Setting the context for this post, it is a tough economic situation all over the world. IT spending has reduced and will reduce significantly. In one of earlier posts, I had referred to information security as an overhead of an overhead (IT). What is a good approach for security practice in this type of economy?

I don't have a magic wand to pull a rabbit out of a hat. I have always been told that: tough economy is the time for real smart people to make money. Coming back to information security topic, with a bit of common sense, it is wise for information security professionals to offer services in those areas that does not involve capital expenditure. As a Security Manager, you may be already aware that your people are willing to go an extra mile in the current economic times.

- No budget or lack of budget, means no new capital expenditure. Spend time wisely in building a future technology strategy and keep it in the back pocket when the economy turns around.

- This is a good time to create roles/responsibilities and ownership for various areas. Create operating procedures. Make your team to automate tasks. This will help your operations become more efficient.

- This is time for security awareness  education. Create pamphlets/brochures/presentations for an online or classroom training. Engage your and your team's time to impart training.

- Leverage already invested technology platforms. Leverage utilized features that reduce costs. If you have already invested in technology such as VMware, this is the time to get the best out of it. You can use VMware's toolkit to build your lab and staging environment and optimize on hardware cost.

- Off shoring has been the mantra of senior executives, this is the time to revisit those services and measure their performance closely and assess your satisfaction level. This is a good time to build a case for not off shoring if it makes sense.

- Companies are more vulnerable in bad economic times. You are in a better position to influence senior management about information security risks under these circumstances and drive home the value of protecting your intellectual property under these kinds of circumstances. management will be all ears for such a pitch.

- Time to engage your architect to optimize your security architecture, revisit standards and optimize design for cost efficiency.

- Revisit various controls and see if there are some risks that you could optimize spending on.

- Training budget is an unfortunate victim of this type of economy. Encourage employees to take free webinars offered by various security vendors and encourage them to share the summary across the team. This will put your employees in touch with latest happenings in security at the same time there is some learning that is imparted despite zero training budget.

- Since there are very few projects in action, this is a good time to have conversations with cross functional teams and educate them about your services and solicit feedback on how to do better.

- Revisit your vendor logistics and identify whether you can renegotiate some of your already existing contracts.

The above are some good ways by which you can optimize costs, this will also enhance your team's competence level in the long run. And this approach is better than letting people go, if you can pull this.

These “take-down” companies are generally specialist offshoots of more general “brand protection” companies, and are hired by banks to handle removal of fake phishing websites.

When we examined our data more carefully we found that we were receiving “feeds” of phishing website URLs from several different sources — and the “take-down” companies that were passing the data to us were not passing the data to each other.

So it often occurs that take-down company A knows about a phishing website targeting a particular bank, but take-down company B is ignorant of its existence. If it is company B that has the contract for removing sites for that bank then, since they don’t know the website exists, they take no action and the site stays up.

Since we were receiving data feeds from both company A and company B, we knew the site existed and we measured its lifetime — which is much extended. In fact, it’s somewhat of a mystery why it is removed at all! Our best guess is that reports made directly to ISPs trigger removal.

The paper contains all the details, and gives all the figures to show that website lifetimes are extended by about 5 days when the take-down company is completely unaware of the site. On other occasions the company learns about the site some time after it is first detected by someone else; and this extends the lifetimes by an average of 2 days.

Since extended lifetimes equate to more unsuspecting visitors handing over their credentials and having their bank accounts cleaned out, these delays can also be expressed in monetary terms. Using the rough and ready model we developed last year, we estimate that an extra $326 million per annum is currently being put at risk by the lack of data sharing. This figure is from our analysis of just two companies’ feeds, and there are several more such companies in this business.

Not surprisingly, our paper suggests that the take-down companies should be sharing their data, so that when they learn about websites attacking banks they don’t have contracts with, they pass the details on to another company who can start to get the site removed.

We analyse the incentives to make this change (and the incentives the companies have not to do so) and contrast the current arrangements with the anti-virus/malware industry — where sample suspect code has been shared since the early 1990s.

In particular, we note that it is the banks who would benefit most from data sharing — and since they are paying the bills, we think that they may well be in a position to force through changes in policy. To best protect the public, we must hope that this happens soon.

Here’s an interesting post on High Earth Orbit about the usage and promotion of open source software for defense contracts. As a developer of open source tools, Andrew Turner of course brings up some “pros” for the government to push open source, but it’s the “cons” that are really interesting. A big “con” – the US government having something called “sovereign immunity” which apparently means something like it can’t be sued unless it consents to be sued. Hunh – the Republic of ScienceLogic-Land? Closing the loop here, a federal appeals court just boosted open-source software licenses by saying that any infringements can now get more severe remedies under copyright law (instead of contract law); here’s the case, Jacobsen v Katzer. But apparently not if it’s the US government?? Who knows more?

