I’ve often read people who say that we (security, risk management) need to “think like the attacker”.  And when you read this sort of article, that usually alludes to trying to anticipate the tactics an attacker might use to mess with your C, I, or A.  Smart stuff, that, and very useful when architecting security solutions.  But as I was training some folks Monday, I was thinking in the back of my head about Threat Capability (TCap) in FAIR.  As you might know, we like to estimate the capability of a threat to apply some level of “force” against our assets.  This ability to apply force is a byproduct of the attacker’s skills and resources.  And thinking of how an attacker applies skills and resources, I came across another way we might “think” like an attacker.

Traditionally, I’ve thought of “skills” as being a byproduct of the toolset an attacker has.  This mindset probably stems from my time with Penetration Testing teams, where in the process of scoping the  PenTest I would ask our clients to select the level of effort that they wanted us to throw at them.  If a client chose “high” we’d throw every ‘spoit we had at them.  If they chose “low” we’d limit ourselves to a more commonly available toolset.

But while the resources part of TCap is time & materials (money) - the skills are really more than just the toolset.  Skills would include the ability of the attacker to be creative and innovative.    As an example of that innovation from those PenTesting days - when we got a “high” effort request, we would always try to couple that with some “social engineering”-type of attack, or some unique means of delivering an existing exploit.  Our creativity was not necessarily a byproduct of a unique exploit or tool we had, but the process by which we might deliver pre-existing or commonly available exploits.  I remember when we first got ahold of a handful of 32mb thumb drives (hey, 32mb was huge back then) and “dropped” a few in the lobby of a client’s retail space.  The keystroke loggers and phone-home script weren’t new, but using the thumb drive as delivery vehicle certainly was.

So I’ve started to really think about this concept of innovation, and how if “thinking like an attacker” means to be innovative, we ought to do the same.  I’ve been thinking of two main categories of innovation this morning.

INNOVATION

The first I’ll call Technology Innovation.  And by Technology Innovation, I mean some new, unique, “ahead of the curve” technology that an attacker can use against us.  The obvious example of which is a zero-day.  It’s that “high” tool set our PenTesters would use against the clients.  For security departments, this might be the latest security product designed to enhance our ability to P, D, and/or R.

Alternately, we can be creative in the way we deliver (manage) existing technology.  I think of this as Process Innovation.  It’s doing more with what we already have, just like the PenTest team would be creative in the delivery of an existing exploit.

Unfortunately for us - attackers have traditionally had quite a leg up on us in terms of Process Innovation.  It is much easier fro them to be creative, as they are free of political constraints and bureaucracy.  In contrast, when the security industry tries Process Innovation, the results are checklists and “standards”.  It’s committees and consensus.  An extreme example of which might be something like SABSA - a great work if you want to understand some very smart people’s comprehensive understanding of organizational security  - but the “adoption”of which will do very little to help you be innovative in P/D/R.

It’s worth noting that ultimately, this is one reason I don’t like regulatory compliance efforts - they simply serve to prove how mundane your security department is,  wasting valuable resources that could be spent on creating ways to be more effective.

PROCESS INNOVATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

As we come to the close of 2009, some surveys suggest that security spending isn’t horribly impacted yet by the economy (the latest from E&Y points to only 5% of their respondents getting budget cuts).  But if this is a protracted downturn, and because InfoSec is an operational expense, I would expect cash to become more and more difficult to keep.  And regardless if technology spends do slow, I believe it makes sense to think about Process Innovation because I see Process Innovation as a means to increase effectiveness without significant capital expenditures (effectiveness increases because our ability to manage risk has a direct correlation to the amount of risk we have).

The bad news is, of course, that great innovation is hard.  It is R & D.  Failure is usually a pre-requisite to success.

The good news is, our current state is so bad that many of us don’t need to come up with a whizbang new way of reducing software defects in the SDLC as innovation.  Simply inserting a risk analyst into the PMO’s processes might count as a big enough victory. Be cautioned, though,  that if we’re substituting the risk reductions provided by technology acquisition - Process Innovation might actually be even more “expensive” as it requires us to expend political capital.   But there are (forgive the term) innovative ways to spend this political capital.

