most aggressive one during the month. Fake flash players, fake windows media players and fake youtube players are prone to increase as a social engineering tactic of choice due to the template-ization of malware serving sites for the sake of efficiency<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
With Zeus vulnerable to a remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to hijack other cybercriminal's Zeus botnet, private exploits targeting the still rather popular at least in respect to usefulness Pinch malware are leaking, allowing everyone including security researchers to take a peek at a particular campaign running unpatched Pinch gateway<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</a><br />
Backdooring phishing pages is perhaps the most minimalistic approach a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal is going to take. The far more beneficial approach that I've encountered on a couple of occassions so far, would be to backdoor a proprietary web malware exploitation kit, release it in the wild, let them put the time and efforts into launching the campaigns, then hijack their botnet. In fact, the possibilities for backdooring copycat web malware exploitation kits in order to take advantage of the momentum while introducing a non-existent kit has always been there at the disposal of malicious attackers. One thing's for sure - there's no such thing as a free web malware exploitation kit, just like there isn't such thing as a free phishing page<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/email-hacking-going-commercial-part-two.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial - Part Two</a><br />
In between the scammers promising the Moon and asking for anything between $20 to $250 to hack into an email account, there are "legitimate" services taking advantage of web email hacking kits consisting of each and every known XSS vulnerability for a particular service in an attempt to increase the chances of the attacker. And given that the majority of these have been patched a long time ago, social engineering comes into play. Do these services have a future? Definitely as more and more people are in fact looking for and requesting such services, in fact, they're willing to pay a bonus considering how exotic it is for them to have any email that they provide hacked into and the accounting data sent back to them<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack.html">The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack</a><br />
Event of the month? Could be, but just like every "event of the moth" everyone seems to be once again restating their "selective retention" preferences. What is selective retention anyway? Selective retention is basically a situation where once Russian is attacking another country's infrastructure, you would automatically conclude that it's Russian FSB behind the attacks and consciously and subconsciously ignore all the research and articles telling you otherwise, namely that the FSB wouldn't even bother acknowledging Georgia's online presence, at least not directly. Moreover, talking about the FSB as the agency behind the cyberattacks indicates "selective retention", talking about FAPSI indicates better understanding of the subject.<br />
<br />
In times when cybercrime is getting ever easier to outsource, anyone following the news could basically orchestrate a large scale DDoS attack against a particular country in order to forward the responsibility to any country that they want to. In Russia vs Georgia, you have a combination of a collectivist society that's possessing the capabilities to launch DDoS attacks, knows where and how to order them, and that in times when your country is engaged in a war conflict drinking beer instead of DDoS-sing the major government sites of the adversary is not an option.<br />
<br />
Selective retention when combined with a typical mainstream media's mentality to "slice the threat on pieces" instead of turning the page as soon as possible, is perhaps the worst possible combination. Furthermore, coming up with <a href="http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/?p=398">Social Network analysis of the cyberattacks</a> would produce nothing more but a few fancy graphs of over enthusiastic Russian netizen's distributing the static list of the targets. The real conversations, as always, are <a href="http://blogs.nyu.edu/blogs/agc282/zia/2008/08/intelfusions_sna_of_russian_cy.html">happening in the "Dark Web" limiting the possibilities for open source intelligence</a> using a data mining software. Things changed, OPSEC is slowly emerging as a concept among malicious parties, whenever some of the "calls for action" in the DDoS attacks were posted at mainstream forums, they were immediately removed so that they don't show up in such academic initiatives<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</a><br />
The reappearance of the 76Service allowing everyone to log into a web based interface and collect all the accounting and financial data coming from malware infected hosts across the globe for the period of time for which they've bought access, indicates that what used to be proprietary services which were supposedly no longer available, are now being operated in a do-it-yourself fashion. Goods and products mature into services, so from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, outsourcing is naturally most beneficial even when it comes to cybercrime <br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/whos-behind-georgia-cyber-attacks.html">Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?</a><br />
