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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: conduct]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/conduct</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[McIrony: An unexpected response from McAfee]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b7777c8973f62604f441965769aa7200</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b7777c8973f62604f441965769aa7200</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Irony: incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs

Right before Black Hat, I put together what I believed was a pretty strong arguement against McAfee Secure - Hacker Safe, at...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Irony: incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs.<br /><br />Right before Black Hat, I put together what I believed was a pretty strong  arguement against McAfee Secure - Hacker Safe, at a level heretofore unexplored. I believe it was more damaging than anything I've said to date, and as such, presented potential risk for me. So I ran it by some friends before publishing it. Then a most extraordinary thing happened. I had a long chat with <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1668" target="_blank">Nate McFeters</a>, who described an awakening he'd recently experienced. He shared with me the belief that a better approach to potentially negative security research might be to try to create a positive outcome, and worry less about press cycles or exposure, the 15 minutes of fame if you will. He pointed to people like <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1030" target="_blank">Mark Dowd</a> as an example of people who conduct crushingly good research, and steer clear of the petty, ego driven  bulls**t. <br />There I sat, repose like the thinking <a href="http://www.downshoredrift.com/photos/uncategorized/thinking_man.gif" target="_blank">man</a>, frozen for minutes. "Nate", I said, "I think you're right." <br />What do I aspire to as an information security professional; more readership or street cred than the next guy, or the respect of my peers for contributing to the greater <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/content/view/21/31/" target="_blank">good</a>? Attention, press cycles, 15 minutes...it all has its allure, trust me on this. <br />But at the end of the day, I really do want to contribute to the greater good.<br />So I did something different. I sent my findings to McAfee and offered them an opportunity to respond, rather than publish first, ask questions later. <br />Here's the real kicker. <br />They responded.<br />I had a three hour lunch this past Thursday with two gentlemen from McAfee, who flew up from the Bay Area to Seattle to have a face to face with me. This, all by itself, speaks volumes to me. In addition to meeting with Kirk Lawrence, the new Director of Product Management for McAfee Secure, there I sat with, of all people, Joe Pierini, the very guy who has suffered more than his share of abuse, up to and including the <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/awards.html">Pwnie</a>.  As I have been a direct contributor and participant in heckling Joe, you can imagine our meeting could have been uncomfortable. It was not. <br />I have had expectations of McAfee and Scan Alert that to date have not been met, or my (your) perception has been that they have not been met.<br />This meeting was designed as an opportunity to voice some of these expectations, and see if McAfee, in turn, believed there was any merit to them.<br />Surprisingly, at least as spoken, we weren't all that far apart.<br />While, as a naive idealist, I believe that security should come before conversions, I am also grounded enough of a realize that the most attainable goal can be a marriage of both. This premise frames my expectations of McAfee. <br />Can they not be more of a "thought leader" for all the Ma & Pa websites who rely on McAfee Secure, first for a higher conversion rate, then security?<br />Can they not hold merchants to a higher standard, without alienating them and losing business?<br />Can they not embrace the security research community in a fashion that McAfee, the security community, the merchants, and consumers can all benefit from?<br />Can they not be more transparent in their approach, providing more details and feedback about their methods, their findings, and their vision?<br />I know McAfee Secure - Hacker Safe scans can find vulnerabilities.<br />I know they report the vulnerabilities to merchants.<br />What happens thereafter is where things begin to break down. <br />Can the scan engine be improved to find more vulns? Sure. That's really not that big a deal; technology can always be improved.<br />But, regarding holding merchants to a higher standard; therein is the whole point of this debate. <br />Anyone can throw a badge on a site. <br />But what happens when the site proves vulnerable is the key. I'll be candid here: I don't give a damn about the merchant at that point; it's the consumer who is at risk and needs something better from McAfee and their peers.<br />So, here begins a different approach. I know that making changes at a company the size of McAfee can be likened to the three miles it takes to turn around an aircraft carrier. I'm willing to work with them, and allow for a positive outcome.<br />I have been told that, in two or three weeks, we can expect a published standard, that clearly defines exactly what the McAfee Secure product offering adheres to, inclusive of their expectations for merchant remediation timelines, potential badge downgrades for unresolved vulnerabilities, and hopefully even a more clear stance on XSS.<br />I have been told that I will have the opportunity to discuss this standard, and invite feedback. Any <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/content/view/19/29/" target="_blank">standard</a> is better than no standard. <br />I have also been told that this is just the beginning of changes that will lead to more of what I have hoped for in my expectations, over the next 6 months or so.<br />I am hopeful that we can take McAfee at their word, and even if slowly, see a positive outcome.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcirony-unexpected-response-from-mcafee.html&title=McIrony:%20An%20unexpected%20response%20from%20McAfee " title="McIrony: An unexpected response from McAfee ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcirony-unexpected-response-from-mcafee.html" title="McIrony: An unexpected response from McAfee ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Aug 2008 09:04:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee">mcafee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee secure">mcafee secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/negative security research">negative security research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee secure product">mcafee secure product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security research community">security research community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security professional">information security professional</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/positive outcome">positive outcome</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/mcirony-unexpected-response-from-mcafee.html">McIrony: An unexpected response from McAfee</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Old laws dont cover Cybercrime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f9bae1b796c4a6d1b215809f4cbd3027</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f9bae1b796c4a6d1b215809f4cbd3027</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We really need to get our laws updated quickly. Cybercrime is up 20
Businesses are being targeted more routinely