For example, by taking a second now and figuring out the 3 things that the rest of the organization can do to make your life easier, when that “I need to reduce your budget” talk comes, you can be prepared to negotiate.  Get a political capital “loan” or “investment” from the C-Suite reducing your budget.  Something to the effect of: “I expected this, and am happy to give up my budget.  But if our tolerance for risk hasn’t changed, what I’d like to do is get you to personally back my office on three projects I’ve identified that can reduce our risk without requiring significant capital expenditure.”

Partial Disclosure - The Good

The responsible disclosure process tends to break down in rare occasions where the vendor doesn’t want to fix the issue. When this occurs, the researcher is put into a difficult position whereby full disclosure could put users’ systems at high risk of compromise. The other case where partial disclosure becomes an alternative is when the researcher has discovered a design flaw in a protocol or underlying multiple vendor component. Examples of this case include the DNS flaws published this past summer by Dan Kaminsky and the TCP denial of service condition discovered by Robert E. Lee and Jack Louis that is currently in the disclosure process. When the flaw affects a very large number of vendors and the actual problem is located within the underlying protocols that support the communications of the Internet as a whole, one possible solution is to follow a partial disclosure model where phasing the details to the general public can be used to encourage adoption and creation of patches throughout the enormous target audience.

Partial Disclosure - The Bad

What is driving the fear surrounding partial disclosure is the potential for abuse. When a major flaw is partially disclosed, a number of potential issues may occur. First and foremost, the further along the partial disclosure path we are, the more details will be released to the public, and the higher the probability that someone (either good or bad intentioned) will figure out the exploit and disclose the details. Second, when partially disclosing, the vendor’s hand is being forced into a situation that could speed up fixes, reduce testing, and cause ripple problems elsewhere within the infrastructure. It is difficult enough to dance the fine time line when doing responsible disclosure, but if we are escalated to the point of partial disclosure, additional fuel is added to the fire.

The Ugly

The real ugly part of partial disclosure is when we add to the equation the ability to spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt into the normal user community. It is generally well accepted that FUD can be used to drive additional revenue. If it is possible to increase the perceived magnitude of the “problem” that your product or service solves, it is possible to directly impact the demand for that product or service. That is the major fear imposed by the growing trend of partial disclosure. By releasing just enough information to trigger wide scale speculation into the flaw, it is possible to create buzz and garner media attention resulting in a lot of speculation and very little hard facts around the issue. The potential for abuse by the security industry at large is enormous.

The Fix

Some have suggested a group of security researchers be convened to vet the requirement of partial disclosure and to allow for independent peer review of any security research that requires the partial disclosure process. This suggestion leaves questions regarding who would stand on this group and who would be impartial enough to ensure that the right thing was always done regardless of profit potential. It also leaves open the opportunity for member researchers to utilize the information gathered during the vetting process to position themselves to profit from the data upon release. It might be wiser to rely on a higher level authority or government entity to manage this process and use the services of security researchers as required for subject matter expertise. While a group of this type wouldn’t ensure that all partial disclosure is appropriate, it would hopefully limit the potential for abuse and the ever present chance that people try to profit from the FUD that surrounds the current partial disclosure process.

Today, allow me to update you on FAIR and the movement towards a formal, open standard.  There’s a couple of cool things going on in our little risk-world.

First, The Open Group Security Forum continues to move towards a formal adoption of FAIR.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN “WE” - YOU GOT A STANDARDS BODY IN YOUR POCKET OR SOMETHING?

Our meeting in Chicago a few weeks ago was great, but also slightly disturbing for me. I got pronoun-confusion syndrome.   I’m used to using the “we” pronoun to refer to RMI, or Jack and myself as we vet the models.  So without even thinking I would said “we have been looking at how loss occurs, and may want to change the model some” and The Open Group Members freaked out (rightfully so).  Adrian Seccombe gently reminded me that the “we” was now the Security Forum, and that “we” didn’t go changing things at will without vetting against each other.  Man I love this stuff.  I get to run our thoughts and ideas past some great folks now - you know, those smart people who tend to have really complex problems and are trying hard to solve them.

