[SecurityRatty] tag: coverage

Antivirus programs unreliable during critical coverage gap

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 22:00:02 +0000

Antivirus companies typically bill themselves as offering critical protection when you need it most, but the timeliness of the protection is a matter of concern. There's some reason to suspect AV companies may be moving too slowly on this one, with a majority of scanners failing to detect malware up to three days after it's seen on the web.

Vulnerabilities and Office Versions

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 04:19:33 +0000

Most of the ink on Microsoft vulnerability coverage goes to browsers and operating systems, but in a way the best progress vulnerabilities have made has been in Microsoft Office. Some of the great attacks of all time (remember LoveLetter?) have been through Office bugs, and I believe most targeted attacks over the last few years have utilized vulnerabilities in Office document parsers. That's why it's encouraging that Microsoft has done a much better job in making current versions of Office secure, as David LeBlanc's recent blog shows. He claims that the company has really stepped up the security testing for Office 2003 SP3 and Office 2007, and that it shows up in the number of reported vulnerabilities. The trend is clear: There are about half as many vulnerabilities as for earlier versions. There may be a little flaw in the analysis in that LeBlanc studied reports during the period from 9/18/2007 to 11/17/2008. By that time earlier Office versions had been around for a long time and many vulnerabilities had already been reported on them. But even so, it makes the numbers all the more impressive for the new versions; the older ones had already had the low-hanging fruit picked clean and yet they still had CVE numbers in excess of the new ones. It seems there is no low-hanging vulnerability fruit in new versions of Office. Are you running an old version of Office? Are you running Office 2003 SP2, which reached the end of support life in October? If so, you are exposing yourself to more known threats than you may think. Office versions are not plug-and-play interchangeable. It's unfortunate that Microsoft saw fit to accompany Office 2007's security enhancements with a radical user interface change. I personally have gotten used to it, but I can see an enterprise being intimidated by the training it would necessitate. If you feel you're stuck in Office 2003, at the very least it's irresponsible to linger on in an old service pack. Do what you can to move on to SP3.

Stampede Death at Wal-Mart

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 01:12:00 +0000

The death of a Wal-Mart employee on Black Friday in New York should never have been allowed to happen.

The Police are said to be reviewing tapes to see if they can identify who was responsible for trampling the poor man to death. What will that achieve? Obviously it was not done on purpose. The findings are bound to result in an "accidental death" determination.

Getting back to; who is responsible? I think that is quite clear. Wal-Mart has to accept responsibility. UNLESS...they really did hire an outside security company and the employees of that company did such a poor job organizing that mob of "door busters", that they lost control of the situation.

One thing is a given. The family of the employee who lost his life is bound to bring a civil law suit against Wal-Mart. If I were them, the first thing I would look to find out would be who(if anyone)was providing security on Thanksgiving night outside of the front door?

Unfortunately, many clients do not take the function of security very seriously and they delegate the responsibility to those with no security training or experience. We have consulted for clients at arenas and found that ordinary ushers will be given a fluorescent vest or jacket with "SECURITY" written on the back and asked to provide security. This is a libility claim waiting to be filed.

If Wal-Mart did in fact outsource their security to an outside company, was the company allowed to provide an adequate number of officers to ensure that shoppers lined up in an orderly fashion? One security officer to a couple of hundred people is another liability suit waiting to be filed.

Next, they should be looking at the training that the security officers (Wal-Mart better hope that shelve stockers were not given the task)receieved. Because it was Thanksgiving night, there is the possibility that the company couldn't get anybody else to work and used untrained and inexperienced personnel. If that turns out to be the case, hopefully the company was legal and had adequate insurance coverage.

Whatever happens regarding a civil law suit, one thing will remain unchanged. A man lost his life in an incident that should have been prevented. It is obvious that not everything was done to ensure the safety of the shoppers who traditonally lined up to get the best bargains when the store opened on "Black Friday".

Whether it was Wal-Mart or the security company who may have been hired to prevent this very incident from happening - somebody failed to do their job. Whichever one it was, they should step up to the plate and apologize to the grieving family for letting them down.

The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems

Tue, 18 Nov 2008 19:47:55 +0000

The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems

Quality of Protection Keynote

Alexandria, VA

October 27. 2008

Gunnar Peterson

Managing Principal, Arctec Group

Blog: http://1raindrop.typepad.com

When Andy Ozment asked me over the summer to do this talk at QoP, I knew back in August that the topic I wanted to address was security and economics. So to that end I would like to start by thanking all of our friends on Wall Street and here in Washington DC for providing such a rich tapestry of recent events that I can speak to.