If it's the botnets used in the attacks, they are known, if it's about who's providing the hosting for the command and control, it's the "usual suspects", but just like previous discussion of the Russian Business Network, it remains questionable on whether or not they work on a revenue-sharing basis, are simply providing the anti-abuse hosting, or are the shady conspirators that every newly born RBN expert is positioning them to be.<br />
<br />
Cheap conversation regarding the RBN ultimately serves the RBN, and just for the record, there's a RBN alternative in every country, but the only thing that remains the same are the customers, tracking the customers means exposing the RBN and the international franchises of their services, making it harder to identify their international operations. And given that the "tip of the iceberg", namely RBN's U.S operations remain in tact, talking about taking actions against their international operations in countries where cybercrime law is still pending, is yet another quality research into the topic building up the pile of research into the very same segments of the very same ISPs.<br />
<br />
Just for the record - these "very same ISPs" are regular readers of my blog, and if you analyze their activities, they're definitely reading yours too, ironically, surfing through gateways residing within their netblock that are so heavily blacklisted due to the guestbook and forum spamming activities that their bad reputation usually ends up in another massive blackhat SEO campaign exposed.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/guerilla-marketing-for-conspiracy-site.html">Guerilla Marketing for a Conspiracy Site</a><br />
Conspiracy theorists may in fact have a new wallpaper to show off with<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/banker-malware-targetting-brazilian.html">Banker Malware Targeting Brazilian Banks in the Wild</a><br />
When misinformed and not knowing anything about a particular underground segment, a potential cybercriminal would stick to using such primitive compared to the sophisticated banker malware kits currently in the wild. These sophisticated banker malware kits are often coming in a customer-tailored proposition, with their price increasing or decreasing based on the specific module to be included or excluded. For instance, a module targeting all the U.S banks that has been put in a "learning mode" long before it was made available to the customers can be requested and is often available with the business model build around the customer's wants&nbsp; <br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</a><br />
Despite the massive SQL injection attacks, accounting data for Cpanel accounts coming from malware infected hosts seems to be once again coming into play, which isn't surprising given the filtering capabilities and log parsing tools today's botnet masters are empowered with. These very same compromised Cpanel accounts and the associated domains often end up so heavility abused that it's tactics like these that are driving the underground multitasking mentality, namely, abusing a single compromised account for each and every malicious online activity you can think of - even hosting banners for their blackhat SEO services <br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Two</a><br />
In August we saw a peek of fake security software, neatly typosquatted domains whose authors earn revenue each and every time someone installs the software. The vendors behind this software are forwarding the entire process of driving traffic to those excelling in aggregating traffic and abusing it. As anticipated, underground multitasking started taking place within the fake security software domains, with the people behind them introducing client-side exploits in order to improve the monetization of the traffic coming to the sites<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diy-botnet-kit-promising-eternal.html">DIY Botnet Kit Promising Eternal Updates</a><br />
There's no such thing as a (quality) free botnet kit. What's for free is often the leftovers from a single feature of a more sophisticated proprietary botnet kit. This one in particular is however trying to demonstrate that even a plain simple GUI botnet command and control software can achieve the results desired by an average script kiddie, and not necessarily satisfy the needs of the experienced botnet master<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_20.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Three</a><br />
As far as trends and fads are concerned, the majority of the domains are currently parked at up to four different IPs, with most of them going into a stand by mode once they get detected and reappear back couple of weeks later<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-celebrity-video-sites-serving.html">Fake Celebrity Video Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a><br />
Due to the template-ization of fake celebrity video sites, and simple traffic management tools combined with blackhat SEO tactics, these sites are also prone to increase in the next couple of months<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</a><br />
It's releases like these that remind us of the amount of time, efforts and personal touch that a malicious attacker would put into such a management kit, currently acting as a personal benchmark as far as complexity and features indicating the coder's experience with botnets is concerned. What's he's failing to anticipate is that this kit is sooner or later going to turn into the "MPack of botnet management"<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security_25.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software - Part Four</a><br />
