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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: costs]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/costs</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 13:43:15 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Gartner Data Center Conference 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9a247228428224b9e36fa0f0db8d1d84</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9a247228428224b9e36fa0f0db8d1d84</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Gartner Data Center Conference kicked off this morning in Las Vegas. Despite the completely packed plane coming out here, Vegas seems quieter and not so crowded. The bartender at Wolfgang Pucks...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="96" alt="clip_image002" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/clip-image002.jpg" width="439" border="0" /></p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=627607" target="_blank">Gartner Data Center Conference</a> kicked off this morning in Las Vegas. Despite the completely packed plane coming out here, Vegas seems quieter and not so crowded. The bartender at Wolfgang Puck&#8217;s Bistro told me they were looking <a href="http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/12/02/at-the-gartner-data-center-conference/" target="_blank">forward to the 1800 people coming</a> to this show to fill the hotel up. As we&#8217;ve noted, the economic crisis is impacting business travel all around.</p>
<p>22% of the attendees at Data Center come from the public sector and government, with 44% coming from very large enterprises of 20K+ employees.</p>
<p>During the <a href="http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=603107" target="_blank">Gartner IOM conference</a> in June, some of the most interesting info coming out of it was the quick polls of the audience on a variety of infrastructure and operations management topics. What are enterprises doing? Where are they headed? What&#8217;s important to them? Here are some quick takes from the opening session:</p>
<p>1) What is the largest data center challenge that you currently face?</p>
<ul>
<li><b>Smaller Budgets: 21%</b></li>
<li><b>Power &amp; Cooling: 20%</b></li>
<li>Dealing with the Rate of Technology Change: 15%</li>
<li>Aligning Activities with the Business: 15%</li>
<li>Modernizing Legacy Applications: 10%</li>
<li>Lack of Data Center Space because of Equipment Spread: 9%</li>
<li>How to Source IT Services: 5%</li>
<li>How to Find and Retain Talent: 5%</li>
</ul>
<p>Well, it&#8217;s taken almost a year to be &#8220;official&#8221;, but the National Bureau of Economic Research just announced that <a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27999557/" target="_blank">the US has been in a recession since December of 2007</a>. It should come as a surprise to no one that dealing with smaller budgets is top of mind, even for the predominantly larger enterprises attending here. </p>
<p>2) What projects will receive the most funding in 2009?</p>
<ul>
<li><b>Virtualization/Consolidation: 31%</b></li>
<li>Data Center Facilities &#8211; new builds: 17%</li>
<li>IT Operations Process Improvement: 12%</li>
<li>IT Modernization: 7%</li>
<li><b>Green IT: 5%</b></li>
</ul>
<p>Virtualization and (server) consolidation projects are clearly a priority for larger enterprises in 2009. What&#8217;s interesting here is the relatively very low priority of <a href="http://www.devx.com/IT_Innovation/Article/40073?trk=DXRSS_LATEST" target="_blank">Green IT projects</a> &#8211; in spite of the importance to attendees of getting power and cooling costs under control. Perhaps there&#8217;s a gap here between what&#8217;s often the hype of Green IT and practical considerations for data center managers when it comes to power and cooling management.</p>
<p>3) Where are you with server consolidation projects?</p>
<ul>
<li>No Plans: 3%</li>
<li>Looking at it now and will start in next 2 years: 13%</li>
<li><b>In process now: 58%</b></li>
<li><b>Have already completed server consolidation project: 26%</b></li>
</ul>
<p>Larger enterprises are consolidating servers with a quarter of attendees already having gone through the process at least once. And according to poll #2, this trend will definitely continue.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 2008 15:55:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center">data center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprises">enterprises</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/predominantly larger enterprises">predominantly larger enterprises</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server consolidation projects">server consolidation projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center managers">data center managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/consolidation projects">consolidation projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data center facilities">data center facilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/larger enterprises">larger enterprises</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/gartner-data-center-conference-2008/12/2008">Gartner Data Center Conference 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Chairman Tata Surprised by Tricky Terrorists]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7b4520b092d5aedad18be187c5cd3069</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7b4520b092d5aedad18be187c5cd3069</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Chairman Rata Tata, whose company owns the Taj hotel in Mumbai, gave a frank and honest interview to CNN. I would imagine that the Tata Group's PR people and General Counsel are scrambling at the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Chairman Rata Tata, whose company owns the Taj hotel in Mumbai, gave a frank and honest interview to CNN.  I would imagine that the Tata Group's PR people and General Counsel are scrambling at the moment trying to do as much damage control as possible. <br /><span id="fullpost"><br />The sad part of this unfolding story is the feeling one gets that the terrible loss of life at the hotel may have been prevented or at least mitigated had proper security measures been implemented and if the security that had been in place prior to the attack had not been removed.  <br /></span><br />One eye witness who stayed at the hotel a week before the terrorist assault spoke about metal detectors and baggage being checked.  The same witness then went on to say that those security measures had been removed within the last week, allowing people to enter without being checked.<br /><br />The most surprising news to surface must be the Chairman's comments regarding the terrible event. Unbelievably, he actually said; "They knew what they were doing and they did not go through the front.  All of our arrangements were on the front entrance".<br /><br />Who is Tata's security advisor, a kitchen worker?  Actually, he might have been better off if that were the case since the terrorists entered the hotel through the rear kitchen door.  ANNOUNCEMENT TO ALL CHAIRMEN AND CEO's; Terrorists are Tricky.  That is their job.  They are watching your businesses and will do the opposite to what you expect.  <br /><br />In the case of the TAJ HOTEL, you made it easy for them.  Did nobody in Mumbai ever stop to think that a bad person can go through the back door?  It is one thing for a cafe in a pedestrian area to be attacked as anyone can walk right by or walk through the front and open fire, but how can a major landmark that attracts Western vistors drop their security measures AFTER they have received terrorist alert warnings that the hotel may be the target of terrorsit attacks?  <br /><br />I don't know if it was the case with the Taj Hotel, but cutting corners where security is concerned is common place in corporate culture.  Security is often seen as a necessary evil and usually the first department to experience budgetary cutbacks.  It is very difficult to convince some clients that nothing happening is really a good thing and that by cutting out security may open the door to evil.<br /><br />This appears to have been the case with the Taj.  There is no doubt that the terrorists had conducted hundreds of hours of surveillance in and around Mumbai.  Was it a coincidence that the attack occurred the week after security measures had been removed?  What might have been the result if security had remained tight (if you could call watching the front entrance and disregarding the back as "tight security")?  Maybe the terrorists would have held back another month or two...maybe in that time they would have been detected...<br /><br />One thing is for certain, places like the Taj Hotel have to get serious about security.  Mr. Tata's claim that; "If I look at what we had...it could not have stopped what took place", must be replaced by more progressive, proactive thinking.  If the Tata Group had spent an adequate amount of funding on ensuring that a strict security policy was in force - if only for the period in question - then they might not now be facing a 5 Billion Rupee reconstruction bill.  Who knows how high the civil suits against the Taj will run when compensation and punitive costs are calculated.         <br /><br />Kudos though to Chairman Tata for at least recognizing that the Indian authorities may not be able to handle the situation on their own.  "These attacks underscore the need for Law Enforcement to seek outside expertise for training, equipment and strategic operations", he said.<br /><br />We agree Mr. Tata.  We also hope that you will recognize the need for the Tata Group to seek similar outside expertise to assist you with your security planning and training.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2008 22:29:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security measures">security measures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/proper security measures">proper security measures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata">tata</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security advisor">security advisor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chairman tata">chairman tata</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chairman rata tata">chairman rata tata</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/taj">taj</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/taj hotel">taj hotel</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/11/chairman-tata-surprised-by-tricky.html">Chairman Tata Surprised by Tricky Terrorists</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Blurring the Lines Between Managed Service Provider and Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/23238e9889824f8ebd65b8a0149c5f4a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/23238e9889824f8ebd65b8a0149c5f4a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[VMware made big announcements at their VMworld conference back in September, talking about adding on a slew of virtualization management functionality to a revamped vCenter and extending into the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>VMware made big announcements at their <a href="http://www.vmworld.com/index.jspa" target="_blank">VMworld conference</a> back in September, talking about adding on a slew of virtualization management functionality to a revamped vCenter and extending into the “cloud” with vCloud services. Like most people, I had a lot of skepticism about what vCloud really meant; was this just more hype trying to take advantage of the cloud computing buzz? Certainly CEO Paul Maritz came from this world and virtualization itself (and especially vMotion) is an enabling technology for cloud computing. But how ready were VMware and its ecosystem of partner vendors to actually fulfill on the promise?</p>
<p>So I was very interested when I heard that <a href="http://opusinteractive.com/" target="_blank">Opus Interactive</a>, a customer of ours, had “joined the VMware vCloud initiative as a <a href="http://www.opusinteractive.com/news_detail.asp?item=40" target="_blank">VMware Service Provider</a>”. I talked to Eric Hulbert, CTO of Opus Interactive, to get some details directly from the source.</p>
<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/clip-image0025.jpg" border="0" alt="clip_image002" width="202" height="74" align="left" /></p>
<p>Eric shared our own caution about making “cloud-ready” announcements. There have simply been too many companies talking about cloud solutions that lack any substance – usually based on definitions of cloud computing that are hazy or just too broad. The backlash against the cloud hype is often quite justified. But in Opus’ case, there are real components that if they don’t add up to a “full” cloud computing solution just yet, are well on their way – and enabled by <a href="http://www.vmware.com/partners/vip/service-providers/" target="_blank">VMware’s program for service providers</a> (VSPP).</p>
<p>Opus Interactive is <a href="http://www.viddler.com/explore/sciencelogic/videos/3" target="_blank">serious about virtualization</a>, which is an indispensable tool in their stated goal of creating a high-density micro-data center with the smallest footprint possible. They are 100% wind-powered and have already virtualized much of their data center, reducing the amount of hardware necessary to run the business and driving down costs to produce even more competitive advantage in a crowded marketplace.</p>
<p>VSPP for vCloud provides a rental model of VMware licenses – e.g., for Enterprise ESX or VDI. VMware Service Providers report on their customers’ virtual machines (vm) and pay only for what is actually used. This model lets Opus Interactive quickly spin up a vm to get a new customer up and running in about an hour and stay very cost competitive at the same time; Opus offers their <a href="http://opusinteractive.com/vClustr.asp" target="_blank">vClustr entry-level virtual server</a> for only $99.</p>
<p>Cost-effective, rapidly scalable computing “on-demand” based on shared resources, managed by “expert” third-parties, enabled by virtualization technology and pay-per-use vm licenses. Cloud computing? Instead of thinking about a single definition of cloud computing, perhaps it’s more relevant as the market matures to think about a continuum of cloud computing. And by that definition, Opus Interactive is providing cloud services, enabled by VMware’s VSP program. Next on the schedule, automated provisioning and perhaps in the future, API’s that make it even easier for application developers to test and deploy apps on Opus Interactive’s cloud platform – which, by the way, uses <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/products.htm" target="_blank">EM7</a> for its core management solution.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2008 11:20:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud hype">cloud hype</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hype">hype</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud-ready announcements">cloud-ready announcements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud solutions">cloud solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/announcements">announcements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware vcloud initiative">vmware vcloud initiative</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ready">ready</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vmware">vmware</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/blurring-the-lines-between-managed-service-provider-and-cloud-computing/11/2008">Blurring the Lines Between Managed Service Provider and Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Arkansas Couple Sues McDonalds for Using Private Nude Photos in Online Ads]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/51fc8263d6d9f3cfbdbd51da0e6e8237</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/51fc8263d6d9f3cfbdbd51da0e6e8237</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[When an Arkansas couple visited a local McDonalds in June, they got more than just their favorite burger. The couple apparently left their cell phone at the store, and even though it was returned,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When an Arkansas couple visited a local McDonald&#8217;s in June, they got more than just their favorite burger. The couple apparently left their cell phone at the store, and even though it was returned, their personal information had already been compromised&#8211;and put online along with nude photos:</p>
<blockquote><p>Staff promised to keep the phone safely until [the couple came to retrieve it].</p>
<p>However, after Philip Sherman retrieved the phone, his wife began receiving threatening calls and messages from strangers. This caused the Shermans’ to become suspicious about what had occurred with the phone.</p>
<p>Soon afterward the Shermans’ found the private photos that Tina Sherman had sent to her husband’s phone published on the Internet along with their names, address, and phone numbers. Pictures of Tina Sherman were altered to contain McDonald’s franchise logos, along with slogans such as, “I’m lovin’ it,” and “Hot as McDonald’s coffee.” The photos were located on several different sites online, but have since been removed.</p></blockquote>
<p>The Shermans are suing for over 3 million dollars in damages, along with relocation costs.</p>
<p>Read the <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.ecanadanow.com/news/curiosity/couple-to-sue-mcdonalds-after-racy-photo-stolen-20081125.html">full article</a> here.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2008 09:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/arkansas couple">arkansas couple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/couple">couple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cell phone">cell phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone">phone</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nude photos">nude photos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/photos">photos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phone safely">phone safely</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online">online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/husbands phone">husbands phone</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/465465087/">Arkansas Couple Sues McDonalds for Using Private Nude Photos in Online Ads</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ Here Comes Everybody Review]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/639cf7107fd08bc70488e1f27a8ec2a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/639cf7107fd08bc70488e1f27a8ec2a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1937, Ronald Coase answered one of the most perplexing questions in economics: if markets are so great, why do organizations exist? Why don't people just buy and sell their own services in a market...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 1937, Ronald Coase answered one of the most perplexing questions in economics: if markets are so great, why do organizations exist? Why don't people just buy and sell their own services in a market instead? Coase, who won the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics, answered the question by noting a market's transaction costs: buyers and sellers need to find one another, then reach agreement, and so on. The Coase theorem implies that if these transaction costs are low enough, direct markets of individuals make a whole lot of sense. But if they are too high, it makes more sense to get the job done by an organization that hires people. </p>