Like many people in this industry, my focus on security was fundamentally altered by Dan Geer's speech "Risk Management is Where the Money Is"[1], there are not many people who can call a ten year shot in the technology business, but Dan Geer did. The talk revolutionized the security industry. Since that speech, the security market, the vendors, consultants, and everyone else has realized that security is really about risk management.

Of course, saying that you are managing risk and actually managing risk are two different things. Warren Buffett started off his 2007 shareholder letter [2] talking about financial institutions' ability to deal with the subprime mess in the housing market saying, "You don't know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out." In our world, we don't know whose systems are running naked, with no controls, until they are attacked. Of course, by then it is too late.

So the security industry understands enough about risk management that the language of risk has permeated almost every product, presentation, and security project for the last ten years. However, a friend of mine who works at a bank recently attended a workshop on security metrics, and came away with the following observation - "All these people are talking about risk, but they don't have any assets." You can't do risk management if you don't know your assets.

Risk management requires that you know your assets, that on some level you understand the vulnerabilities surrounding your assets, the threats against those, and efficacy of the countermeasures you would like to use to separate the threat from the asset. But it starts with assets. Unfortunately, in the digital world these turn out to be devilishly hard to identify and value.

Recent events have taught us again, that in the financial world, Warren Buffett has few peers as a risk manager. I would like to take the first two parts of this talk looking at his career as a way to understand risk management and what we can infer for our digital assets.

Warren Buffett's evolution as an investor can be broken up into two parts. He began his career very much influenced by Ben Graham, who sought to buy "cheap stocks", comparing the price of the stock to value of the company's assets, and placing many, diversified bets on companies whose share price was below the total assets. Note that the businesses may have been of unremarkable quality, but when the price was right Graham would buy in, wait for it to rise and then sell. This was the dawn of value investing.

Buffett's later career departed from Graham's strict, statistical measures, where he sought to buy into companies that were selling at a fair price, but were also high quality businesses. We will examine high quality in Part 2 of this talk, but first we go to Part 1 which is asset value.

Why does a talk on finding and fixing vulnerabilities start with valuing assets? The reason is that vulnerabilities are everywhere, we are literally marinating in them. Interesting vulnerabilities are attached to high value assets. In a world that quite literally presents us with too much information, we need screens to sift out what is worth paying attention to. You can run your vulnerability assessment tool of choice on your system, and come back with hundreds or thousands of vulnerabilities, but which ones should you pay attention to and act on? The first part of answering this question is asset value.

When Warren Buffett was 19 years old studying at the University of Nebraska, he read Ben Graham's book "The Intelligent Investor", Buffett said he thought it was the best book on investing he has ever read and still feels that way today. In the Intelligent Investor Graham lays out the framework of value investing. Specifically, Graham talks about three concepts - Mr. Market, a stock is a piece of a business, and Margin of Safety.

Mr. Market is a fictional, teaching device invented by Graham. You imagine that you have a somewhat manic depressive business partner called Mr. Market. Every day, Mr. Market comes into the office and offers you quotes on companies, some days he is in a good mood and the prices are high, other days he is gloomy and prices are low. The market is a quote machine, for quoting prices, not a value assessment machine. Your job is to wait for the right price, and you are free to take as many passes and be as patient as you would like, Mr. Market will just show up the next day and throw out a new price.

Graham used Mr. Market to teach us the separation between a price of a stock, and the value of a company. The second big concept from Intelligent Investor is that buying a stock is buying a small piece of the underlying business. You are not buying a roulette chip, or a number that fluctuates in the newspaper every day, rather you are buying a piece of the company's existing and future cash flow. What the stock market says General Electric is worth yesterday, today or tomorrow is separate from GE's actual ability to generate cash flow.

The last big concept in "The Intelligent Investor" and the one seemingly most applicable to information security is the Margin of Safety. Graham's margin of safety involved calculating the intrinsic value of a business and then buying stock where the market cap of a company is less than its intrinsic value. So if a company has $100 million in assets and a market capitalization of $75 million, then an investor would get a 25% margin of safety. Ideally, Graham wanted to buy stocks that were selling for one half of their book value, i.e. with a 50% margin of safety. Graham said that buying stocks without a margin of safety, above their book value, speculation, not investing.