clipped from www.crime-research.org

Scene of the Cybercrime: Inside Todays...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>We really need to get our laws updated quickly. Cybercrime is up 20%.<br />
Businesses are being targeted more routinely.</div>
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<td valign="top"><a title="go to this clipmark" href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/64B02289-0173-4D25-8D18-B2E876E5E3D6/"><img style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/a09d3640-cf18-4e6d-b96e-e15292ab93eb/64B02289-0173-4D25-8D18-B2E876E5E3D6/" border="0" alt="" width="19" height="19" /></a>clipped from <a style="font-size: 11px;" title="http://www.crime-research.org/news/10.08.2008/3498/" href="http://www.crime-research.org/news/10.08.2008/3498/">www.crime-research.org</a></td>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.crime-research.org/news/10.08.2008/3498/ --></p>
<div style="margin: 4px 0px; color: #000000; font-size: 20px;">Scene of the Cybercrime: Inside Today&#8217;s Cybercrime World</div>
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<p>Today we live and work in a world of global connectivity. We can exchange casual conversation or conduct multimillion-dollar monetary transactions with people on the other side of the planet quickly and inexpensively. The proliferation of personal computers, easy access to the Internet, and a booming market for related new communications devices have changed the way we spend our leisure time and the way we do business.</p></div>
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<td style="border-width: 0px; padding: 0px; background: transparent none repeat scroll 0%; width: 107px;" width="107" align="right"><a title="blog or email this clip" href="http://clipmarks.com/share/64B02289-0173-4D25-8D18-B2E876E5E3D6/blog/"><img style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" src="http://content6.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 16 Aug 2008 12:38:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cybercrime">cybercrime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exchange casual conversation">exchange casual conversation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/planet quickly">planet quickly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quickly">quickly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/communications devices">communications devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/easy access">easy access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monetary transactions">monetary transactions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal computers">personal computers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/leisure time">leisure time</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=561">Old laws dont cover Cybercrime</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Apptis and USNS Mercy Monitoring on the High Seas]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32ab3189b54d8e46b467ebbf87db32e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32ab3189b54d8e46b467ebbf87db32e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Meet Mike Lawson, Pre-Sales Engineer at Apptis, a leading system integrator and ScienceLogic partner that has deployed EM7 to meet the network, systems and application management needs of several...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="244" alt="mike2 (Small)" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/mike2-small.jpg" width="204" align="left" border="0"> Meet Mike Lawson, Pre-Sales Engineer at Apptis, a leading system integrator and ScienceLogic partner that has deployed EM7 to meet the network, systems and application management needs of several customers. We thought Mike would have an interesting perspective to share on EM7, having recently come from the “customer side” and already with a few deployments under his belt.
<p><b>ScienceLogic: Mike, what’s your background working with network and management system tools?</b>
<p><b>Mike Lawson: </b>Before joining Apptis, I worked for the Air Force, mainly in satellite communications for almost nine years. I’m probably most familiar with HP OpenView and BMC Remedy. I managed a team that used them but wasn’t involved in tool selection; like many other federal IT workers, we didn’t have a choice of tools because there were existing enterprise licenses and maintenance contracts.
<p>I also saw a large systems integrator do a full Remedy/Crystal Systems/OpenView installation. It took 6 weeks to stand up and customize to meet just the basic monitoring requirements, and it cost something like half a million dollars. At the time, I thought that wasn’t bad and was a pretty typical experience.
<p><b>ScienceLogic: Coming from where you did, what’s your take on EM7?</b>
<p><strong>Mike Lawson:</strong> Honestly, I didn’t believe that EM7 could really do all that it claimed. In many ways, it was the complete opposite of what I had seen first-hand with other monitoring solutions. Could it really cover that much functionality? At relatively much lower cost to the customer and without the licensing nightmare?
