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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: cpus]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/cpus</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2007 20:32:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hardware Drive Encryption Becomes Manageable]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3f1f395706509cb09fc84984610e562a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3f1f395706509cb09fc84984610e562a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Regulatory compliance requirements and other best security practices are driving enterprises more consistently towards use of hard drive encryption, but it's not always an easy decision., Software...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Regulatory compliance requirements and other best security practices are driving enterprises more consistently towards use of hard drive encryption, but it's not always an easy decision., Software encryption products can impose a performance burden and key management can be problematic.

<a href="http://www.seagate.com/security">The answer, argues Seagate, is hardware encryption built into the drive.</a> Integration into McAfee's Endpoint Encryption products makes key management more organized and secure, and no CPUs are burdened in the encryption or decryption of the data. Seagate also has announced they are now shipping 320GB and 500GB self-encrypted drives up to 7200RPM. Dell will be shipping notebooks with these drives. The drives come factory pre-loaded with management software.

Early this year headlines were had with the revelation, by researchers at Princeton, of a theoretical attack that could recover software encryption keys even from a notebook that had been shut off. It's actually silly James Bond stuff that real people shouldn't worry about, but it did demonstrate the real point that the keys exist in memory and there are ways they can be gotten. Attacks on the live system that gain control of it, through malware for example, could still gain access to any data to which the compromised user has access. With hardware-encrypted drives, at least the private key is secure and the Princeton attack is prevented.

Notebooks with drives like these in a managed environment really do make it easier to feel secure about notebooks, even if they have sensitive data on them. Combine them with other best practices, like multi-factor authentication, and you've given yourself the best chance to succeed in security. One day we'll use products like this and nothing less will be acceptable.
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/T_UMdFf59j2CuXKDSsm3b87YBMY/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/T_UMdFf59j2CuXKDSsm3b87YBMY/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/SRLtIgpRBwM" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2008 06:51:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/encryption">encryption</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software encryption products">software encryption products</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/endpoint encryption products">endpoint encryption products</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drive">drive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/products">products</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hard drive encryption">hard drive encryption</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key">key</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key management">key management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive data">sensitive data</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/SRLtIgpRBwM/hardware_drive_encryption_becomes_manageable.html">Hardware Drive Encryption Becomes Manageable</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Remote Code Execution Through Intel CPU Vulnerability Will Be Presented In Hack In The Box Security Conference]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c476ad4e9a7cd1daced508013568c8f2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c476ad4e9a7cd1daced508013568c8f2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Intel CPUs have exploitable bugs which are vulnerable to both local and remote attacks which works against any OS regardless of the patches applied or the applications which are running. Kris...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Intel CPUs have exploitable bugs which are vulnerable to both local and remote attacks which works against any OS regardless of the patches applied or the applications which are running. Kris Kaspersky, author of numerous books on reverse engineering and software engineering, will be presenting his research on remote code execution through Intel CPU bugs [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 09:37:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/remote code execution">remote code execution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intel cpu bugs">intel cpu bugs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/numerous books">numerous books</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kris kaspersky">kris kaspersky</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exploitable bugs">exploitable bugs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intel cpus">intel cpus</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/remote attacks">remote attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/applications">applications</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/remote-code-execution-through-intel-cpu-vulnerability-will-be-presented-in-hack-in-the-box-security-conference/">Remote Code Execution Through Intel CPU Vulnerability Will Be Presented In Hack In The Box Security Conference</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a5ef3fac42280b513c7c8d31f1a499be</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a5ef3fac42280b513c7c8d31f1a499be</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[New Video: Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption
Ive recently become interested in measures that modern CPUs can...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<b>New Video:</b><a href="http://irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/using-data-execution-prevention-dep-in-windows-xp-and-vista">Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption</a><br>
&nbsp;I’ve recently become interested in measures that modern CPUs can take to prevent various types of memory corruption attacks. One such feature is the NX bit (as AMD calls it, XD is Intel’s term), which allows for memory pages to me 
marked as not executable. Microsoft Windows started using this ability with XP 
SP2 as part of their Data Execution Prevention (DEP) feature. Unfortunately, to 
get most out of DEP you have to configure it. This video will show how to 
configure DEP protection in Windows XP and Vista.