Keep it coming, we'll keep it exposing until we end up getting down to the "fake software vendor" itself<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
Email harvesting is slowly maturing into a vertically integrated service provided by vendors of managed spamming services. This email harvesting module is aiming to close the page on text obfuscation in respect to fighting spam, and is successfully recognizing and collecting such publicly available emails. From a psychological perspective though, the end users who bothered to obfuscate their emails are less likely to fall victims into phishing scams, with the obfuscation speaking for a relatively decent situational awareness on how they emails end up in a spammer's campaign<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Three</a><br />
As a firm believer in sampling in order to draw conclusions on the big picture, an approach that has proven highly accurate in modeling historical and upcoming tactics and behavior, a single fake porn site serving malware campaign usually exposes a dozen of misconfigured redirectors, which thanks to their misconfiguration despite the evasive features available within the kits, expose another dozen of malware campaigns<br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</a><br />
With no particular flaw exploited other than the social engineering tactic of using already compromised Facebook accounts who would automatically spam all their friends with links to flash files hosted at legitimate services, the more persistent the campaign is, the higher the chance that it will scale enough. This campaign in particular is mainly relying on rotation of tactics, namely different messages, different services and file extensions used in order to trick someone's friend into visiting the URL. With the number of users increasing, the most popular social networking sites are naturally going to be permanently under attacks from cybercriminals<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/fake-security-software-domains-serving.html">Fake Security Software Domains Serving Exploits</a><br />
Despite that it's a single brand, namely the International Virus Research Lab that's introducing client-side exploits within it's portfolio of domains, the opportunity for abuse may be noticed by the rest of the brands pretty fast<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/exposing-indias-captcha-solving-economy.html">Exposing India’s CAPTCHA Solving Economy</a><br />
Taking into consideration the mentality surrounding a particular country's cybercriminals, how they think, how they operate, what do they define as an opportunity, and how much personal efforts are they willing to put into their campaigns, I wouldn't be surpised if a Russian vendor offering 100,000 bogus Gmail accounts for sale has in fact outsourcing the account registration process to Indian workers, paid them pocket change and is then reselling them ten to twenty times higher than the price he originally paid for them. <br />
<br />
The text based CAPTCHAs used at the major Internet portals and services, are so efficiently abused by this approach that continuing to use is directly undermining the trust these email providers and services often come with as granted<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2008 02:57:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaigns">facebook malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/usefulness pinch malware">usefulness pinch malware</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaigns">malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware">banker malware</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/388609194/summarizing-augusts-threatscape.html">Summarizing August's Threatscape</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modelling Shoplifting]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3943f3c70f24e801812a87cf0b0b61f8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3943f3c70f24e801812a87cf0b0b61f8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The other day I was thinking that I should write about specific situation models and by coincident Marc Adler pens CEP and Shoplifting . In Marcs post, Marc begins to model shoplifting as if...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The other day I was thinking that I should write about specific situation models and by coincident Marc Adler pens <a href="http://magmasystems.blogspot.com/2008/09/cep-and-shoplifting.html" target="_blank">CEP and Shoplifting</a>.  In Marc&#8217;s post, Marc begins to model shoplifting as if shoplifting is &#8220;market data,&#8221; with Level 1 to Level 4 shoplifting &#8220;quotes&#8221; - the natural approach for a brilliant guy from Citi.   In reality, this model does not work very well, and I&#8217;ll touch on a few reasons why today.</p>