Formal Adoption:  Soon, Very Soon Now

Formal Adoption basically means we’ve made this document, everyone is close to saying that they generally like it, and once that finally happens then “bam”, we’re ready to move onward and upward with better things (see Cookbooks, below).  We’ve got a couple of changes to the current document that have been requested that aren’t a big deal.  For example, one request is that we make some statement about general applicability of FAIR to risk domains outside of the IT realm.   But once additions like that and others are done, this long process should be complete.

New Document Moving Towards Public Release:

We’ve got a basic document that should be public in the next few weeks on “What Makes a Good Risk Assessment Methodology” - written by yours truly and Jack.  It’s a very high-level document, and serves two purposes:

• For novices it helps parse out what is important in any undertaking to understand corporate risk (the repeated discussions on the ISO 27001 mailing list make me think it would be a place ripe for such a document).
• For those who “know” risk, it helps to re-establish some fundamental principles like the use of scales (ratio, please), the implications of dealing in probabilities, what attributes like consistency and defensibility mean, how “risk” should be reported to the business (something you know, meaningful) and so on.

When this doc is deemed ready for public consumption I’ll be sure to post on this blog here.

COOKBOOKS, EUROPEAN AGENCIES, AND, IRON CHEF “RISK” - WHOSE CUISINE WILL REIGN SUPREME?

One interesting thing that came up in the Chicago meeting was that ENISA (The European Network and Information Security Agency) developed a very nice document that reviewed something like 18 different risk assessment methodologies against their Criteria for Goodness.  FAIR was one of the ones they reviewed, and we (the royal “we” used there to include all us FAIR-Folk) did awfully well.  Things of interest:

1. They based their work on the current introduction paper which is not at all a step-by-step guide towards an organizational risk assessment (what ENISA really wanted) and we did pretty well.  Well enough that if we had developed a paper along the lines of NIST 800-30 or OCTAVE for the use of FAIR in a formal process, we could have done really, really well.  Like won-the-bake-off kind of well.
2. FAIR is actually not at all incongruous to many of the risk assessment methodologies offered, and in fact compliments many of them by letting those methodologies develop real, structured probabilities.  Think OCTAVE, where they basically say “math is (probabilities are) hard, so if you want to do them for reals, good luck!  But here’s a nonsensical way to do things if you want to believe in magic-fairy risk“.  FAIR fits right in there by stomping on the magic-fairy risk with the jack-boots of rationality.  FAIR similarly helps other risk standards that might lack structured probability development.

So The Open Group Security Forum decided that though we could create a new document and totally p0wn any future ENISA bake-off, there wasn’t much demand for the development of that documentation by the membership  - a point which was made quite apparent at the beginning of the discussion when one large European company CISO asked “What’s ENISA?”  Relevancy is everything, I suppose.

But that second item up there - the one about helping rather than competing with other “risk assessment methodologies” - really struck a chord.  So “we” (The Security Forum) are going to develop some “Cookbooks” that basically are high-level documents that say “If you want to use FAIR with (OCTAVE/COSO/CoBIT/Whatever) here’s how it fits, makes it better, and improves your life.  I’m pretty excited about these, and our first document looks like it’s going to be COSO integration.

THE OPEN GROUP SECURITY FORUM - THEY’RE A TRUSTING BUNCH (WITH QUALIFICATION, OF COURSE)

Finally, many people have asked me “Why work with The Open Group?”  There are many reasons, to be sure, but I will give you one example.  Members of the Security Forum there are not only great at vetting the model and getting consensus on risk and risk factors - but they’re quick to start applying.  So in Chicago, I thought I’d be talking about FAIR and the standard and fighting groupthink.  Nope.  Not at all.  In fact, the forum members spent more time suddenly discussing use of FAIR in a new Trust Model they’re developing.  So all of the sudden, I’m part of a new and exciting project to develop a Trust Model - how cool is that?  While formal adoption of the Trust Model will be necessarily long and deliberate - the collaboration and development is happening much faster than I can keep up with.  But if you all will allow me, it will help me get my head around it all by blogging about it later this week.  So be prepared to read about me dealing in “Trust” a little bit.