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/IrongeeksSecuritySite?a=c8SqYS"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/IrongeeksSecuritySite?i=c8SqYS" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~4/307708597" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Jun 2008 20:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dep">dep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data execution prevention">data execution prevention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory corruption">memory corruption</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows">windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/configure dep protection">configure dep protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/configure">configure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory corruption attacks">memory corruption attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vista">vista</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/buffer overflows">buffer overflows</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~3/307708597/i.php">Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a9a090d025173f22251ad2d7caf4ad62</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a9a090d025173f22251ad2d7caf4ad62</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[New Video: Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption
Iâve recently become interested in measures that modern CPUs can...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<b>New Video:</b><a href="http://irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/using-data-execution-prevention-dep-in-windows-xp-and-vista">Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption</a><br>
&nbsp;Iâve recently become interested in measures that modern CPUs can take to prevent various types of memory corruption attacks. One such feature is the NX bit (as AMD calls it, XD is Intelâs term), which allows for memory pages to me 
marked as not executable. Microsoft Windows started using this ability with XP 
SP2 as part of their Data Execution Prevention (DEP) feature. Unfortunately, to 
get most out of DEP you have to configure it. This video will show how to 
configure DEP protection in Windows XP and Vista.<img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~4/SQcMieqywPc" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Jun 2008 20:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dep">dep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data execution prevention">data execution prevention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory corruption">memory corruption</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows">windows</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/configure dep protection">configure dep protection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/configure">configure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory corruption attacks">memory corruption attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vista">vista</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/buffer overflows">buffer overflows</category>
      <source url="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/IrongeeksSecuritySite/~3/SQcMieqywPc/i.php">Using Data Execution Prevention (DEP) in Windows XP and Vista: Fighting back against buffer overflows and memory corruption</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Your Turn At The Bar Again? Security Costs in a Pay Per Drink Cloud]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8bab710531ef5484810afd8bf2b3ee41</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8bab710531ef5484810afd8bf2b3ee41</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With in-house IT, you pay your upfront capital costs and maintenance fees and you get whatever compute power you paid for. If you over-specify, you have excess computer power or disk - you are wasting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Lounge" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/58746120@N00/226174381/" target="_blank"><img src="http://farm1.static.flickr.com/77/226174381_1c9bac8eb7_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Lounge" /></a></p>
<p>With in-house IT, you pay your upfront capital costs and maintenance fees and you get whatever compute power you paid for.  If you over-specify, you have excess computer power or disk - you are wasting money.  If you under-specify, you may be forced to raid your &#8216;rainy day&#8217; budget and order new hardware.</p>
<p>A primary selling point of Cloud Computing is the  &#8216;pay by the drink&#8217; billing model - you only pay for the CPU cycles and storage you use - that&#8217;s it.</p>
<p>If you run any IT security tools at all, Cloud Computing may impact the way you calculate your IT security budgets.</p>
<h3>Assessing The Cost of Runtime Security</h3>
<p>Security costs can be overt or hidden:</p>
<ul>
<li>budget items spread across infrastructure, security, compliance, midrange.</li>
<li>the runtime security costs of security tools that execute on the systems.</li>
</ul>
<p>How many organisations know their runtime security compute costs?  My guess is not many.  Under the traditional IT billing model, you mostly don&#8217;t need to figure this stuff out.  As long as your security tools don&#8217;t chew up the CPU unnecessarily or fill the disk, everyone is happy.</p>