<p>Economists have long understood the corollary concept of Coase's ceiling, a point above which organizations collapse under their own weight -- where hiring someone, however competent, means more work for everyone else than the new hire contributes. Software projects often bump their heads against Coase's ceiling: recall Frederick P. Brooks Jr.'s seminal study, <cite>The Mythical Man-Month</cite> (Addison-Wesley, 1975), which showed how adding another person onto a project can slow progress and increase errors. </p>

<p>What's new is something consultant and social technologist Clay Shirky calls &quot;Coase's Floor,&quot; below which we find projects and activities that aren't worth their organizational costs -- things so esoteric, so frivolous, so nonsensical, or just so thoroughly unimportant that no organization, large or small, would ever bother with them. Things that you shake your head at when you see them and think, &quot;That's ridiculous.&quot;</p>

<p>Sounds a lot like the Internet, doesn't it? And that's precisely Shirky's point. His new book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1594201536/counterpane/"><cite>Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations</cite></a>, explores a world where organizational costs are close to zero and where ad hoc, loosely connected groups of unpaid amateurs can create an encyclopedia larger than the Britannica and a computer operating system to challenge Microsoft's. </p>

<p>Shirky teaches at New York University's Interactive Telecommunications Program, but this is no academic book. Sacrificing rigor for readability, <cite>Here Comes Everybody</cite> is an entertaining as well as informative romp through some of the Internet's signal moments -- the Howard Dean phenomenon, Belarusian protests organized on LiveJournal, the lost cellphone of a woman named Ivanna, Meetup.com, flash mobs, Twitter, and more -- which Shirky uses to illustrate his points. </p>

<p>The book is filled with bits of insight and common sense, explaining why young people take better advantage of social tools, how the Internet affects social change, and how most Internet discourse falls somewhere between dinnertime conversation and publishing. </p>

<p>Shirky notes that &quot;most user-generated content isn't 'content' at all, in the sense of being created for general consumption, any more than a phone call between you and a sibling is 'family-generated content.' Most of what gets created on any given day is just the ordinary stuff of life -- gossip, little updates, thinking out loud -- but now it's done in the same medium as professionally produced material. Unlike professionally produced material, however, Internet content can be organized after the fact.&quot; </p>