So price is readily available, but how do we calculate intrinsic value so that we can ascertain the margin of safety? Graham used quantitative statistical measures, relying heavily on the company's book value, like its hard assets. What would it take for a competitor to reproduce the company's assets - its factories, distribution system, and so on. The difference between the book value of the assets and market cap is the margin of safety.

What can we learn in information security from this quantitative approach? Where price and value are readily ascertainable we should build countermeasures and eliminate on vulnerabilities that give our assets a wide margin of safety. Since budgets are not unlimited we should prefer vulnerabilities that are cheap to find, cheap to fix.

First to the asset question, information security budgets like all IT budgets are crufty, they are not a reflection of today's top issues and priorities so much as an accumulating snowball of decisions, legacy contracts, and solution attempts to yesteryear's problems. Today the normal Information Security budget is just a legacy artifact from bygone years when the network was the purported greatest vulnerability. If you were around in 1995, you remember the great gnashing of gears as the enterprises opened up their networks, connected their back ends to the Web and began to transact business in the giant virtual space.

The security people huffed and puffed that it was dangerous but there was simply too much money to be made, so businesses went ahead. The security people would not go down without a fight and insisted on countermeasures. They got two - the network firewall and SSL. The firewall was used to separate the average Fortune 500s network of hundreds of thousands of machines, employees, consultants, and partners from the web at large. SSL was used to protect the network channel between the web server and the client browser. so the network firewall separated the network segments, and SSL in effect encrypted the last mile of many million complex transactions and computations.

In 1995, this seemed like a good security architecture. When we built out these security architectures, the eCommerce market was derided as a toy. Amazon famously lost money for years - losing a little on every transaction but making it up in volume. When the market is nascent, a quaint security architecture offers cost effective protection. But what about 2008? Those cute little eCommerce buggers have grown they even make profits now - market caps measured in the tens of billions, accumulating large cash hordes, no debt, and the largest ones are in better financial shape than the financial services players that kicked sand in their face in the dotcom era.

And its not just eCommerce, the "real" economy Fortune 500 types are all connected as well. Directly and indirectly the Web is seeping into all businesses. Major changes from when the security architecture of the web was built out. But has the security architecture changed to reflect these new business realities? Not a bit of it!

We can use the book value of the IT budget investments and the book value of the Information Security investments to see what kind of Margins of Safety Information Security groups are engineering.

Let's look at some market data, Gary McGraw reviewed the numbers [2] in software security for 2007, breaking down software security sectors like tools and services. Here is a summary of his findings on software security tools:

"One of the most important developments in the software security market can be seen in the tools space which, combined, almost doubled to $150-180 million. Top of list are two major acquisitions that closed in 2007: Watchfire's purchase by IBM (somewhere in the range of $120-150 million on 2006 revenue of $26 million) and SPI Dynamics's purchase by HP (for around $100 million on 2006 revenue of $21.2 million).

...

The black box space was flat in 2007, with IBM/Watchfire checking in at $24.1 million and HP/SPI Dynamics earning $22.3 million. Smaller companies in the space, including Cenzic, Codenomicon, WhiteHat and the like had combined revenues around $12.5 million (a growth of 25%, though Cenzic grew 16% and WhiteHat 52%). Most of the growth "hiccup" in the black box market can be attributed to the serious challenges posed by any acquisition. So far 2008 looks to be back on track from a growth perspective in the black box testing space. The global reach that IBM and HP offer are already making a big difference.

On a more positive note, static analysis tools for code review grew at a healthy clip in 2007 into a $91.9 million dollar market. Fortify was up 83% to $29.2 million. Klocwork grew over 60% to $26 million. Coverity grew over 50% to $27.2 million. Ounce Labs tripled their revenue to $9.5 million."

These are very nice growth numbers, what company doesn't want 83% growth? However, the let's look at the total picture and compare the software security countermeasures against other security mechanisms. Gary McGraw's estimate shows the software security space coming in at $150 Million total, yet we see a company like Checkpoint that won the network security war in 1995 with earnings of around $900 Million! One single network security vendor is 6 times bigger than the entire software security space, in what alternate universe does this make sense?

This is where we begin to see that decisions in the People's Republic of Information Security have no real risk management thinking, they truly are swimming naked and hoping the tide doesn't go out.