<p>That quickly changed when I needed to understand the system enough to run it at a customer’s site. I went back over the training docs I received during my initial training class and jumped in; now, 6 months later, I’m the EM7 expert and can tell you that it delivers on all those promises. (But I still need to show people to get them to believe it too)
<p>I preach the “EM7 gospel” and when anyone wants to talk monitoring, I ask about the universal pain points: cost, maintenance contracts and licensing, and then I explain EM7. The cost difference is real; the solution is based on capacity, so there’s no licensing and it’s easy to use. They are shocked to learn that they can buy multiple EM7 appliances and years of maintenance for what they paid for most other tools.
<p><b>ScienceLogic: Apptis won the contract for monitoring aboard the USNS Mercy. We love that you’re using EM7 for one of the Navy’s hospital ships. Can you tell us more?</b>
<p><strong>Mike Lawson:</strong> The USNS Mercy is a Military Sealift Command hospital ship. <a href="http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&amp;tid=400&amp;ct=4" target="_blank">Some stats</a>:
<ul>
<li>849 feet long (nearly the size of a football field)
<li>12 fully-equipped operating rooms, a 1,000 bed hospital facility, digital radiological services, a diagnostic and clinical laboratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, a CAT scan and two oxygen producing plants
<li>Crew: 61 civilian mariners, 956 Naval medical staff, and 259 Naval support staff</li>
</ul>
<p>The USNS recently departed on a five-month humanitarian mission in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia in support of Pacific Partnership 2008. The partnership provides international medical, dental and engineering teams this summer to provide humanitarian support and conduct joint, combined, and cooperative Civil-Military Operations in order to improve regional stability and build partner capacity to respond to natural disasters and pandemic.
<p>For the most part, the ship’s network is self-contained, but can also use a landline when docked. The network covers 400 devices, including Windows/Exchange servers and VMware for server virtualization. Prior to using EM7, none of the monitoring was integrated; each system was independently monitored through individual vendor-specific consoles.
<p>Out of the box, EM7 provided integrated systems, application and network management for all network gear, applications and virtual machines in one solution. We didn’t have to do a lot of customization – EM7 includes best-practice based thresholds, event and monitoring templates and this covered what USNS Mercy needed to monitor.
<p><b>ScienceLogic: You’re a systems integrator with a very useful “customer point of view” when it comes to looking at tools. From that perspective, can you share what you think are the biggest benefits that EM7 provides?</b>
<p><strong>Mike Lawson:</strong> First of all, EM7 stands up right away. We’re talking days, not weeks. In contrast to the lengthy installation of OpenView and Remedy I witnessed during my military career, I was able to configure, customize, and implement the EM7 solution for the USNS Mercy in three days.
<p>Second, it’s easy to train people on and the support is outstanding. This judgment is from first-hand experience. Right before the USNS Mercy departed on its latest voyage, the system administrator I had trained on EM7 left, so I had all of a day to train some new EM7 admins. I prepared a seven-page “cheat sheet” and over a 3-hour conference call, we walked through the entire EM7 solution; I haven’t gotten a support call since.
<p>And when a problem did crop up with a device being discovered incorrectly, ScienceLogic was very responsive. We contacted ScienceLogic support on a Saturday and they created and emailed us a video to help troubleshoot the same day. Within 30 seconds of watching the video, the problem was resolved.
<p>Finally, EM7 helps us be good stewards of the government’s money. This is very important to me personally and to Apptis as a company. Because EM7 is cheaper and deploys so quickly and easily, you might think that it’s just the opposite of what a system integrator would want to use. But that’s short-term thinking. We believe in deliver the most value for customers every time. It’s what creates trust and long-term relationships with our customers. Instead of that half million spent on standing up the solution and basic setup, I’d much rather (and I know the customer would rather) spend that on fine-tuning or extending the solution to do much, much more.