<p>No one coordinates Flickr's 6 million to 8 million users. Yet Flickr had the first photos from the 2005 London Transport bombings, beating the traditional news media. Why? People with cellphone cameras uploaded their photos to Flickr. They coordinated themselves using tools that Flickr provides. This is the sort of impromptu organization the Internet is ideally suited for. Shirky explains how these moments are harbingers of a future that can self-organize without formal hierarchies. </p>

<p>These nonorganizations allow for contributions from a wider group of people. A newspaper has to pay someone to take photos; it can't be bothered to hire someone to stand around London underground stations waiting for a major event. Similarly, Microsoft has to pay a programmer full time, and <cite>Encyclopedia Britannica</cite> has to pay someone to write articles. But Flickr can make use of a person with just one photo to contribute, Linux can harness the work of a programmer with little time, and Wikipedia benefits if someone corrects just a single typo. These aggregations of millions of actions that were previously below the Coasean floor have enormous potential. </p>

<p>But a flash mob is still a mob. In a world where the Coasean floor is at ground level, all sorts of organizations appear, including ones you might not like: violent political organizations, hate groups, Holocaust deniers, and so on. (Shirky's discussion of teen anorexia support groups makes for very disturbing reading.) This has considerable implications for security, both online and off. </p>

<p>We never realized how much our security could be attributed to distance and inconvenience -- how difficult it is to recruit, organize, coordinate, and communicate without formal organizations. That inadvertent measure of security is now gone. Bad guys, from hacker groups to terrorist groups, will use the same ad hoc organizational technologies that the rest of us do. And while there has been some success in closing down individual Web pages, discussion groups, and blogs, these are just stopgap measures. </p>

<p>In the end, a virtual community is still a community, and it needs to be treated as such. And just as the best way to keep a neighborhood safe is for a policeman to walk around it, the best way to keep a virtual community safe is to have a virtual police presence. </p>

<p>Crime isn't the only danger; there is also isolation. If people can segregate themselves in ever-increasingly specialized groups, then they're less likely to be exposed to alternative ideas. We see a mild form of this in the current political trend of rival political parties having their own news sources, their own narratives, and their own facts. Increased radicalization is another danger lurking below the Coasean floor. </p>

<p>There's no going back, though. We've all figured out that the Internet makes freedom of speech a much harder right to take away. As Shirky demonstrates, Web 2.0 is having the same effect on freedom of assembly. The consequences of this won't be fully seen for years. </p>

<p><cite>Here Comes Everybody</cite> covers some of the same ground as Yochai Benkler's <cite>Wealth of Networks</cite>. But when I had to explain to one of my corporate attorneys how the Internet has changed the nature of public discourse, Shirky's book is the one I recommended.</p>

<p>This essay <a href="http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/sep08/6631">previously appeared</a> in <i>IEEE Spectrum</i>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=wZmPN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=wZmPN" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=xDcAN"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=xDcAN" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2008 04:39:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shirky">shirky</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shirky notes">shirky notes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/organizations">organizations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/community">community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual community safe">virtual community safe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/organizations collapse">organizations collapse</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet content">internet content</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet discourse falls">internet discourse falls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet">internet</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/11/here_comes_ever.html"> Here Comes Everybody Review</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links List 11.24.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f209f4653ec3034a29d9cf1ff2ca5cd8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f209f4653ec3034a29d9cf1ff2ca5cd8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The hunt for the nations first CTO continues . Although names have been suggested, such as standout nominees include Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane and now chief security technology officer at...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/markcuban.jpg" border="0" alt="markcuban" width="240" height="164" align="left" /> The hunt for the <a href="http://weblog.infoworld.com/robertxcringely/archives/2008/11/the_once_and_fu.html?source=NLC-NOTES&amp;cgd=2008-11-17" target="_blank">nation’s first CTO continues</a>. Although names have been suggested, such as standout nominees include Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane and now chief security technology officer at BT; Mark Cuban for his obvious business sense – and in spite of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/17/mark-cuban-insider-tradin_n_144320.html" target="_blank">insider trading indictment</a> – and Carly Fiorina, former controversial CEO of HP, the next question is what policies should this CTO pursue? Visit <a href="http://obamacto.org/" target="_blank">ObamaCTO.org</a> to view and vote for policies.</p>
<p>SaaS is taking a bite out of the $18 billion IT management market. A <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2008/11/will_it_managem.html?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_ALL" target="_blank">new Forrester Research report forecasts SaaS-based IT management accounts will be 10%</a> of the market by 2013. The reason: high level of interest from medium-sized and large enterprises. Forrester also predicts that enterprises with 1,000 or more employees will account for 50% of SaaS installations in 2009. We’ve seen this on the service desk side with the <a href="http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/01/17/service-nowcom-briefing-itil-saas/" target="_blank">rapid growth of upstart Service-now.com</a>. Companies are looking for easier and rapid deployment, lower upfront and capital costs and rapid time to value – all benefits of SaaS as well as our own <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/appliancebenefits.htm" target="_blank">appliance model</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://chucksblog.emc.com/chucks_blog/2008/11/the-speculation-game-ibm-buys-transitive.html" target="_blank">IBM snapped up Transitive</a> this week. Their QuickTransit software dynamically translates native code <a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081120-ibm-to-buy-transitive.html" target="_blank">between architectures</a>, enabling apps compiled for one processor to be run on another without any modification. Apple was the first licensee and used it to build Rosetta, a translation system that allowed users of Intel Macs to seamlessly run legacy PowerPC apps. IBM plans to use the technology to move workloads onto IBM systems without recompiling, allowing customers to “save on energy costs due to hardware consolidation and reduced TCO.”</p>
<p>At CA World, CA announced a partnership with Amazon to provide “<a href="http://stage.vambenepe.com/archives/442" target="_blank">management capabilities around Amazon’s EC2</a> utility computing platform, potentially including discovery of software running on EC2 instances, performance monitoring, configuration management, software deployment capabilities and provisioning”. John Willis, in spite of some pretty funny potshots and stories about CA (don’t we all have them), writes that “<a href="http://www.johnmwillis.com/amazon/what-color-is-your-cloud/" target="_blank">CA is the first of the Big Four to take the cloud serious</a>”.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2008 11:15:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software deployment capabilities">software deployment capabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibm plans">ibm plans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibm">ibm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apps">apps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legacy powerpc apps">legacy powerpc apps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saas">saas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saas installations">saas installations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/links-list-112408/11/2008">Links List 11.24.08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Not Your Father's Data Breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6e6dd929bba96e08b0dee7eee16ea946</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I am surprised this doesn't happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will