Let's look at network assets. Obviously Cisco is the biggest, they earned $39.5 Billion last year. Pretty stellar. So spending $900 Million (Checkpoint) to defined $39.5 Billion seems like a pretty good deal.

Except, let's compare software security spending - last year Microsoft earned $60 Billion, SAP $16 billion, and Oracle $22 Billion. So that is about $98 Billion in just three vendors and you are going to "defend" that with allocating $150 Million worth of software security tools?

On the network side we are buying $900 million of security countermeasures (Checkpoint firewalls) to protect $39.5 billion worth of Cisco gear, about 2.3% of the network investment goes to security.

On the software side, we are buying $150 million of security countermeasures (like static analysis and black box scanners) to protect $98 billion of software (you know the stuff that runs the whole business), roughly coming to about 0.2% of the software budget goes to security.

This is very disturbing. From a prioritization standpoint The People's Republic of Information Security is misaligned by an order of magnitude at least. Next time you read about a data breach, or see an auditor's report with thousands of findings you won't have to wonder how it happened. It happened because Information Security doesn't have its eye on the ball, it invests in network security not because those controls have greater efficacy (the whole point of networks is they are dumb), no, they invest in network firewalls because they bought a bunch in 1995, some more in 1998, and heck they just kept buying them, the Checkpoint rep kept showing up and taking CISOs out to play golf, contracts got renewed, and poof - there goes the security budget.

Consider that software security tools could grow 50% a year for five years and still be half of where Checkpoint is today.

The optimistic way of looking at all this data is that there is major room for growth for software security, if you take network security as a target for a mature industry and assume that 2.3% is a reasonable margin of safety, then the software security space should evolve to around 2% of the software space meaning that it should evolve into a $2 billion space around fifteen times larger than it is today. Unprotected assets will either be protected or will cease to be assets, VCs get your check books ready.

My friend Brian Chess has a nice way of looking at this he says 2007 was the turning point - "the first year there was a bigger market for products that help you get code right than there was for products that help you demonstrate a problem exists."

Now I am not suggesting that Information Security budgets have to be aligned with IT budget one for one, but I do think that looking at the overall IT budget is the starting point. If Information Security has a more cost effective security mechanism they should deploy it, but the starting point should be aligned to the business. Businesses spend most of their money on software, and there are very good reasons - competitive advantage, increased revenues and lower costs. Information Security spends most of its money on network security, and there is no good reason why, except that it was a seemingly good idea in 1995. You really don't have to go beyond the book value of IT investment as a whole versus Information Security to see a stunning disparity. Information Security's job is to deliver a Margin of Safety to the business, but they are not.

To deliver a real Margin of Safety to the business, I propose the following based on a defense in depth mindset. Break the IT budget into the following categories:

- Network: all the resources invested in Cisco, network admins, etc.

- Host: all the resources invested in Unix, Windows, sys admins, etc.

- Applications: all the resources invested in developers, CRM, ERP, etc.

- Data: all the resources invested in databases, DBAs, etc.

Tally up each layer. If you are like most business you will probably find that you spend most on Applications, then Data, then Host, then Network.

Then do the same exercise for the Information Security budget:

- Network: all the resources invested in network firewalls, firewall admins, etc.

- Host: all the resources invested in Vulnerability management, patching, etc.

- Applications: all the resources invested in static analysis, black box scanning etc.

- Data: all the resources invested in database encryption, database monitoring, etc.

Again, tally each up layer. If you are like most business you will find that you spend most on Network, then Host, then Applications, then Data. Congratulations, Information Security, you are diametrically opposed to the business!

Its not just about alignment for alignment's sake, its about applying controls as a way to have a Margin of Safety properly placed so that when not if there is a failure on a higher value asset you are relatively better positioned to deal with it.

The pure statistical approach can only take us so far. Buffett said he would be a lot poorer if all he did was listen to Ben Graham. Book value is great to see the diametric opposition mentioned above, but it doesn't really tell us much about the efficacy of the security mechanisms.

What we do get out of this statistical approach is a screen. The asset value screen filters out subjective opinion and narrows the field for where we need to dig in to do the high value, time consuming analytical work.