<p>As a former government employee, I know what it’s like to use a tool that doesn’t fit my needs. EM7 proves that the best solution can totally break the old model of costly, lengthy installations. EM7 has the right model: the right solution and the right price delivered as an appliance that is easy to deploy, train on and use. </p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Apptis+and+USNS+Mercy+%26ndash%3B+Monitoring+on+the+High+Seas&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fapptis-and-usns-mercy-monitoring-on-the-high-seas%2F08%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:59:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solution">solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/entire em7 solution">entire em7 solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 gospel">em7 gospel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 proves">em7 proves</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 admins">em7 admins</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple em7 appliances">multiple em7 appliances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 solution">em7 solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/explain em7">explain em7</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/apptis-and-usns-mercy-monitoring-on-the-high-seas/08/2008">Apptis and USNS Mercy Monitoring on the High Seas</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reminder: WebEx Seminar on Risk Analysis]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/967093a66c194ca86dac97183d5a6526</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/967093a66c194ca86dac97183d5a6526</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Hey everybody! Quick post this morning to remind you guys that Cisco has been kind enough to let us give a follow on WebEx presentation on July 31, 2008 at 11:30 a.m. EDT. The link to sign up is &gt;&gt; ....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey everybody!  Quick post this morning to remind you guys that Cisco has been kind enough to let us give a follow on WebEx presentation on  July 31, 2008 at 11:30 a.m. EDT.  The link to sign up is <a href="https://ciscosales.webex.com/ciscosales/onstage/g.php?d=929845289&amp;t=a&amp;EA=miradiga%40cisco.com&amp;ET=d5be1b551672ee32df7260c6418042ca&amp;ETR=b92381359a9255da61ca95ac83ae2f0e"><strong>&lt;&lt;&lt;here&gt;&gt;&gt;</strong></a>.  There are only about 40 slots left.  It looks like it&#8217;s going to be a good crowd.</p>
<p>We&#8217;re calling this part II - and it&#8217;s being advertised as:</p>
<p><em><strong>&#8220;How to conduct a risk analysis and produce a high impact deliverable to senior management.&#8221;</strong></em></p>
<p>With topics:</p>
<ul>
<li>The life-cycle of a quantitative risk analysis</li>
<li>Key control opportunities against targeted attacks</li>
<li>Getting senior management to understand the risk posed to the business</li>
</ul>
<p>I got to do the Q&amp;A backchannel on the last presentation, and there were great questions asked.  I think this presentation will be even more exciting, as it&#8217;ll cover both analyst and management considerations.</p>
<p>If you&#8217;re a regular reader of the blog, I don&#8217;t think you&#8217;ll have to have attended the last one for this one to be worth your while.</p>
<p><strong>REPEAT PERFORMANCES OF THE FIRST WEBEX ARE AVAILABLE</strong></p>
<p>And if you missed it the first time, the playback of the first preso is <a href="https://ciscosales.webex.com/ciscosales/lsr.php?AT=pb&amp;SP=EC&amp;rID=25693942&amp;rKey=5A9EF2E7F1B062BC"><strong>here</strong></a>, and the slides are <a href="http://www.riskmanagementinsight.com/media/documents/Risk_Evolution.pdf"><strong>here</strong></a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 13:56:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk analysis">risk analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webex">webex</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webex presentation">webex presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quantitative risk analysis">quantitative risk analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presentation">presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/senior management">senior management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key control opportunities">key control opportunities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk posed">risk posed</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact deliverable">impact deliverable</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=379">Reminder: WebEx Seminar on Risk Analysis</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Wee-Fi: Research on Digital Divide; NYC May Opt for Fiber for Housing Projects]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bee176c3470a5229e4b9bd38947d3add</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bee176c3470a5229e4b9bd38947d3add</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Participate in a research survey on the role of wireless to shrink the digital divide: Gwen Shaffer, a Temple University (Phila.) doctoral student, is looking for responses from many kinds of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/weefi.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://templeuniversit.wirelesscommunities.sgizmo.com"><strong>Participate in a research survey on the role of wireless to shrink the digital divide:</strong></a> Gwen Shaffer, a Temple University (Phila.) doctoral student, is looking for responses from many kinds of stakeholders in building networks that have a purpose, at least in part, to extend Wi-Fi access. She notes that this could include community networks, non-profits, and for-profit firms like Fon. Personal information will not be collected, and she's looking to conduct in-depth interviews with some participants.</p>