Corporate custodians of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am surprised <a href="http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/the-platform/published-editorials/2008/11/express-scripts-data-breach-is-bitter-medicine/"><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">this</span></a><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "> doesn&#39;t happen more often, or become public when it does happen, and I suspect it will:</span></p><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Corporate custodians</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;of confidential medical data should be closely monitoring events connected to a nightmarish computer security breach in the St. Louis region.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Express Scripts is one of the nation’s largest pharmacy benefits managers. The company, with headquarters in St. Louis County, handles approximately 500 million prescriptions per year for 50 million workers at 1,600 American companies. Early in October, it received an extortion letter, the details of which it released on Nov. 6.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The letter included personal information on about 75 Express Scripts clients — Social Security numbers, dates of birth and, in some cases, information about prescription medications. Whoever sent the letter demanded money from the company — the amount has not been disclosed — and threatened to use the Internet to reveal personal and medical information about millions of people if the demands were not met.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">...</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Beyond&#0160;</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">the scale of the problem for Express Scripts — and the potential impact on the company is enormous — the issue extends well beyond the mounting concerns about identity theft, a phenomenon with which most people have become at least somewhat familiar.</span></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The greater problem is the unique nature of personal medical records, the importance of moving to computerization of such records to improve health safety and reduce costs and the irreversibility of the damage people can suffer if confidential medical information becomes public. The stakes are so high that a federal law establishes strict standards for maintaining the privacy of medical information and stiff fines for failing to do so.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Medical records of all kinds — paper and, especially, electronic — must be protected with the most sophisticated kinds of security systems available, including backup protections and automatic alerts of security violations. Yet Express Scripts learned of this breach in the “worst way,” as InformationWeek.com security correspondent George Hulme put it in an online report: “via an extortion letter.”</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The Express Scripts</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;breach raises many questions for all elements of the health industry: hospitals, clinics and doctors’ practices, benefits management firms, insurance companies, pharmacies, employers and government agencies:</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Are they using the most advanced information security technology possible? Do they minimize the amount of data they collect and keep it only as long as necessary? Do they have strict protocols governing access to personal and medical data — and systems to enforce those protocols? If criminals were to hack into their systems, how would the companies know? How soon? And are the systems capable of instantly cutting off illegal access as soon as a breach is discovered?</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><strong style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; "><span style="font-style: normal; font-weight: bold; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Confronted</span></strong><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">&#0160;with a grave breach of electronic security, Express Scripts has responded by contacting law enforcement, establishing an informational website, offering a substantial reward and hiring a private consulting firm to help clients who have privacy concerns and investigate situations that “appear to be tied to identity theft” and provide “identity restoration services.” There is no question that the company is taking the situation extremely seriously.</span></span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">Given the ongoing criminal situation, information about how Express Scripts’ data systems were compromised — and whether it could have been avoided — has yet to be disclosed. But the American people have the right to expect that their sensitive personal and medical information is zealously protected and kept secure — not only by Express Scripts but also by every person or company entrusted with it.</span><span style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 40px; border-top-style: none; border-right-style: none; border-bottom-style: none; border-left-style: none; border-width: initial; border-color: initial; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><p><span style="color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 17px; "><div><span style="font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span></div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">The reason I am surprised this doesn&#39;t happen more often is that many Fortune 500 companies have oceans and oceans of personal data. Almost the only companies that have even tried to get to a medium level assurance are financial companies, yet many of the other companies have as much or even more data, with lower assurance. All that was lacking in the mix was an incentive and a bit of creativity and risk taking by the bad guys.</span></span></p><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">I posted this to the security metrics list and Andy Jaquith quoted it in his great book S<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/08/chicken-soup-fo.html">ecurity Metrics</a>:</span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; ">&quot;Customers and customer relationships...have tangible measurable value to businesses, and their value is much easier to communicate to those who fund projects. So in an enterprise risk management scenartio, their vlaue informs the risk management process...[For example, consider] a farmer deciding which crop to grow. A farmer interested in short term profits may grow the same high yield crop every year, but over time this would burn the fields out. The long term focused farmer would rotate the crops and invest in things that build the value of the farm and soil over time. Investing in security on behalf of your customers is like this. The investment made in securing your customer&#39;s data build current and future value for them. Measuring the value of the customer and relationships helps to target where to allocate security resources.&quot;</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px;">Of course this is the opposite of how most organizations do risk management and security architecture, and now, the fields have turned brown.<br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; "><br /></span><div><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 17px; font-size: 13px; font-family: &#39;Trebuchet MS&#39;; ">(Thanks to Chris for pointing me to this story)</span></div></div></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 06:37:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical information">medical information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal">personal</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal medical records">personal medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/medical records">medical records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security systems">security systems</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/11/not-your-fathers-data-breach.html">Not Your Father's Data Breach</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems ]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8a34266a61546df04c75d0de7416a33d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8a34266a61546df04c75d0de7416a33d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems
Quality of Protection Keynote
Alexandria, VA
October 27. 2008