The second part of Warren Buffett's career and the second part of this talk leave behind pure statistical measures. In Warren Buffett's case he was joined by a guy named Charlie Munger who talked him out of the pure Ben Graham approach. Charlie Munger has a saying - "a great business at a fair price beats a fair business at a great price." Where Graham was focused on price and margin of safety, Munger wants a fair price but also a high quality business. This lead to Warren Buffett's company Berkshire Hathaway investing in companies like Coca Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express, where the prices were far from dirt cheap (as Graham would have wanted), but the long term returns were outstanding.

In our world of Information Security, we start by aligning our priorities with the business using the thumbnail defense in depth approach, but then we would like to invest in high quality, effective controls.

To get at the notion of control quality and effectiveness, I am going to start part 2 of this talk with a brief history of software. The first web software was just static HTML, but web software really got interesting when developers started creating dynamic websites using CGI an PERL.

Once websites were hooked up to company databases and were not just serving static content, the security people realized they needed a security architecture, and they sprung into action. What they came up was was model that divided the world into "good stuff" which was comprised of all their networks, systems, and data; and then there was everything else the "bad stuff" on the Internet. So job one of the early days Internet security architecture was to separate all your good stuff (i.e. your network) for the bad stuff (the Internet). To do this the security people used a sophisticated tool called Visio to draw a flaming brick wall on the network diagram, and this flaming brick wall was supposed to keep the good stuff and the bad stuff separate.

The security people also realized that the data and session tokens that they served up from their Web server would have to traverse the "bad" neighborhood called the Internet, so they added one more security mechanism to secure the last mile of the transaction - SSL between the browser and the Web server.

And this was the state of the art security architecture used circa 1995 to protect the earliest dynamic web applications.

What happened next was that the dotcom boom started to happen and businesses realized they could make some real money on the Web, the web apps started to get more sophisticated, more personalization, richer session experiences and so on. This led the Java people to create JSP and the Microsoft people to create ASP, and of course the PERL people to create even greasier PERL scripts, all of this in the effort to pooling resources and sessions on the Web server. The security people defended this new application programming model with network firewall and SSL.

Around 1998, developers began building out more distributed N tier or 3 tier applications that separated the business logic layer, the presentation layer and the data access layer. Among other things, your web application could seamlessly integrate data from multiple back ends systems. Let's say you have pricing data in Oracle, order data in SAP, and customer data in a Mainframe. You write separate data access objects, apply business logic in the middle tier and then you tie it all together in a friendly user interface. At this point the web applications are beginning to integrate across departments and geographic boundaries, huge critical chunks of the business are now connected to the web. How did the security people defend this part of the business? They applied the same 1995 security architecture - network firewall and SSL.

Around 1999-2000 timeframe businesses relied on web applications for major parts of the revenue, and the apps were built in different technologies like Java and Microsoft technologies, but the customer didn't care (still doesn't), the customer wanted (and still wants) data access and functionality. So to integrate the disparate technologies, SOAP and XML were deployed so that Microsoft could talk to Java and so Websphere could talk to Weblogic and so on. And, oh yes, SOAP and XML were used to connect B2B networks so partners in a supply chain and business process can exchange data and interoperate. SOAP and XML present a fundamentally new programming model based on a message document style integration, where XML is used to mesh together data and functionality across platforms. SOAP and XML have no security model by default for authentication, authorization, and confidentiality. How did the security people deal with this? They kept the security architecture the same as they had in 1995 - network firewalls and SSL.

The software world did not stop innovating in 2000 of course, in the last few years we have seen Web services and XML form the basis of baroque and powerful SOAs and simple REST applications. We have seen Web 2.0 come on the scene, and entirely new networked applications built on top of that.

What we have not seen, is a single meaningful change in security architecture in 13 years. Developers have evolved, businesses have increasingly bet their entire business models on the web and they have increased security budgets. But what has the security architecture as its deployed in the field got to show for all of this? More firewalls and more SSL connections.

Since Information Security has proven incapable of evolving, it is time to learn from a discipline that has mastered innovation - software development, and yes, I will step back in case the lightning bolts hits.

What does software development focus on these days? Well, let's look at Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), all hype aside I look at SOA as a set of technologies that delivers three things:

Virtualization: we want Beijing, Bangalore and Boston to communicate.

Interoperability: we want our .Net stuff to talk to our java stuff.

Reusability: how many order/claim/pricing/customer systems does one company need?

To build out their SOA, developers separated the application interface from its implementation. So you can host the interface in a variety of locations, but its separate from the application logic and data.