It's basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cyber security advisor, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security the devil is always in the details -- and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic -- McCain supposedly is "working on the issues" as well -- I have three pieces of policy advice for the next president, whoever he is. They're too detailed for campaign speeches or even position papers, but they're essential for improving information security in our society. Actually, they apply to national security in general. And they're things only government can do.

One, use your immense buying power to improve the security of commercial products and services. One property of technological products is that most of the cost is in the development of the product rather than the production. Think software: The first copy costs millions, but the second copy is free.

You have to secure your own government networks, military and civilian. You have to buy computers for all your government employees. Consolidate those contracts, and start putting explicit security requirements into the RFPs. You have the buying power to get your vendors to make serious security improvements in the products and services they sell to the government, and then we all benefit because they'll include those improvements in the same products and services they sell to the rest of us. We're all safer if information technology is more secure, even though the bad guys can use it, too.

Two, legislate results and not methodologies. There are a lot of areas in security where you need to pass laws, where the security externalities are such that the market fails to provide adequate security. For example, software companies who sell insecure products are exploiting an externality just as much as chemical plants that dump waste into the river. But a bad law is worse than no law. A law requiring companies to secure personal data is good; a law specifying what technologies they should use to do so is not. Mandating software liabilities for software failures is good, detailing how is not. Legislate for the results you want and implement the appropriate penalties; let the market figure out how -- that's what markets are good at.

Three, broadly invest in research. Basic research is risky; it doesn't always pay off. That's why companies have stopped funding it. Bell Labs is gone because nobody could afford it after the AT&T breakup, but the root cause was a desire for higher efficiency and short-term profitability -- not unreasonable in an unregulated business. Government research can be used to balance that by funding long-term research.

Spread those research dollars wide. Lately, most research money has been redirected through DARPA to near-term military-related projects; that's not good. Keep the earmark-happy Congress from dictating how the money is spent. Let the NSF, NIH and other funding agencies decide how to spend the money and don't try to micromanage. Give the national laboratories lots of freedom, too. Yes, some research will sound silly to a layman. But you can't predict what will be useful for what, and if funding is really peer-reviewed, the average results will be much better. Compared to corporate tax breaks and other subsidies, this is chump change.

If our research capability is to remain vibrant, we need more science and math students with decent elementary and high school preparation. The declining interest is partly from the perception that scientists don't get rich like lawyers and dentists and stockbrokers, but also because science isn't valued in a country full of creationists. One way the president can help is by trusting scientific advisers and not overruling them for political reasons.

Oh, and get rid of those post-9/11 restrictions on student visas that are causing (.pdf) so many top students to do their graduate work in Canada, Europe and Asia instead of in the United States. Those restrictions will hurt us immensely in the long run.

Those are the three big ones; the rest is in the details. And it's the details that matter. There are lots of serious issues that you're going to have to tackle: data privacy, data sharing, data mining, government eavesdropping, government databases, use of Social Security numbers as identifiers, and so on. It's not enough to get the broad policy goals right. You can have good intentions and enact a good law, and have the whole thing completely gutted by two sentences sneaked in during rulemaking by some lobbyist.

Security is both subtle and complex, and -- unfortunately -- it doesn't readily lend itself to normal legislative processes. You're used to finding consensus, but security by consensus rarely works. On the internet, security standards are much worse when they're developed by a consensus body, and much better when someone just does them. This doesn't always work -- a lot of crap security has come from companies that have "just done it" -- but nothing but mediocre standards come from consensus bodies. The point is that you won't get good security without pissing someone off: The information broker industry, the voting machine industry, the telcos. The normal legislative process makes it hard to get security right, which is why I don't have much optimism about what you can get done.

And if you're going to appoint a cyber security czar, you have to give him actual budgetary authority -- otherwise he won't be able to get anything done, either.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

It's basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cyber security advisor, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security the devil is always in the details -- and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic -- McCain supposedly is "working on the issues" as well -- I have three pieces of policy advice for the next president, whoever he is. They're too detailed for campaign speeches or even position papers, but they're essential for improving information security in our society. Actually, they apply to national security in general. And they're things only government can do.