Gunnar Peterson
Managing Principal, Arctec Group
Blog:...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems&#0160;</div><div><a href="http://qop-workshop.org/Program.htm">Quality of Protection Keynote</a></div><div>Alexandria, VA</div><div>October 27. 2008</div><br /><div>Gunnar Peterson</div><div>Managing Principal, Arctec Group</div><div>Blog: http://1raindrop.typepad.com</div><br /><div>When Andy Ozment asked me over the summer to do this talk at QoP, I knew back in August that the topic I wanted to address was security and economics. So to that end I would like to start by thanking all of our friends on Wall Street and here in Washington DC for providing such a rich tapestry of recent events that I can speak to.</div><br /><div>Like many people in this industry, my focus on security was fundamentally altered by Dan Geer&#39;s speech &quot;Risk Management is Where the Money Is&quot;[1], there are not many people who can call a ten year shot in the technology business, but Dan Geer did. The talk revolutionized the security industry. Since that speech, the security market, the vendors, consultants, and everyone else has realized that security is really about risk management.</div><br /><div>Of course, saying that you are managing risk and actually managing risk are two different things. Warren Buffett started off his 2007 shareholder letter [2] talking about financial institutions&#39; ability to deal with the subprime mess in the housing market saying, &quot;You don&#39;t know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out.&quot; In our world, we don&#39;t know whose systems are running naked, with no controls, until they are attacked. Of course, by then it is too late.</div><br /><div>So the security industry understands enough about risk management that the language of risk has permeated almost every product, presentation, and security project for the last ten years. However, a friend of mine who works at a bank recently attended a workshop on security metrics, and came away with the following observation - &quot;All these people are talking about risk, but they don&#39;t have any assets.&quot; You can&#39;t do risk management if you don&#39;t know your assets.</div><br /><div>Risk management requires that you know your assets, that on some level you understand the vulnerabilities surrounding your assets, the threats against those, and efficacy of the countermeasures you would like to use to separate the threat from the asset. But it starts with assets. Unfortunately, in the digital world these turn out to be devilishly hard to identify and value.</div><br /><div>Recent events have taught us again, that in the financial world, Warren Buffett has few peers as a risk manager. I would like to take the first two parts of this talk looking at his career as a way to understand risk management and what we can infer for our digital assets.</div><br /><div>Warren Buffett&#39;s evolution as an investor can be broken up into two parts. He began his career very much influenced by Ben Graham, who sought to buy &quot;cheap stocks&quot;, comparing the price of the stock to value of the company&#39;s assets, and placing many, diversified bets on companies whose share price was below the total assets. Note that the businesses may have been of unremarkable quality, but when the price was right Graham would buy in, wait for it to rise and then sell. This was the dawn of value investing.</div><br /><div>Buffett&#39;s later career departed from Graham&#39;s strict, statistical measures, where he sought to buy into companies that were selling at a fair price, but were also high quality businesses. We will examine high quality in Part 2 of this talk, but first we go to Part 1 which is asset value.</div><br /><div>Why does a talk on finding and fixing vulnerabilities start with valuing assets? The reason is that vulnerabilities are everywhere, we are literally marinating in them. Interesting vulnerabilities are attached to high value assets. In a world that quite literally presents us with too much information, we need screens to sift out what is worth paying attention to. &#0160;You can run your vulnerability assessment tool of choice on your system, and come back with hundreds or thousands of vulnerabilities, but which ones should you pay attention to and act on? The first part of answering this question is asset value.</div><br /><div>When Warren Buffett was 19 years old studying at the University of Nebraska, he read Ben Graham&#39;s book &quot;The Intelligent Investor&quot;, Buffett said he thought it was the best book on investing he has ever read and still feels that way today. In the Intelligent Investor Graham lays out the framework of value investing. Specifically, Graham talks about three concepts - Mr. Market, a stock is a piece of a business, and Margin of Safety.</div><br /><div>Mr. Market is a fictional, teaching device invented by Graham. You imagine that you have a somewhat manic depressive business partner called Mr. Market. Every day, Mr. Market comes into the office and offers you quotes on companies, some days he is in a good mood and the prices are high, other days he is gloomy and prices are low. The market is a quote machine, for quoting prices, not a value assessment machine. Your job is to wait for the right price, and you are free to take as many passes and be as patient as you would like, Mr. Market will just show up the next day and throw out a new price.&#0160;</div><br /><div>Graham used Mr. Market to teach us the separation between a price of a stock, and the value of a company. The second big concept from Intelligent Investor is that buying a stock is buying a small piece of the underlying business. You are not buying a roulette chip, or a number that fluctuates in the newspaper every day, rather you are buying a piece of the company&#39;s existing and future cash flow. What the stock market says General Electric is worth yesterday, today or tomorrow is separate from GE&#39;s actual ability to generate cash flow.</div><br /><div>The last big concept in &quot;The Intelligent Investor&quot; and the one seemingly most applicable to information security is the Margin of Safety. Graham&#39;s margin of safety involved calculating the intrinsic value of a business and then buying stock where the market cap of a company is less than its intrinsic value. So if a company has $100 million in assets and a market capitalization of $75 million, then an investor would get a 25% margin of safety. Ideally, Graham wanted to buy stocks that were selling for one half of their book value, i.e. with a 50% margin of safety. Graham said that buying stocks without a margin of safety, above their book value, speculation, not investing.</div><br /><div>So price is readily available, but how do we calculate intrinsic value so that we can ascertain the margin of safety? Graham used quantitative statistical measures, relying heavily on the company&#39;s book value, like its hard assets. What would it take for a competitor to reproduce the company&#39;s assets - its factories, distribution system, and so on. The difference between the book value of the assets and market cap is the margin of safety.</div><br /><div>What can we learn in information security from this quantitative approach? Where price and value are readily ascertainable we should build countermeasures and eliminate on vulnerabilities that give our assets a wide margin of safety. Since budgets are not unlimited we should prefer vulnerabilities that are cheap to find, cheap to fix.</div><br /><div>First to the asset question, information security budgets like all IT budgets are crufty, they are not a reflection of today&#39;s top issues and priorities so much as an accumulating snowball of decisions, legacy contracts, and solution attempts to yesteryear&#39;s problems. Today the normal Information Security budget is just a legacy artifact from bygone years when the network was the purported greatest vulnerability. If you were around in 1995, you remember the great gnashing of gears as the enterprises opened up their networks, connected their back ends to the Web and began to transact business in the giant virtual space.</div><br /><div>The security people huffed and puffed that it was dangerous but there was simply too much money to be made, so businesses went ahead. The security people would not go down without a fight and insisted on countermeasures. They got two - the network firewall and SSL. The firewall was used to separate the average Fortune 500s network of hundreds of thousands of machines, employees, consultants, and partners from the web at large. SSL was used to protect the network channel between the web server and the client browser. so the network firewall separated the network segments, and SSL in effect encrypted the last mile of many million complex transactions and computations.</div><br /><div>In 1995, this seemed like a good security architecture. When we built out these security architectures, the eCommerce market was derided as a toy. Amazon famously lost money for years - losing a little on every transaction but making it up in volume. When the market is nascent, a quaint security architecture offers cost effective protection. But what about 2008? Those cute little eCommerce buggers have grown they even make profits now - market caps measured in the tens of billions, accumulating large cash hordes, no debt, and the largest ones are in better financial shape than the financial services players that kicked sand in their face in the dotcom era.&#0160;</div><br /><div>And its not just eCommerce, the &quot;real&quot; economy Fortune 500 types are all connected as well. Directly and indirectly the Web is seeping into all businesses. Major changes from when the security architecture of the web was built out. But has the security architecture changed to reflect these new business realities? Not a bit of it!</div><br /><div>We can use the book value of the IT budget investments and the book value of the Information Security investments to see what kind of Margins of Safety Information Security groups are engineering.</div><br /><div>Let&#39;s look at some market data, Gary McGraw reviewed the numbers [2] in software security for 2007, breaking down software security sectors like tools and services. Here is a summary of his findings on software security tools:</div><br /><div>&quot;One of the most important developments in the software security market can be seen in the tools space which, combined, almost doubled to $150-180 million. Top of list are two major acquisitions that closed in 2007: Watchfire&#39;s purchase by IBM (somewhere in the range of $120-150 million on 2006 revenue of $26 million) and SPI Dynamics&#39;s purchase by HP (for around $100 million on 2006 revenue of $21.2 million).</div><br /><div>...</div><br /><div>The black box space was flat in 2007, with IBM/Watchfire checking in at $24.1 million and HP/SPI Dynamics earning $22.3 million. Smaller companies in the space, including Cenzic, Codenomicon, WhiteHat and the like had combined revenues around $12.5 million (a growth of 25%, though Cenzic grew 16% and WhiteHat 52%). Most of the growth &quot;hiccup&quot; in the black box market can be attributed to the serious challenges posed by any acquisition. So far 2008 looks to be back on track from a growth perspective in the black box testing space. The global reach that IBM and HP offer are already making a big difference.</div><br /><br /><div>On a more positive note, static analysis tools for code review grew at a healthy clip in 2007 into a $91.9 million dollar market. Fortify was up 83% to $29.2 million. Klocwork grew over 60% to $26 million. Coverity grew over 50% to $27.2 million. Ounce Labs tripled their revenue to $9.5 million.