This is also a useful trick for putting services like SOAP through the firewall. SOAP was designed as a firewall friendly protocol. When SOAP first came out, Bruce Schneier said calling SOAP a firewall friendly protocol is like having a skull friendly bullet. Which is a great line and explains why his books fly off the shelves, it does not explain, why security people think an architecture designed in 1995 is the one we should be using today. Maybe the problem is not that the developers figured out how to go through the firewall to get the data their customers want, maybe the problem is that the firewall is the sum total of the security architecture, and it never adapted.

A big part of this problem is that we have left Newton's world behind and entered Einstein's universe. Mainframes are Newton’s world, we have THE computer, THE price, THE record and so on.

As Pat Helland explained [4,5], Mainframes are Newron's world, but Distributed computing is Einstein’s world. More specifically in the Einstein world of distributed computing - "Computers don’t make decisions, computers try to make decisions." Our computers don't really make a decision, they say you can buy this book from Amazon at this price, we have it in stock and will deliver on such and such a date. But the warehouse runs out, the pallet gets dropped in the warehouse, your boo is crushed, and the package is stolen off your front step. The computer confirmed your transaction, but the real world intervened.

So we don't have iron clad decisions, instead its all about Memories (last time I checked your book was in stock), Guesses (we should be able to ship on this date) and Apologies (sorry the forklift ran over your book)

Translating this into security, security mechanisms don’t make policy-based decisions, security mechanisms try to make policy-based decisions

Some examples of memories, guesses and apologies in security

Memories

Security Policies - for example Triple A policy

Triple A policies can memorize a map of subjects, objects, and roles. They can even replicate these memories and play them back at runtime to try to make policy enforcement decisions.

Guesses

Security Policy Enforcement Decision

Unfortunately, while the policy enforcement decisions can be based on memorized logic, the decision itself is still a guess, even in the case of Triple A. Any guesses why? Because, the authentication process itself is a guess. It happens to be a guess that you then bind to a principal so it looks very official once you bind your guess to a Kerberos ticket or SAML assertion, but it still a guess.

Apologies

Giant Global Bank is sorry your account was compromised!

And this leads to lots and lots of apologies by companies with poor access control models.

Some additional examples of information security memories, guesses and apologies.

Example Memories - Triple A Security Policies, Audit logs, User account information , Authorization Logic - concrete mapping Subject, Resource, Condition, Action

Example Guesses - Security Policy Enforcement Decision Points, Authentication Logic, Monitoring, detection, fraud response

Example Apologies - Identity Management tools - provisioning, deprovisioning, Reimburse customer for fraud losses, Compensating Transaction - Giant Global Bank is still sorry your account was compromised!

The point of this is that security memories, guesses and apologies utilize different processes, different people, and different capabilities to be effective.

What trends can we identify to lead us toward better qualitative analysis based on the best practices of virtualization, interoperability and reusability.

Virtualization

Finding Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because applications are more configured than coded. Runtime behavior and structure not apparent due to weak typing and inversion of control.

Result - finding bugs becomes harder. Action - use screens to target finding time and resources

Fixing Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because how do I locate the controls when interfaces run in Beijing, Bangalore and Boston?

Result - synchronization and/or replication of security policy is problematic. Action - decentralized policy enforcement points and policy decision points.

Interoperability

Finding interoperable vulnerabilities

XSS - Javascript is an equal opportunity offender - interoperability for developers and attackers alike.

Fixing interoperable vulnerabilities

App servers, ESBs, and services are the attacker’s red carpet to your enterprise, right into your book of business. Interoperable access control can be leveraged across the enterprise.

Use XML signature for authentication and integrity

…

Use XML encryption to protect sensitive data, don't pass sensitive data in the clear

My Credit Card Number

Encrypt the data

…

XNQ0a4legiie5mWFxO6CQkk2hhldYNnKroObue/LXS/VYtvaTgMbCujhGExDi+vlkU//Qc2/T6mx0WVTmBMT3z8rogha8jD+nS9Zr2Bc3CwoTh2lh8wL3D0DEu91iwJT9JByLGXvt7v9lyuxK0ooDOYEClsH974CPmTs3tBC+GQ=

To ensure that these controls are applied use automated tools like static analysis to scan for security mechanism use and coverage.