One, use your immense buying power to improve the security of commercial products and services. One property of technological products is that most of the cost is in the development of the product rather than the production. Think software: The first copy costs millions, but the second copy is free.

You have to secure your own government networks, military and civilian. You have to buy computers for all your government employees. Consolidate those contracts, and start putting explicit security requirements into the RFPs. You have the buying power to get your vendors to make serious security improvements in the products and services they sell to the government, and then we all benefit because they'll include those improvements in the same products and services they sell to the rest of us. We're all safer if information technology is more secure, even though the bad guys can use it, too.

Two, legislate results and not methodologies. There are a lot of areas in security where you need to pass laws, where the security externalities are such that the market fails to provide adequate security. For example, software companies who sell insecure products are exploiting an externality just as much as chemical plants that dump waste into the river. But a bad law is worse than no law. A law requiring companies to secure personal data is good; a law specifying what technologies they should use to do so is not. Mandating software liabilities for software failures is good, detailing how is not. Legislate for the results you want and implement the appropriate penalties; let the market figure out how -- that's what markets are good at.

Three, broadly invest in research. Basic research is risky; it doesn't always pay off. That's why companies have stopped funding it. Bell Labs is gone because nobody could afford it after the AT&T breakup, but the root cause was a desire for higher efficiency and short-term profitability -- not unreasonable in an unregulated business. Government research can be used to balance that by funding long-term research.

Spread those research dollars wide. Lately, most research money has been redirected through DARPA to near-term military-related projects; that's not good. Keep the earmark-happy Congress from dictating (.pdf) how the money is spent. Let the NSF, NIH and other funding agencies decide how to spend the money and don't try to micromanage. Give the national laboratories lots of freedom, too. Yes, some research will sound silly to a layman. But you can't predict what will be useful for what, and if funding is really peer-reviewed, the average results will be much better. Compared to corporate tax breaks and other subsidies, this is chump change.

If our research capability is to remain vibrant, we need more science and math students with decent elementary and high school preparation. The declining interest is partly from the perception that scientists don't get rich like lawyers and dentists and stockbrokers, but also because science isn't valued in a country full of creationists. One way the president can help is by trusting scientific advisers and not overruling them for political reasons.

Oh, and get rid of those post-9/11 restrictions on student visas that are causing (.pdf) so many top students to do their graduate work in Canada, Europe and Asia instead of in the United States. Those restrictions will hurt us (.pdf) immensely in the long run.

Those are the three big ones; the rest is in the details. And it's the details that matter. There are lots of serious issues that you're going to have to tackle: data privacy, data sharing, data mining, government eavesdropping, government databases, use of Social Security numbers as identifiers, and so on. It's not enough to get the broad policy goals right. You can have good intentions and enact a good law, and have the whole thing completely gutted by two sentences sneaked in during rulemaking by some lobbyist.

Security is both subtle and complex, and -- unfortunately -- it doesn't readily lend itself to normal legislative processes. You're used to finding consensus, but security by consensus rarely works. On the internet, security standards are much worse when they're developed by a consensus body, and much better when someone just does them. This doesn't always work -- a lot of crap security has come from companies that have "just done it" -- but nothing but mediocre standards come from consensus bodies. The point is that you won't get good security without pissing someone off: The information broker industry, the voting machine industry, the telcos. The normal legislative process makes it hard to get security right, which is why I don't have much optimism about what you can get done.

And if you're going to appoint a cyber security czar, you have to give him actual budgetary authority -- otherwise he won't be able to get anything done, either.

---

Bruce Schneier is chief security technology officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

Dan Munz, project manager of the Collaboration Project commented on the unique work that the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) is doing to bring together government leaders. The Collaboration Project seeks to innovate across government not just down the silos and create a safe place for leaders to have discussions around innovation.

ScienceLogic: What is the National Academy of Public Administration?

Dan Munz: The Academy is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to tackling government’s most complex challenges. We were founded in 1967 by James Webb, the NASA administrator who took us to the moon – he saw that he could consult the National Academy of Sciences for expert technical advice, but had no counterpart in government for expert management advice. That’s been our mission ever since.

ScienceLogic: What is the Collaboration Project? How long has it been around?