<p><a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9110977"><strong>New York City considers plan to bring fiber to public housing residents:</strong></a> Wireless networks are definitely out in the recommendations of a private consultant to the city's Broadband Advisory Committee, ComputerWorld reports. They may opt to use $4m in a fund from Verizon and a potential $8m from the two incumbent cable operators.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jul 2008 10:40:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/networks">networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/include community networks">include community networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital divide">digital divide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless networks">wireless networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless">wireless</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/incumbent cable operators">incumbent cable operators</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/extend wi-fi access">extend wi-fi access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/broadband advisory committee">broadband advisory committee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conduct in-depth interviews">conduct in-depth interviews</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008404.html">Wee-Fi: Research on Digital Divide; NYC May Opt for Fiber for Housing Projects</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Basic Flaws Allow Phishing And Spamming Vulnerabilities In iPhone]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3772766b7190ac40aafef25191e19194</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3772766b7190ac40aafef25191e19194</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Security researcher Aviv Raff has discovered a pair of basic design flaws that could allow malicious phishing and spamming attacks on your iPhone. According to an advisory from Raff, the iPhones Mail...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Security researcher Aviv Raff has discovered a pair of basic design flaws that could allow malicious phishing and spamming attacks on your iPhone. According to an advisory from Raff, the iPhone’s Mail and Safari applications are susceptible to a URL Spoofing vulnerability which allow attackers to conduct phishing attacks. iPhone Mail and Safari on firmware [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 18:34:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iphone">iphone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/basic design flaws">basic design flaws</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safari applications">safari applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iphone mail">iphone mail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safari">safari</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/iphones mail">iphones mail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/firmware">firmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pair">pair</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/basic-flaws-allow-phishing-and-spamming-vulnerabilities-in-iphone/">Basic Flaws Allow Phishing And Spamming Vulnerabilities In iPhone</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Seven steps to managing IT Risk]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3cc491d771b5e862de257f98f7667692</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3cc491d771b5e862de257f98f7667692</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Came across this overview read from a Gartner research note recently. It lays out seven recommended steps managing risk