&quot;</div><br /><div>These are very nice growth numbers, what company doesn&#39;t want 83% growth? However, the let&#39;s look at the total picture and compare the software security countermeasures against other security mechanisms. Gary McGraw&#39;s estimate shows the software security space coming in at $150 Million total, yet we see a company like Checkpoint that won the network security war in 1995 with earnings of around $900 Million! One single network security vendor is 6 times bigger than the entire software security space, in what alternate universe does this make sense?</div><br /><div>This is where we begin to see that decisions in the People&#39;s Republic of Information Security have no real risk management thinking, they truly are swimming naked and hoping the tide doesn&#39;t go out.</div><br /><div>Let&#39;s look at network assets. Obviously Cisco is the biggest, they earned $39.5 Billion last year. Pretty stellar. So spending $900 Million (Checkpoint) to defined $39.5 Billion seems like a pretty good deal.</div><br /><div>Except, let&#39;s compare software security spending - last year Microsoft earned $60 Billion, SAP $16 billion, and Oracle $22 Billion. So that is about $98 Billion in just three vendors and you are going to &quot;defend&quot; that with allocating $150 Million worth of software security tools?</div><br /><div>On the network side we are buying $900 million of security countermeasures (Checkpoint firewalls) to protect $39.5 billion worth of Cisco gear, about 2.3% of the network investment goes to security.</div><br /><div>On the software side, we are buying $150 million of security countermeasures (like static analysis and black box scanners) to protect $98 billion of software (you know the stuff that runs the whole business), roughly coming to about 0.2% of the software budget goes to security.</div><br /><div>This is very disturbing. From a prioritization standpoint The People&#39;s Republic of Information Security is misaligned by an order of magnitude at least. Next time you read about a data breach, or see an auditor&#39;s report with thousands of findings you won&#39;t have to wonder how it happened. It happened because Information Security doesn&#39;t have its eye on the ball, it invests in network security not because those controls have greater efficacy (the whole point of networks is they are dumb), no, they invest in network firewalls because they bought a bunch in 1995, some more in 1998, and heck they just kept buying them, the Checkpoint rep kept showing up and taking CISOs out to play golf, contracts got renewed, and poof - there goes the security budget.</div><br /><div>Consider that software security tools could grow 50% a year for five years and still be half of where Checkpoint is today.</div><br /><div>The optimistic way of looking at all this data is that there is major room for growth for software security, if you take network security as a target for a mature industry and assume that 2.3% is a reasonable margin of safety, then the software security space should evolve to around 2% of the software space meaning that it should evolve into a $2 billion space around fifteen times larger than it is today. Unprotected assets will either be protected or will cease to be assets, VCs get your check books ready.</div><br /><div>My friend Brian Chess has a nice way of looking at this he says 2007 was the turning point - &quot;the first year there was a bigger market for products that help you get code right than there was for products that help you demonstrate a problem exists.&quot;</div><br /><div>Now I am not suggesting that Information Security budgets have to be aligned with IT budget one for one, but I do think that looking at the overall IT budget is the starting point. If Information Security has a more cost effective security mechanism they should deploy it, but the starting point should be aligned to the business. Businesses spend most of their money on software, and there are very good reasons - competitive advantage, increased revenues and lower costs. Information Security spends most of its money on network security, and there is no good reason why, except that it was a seemingly good idea in 1995. You really don&#39;t have to go beyond the book value of IT investment as a whole versus Information Security to see a stunning disparity. Information Security&#39;s job is to deliver a Margin of Safety to the business, but they are not.&#0160;</div><br /><div>To deliver a real Margin of Safety to the business, I propose the following based on a defense in depth mindset. Break the IT budget into the following categories:</div><br /><div>- Network: all the resources invested in Cisco, network admins, etc.</div><div>- Host: all the resources invested in Unix, Windows, sys admins, etc.</div><div>- Applications: all the resources invested in developers, CRM, ERP, etc.</div><div>- Data: all the resources invested in databases, DBAs, etc.</div><br /><div>Tally up each layer. If you are like most business you will probably find that you spend most on Applications, then Data, then Host, then Network.</div><br /><div>Then do the same exercise for the Information Security budget:</div><br /><div>- Network: all the resources invested in network firewalls, firewall admins, etc.</div><div>- Host: all the resources invested in Vulnerability management, patching, etc.</div><div>- Applications: all the resources invested in static analysis, black box scanning etc.</div><div>- Data: all the resources invested in database encryption, database monitoring, etc.</div><br /><div>Again, tally each up layer. If you are like most business you will find that you spend most on Network, then Host, then Applications, then Data. Congratulations, Information Security, you are diametrically opposed to the business!</div><br /><div>Its not just about alignment for alignment&#39;s sake, its about applying controls as a way to have a Margin of Safety properly placed so that when not if there is a failure on a higher value asset you are relatively better positioned to deal with it.&#0160;</div><br /><div>The pure statistical approach can only take us so far. Buffett said he would be a lot poorer if all he did was listen to Ben Graham. Book value is great to see the diametric opposition mentioned above, but it doesn&#39;t really tell us much about the efficacy of the security mechanisms.</div><br /><div>What we do get out of this statistical approach is a screen. The asset value screen filters out subjective opinion and narrows the field for where we need to dig in to do the high value, time consuming analytical work.</div><br /><div>The second part of Warren Buffett&#39;s career and the second part of this talk leave behind pure statistical measures. In Warren Buffett&#39;s case he was joined by a guy named Charlie Munger who talked him out of the pure Ben Graham approach. Charlie Munger has a saying - &quot;a great business at a fair price beats a fair business at a great price.&quot; Where Graham was focused on price and margin of safety, Munger wants a fair price but also a high quality business. This lead to Warren Buffett&#39;s company Berkshire Hathaway investing in companies like Coca Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express, where the prices were far from dirt cheap (as Graham would have wanted), but the long term returns were outstanding.</div><br /><div>In our world of Information Security, we start by aligning our priorities with the business using the thumbnail defense in depth approach, but then we would like to invest in high quality, effective controls.</div><br /><div>To get at the notion of control quality and effectiveness, I am going to start part 2 of this talk with a brief history of software. The first web software was just static HTML, but web software really got interesting when developers started creating dynamic websites using CGI an PERL.</div><br /><div>Once websites were hooked up to company databases and were not just serving static content, the security people realized they needed a security architecture, and they sprung into action. What they came up was was model that divided the world into &quot;good stuff&quot; which was comprised of all their networks, systems, and data; and then there was everything else the &quot;bad stuff&quot; on the Internet. So job one of the early days Internet security architecture was to separate all your good stuff (i.e. your network) for the bad stuff (the Internet). To do this the security people used a sophisticated tool called Visio to draw a flaming brick wall on the network diagram, and this flaming brick wall was supposed to keep the good stuff and the bad stuff separate.</div><br /><div>The security people also realized that the data and session tokens that they served up from their Web server would have to traverse the &quot;bad&quot; neighborhood called the Internet, so they added one more security mechanism to secure the last mile of the transaction - SSL between the browser and the Web server.</div><br /><div>And this was the state of the art security architecture used circa 1995 to protect the earliest dynamic web applications.</div><br /><div>What happened next was that the dotcom boom started to happen and businesses realized they could make some real money on the Web, the web apps started to get more sophisticated, more personalization, richer session experiences and so on. This led the Java people to create JSP and the Microsoft people to create ASP, and of course the PERL people to create even greasier PERL scripts, all of this in the effort to pooling resources and sessions on the Web server. The security people defended this new application programming model with network firewall and SSL.</div><br /><div>Around 1998, developers began building out more distributed N tier or 3 tier applications that separated the business logic layer, the presentation layer and the data access layer. Among other things, your web application could seamlessly integrate data from multiple back ends systems. Let&#39;s say you have pricing data in Oracle, order data in SAP, and customer data in a Mainframe. You write separate data access objects, apply business logic in the middle tier and then you tie it all together in a friendly user interface. At this point the web applications are beginning to integrate across departments and geographic boundaries, huge critical chunks of the business are now connected to the web. How did the security people defend this part of the business? They applied the same 1995 security architecture - network firewall and SSL.</div><br /><div>Around 1999-2000 timeframe businesses relied on web applications for major parts of the revenue, and the apps were built in different technologies like Java and Microsoft technologies, but the customer didn&#39;t care (still doesn&#39;t), the customer wanted (and still wants) data access and functionality. So to integrate the disparate technologies, SOAP and XML were deployed so that Microsoft could talk to Java and so Websphere could talk to Weblogic and so on. And, oh yes, SOAP and XML were used to connect B2B networks so partners in a supply chain and business process can exchange data and interoperate. &#0160;SOAP and XML present a fundamentally new programming model based on a message document style integration, where XML is used to mesh together data and functionality across platforms. SOAP and XML have no security model by default for authentication, authorization, and confidentiality. How did the security people deal with this? They kept the security architecture the same as they had in 1995 - network firewalls and SSL.</div><br /><div>The software world did not stop innovating in 2000 of course, in the last few years we have seen Web services and XML form the basis of baroque and powerful SOAs and simple REST applications. We have seen Web 2.0 come on the scene, and entirely new networked applications built on top of that.