Dan Munz: The Collaboration Project is the Academy’s response to two parallel trends we see in government. The first is the government’s need to transform the way it does business. There is a strong demand for change out there driven by a number of challenges that are forcing the government to rethink its mission and structure. Challenges include a public disconnected from government; a multi-sector workforce and increasing reliance on contractors; financial instability; and new types of security threats, just to name a few. More and more, the challenges facing government reach across the traditional boundaries of agency and mission. But government isn’t configured to work that way.

The second trend is the unprecedented opportunity collaborative technology offers to drive transformational change in government. Tools like blogs, wikis, and mashups are changing the way leaders think about problems. They’re focusing not on what they can do just within their offices or agencies, but what voices they need to pull together across government, non-profits, the general citizenry, and other stakeholders to solve these problems. The Collaboration Project’s goal is to encourage this type of thinking and empower leaders committed to use collaborative technology to:

• strengthen citizen civic engagement;
• enhance government transparency;
• improve service delivery and operational efficiency; and
• facilitate coordination and innovation within and between agencies.

ScienceLogic: Why focus on Web 2.0 in the government?

Dan Munz: The question of how web 2.0 will impact federal IT departments is a critical one. Our view is that “the era of big systems” is basically over. Things like disk space, bandwidth, and computing power are basically shifting from being assets to being commodities.

There’s also a shift in expectations. People both inside and outside government – especially Gen-X and Gen-Y – are incredibly frustrated by being able to use lightning-fast apps like Flickr, YouTube, and Facebook that don’t even live on their hard drives while the government and other large organizations still operate clunky PCs, space-limited e-mail accounts, and sluggish e-mail servers.

So aside from the opportunity for transformative leadership, the idea of web 2.0 at a government level is very appealing in terms of getting the most out of the IT infrastructure we already have, rather than embarking on costly, large-scale projects in an era of diminishing budgets.

ScienceLogic: How do you build a sense of community at the Collaboration Project?

Dan Munz: Some community feel emerges naturally, from a sense that mass collaboration really is a tool for “doing government” in a whole new way.

The more formal community building mechanisms we have include our web page, where we share insights, news, case studies, and other content – The virtual space serves as an anchor for people, whether they’re experts or beginners, to learn about what we do.

Finally, we are conducting an ongoing series of in-person meetings, usually featuring a leader who has harnessed collaborative technology in what we think is a truly revolutionary new way.

ScienceLogic: How do you hear about cool new government Web 2.0 projects?

Dan Munz: That’s a key question, because part of our mission is to inspire action by finding leaders who have succeeded and highlight their accomplishments. We’ve done that with folks like Kip Hawley, TSA, Molly O’Neill, EPA, and Jim Walker, Alabama DHS.

We also feel that the Academy’s position as a “safe space” for leaders means that we’re a place people can turn to when they hear about an emerging trend or project and want some help making sense of it.

ScienceLogic: What are the most innovative uses of Web 2.0 technology you’ve seen in the government?

Dan Munz: It’s important to distinguish between agencies that are simply adjusting to the reality of web 2.0, and those that are “using” it. Getting a YouTube account for your agency, or putting some photos on Flickr, is a great first step, but we want to inspire leaders to really transform their normal ways of doing business. At the moment a few that come to mind are the EPA Puget Sound Mashup, ODNI’s Intellipedia, TSA IdeaFactory, the PTO Peer-to-Patent Project, and Virtual Alabama, to name a few.

The TSA launched the IdeaFactory in February 2008. TSA set up a collaboration platform with commenting, voting, etc. to form communities in a way to bring people to consensus and offer ways to improve the agency’s performance.

ScienceLogic: Do you see a difference between state and local versus federal adoption of Web 2.0?

Dan Munz: That’s a hard generalization to make – at all levels you see leaders who recognize the potential in this technology to bring new voices into the governance process.

ScienceLogic: What are the obstacles to Web 2.0 adoption by government agencies?

Dan Munz: The three main challenges that we see are in the areas of technology, culture, and policy/governance.

The technology issue is probably the simplest to solve – it’s important to choose a technology that fits the problem you’re trying to solve, but these technologies are usually inexpensive and almost never very complex.