Implement a framework for risk assessment and mapping
Establish the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Came across this <a href="http://www.pmportal.co.uk/content.asp?id=1812">overview read from a Gartner</a> research note recently.  It lays out seven recommended steps managing risk. <br /><br /><ul><li>Implement a framework for risk assessment and mapping.</li><li>Establish the responsibilities of risk managers with their areas of responsibility.</li><li>Identify and define the risks to which the business is exposed and what constitutes a risk event or "near miss" so that incidents can be mapped to specific risks.</li><li>Determine the threat level, and focus on those risks with the highest impact on performance.</li><li>Establish levels of controls for processes commensurate with the perceived threat.</li><li>Record and retain risk incident and near-miss information.</li><li>Conduct periodic risk assessments to determine changes in the operations risk profile and assess control performance.</li></ul>Great advice.  These seven steps are precisely what IT-GRC solutions should help an Enterprise accomplish.  They provide the construct (aka think configuration wizard) for establishing and maintaining a quality risk management program.   If you have on your company priority list advancing the the risk mitigation/management capabilities or if you've recently been burned, take the time and check out some of our new product demonstration videos.  We strive to be transparent around what we offer with our software.  That's why our marketing isn't really "marketing" it's live product in action.  <a href="http://security-works.com/metrics.html">Come check it out</a>.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PracticalRiskManagement/~4/341936763" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 17:34:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk event">risk event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk assessment">risk assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk managers">risk managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/operations risk profile">operations risk profile</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/retain risk incident">retain risk incident</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific risks">specific risks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/steps">steps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risks">risks</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/PracticalRiskManagement/~3/341936763/seven-steps-to-managing-it-risk.html">Seven steps to managing IT Risk</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Do we need a farm system in the security industry?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9bd54e0c74e4d7f5590217159a48aeec</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9bd54e0c74e4d7f5590217159a48aeec</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just read a good article by Lisa Vaas on Computerworld titles &quot;When security staffers fail up&quot;. The article talks about some of the challenges that are faced by companies trying to provide proper...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just read a <a href="http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&amp;articleId=9104599&amp;pageNumber=4">good article by Lisa Vaas</a> on Computerworld titles "When security staffers fail up". The article talks about some of the challenges that are faced by companies trying to provide proper security. While one of the issues is "bundled badness" which I will talk about later, the bigger problem that Lisa writes about is the profile of our security administrators. It is a familiar story I am afraid. Security people don't do a good job of "humanizing" themselves. Their peers don't understand what they are trying to accomplish and too often we speak in geek terms and try to dictate how people conduct business. As a result we are the "people in the way".<br><br>The next thing Lisa hits on is the obsession with certifications. Too many people think having a CISSP is the be all and end all of security. First of all, you can't hire enough of them and many of them don't have the practical business experience to take it to the next level. Than there is the security "prima donna". They just think they are smarter than everyone else and too many tasks are below them as to elementary. We have all met these types before as well. <br><br>Quickly on the "bundled badness" thing. Lisa rightfully points out that in spite of Mike Rothman's feelings to the contrary, though CIO and CFO types like to buy the bundle and get the jack of all trades suite cheaper than buying best of breeds individually, at the end of the day it is hurting our security. If you are really serious about securing the environment there is a world of difference between buying the bundle of goodness versus best in class tools.<br><br>Ultimately though, what are we to do about getting better security pros in the workplace? Do we need to change the certification process? Should companies have a different profile of who they hire for security positions. Do we need to develop some sort of farm system where security pros can cut their teeth and learn their craft, like the guilds and apprentices of yesteryear? The construction industry used to work like that. Maybe we should consider it too?</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=bEHJbL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=bEHJbL" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=mx99tJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=mx99tJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=e6dpaJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=e6dpaJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=YwE32J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=YwE32J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=Io9IaJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=Io9IaJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=qFI7Kj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=qFI7Kj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=TYeLwj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=TYeLwj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/341925149" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 12:17:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security administrators">security administrators</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security staffers fail">security staffers fail</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security positions">security positions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security people">security people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security pros">security pros</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lisa hits">lisa hits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lisa">lisa</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/341925149/do-we-need-a-fa.html">Do we need a farm system in the security industry?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Bubblicious]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/14b20bc109726f2d895ba34188e3ede3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/14b20bc109726f2d895ba34188e3ede3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[iang surveyed the events that conspired to our present ever mounting economic problems. Interestingly enough Charlie Munger identified much the same themes (not all the particulars) way back in Wesco...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.theonion.com/content/news/recession_plagued_nation_demands"></a><a style="float: left;" href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553a119cb8833-pi"><img  class="at-xid-6a00d83451c75869e200e553a119cb8833 " alt="20080714_onion_bubble" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553a119cb8833-320pi" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px;" title="20080714_onion_bubble"></a> <a href="https://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001062.html">iang surveyed</a> the events that conspired to our present ever mounting economic problems. Interestingly enough <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Munger">Charlie Munger</a> identified much the same themes (not all the particulars) way back in <a href="http://www.docstoc.com/docs/949558/Wesco-Financial-1990-Letter">Wesco Financial's 1990 letter</a>