Does Linus Torvalds hate everyone except for developers? You have to check out this article on an email exchange he had with Network World this week, talking about how fed up he is with the “security circus”. Over the course of the exchange and some other comments from last month, he manages to blast security folk, OpenBSD (on security) in particular, vendors and PR people (of course). In the midst of the barrage of colorful language, it’s difficult to really get his point – which if you can dig it out, ends up being surprisingly sensible.

Sharon Taylor, Chief Architect of ITIL V3, recently wrote that with the release of the latest version of ITIL, BSM is now an ‘ITIL best practice.’ You say potato… “The distinction between IT and the business has blurred, and the language of IT has been replaced with the language of the business.”

It's basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cyber security advisor, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security the devil is always in the details -- and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic -- McCain supposedly is "working on the issues" as well -- I have three pieces of policy advice for the next president, whoever he is. They're too detailed for campaign speeches or even position papers, but they're essential for improving information security in our society. Actually, they apply to national security in general. And they're things only government can do.

One, use your immense buying power to improve the security of commercial products and services. One property of technological products is that most of the cost is in the development of the product rather than the production. Think software: The first copy costs millions, but the second copy is free.

You have to secure your own government networks, military and civilian. You have to buy computers for all your government employees. Consolidate those contracts, and start putting explicit security requirements into the RFPs. You have the buying power to get your vendors to make serious security improvements in the products and services they sell to the government, and then we all benefit because they'll include those improvements in the same products and services they sell to the rest of us. We're all safer if information technology is more secure, even though the bad guys can use it, too.

Two, legislate results and not methodologies. There are a lot of areas in security where you need to pass laws, where the security externalities are such that the market fails to provide adequate security. For example, software companies who sell insecure products are exploiting an externality just as much as chemical plants that dump waste into the river. But a bad law is worse than no law. A law requiring companies to secure personal data is good; a law specifying what technologies they should use to do so is not. Mandating software liabilities for software failures is good, detailing how is not. Legislate for the results you want and implement the appropriate penalties; let the market figure out how -- that's what markets are good at.

Three, broadly invest in research. Basic research is risky; it doesn't always pay off. That's why companies have stopped funding it. Bell Labs is gone because nobody could afford it after the AT&T breakup, but the root cause was a desire for higher efficiency and short-term profitability -- not unreasonable in an unregulated business. Government research can be used to balance that by funding long-term research.

Spread those research dollars wide. Lately, most research money has been redirected through DARPA to near-term military-related projects; that's not good. Keep the earmark-happy Congress from dictating how the money is spent. Let the NSF, NIH and other funding agencies decide how to spend the money and don't try to micromanage. Give the national laboratories lots of freedom, too. Yes, some research will sound silly to a layman. But you can't predict what will be useful for what, and if funding is really peer-reviewed, the average results will be much better. Compared to corporate tax breaks and other subsidies, this is chump change.

If our research capability is to remain vibrant, we need more science and math students with decent elementary and high school preparation. The declining interest is partly from the perception that scientists don't get rich like lawyers and dentists and stockbrokers, but also because science isn't valued in a country full of creationists. One way the president can help is by trusting scientific advisers and not overruling them for political reasons.

Oh, and get rid of those post-9/11 restrictions on student visas that are causing (.pdf) so many top students to do their graduate work in Canada, Europe and Asia instead of in the United States. Those restrictions will hurt us immensely in the long run.

Those are the three big ones; the rest is in the details. And it's the details that matter. There are lots of serious issues that you're going to have to tackle: data privacy, data sharing, data mining, government eavesdropping, government databases, use of Social Security numbers as identifiers, and so on. It's not enough to get the broad policy goals right. You can have good intentions and enact a good law, and have the whole thing completely gutted by two sentences sneaked in during rulemaking by some lobbyist.

Security is both subtle and complex, and -- unfortunately -- it doesn't readily lend itself to normal legislative processes. You're used to finding consensus, but security by consensus rarely works. On the internet, security standards are much worse when they're developed by a consensus body, and much better when someone just does them. This doesn't always work -- a lot of crap security has come from companies that have "just done it" -- but nothing but mediocre standards come from consensus bodies. The point is that you won't get good security without pissing someone off: The information broker industry, the voting machine industry, the telcos. The normal legislative process makes it hard to get security right, which is why I don't have much optimism about what you can get done.

And if you're going to appoint a cyber security czar, you have to give him actual budgetary authority -- otherwise he won't be able to get anything done, either.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.