In terms of reusability findings and fixes consider two bug findings

Session management bug: session state is passed around to every component, service and user. Makes for many high priority findings in audit report, also the fix is required on virtually every program

Data validation bug: Data access object (DAO) has a SQL injection hole. One major high priority finding in report. DAO used by many business logic classes, one fix location serves many classes

To bring these factors together, I generally use a scorecard index [6], so you can measure such things as transport security, message security, threat protection and so on. The hard work in developing the index is developing a useful scale. A scale for XML tokens could use the following

0: no token

1: hashed token

2: hashed and signed token

3: hashed and signed token from standard authoritative source

An example scale for XML validation could use:

0: no validation

1: schema validation

2: schema validation against hardened schema

3: schema validation against standard, hardened schema

These indexed scales are used to show maturity across the factors in the scorecard. The first part of the talk described value, the value assessment is used to focus time and effort on high value assets. The value assessment can be determined quantitatively. There is hard analytical work to qualitatively determine the scorecard, index, and scales, the quantitative value assessment is used to screen out high value targets for these endeavors. The scoring index is used to track progress and improve quality over time. In the best case scenario, automated tools are used to perform the checks described in the index, and once security is automated just like software developers we may see security innovation make progress in years not decades.

Thank you for your time.

1 "Risk Management is where the Money Is" by Dan Geer, http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html

2 Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Shareholder Letter by Warren Buffett, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf

3 "Software [In]security: Software Security Demand Rising, by Gary McGraw

http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978

4 "SOA and Newton's Universe" by Pat Helland, http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx

5 "Memories, Guesses and Apologies" by Pat Helland, http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx

6 "Web Servicres Security Checklist" by Gunnar Peterson, http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf

DDoS Attack Graphs from Russia vs Georgia's Cyberattacks

Wed, 15 Oct 2008 11:01:58 +0000

Part of Georgia's information warfare campaign aiming to minimize the bandwidth impact on its de-facto media platforms such as the web site of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I've just received a report part of Georgia's "Russian Invasion of Georgia" series entitled "Russian Cyberwar on Georgia", which is quoting me on page 4 in regard to the "too good to be courtesy of Russia's cyber militia" creative that appeared on the defaced Georgian President's web site. The report also includes DDoS attack graphs and related details worth going through :

"The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to regular civilians. On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second, and up to 200–250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were higher.

The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload the web server in a way where every single request would need significant CPU time. The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to the load on the servers by these requests. As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the Russian cyber attacks."

In case you're interested in more factual evidence about what was happening at the particular moment in time, go through the following assessment - "Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress", as well as through the following posts - "The Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack"; "Who's Behind the Georgia Cyber Attacks?"; "Georgia President’s web site under DDoS attack from Russian hackers".

Employees, not hackers, cause most corporate data loss

Sun, 12 Oct 2008 19:20:02 +0000

Much security coverage focuses on malware, hackers, and the dangers both pose to unwary companies, but there's evidence to suggest the problem lies a good deal closer to home. How close? Try one cubicle over.

Employees, not hackers, cause most corporate data loss

Sun, 12 Oct 2008 19:20:02 +0000

Fun Reading on Security - 8

Thu, 02 Oct 2008 06:31:00 +0000

Instead of my usual "blogging frenzy" machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series "Fun Reading on Security." Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008.

Great paper that complements the whole "SIEM is dead?" saga - "Most enterprises are looking for a product that will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. "
"The Mess: looking for someone to blame?" is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up ("If a tree falls in someone else's silo...")
Mike call to "Rise up against Mediocrity." - "Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear."; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do "Security FIRST!" (and compliance second)
A great piece from Burton: "On Response" - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. This is definitely a good one for those still in the "we'll just block the threat world" - "we will not win a continuing war of escalation" and "using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool"
More on metrics, including the highly-awaited ISO27004.
Pretty dumb paper by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read this). PCI doesn't "fall short," it helps people who will otherwise not do anything and their systems will "power" those botnets of the future...
While we are on this subject: a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun here. And more here ("PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths"). And, more PCI myths. And more good ideas on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-) - also this is good.
Adrian on behavioral monitoring; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security.
"Premature Chasm-Crossing" - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and their easily-excitable PR teams...) - "Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?" (Mike R also comments on that). A related - and just as interesting point is made here: "Security is not a solution"
More on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: "I think this is a dangerous trend unless the "checklist" is all inclusive." (how can a checklist include ALL? :-))
"SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008"
Read "The three approaches to computer security!" Why? Come on, it is from Joanna! :-)
A fun discussion about a hot new technology: network IDS. Is IDS absolutely indispensable to ALL companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion.
On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? Some say no.
Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): "Get Rich Quick With Network Security"

Enjoy!