The question of culture is harder, particularly given the way that baby boomers, gen-xers, and millenials are beginning to interact in the workforce. How do you gain acceptance and buy-in among groups that have very different comfort levels with collaborative tools and environments?

Finally, the most daunting challenge might be the questions of policy and governance, if only because those are the things that most commonly prevent leaders from even dipping a toe in the waters of collaboration. Most of the policies, regulations, and statutes governing the way government does business don’t anticipate things like wikis, blogs, or instant messaging. One of our most important missions is helping leaders who just want to get to action navigate these obstacles.

ScienceLogic: Is there any advice you can give to government employees getting started with Web 2.0? Or any places you would point them to for more info?

Dan Munz: It’s shameless plug time! I’d of course point them to our web page, collaborationproject.org, where, among other things, we’ve collected a case library of over 40 instances of collaborative technology being used in the government and non-profit sectors. The library is growing every day and is a sort of “database of record” for what is and isn’t working in terms of collaborative government. I think that would be a great place to start for anyone looking to get started but not really knowing the way.

In terms of advice, the best thing to say is that, once you’ve settled on a problem you want to solve and an audience you want to reach out to, just do it! We believe strongly that there are a lot of organizational and leadership issues that still need to be addressed regarding collaboration in government, but our biggest mantra is about getting leaders to action. The most successful projects we’ve seen are ones that try something daring and new, and discover the true power of what they’ve done as it catches on more and more widely.

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Their initial report last summer, which I blogged about at the time, was — almost entirely — rejected by the Government last autumn (blog article here).

The Committee decided that in the light of the Government’s antipathy they would hold a rapid follow-up inquiry to establish whether their conclusions were sound or whether the Government was right to turn them down, and indeed, given the speed of change on the Internet, whether their recommendations were still timely.

The written responses broadly endorsed the Committee’s recommendations, with the main areas of controversy being liability for software vendors, making the banks statutorily responsible for phishing/skimming fraud, and how such fraud should be reported.

There was one oral session where, to everyone’s surprise, two Government ministers turned up and were extremely conciliatory. Baroness Vadera (BERR) said that the report “was somewhat more interesting than our response” and Vernon Coaker (Home Office) apologised to the Committee “if they felt that our response was overdefensive” adding “the report that was produced by this Committee a few months ago now has actually helped drive the agenda forward and certainly the resubmission of evidence and the re-thinking that that has caused has also helped with respect to that. So may I apologise to all of you; it is no disrespect to the Committee or to any of the members.”

I got the impression that the ministers were more impressed with the Committee’s report than were the civil servants who had drafted the Government’s previous formal response. Just maybe, some of my comments made a difference?

Given this volte face, the Committee’s follow-up report is also conciliatory, whilst recognising that the new approach is very much in the “jam tomorrow” category — we will all have to wait to see if they deliver.

The report is still in favour of software vendor liability as a long term strategy to improving software security, and on a security breach notification law the report says “we hold to our view that data security breach notification legislation would have the twin impacts of increasing incentives on businesses to avoid data loss, and should a breach occur, giving individuals timely information so that they can reduce the risk to themselves“. The headlines have been about the data lost by the Government, but recent figures from the ICO show that private industry is doing pretty badly as well.

The report also revisits the recommendations relating to banking, reiterating the committee’s view that “the liability of banks for losses incurred by electronic fraud should be underpinned by legislation rather than by the Banking Code“. The reasoning is simple, the banks choose the security mechanisms and how much effort they put into detecting patterns of fraud, so they should stand the losses if these systems fail. Holding individuals liable for succumbing to ever more sophisticated attacks is neither fair, nor economically efficient. The Committee also remained concerned that where fraud does take place, reports are made to the banks, who then choose whether or not to forward them to the police. They describe this approach as “wholly unsatisfactory and that it risks undermining public trust in the police and the Internet“.

This is quite a short report, a mere 36 paragraphs, but comes bundled with the responses received, all of which from Ross Anderson and Nicholas Bohm, through to the Metropolitan Police and Symantec are well worth reading to understand more about a complex problem, yet one where we’re beginning to see the first glimmers of consensus as to how best to move forward.