</p><blockquote><p>
	Granting the presence of perverse incentives, what are the operating mechanics that cause widespread bad loans (where the higher interest rates do not adequately cover increased risk of loss) under our present system? After all, the bad lending, while it has a surface plausibility to bankers under cost pressure, is, by definition, not rational, at least for the lending banks and the wider civilization. How then does bad lending occur so often? 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>It occurs (partly) because there are predictable irrationalities among people as social animals. It is now pretty clear (in experimental social psychology) that people on the horns of a dilemma, which is where our system has placed our bankers, are extra likely to react unwisely to the example of other peoples' conduct, now widely called "social proof". So, once some banker has apparently (but not really) solved his cost-pressure problem by unwise lending, a considerable amount of imitative "crowd folly", relying on the "social proof", is the natural consequence. Additional massive irrational lending is caused by "reinforcement" of foolish behavior, caused by unwise accounting convention in a manner discussed later in this letter. It is hard to be wise when the messages which drive you are wrong messages provided by a mal-designed system. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>In chemistry, if you mix items that explode in combination, you always get in trouble until you learn not to allow the mixture. So also, in the American banking system.
</p></blockquote><p>

So Munger identified this volatile combination about 17 years ago at least.

In the same letter Warren Buffett added:
</p><blockquote><p>
	A few small sections of Mr. Munger's letter have been excluded: When Berkshire's report exceeds 72 pages, we have problems in binding it. Because of this limitation, either Charlie's letter or mine had to be cut and I decided a coin flip was appropriate. In fact - as things turned out - I finally decided nine flips were appropriate. -- W.E.B.
	
</p></blockquote><p>

Only thing I would (and did) add to iang's post is that historically speaking when things are looking bad is when deals are found. <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121582067258747665.html">Jason Zweig</a> (channeling <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Graham">Ben Graham</a>)

</p><blockquote><p>
	"Could things possibly get worse? I don't know, but I am an optimist -- so I certainly hope things do get worse. Nothing else should satisfy an intelligent investor."
</p></blockquote>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 17:26:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad">bad</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/widespread bad loans">widespread bad loans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter">letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/charlie munger">charlie munger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/charlie">charlie</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social proof">social proof</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/munger">munger</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/volatile combination">volatile combination</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/bubblicious.html">Bubblicious</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5e8ee0a0eb7aec0d6393e17e6cc64b3d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon. Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young. Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in Batman , than Col Jessep in A Few Good...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen.jpg"><img title="fewgoodmen" height="183" alt="fewgoodmen" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/fewgoodmen_thumb.jpg" width="179" align="left" border="0" style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: 0px; MARGIN: 0px 10px 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0px" /></a> I am not sure what it is with Richard Stiennon.&nbsp; Maybe his mom beat him with a NAC stick when he was young.&nbsp; Hence his Jack Nicholson looks (more like the Joker in <a class="zem_slink" title="Batman" href="http://www.dccomics.com/sites/batman/" rel="homepage">Batman</a>, than Col Jessep in <a class="zem_slink" title="A Few Good Men" href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257" rel="imdb">A Few Good Men</a>) and his total disdain for NAC.&nbsp; In any event Richard never seems to miss a chance to take a pot shot at NAC.&nbsp; I have fired back and debated him many times on this.&nbsp; In fact I am convinced that Richard's problem with NAC is that like Uncle Joe, he is just moving a little slow.&nbsp; Richard still thinks of NAC as Cisco???s network admission control, circa Dec ???03.&nbsp; He has not gotten up to speed on anything happening with NAC since.&nbsp; Richard is going to debate NAC with Joel Snyder according to <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/vpn/2008/070708nac2.html">this article</a> by Tim Greene today. My prediction is Snyder by a knockout in 3 rounds or less.</p>