</div><br /><div>What we have not seen, is a single meaningful change in security architecture in 13 years. Developers have evolved, businesses have increasingly bet their entire business models on the web and they have increased security budgets. But what has the security architecture as its deployed in the field got to show for all of this? More firewalls and more SSL connections.</div><br /><div>Since Information Security has proven incapable of evolving, it is time to learn from a discipline that has mastered innovation - software development, and yes, I will step back in case the lightning bolts hits.</div><br /><div>What does software development focus on these days? Well, let&#39;s look at Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), all hype aside I look at SOA as a set of technologies that delivers three things:</div><br /><div>Virtualization: we want Beijing, Bangalore and Boston to communicate.</div><br /><div>Interoperability: we want our .Net stuff to talk to our java stuff.</div><br /><div>Reusability: how many order/claim/pricing/customer systems does one company need?</div><br /><div>To build out their SOA, developers separated the application interface from its implementation. So you can host the interface in a variety of locations, but its separate from the application logic and data.</div><br /><div>This is also a useful trick for putting services like SOAP through the firewall. SOAP was designed as a firewall friendly protocol. When SOAP first came out, Bruce Schneier said calling SOAP a firewall friendly protocol is like having a skull friendly bullet. Which is a great line and explains why his books fly off the shelves, it does not explain, why security people think an architecture designed in 1995 is the one we should be using today. Maybe the problem is not that the developers figured out how to go through the firewall to get the data their customers want, maybe the problem is that the firewall is the sum total of the security architecture, and it never adapted.</div><br /><div>A big part of this problem is that we have left Newton&#39;s world behind and entered Einstein&#39;s universe. Mainframes are Newton’s world, we have THE computer, THE price, THE record and so on.</div><br /><div>As Pat Helland explained [4,5], Mainframes are Newron&#39;s world, but Distributed computing is Einstein’s world. More specifically in the Einstein world of distributed computing - &quot;Computers don’t make decisions, computers try &#0160;to make decisions.&quot; Our computers don&#39;t really make a decision, they say you can buy this book from Amazon at this price, we have it in stock and will deliver on such and such a date. But the warehouse runs out, the pallet gets dropped in the warehouse, your boo is crushed, and the package is stolen off your front step. The computer confirmed your transaction, but the real world intervened.</div><br /><div>So we don&#39;t have iron clad decisions, instead its all about Memories (last time I checked your book was in stock), Guesses (we should be able to ship on this date) and Apologies (sorry the forklift ran over your book)</div><br /><div>Translating this into security, security mechanisms don’t make policy-based decisions, security mechanisms try to make policy-based decisions</div><br /><div>Some examples of memories, guesses and apologies in security</div><br /><div>Memories</div><div>Security Policies - for example Triple A policy</div><div>Triple A policies can memorize a map of subjects, objects, and roles. They can even replicate these memories and play them back at runtime to try to make policy enforcement decisions.</div><br /><div>Guesses</div><div>Security Policy Enforcement Decision</div><div>Unfortunately, while the policy enforcement decisions can be based on memorized logic, the decision itself is still a guess, even in the case of Triple A. Any guesses why? Because, the authentication process itself is a guess. It happens to be a guess that you then bind to a principal so it looks very official once you bind your guess to a Kerberos ticket or SAML assertion, but it still a guess.</div><br /><div>Apologies</div><div>Giant Global Bank is sorry your account was compromised!</div><div>And this leads to lots and lots of apologies by companies with poor access control models.</div><br /><div>Some additional examples of information security memories, guesses and apologies.</div><br /><div>Example Memories - Triple A Security Policies, Audit logs, User account information , Authorization Logic - concrete mapping Subject, Resource, Condition, Action</div><br /><div>Example Guesses - Security Policy Enforcement Decision Points, Authentication Logic, Monitoring, detection, fraud response</div><br /><div>Example Apologies - Identity Management tools - provisioning, deprovisioning, Reimburse customer for fraud losses, Compensating Transaction - Giant Global Bank is still sorry your account was compromised!</div><br /><div>The point of this is that security memories, guesses and apologies utilize different processes, different people, and different capabilities to be effective.</div><br /><div>What trends can we identify to lead us toward better qualitative analysis based on the best practices of virtualization, interoperability and reusability.</div><br /><div>Virtualization</div><div>Finding Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because applications are more configured than coded. Runtime behavior and structure not apparent due to weak typing and inversion of control.</div><br /><div>Result - finding bugs becomes harder. Action - use screens to target finding time and resources</div><br /><div>Fixing Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because how do I locate the controls when interfaces run in Beijing, Bangalore and Boston?</div><br /><div>Result - synchronization and/or replication of security policy is problematic. Action - decentralized policy enforcement points and policy decision points. &#0160;</div><br /><div>Interoperability</div><div>Finding interoperable vulnerabilities</div><div>XSS - Javascript is an equal opportunity offender - interoperability for developers and attackers alike.</div><br /><div>Fixing interoperable vulnerabilities</div><div>App servers, ESBs, and services are the attacker’s red carpet to your enterprise, right into your book of business. Interoperable access control can be leveraged across the enterprise.</div><br /><div>Use XML signature for authentication and integrity&#0160;</div><br /><div>&lt;SOAP:Envelope&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;SOAP:Header&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;WSSE:Security&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">			</span>&lt;ds:Signature&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">				</span>&lt;ds:Reference URI=‘#body’&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;/WSSE:Security&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;/SOAP:Header&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;SOAP:Body wsu:Id=‘body’&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>…</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;/SOAP:Body&gt;</div><div>&lt;SOAP:Envelope&gt;</div><br /><div>Use XML encryption to protect sensitive data, don&#39;t pass sensitive data in the clear</div><br /><div>&lt;?xml version=&#39;1.0&#39; encoding=&#39;UTF-8&#39;?&gt;</div><div>&lt;soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=&quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/&quot;&gt;</div><br /><div>&lt;soapenv:Body&gt;&lt;ns1:echo xmlns:ns1=&quot;http://sample01.samples.rampart.apache.org&quot;&gt;</div><br /><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;param0&gt;My Credit Card Number&lt;/param0&gt;</div><div>&lt;/ns1:echo&gt;</div><div>&lt;/soapenv:Body&gt;</div><div>&lt;/soapenv:Envelope&gt;</div><br /><div>Encrypt the data</div><br /><div>&#0160;&lt;wsse:Security xmlns:wsse=&quot;http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd&quot; soapenv:mustUnderstand=&quot;1&quot;&gt;…</div><div>&#0160;&#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160;&lt;xenc:EncryptedKey Id=&quot;EncKeyId-3020592&quot;&gt;</div><div>&#0160;&#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=&quot;http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5&quot; /&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span> &lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;</div><div>XNQ0a4legiie5mWFxO6CQkk2hhldYNnKroObue/LXS/VYtvaTgMbCujhGExDi+vlkU//Qc2/T6mx0WVTmBMT3z8rogha8jD+nS9Zr2Bc3CwoTh2lh8wL3D0DEu91iwJT9JByLGXvt7v9lyuxK0ooDOYEClsH974CPmTs3tBC+GQ=</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;/xenc:CipherValue&gt; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160;&#0160;</div><div>&lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</div><br /><div>To ensure that these controls are applied use automated tools like static analysis to scan for security mechanism use and coverage.</div><br /><div>In terms of reusability findings and fixes consider two bug findings</div><br /><div>Session management bug: session state is passed around to every component, service and user. Makes for many high priority findings in audit report, also the fix is required on virtually every program</div><br /><div>Data validation bug: Data access object (DAO) has a SQL injection hole. One major high priority finding in report. DAO used by many business logic classes, one fix location serves many classes&#0160;</div><br /><div>To bring these factors together, I generally use a scorecard index [6], so you can measure such things as transport security, message security, threat protection and so on. The hard work in developing the index is developing a useful scale. A scale for XML tokens could use the following</div><br /><div>0: no token</div><div>1: hashed token</div><div>2: hashed and signed token</div><div>3: hashed and signed token from standard authoritative source</div><br /><div>An example scale for XML validation could use:</div><br /><div>0: no validation</div><div>1: schema validation</div><div>2: schema validation against hardened schema</div><div>3: schema validation against standard, hardened schema</div><br /><div>These indexed scales are used to show maturity across the factors in the scorecard. The first part of the talk described value, the value assessment is used to focus time and effort on high value assets. The value assessment can be determined quantitatively. There is hard analytical work to qualitatively determine the scorecard, index, and scales, the quantitative value assessment is used to screen out high value targets for these endeavors. The scoring index is used to track progress and improve quality over time. In the best case scenario, automated tools are used to perform the checks described in the index, and once security is automated just like software developers we may see security innovation make progress in years not decades.</div><br /><div>Thank you for your time.