<p>Marc&#8217;s initial shoplifting model in his post is based on John <span id="SPELLING_ERROR_3" class="blsp-spelling-error">Colapinto&#8217;s concepts of matching a pattern of customer movements in the store with their estimated patterns of shoplifting behavioral patterns.    Marc&#8217;s asks how Coral8 might address this.   We are not ready to seek a vendor solution.  We do not yet have a workable detection model.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">As indicated above, I don&#8217;t think the example situation cited by John and Marc is a viable model for automated processing.    Tracking the behavior of customer&#8217;s movements, by machine, would require some very sophisticated image processing technology that would be too expensive compared to any possible loss at most retails stores.    This type of behavioral pattern recognition. in retail stores, is performed by people (security personnel), not machines, observing people.  </span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">To develop a machine pattern recognition application to detect retail shoplifting we need to build detection models that are economically feasible.  If we are going to use a model of shoplifting pattern recognition versus anomaly detection, we need to define the objects we must track.   </span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">In the most simple model, we have merchandise-objects.   Stores normally (physically) track merchandise-objects only at the exit/entry points of the store using some electromagnetic proximity detection technology.   In this model, the detection configuration is a combination of simple alerting with humans watching the store (&#8221;minding the store&#8221;).    This is not complex event processing.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">However, if we added another object to our model, the customer-object, then we start to get more &#8220;complex,&#8221; but we have not defined &#8220;complexity&#8221; yet because we have not defined the object properties, the possible states of the objects, and the relationships between the objects that are the basis for estimated situations.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Hence, model building is constrained by available resources, simple economics and risk (cost-benefit).  If we are detecting shoplifting in Walmart the cost-benefit model for implementing an automated shoplifting detection system would be different than at a top diamond store on 5th Avenue in NYC.   Protecting loss at a weapons-grade uranium respository follows a different model than protecting loss at a handicraft shop, naturally.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Like Marc, I find models to automatically detect shoplifting interesting, so permit me to close with a general discussion of shoplifting in the context of our <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/what-is-complex-event-processing/" target="_blank">CEP/EP reference model</a>.</span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">One approach would be do determine what objects will be represented in our model.   For example, if we are going to track merchandise, we need to model the &#8221;merchandise-object&#8221;.  If we are going to track people, we need to define the properties of this &#8220;person object.&#8221;  If we are going to represent the store layout, we need to define all these objects (store-object, table-object, shelf-object, entry-object and so forth).  The model can get &#8220;complex&#8221; quite quickly.  </span></span></p>
<blockquote><p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Editorial Note:  <em>An object-oriented approach greatly assists complex model building because we can benefit from OO properties such as encapsulation and polymorphism.  For example, we can define a basic &#8220;person object class&#8221; and then create superclasses of this object for &#8220;customer-object&#8221;, &#8220;manager-object&#8221;, &#8220;or criminal-object.&#8221;</em></span></span></p></blockquote>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Generally speaking, each object we define will require a state-model, for example, in Marc&#8217;s example of a customer moving around the store, we would need to model the possible states (customer at the entrance, at table 1, at table 2, at shelf 1, in the bathroom, at the cashier, etc.)  Indeed Marc, this is complex event processing if we have modelled multiple objects and defined object-object relationships that indicate situations of interest.   For example, customer-object at table2 where merchandise-object has the property of  &#8221;very expensive, high risk&#8221; and then customer-object changes state to &#8220;in bathroom&#8221;.  Of course, we need more key indicators, but you get the idea.</span></span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">Right now, I am typing from the <a href="http://www.taste4heaven.com">Taste from Heaven Vegetarian Restaurant</a> in Chiang Mai and my battery is running low.  The owner of this excellent restaurant also runs the <a href="http://www.elephantnaturefoundation.org/" target="_blank">Elephant Nature Park</a>, a non-profit organization advocating and acting on behalf of the rights of the mighty elephants in Thailand.  Would be great if we could also automatically detect the situation of &#8220;elephant abuse&#8221; by poachers and other crimes against nature.   Time to get back to my delicious mushroom salad, Northeastern Thai style.</span></span></p>
<p><span class="blsp-spelling-error"><span class="blsp-spelling-error">As always, thanks for reading, time for me to get back to eating!</span></span></p>
<p> </p>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 07 Sep 2008 03:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store">store</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store-object">store-object</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex">complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/model canget complex">model canget complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/model">model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple">simple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple economics">simple economics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple model">simple model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/object">object</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/07/modelling-shoplifting/">Modelling