<p>Richard???s latest NAC knock comes on a comment to an <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/07/security-analys.html?cid=121871540#comment-121871540">excellent article by the Hoff</a>.&nbsp; Chris takes a bold stand for someone working for a vendor and calls BS on the whole analyst thing (I will write more about that later in this article). Richard being an ex-analyst himself (lets face it, with Richard you can take the man out of the analyst job, but you can???t take the analyst out of the man), takes exception to Hoff???s ???whining??? (Richards words, not mine) and tries to tell Hoff that giving up is not the answer and the way to show up analysts, is to prove them wrong.&nbsp; Great Richard you try to prove them wrong, when because of what they report you don???t have a market, can???t get any capital and have no visibility.&nbsp; I guess that is when it is time to move on to the next gig, right? Then Richard has a bad NAC deja vu and feels it necessary to write this: </p><blockquote><p><em>???Look how easy it is to one up the analyst firms, who as near as I can tell support Network Admission Control universally. Everyone except the folks at Updata Ventures know how seriously flawed NAC is with only one viable market, edu.???</em></p></blockquote><p>I assume Richard is referring to Updata recently leading the Bradford Networks VC round. But more importantly Richard it is time to call a code red on you and give you the cold hard truth.&nbsp; Richard the fact is that the edu market is not the only viable market for NAC.&nbsp; In fact, one of the biggest customers of NAC is the DoD.&nbsp; That is right Richard at least 3 of the 4 armed forces use NAC in helping to secure their networks. To paraphrase my friend Col Jessep - Richard, you want the truth, you can???t handle the truth!&nbsp; You sleep securely under the blanket of protection that NAC provides.&nbsp; If it is good enough to help ???clean the sand??? out of laptops coming home from SWA (that is SouthWest Asia, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, in case you don???t know Richard), it should be good enough for you. Think about that next time you are about to bad mouth NAC.</p>

<p>Let me give you some other truths you may not like Richard.&nbsp; Why do you think every switch vendor (of which we partner with many of them) is lining up and bringing out NAC solutions?&nbsp; Why has Microsoft put such a big push on NAP?&nbsp; Why despite the Luddites like you does NAC still draw crowds at conferences like Interop (ask Joel about that).&nbsp; Richard we are still signing new major OEM partners.&nbsp; I am afraid you are the one sadly out of touch on this one Richard.&nbsp; Just as you are out of touch in missing Hoff???s point in his article.</p>

<p>As to Hoff???s article, as I said I give Chris credit for speaking his mind. I spend an ungodly amount of my time speaking with analysts and trying to ???learn??? from them while at the same time trying to educate them.&nbsp; I am constantly amazed that so many analysts (and press for that matter) just take a vendors word as gospel. I have seen research reports from analysts big and small, that I am sure did not have any more research done than calling a handful of vendors and listening to their spiel. Too many of these vendors if they do speak to customers, base their findings on such a small sample that it is impossible to have an accurate picture.</p>

<p>Personally, like Hoff says, who watches the watchers is the truth. I would like to see a code of conduct among analysts. I would start by dictating that vendors cannot pay analysts.&nbsp; Take the payola out of the equation the way they did to the DJ/Radio business in the late 50s. Next analyst reports have to come with metrics to back up the findings. I want to know how many customers they spoke to, how big they were, how they were found, etc.&nbsp; A vendor giving an analyst a real live???pet??? customer is not real research. I want to know if the customer pays the analyst. It is a dirty business. </p>

<p>Hey let me be clear, I play the game as well as the next guy.&nbsp; But I agree with Hoff we need to clean up the rules to make the whole analyst thing more fair, viable and valuable.</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=e6165b9b-253e-4392-a8dd-ef9917b5dc2e" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jul 2008 18:50:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac">nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac stick">nac stick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard">richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/richard stiennon">richard stiennon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad mouth nac">bad mouth nac</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/importantly richard">importantly richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nac knock">nac knock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume richard">assume richard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/event richard">event richard</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/you-want-the-tr.html">You want the truth, you can't handle the truth!</source>
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