</div><br /><div>1 &quot;Risk Management is where the Money Is&quot; by Dan Geer,&#0160;<a href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html">http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html</a></div><br /><div>2 Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Shareholder Letter by Warren Buffett, <a href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf">http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf</a></div><br /><div>3 &quot;Software [In]security: Software Security Demand Rising, by Gary McGraw</div><div><a href="http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978">http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978</a></div><br /><div>4 &quot;SOA and Newton&#39;s Universe&quot; by Pat Helland, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx">http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx</a></div><br /><div>5 &quot;Memories, Guesses and Apologies&quot; by Pat Helland, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx">http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx</a></div><br /><div>6 &quot;Web Servicres Security Checklist&quot; by Gunnar Peterson, <a href="http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf">http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf</a></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 19:47:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security spends">information security spends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safety information security">safety information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versus information security">versus information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security budgets">information security budgets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security budget">information security budget</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security space">software security space</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/11/the-economics-of-finding-and-fixing-vulnerabilities-in-distributed-systems-.html">The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems </source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Links List 11.17.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/85b0ee0a0390b793b97cc896d3067a94</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/85b0ee0a0390b793b97cc896d3067a94</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Wow. I think we all know that we can take or leave surveys numbers dont mean a lot without context. In this case the context is the current economic meltdown. The Society for Information Management...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wow. I think we all know that we can take or leave surveys – numbers don’t mean a lot without context. In this case the “context” is the current economic meltdown. The Society for Information Management (SIM) released the results of their 2008 IT Trends Survey – predicting an “upbeat” forecast for IT jobs; the HUGE caveat here is that the study was conducted before all the recent economic woes. Apparently organizations are using IT to <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=10765" target="_blank">drive efficiencies, streamline operations, and cut costs</a> rather than just slashing the IT budget to save money during the downturn. What would be a nice follow-up: a quick second survey comparing responses before and after. Regardless Jerry Luftman, SIM vice president of academic affairs, still says the survey results demonstrate “that the overall state of IT remains very strong.”</p>
<p><img style="margin: 5px" src="http://images.google.com/url?q=http://disney-clipart.com/Chicken-Little/Disney-Chicken-Little.jpg&amp;usg=AFQjCNGA4kajmvy1h_lrcRnuywgV7_X0aQ" alt="" width="198" height="201" align="left" />The sky is falling! Trip Chowdhry, the analyst with Global Equities Research who claimed Red Hat was ‘rubbish and the entire LAMP stack is potty, too’ published some eye-opening predictions, predominantly negative, about tech business in Silicon Valley. Now <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13505_3-10094221-16.html?part=rss&amp;subj=news&amp;tag=2547-1_3-0-20" target="_blank">Chowdhry claims that “almost every VC funded open-source company</a> is struggling and will run out of money within the next six months.” (Probably not the most unbiased guy about open source) Matt Asay argues that organizations in general are struggling, but open-source companies are not that high on the list. (But are they high on the VC “axe” list??) He notes Alfresco, Pentaho and JasperSoft are some of the players with ‘millions in the bank and growing revenue.’ Asay also says Chowdhry has a responsibility to do real due diligence and not create myths. Take that, Chicken Little! (<a href="http://disney-clipart.com/Chicken-Little/Disney-Chicken-Little.jpg" target="_blank"><em>img from Disney-Clipart</em></a>)</p>
<p>We’re not as far behind as we thought we were. Google presented the results of a study they conducted about how IPv6- capable “ordinary users” are at the RIPE meeting in Dubai a few weeks ago. Turns out Apple Macs drive IPv6 penetration in the US. <a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081113-google-more-macs-mean-higher-ipv6-usage-in-us.html" target="_blank">Fifty-two percent of all IPv6 users in the U.S. own a Mac</a> and use 6to4 (creating IPv6 addresses from an IPv4 address and tunneling packets) – making the US fifth in the list of countries using IPv6. Russia and France took first and second place with .76 and .65 percent IPv6-enabled traffic . The US is at .45 percent. Worldwide, 0.238 percent of Google users’ systems are IPv6-enabled and prefer to use IPv6 over IPv4.</p>
<p>Obama’s win = Google’s win? Apparently Google <a href="http://blogs.cioinsight.com/biztech30/content/2008_campaign/google_vs_microsoft_the_obama_factor.html?kc=rss" target="_blank">CEO Eric Schmidt and President-Elect Obama are very good buddies</a> and “this terrifies Microsoft”. Now competitors are more on guard against Google’s growing empire and popularity. Although Schmidt was mentioned as a possible candidate for the country’s new national CTO position, he said he would not accept the post if asked. I guess that’s one less thing Microsoft has to worry about.</p>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 19:35:52 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/list">list</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/survey results">survey results</category>
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      <title><![CDATA[Rational Risk Management, Angry Italians, and Irrational Security Analysts]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/616867e9cd4e8203d8c23c0bef989749</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/616867e9cd4e8203d8c23c0bef989749</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Hope you all had a great weekend. I had meant to point you earlier to a FAIR analysis that Chris Hayes did over at his Blog . But Ive been a little busy, and before I could mention it, Stuart King put...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hope you all had a great weekend.  I had meant to point you earlier to a <strong><a href="http://risktical.com/2008/11/06/security-template-exception-part-2-%E2%80%93-the-assessment/">FAIR analysis that Chris Hayes did over at his Blog</a></strong>.  But I&#8217;ve been a little busy, and before I could mention it, Stuart King <strong><a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/11/ive-written-up-a-report.html">put up a kind of angry response</a></strong> on his ComputerWorld blog.  Snark aside, there are a couple of other really troubling aspects of Stuart&#8217;s reaction to Chris&#8217; analysis that I thought we could talk about this morning.</p>
<blockquote><p>The problem is that (Chris&#8217; analysis is) completely impractical. I&#8217;ll take a recent, and fairly typical situation as an example. I was taking issue with the manner in which remote access was being provisioned for a third party vendor to connect to a system hosted by one of our European business units. To cut a long story short, it was not only a breach of policy but highly insecure. I wanted the access to be disconnected, the business unit director wanted my risk assessment. And he didn&#8217;t want to wait for it.</p>
<p>To quote Chris Hayes, spending time on working out <em> <strong>the expected effectiveness of controls, over a given timeframe, as measured against a baseline level of force </strong></em>was not going to pacify an angry Italian fearful that my decision was going to cost him money. He wanted my explanation of the risk and more importantly, what I was going to offer as a solution to keep his business functioning</p></blockquote>
<p>As Chris is someone who actually does this for a living in a large company, and this is typical of his actual day job, I really find Stuart&#8217;s &#8220;impractical&#8221; comment to be, um, misinformed.</p>
<p>Also, I think Stuart mistakes the purpose of a risk analysis.  The purpose of the risk analysis is not to force someone to be &#8220;secure&#8221;, but to provide knowledge for decision making.  Using it as a &#8220;hammer&#8221; to knock in the nail of your personal risk tolerance impairs efficiency and in the long run retards &#8220;security&#8221; as it creates political resentment.  Seriously, who cares if something might violate policy or not in a pre-implementation discussion?  Policies are not stone tablets handed down from on high, they are state-in-time codification of the <em><strong>data owners </strong></em>risk tolerance.  This risk tolerance changes sometimes, and that&#8217;s OK.</p>
<p>To that extent, I appreciate (and I&#8217;m sure Chris does, as well) that risk analysis does not create rationality in the data owner.  Someone who sees you as a speedbump on the route to progress they may not be ready to appreciate your point of view even if it is stated in the most rational manner possible.   But it&#8217;s worth noting (and Stuart&#8217;s example is indicative of this point) that <em><strong>risk analysis does not create rationality in the analyst, either</strong></em>.  If one is being so &#8220;security minded&#8221; as to ignore the risk tolerance of the business owner - we&#8217;re bound to get a reaction similar to that Stuart encountered.  In fact, a practical risk analysis like Chris performed on his blog, done in 30 minutes, should identify the critical point of disagreement between Stuart and the data owner (again, Stuart doesn&#8217;t own the data, the agitated Italian does).</p>
<p>But let&#8217;s stay rational and open to alternatives to what Chris offers.  Stuart states his approach to risk analysis as:</p>
<blockquote><p>When I need to document a risk assessment I use a very simple form: list the threats, state the level of vulnerability, list the associated operational costs and potential revenue hits. High, medium, or low risk? Describe the controls and options. Write up who needs to do what, and how much of their time it&#8217;s going to take. Job done.</p></blockquote>
<p>At first glance, I don&#8217;t think what Chris has done is any less efficient, and it provides greater insight (using Frequency and Capability instead of just &#8216;listing the threats&#8217;).  But what is key here is that Chris&#8217; approach is consistent and defensible.  Less generous risk geeks and CSO&#8217;s I know would have no little difficulty with Stuart&#8217;s approach.  But to particularly answer Stuart&#8217;s main objection (impracticality) I would offer that with practice, Chris&#8217; work is probably quicker and easier than Stuart&#8217;s described process as it eliminates much of the ambiguity an immature risk analysis creates - reducing the need for further discussion and arguments with data owners (regardless of disposition or nationality).</p>
<p>Finally the irony of Stuart&#8217;s post is that the reason he had this confrontation may in fact be because he was incapable of bringing a salient model for risk to the table, one that identified the factors that create risk and developed a defensible belief statement concerning risk.   We&#8217;ll never know if one would have helped him in this isolated instance, but I can tell you that in organizations like Chris&#8217;, good risk models and strong risk anlayses create operational efficiencies, reduce costs, and streamlines intra-departmental communications.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 13:43:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
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      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=520">Rational Risk Management, Angry Italians, and Irrational Security Analysts</source>
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