Shoplifting</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[More on Why Routing is Not Complex Event Processing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b2a2132904db8b6f400e9dc6e9ba65b1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b2a2132904db8b6f400e9dc6e9ba65b1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interestingly, CEP is Not BPM, BAM, BRE, BRMS or SOA stimulated many great comments andthe rebuttal Smart Order Routing and CEP - Made for Each Other . James Taylor responded with Business rules,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interestingly, <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/08/27/cep-is-not-bpm-bam-bpm-brms-or-soa/">CEP is Not BPM, BAM, BRE, BRMS or SOA</a> stimulated many great comments and the rebuttal <a href="http://streambase.typepad.com/streambase_stream_process/2008/09/smart-order-routing-and-cep.html">Smart Order Routing and CEP - Made for Each Other</a>.  James Taylor responded with <a href="http://www.ebizq.net/blogs/decision_management/2008/08/business_rules_decisions_and_e.php">Business rules, decisions and events</a>.   I followed up with <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/03/cep-is-not-low-latency-messaging-eai-or-esb/">CEP is Not Low Latency Messaging, EAI or ESB</a> and James replied in turn with <a href="http://www.ebizq.net/blogs/decision_management/2008/09/still_more_on_event_processing.php" target="_blank">Still More on Event Processing</a>.  It&#8217;s great to see the blogosphere doing so well.  Continuing, I would like to discuss smart order routing (SOR) a bit more and why routing is not CEP.</p>
<p>First of all, let&#8217;s ground the discussion a bit by translating &#8220;smart order routing&#8221; to &#8220;rule-based message routing&#8221; since in this application &#8220;smart&#8221;  translates to &#8220;using rules&#8221; and &#8220;order&#8221; translates to &#8220;message&#8221;.    Basically, Mark (and other &#8220;new on the routing scene&#8221; stream processing players) argue that rule-based message routing is CEP.  I will argue that routing is not even close to CEP.  Here is why,</p>
<p>Let&#8217;s take a look at a router on the backbone of the global Internet.   A backbone router has very sophisticated software developed over many decades.   These routers run sophisticated, mature algorithms to determine how to route messages (packets) and use these algorithms to build complex routing tables. </p>
<p>In addition, these routers process messages (packets) from countless sources and route messages (packets) to countless destinations.  Using some of the terms in early posts (above), there is a great &#8220;confluence of events&#8221; processed by routers.    Futhermore, there are normally quite complex authentication, authorization and other security parameters managed in a router, all in real time.   Routers do much more, but I don&#8217;t want to get too deep into routing in this post.</p>
<p>My point is that, without any doubt, global Internet routers process very &#8220;cloudy&#8221; &#8220;confluence of events&#8221; with much more sophistication than order routing applications.    However, we do not call Internet routing &#8220;CEP&#8221;, regardless of how many connections are processed or how much sophisticated processing occurs.  The reason is because the &#8220;C&#8221; in &#8220;CEP&#8221; defines a complexity that is at a higher abstraction than messaging and routing.</p>
<p>If you study the literature on CEP, some of which I posted recently, CEP was envisioned to solve complex event processing problems &#8220;on top of the routing layer&#8221; because the routing layer is a mature technology layer.  We can route, pure and simple.  Of course, we are always seeking faster, more scaleable and more secure routing. </p>
<p>I admire some of the startups in the CEP/ESP/EP space for working hard to make money and for aggressively positioning their products and attempting to build market share.   However, issues surface when these same companies seem to believe they are the first companies to work in the event processing or message routing space and that they can define whatever they want as &#8220;complex event processing&#8221; as long as it benefits their sales targets.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that a router does much more sophisticated event processing than the new rule-based stream processing systems running continuous queries across streaming data.  There is no doubt that a router processes a complex &#8220;confluence of events&#8221;.   However, we don&#8217;t call routers &#8220;CEP&#8221;. </p>
<p>We do not call routers &#8220;CEP&#8221; because CEP is about a higher level of knowledge processing.  CEP was created to detect the &#8220;complex events&#8221; that happen above the mediation and routing layer.     The literature and original examples on CEP are quite clear on this.</p>
<p> </p>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 05:38:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex">complex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solve complex event">solve complex event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/upwith cep">upwith cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event">event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep defines">cep defines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call routers cep">call routers cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call">call</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/04/more-on-why-routing-is-not-complex-event-processing/">More on Why Routing is Not Complex Event Processing</source>
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