Previous security reading.

Network World Coverage of ScienceLogic at Interop

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 11:36:22 +0000

We were all really excited to have the opportunity to illuminate Sevick and Wetzel about ScienceLogic’s value proposition at Interop.

Yesterday, they posted a terrific blog post about what they saw at Interop. Fortunately, ScienceLogic was one of the technologies that they highlighted from the show. I have written earlier posts about how difficult it has been to gain smart, insightful coverage for our solutions with technology media.

I have to say that they really got it! And it feels so good. We know that we have a bit of a hidden gem of a product here at ScienceLogic and will be working overtime in the coming months to take our business and products to a “Blue Ocean” environment that will shock and surprise many others in the media. However Sevick and Wetzel will be amongst the first to get a close-up on why and how we will deliver a new paradigm to this marketplace in 2009!

A few excerpts from their post:

“We noticed yet more specialty network management vendors, leading us to wonder how the market can support such a plethora of them, and we felt empathy for IT teams that have to master yet more interfaces.”
“Application performance management and application acceleration vendors were well represented. Such products play well in today’s climate because they allow enterprises to get the most out of existing IT investments instead of buying more “stuff”. One particularly interesting vendor we talked to was ScienceLogic. They are integrating IT infrastructure and application monitoring into a single, not-very-expensive platform that will serve mainstream business well. This is smart, and we predict they will give the CA’s, BMC’s, HP’s and IBM’s of the world a run for their money.”

Check out the blog post here and keep App Performance View on your radar..

About the SDL Pro Network

Thu, 18 Sep 2008 23:12:00 +0000

Hello all, Dave here...

I expect that a number of you have seen the announcement and various press articles or Steve Lipner's Tuesday post about our launch of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.0, the SDL Optimization Model and the SDL Pro Network. Since I was intimately involved with the creation of the SDL Pro Network, I thought I'd write a few words about our objectives and chat a bit about the thinking behind our partner choices for the pilot phase.

So, what are we hoping to gain by creating a network of security consulting and training experts to work with customers who want to implement the SDL? Generally speaking, this question has a two-part answer: First, Microsoft is, and always will be a partner-driven company - we rely on the skills and capabilities of our partners to provide specialized services and broad geographic coverage for Microsoft products and services. Second, even though there are talented folks in the Microsoft Services organization, it's clear that we will need help from our partners to scale to meet the demand. I can't tell you how many times the folks on the SDL team have been approached by people - after an executive briefing, or a session at TechEd - asking for guidance in implementing SDL in their own organizations. When we look at the demand and pair it with the geographic diversity of our customer base, it's clear that a partner approach is the right answer.

Now a few words about the partners who will be participating in the pilot phase...

After the decision was made to work with partners on SDL delivery, we had two primary criteria that we had to address; partner quality, and manageability of the SDL Pro Network pilot. We have all seen instances where individuals or consulting organizations have represented themselves to the IT community as having security expertise when in reality the "experts for hire" were simply reading a page or two ahead of the customer in whatever security tome was "in vogue" at the time.

Based on those observations, it was clear that partner "quality" was a critical criterion. Fortunately for us, we didn't have to look far to satisfy our quality bar - many of the companies in the SDL Pro Network pilot have direct experience with executing portions of the SDL on our products, or have delivered services to Microsoft in a security context. Design reviews, code reviews, penetration testing, training and other tasks critical to SDL implementation were (and are) common fare for these folks.

Despite the customer demand for SDL that I alluded to above, starting with a small pilot was the right thing to do; a small group of trusted consultancies supports our imperative for quality and it allows us to pragmatically grow the SDL Pro Network as the market matures. As we continue to evolve and innovate with the SDL, we'll have a strong core of partners to help drive the software security message.

Will we grow the SDL Pro Network? The qualified answer is: "When the market demands it..." - there are a number of talented potential partners who meet the quality bar - and clearly, the need for security in software development will grow to demand additional talented specialists. However, it's our plan to begin with a small set of partners of known expertise, and then respond to growing demand as it materializes.

So there you have it - the nuanced beginning and bright future of the SDL Pro Network... I invite your comments, and encourage you to check in at the SDL Portal as we continue to build out the program