<p>The performance of security products varies greatly.  On the negative side, poor design or implementation are problems only the vendor can address.   Site specific issues arise through all kinds of madness - customers failing to &#8220;read the label&#8221; and provision properly, insufficiently trained people making poor configuration choices or simply relying on the default settings in a very non-default environment!</p>
<p>The negative side effects of in-line security tools hit home as system load increases.  Access checks, logging and other &#8216;in-line&#8217; security operations may perform fine under normal load fail to scale as load increases past a certain threshold.  This can lead to CPU spikes or poor disk access patterns.</p>
<h3>Switch Off Or Pay Up?</h3>
<p>To bring this closer to home, lets explore how the impact of security tools plays out today under traditional IT and tomorrow, under Cloud Computing.  Lets eavesdrop on a fictitious conversation between Oscar the ORACLE DBA and Simon the Security Dude.</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>: Hey Simon, your Security Agents are killing system performance again.  Anna in accounts called up to say they can&#8217;t do the Quarterly close, the jobs are getting killed before they finish.</p>
<p><strong>Simon</strong>: Hi Simon, I understand but we can&#8217;t just disable all the security!</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>: Well, we need to do something if we are going to finish posting our numbers this quarter.  Are you volunteering to explain to our CEO why we didn&#8217;t?</p>
<p><strong>Simon</strong>: Hmm.  Let me check the agent logs, perhaps there is a problem.</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>: I already checked them, no errors reported.</p>
<p><strong>Simon</strong>: Hmm.  I&#8217;ll log a call with the Premium International Support Service.</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>: You did that last time and the support guy stuck to the party line that the security agent takes 5-10% of CPU.  We know those numbers are wrong from our benchmarking - sometimes it takes 20% of CPU and always a lot more during quarter close.</p>
<p><strong>Simon</strong>: Hmm.  Are there any other processes running on the system we can disable for a while?</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>: Nope - we&#8217;re running a tight a ship as we can here.  I&#8217;ve already told Steve from sourcing he is going to have to wait for his reports.</p>
<p><strong>Simon</strong>: Hmm.  Bugger.  OK, I&#8217;ll disable the agents - but you must tell me as soon as the quarter close completes so I can start them up again.</p>
<p><strong>Oscar</strong>:  Thanks - will do.</p>
<p>A classic conversation under the &#8216;old regime&#8217;.  Oscar is forced into an operational security decision due to an under-specified system or an over indulgent security agent.  His only option in this scenario is to disable the poorly scaling security tool.  He can&#8217;t just scream &#8220;Need more power!&#8221; and additional CPUs appear.</p>
<p>Now lets see how this plays out with Cloud Computing, where the change in paradigm will remove the compute limits and make your on the spot risk decisions link directly to your costs and security tool efficiencies:</p>
<p>Simon the Security Dude receives an auto-generated email from the Cloud Provider:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>A virtual CPU was auto-inserted on virtual machine image FINANCE1 at 10:30am as Runtime Security Compute usage exceeded the agreed threshold in the SLA.   Please note, you have now reached your soft credit limit - please click the link below to authorize an increase.  You currently have 4USD left in your account.</em></p></blockquote>
<p>So what does Simon do now? He already tapped into his security compute budget five times this week and he&#8217;s running low.  The silver lining is that at least he gets to make the decision now - he isn&#8217;t forced to &#8217;switch off security&#8217;. If he has the cash, he can attempt to buy his way out of the problem.  The obvious negative is &#8220;death by a thousand costs&#8221; - he&#8217;s running out of budget.</p>
<p>The root cause of the problem is that prior to moving to the Cloud, Oscar didn&#8217;t have a handle on how much runtime security was *really* costing. He didn&#8217;t know (a) his runtime security costs or (b) how much of that cost was unnecessary - caused by security tool inefficiency.  He wasn&#8217;t the one paying, so most of the time he didn&#8217;t have to care.  Even if he had found a way to calculate his costs, he&#8217;d still have to figure out how performance differences of Cloud Computing would skew his numbers.</p>
<p>And therein lies the rub: if you don&#8217;t know your security runtime costs are today - and where the waste is - how will you cope &#8220;tomorrow&#8221; when it&#8217;s always your turn to pay for drinks at the Cloud Bar?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/281672030" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 16:55:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security costs">security costs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/costs">costs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/runtime security costs">runtime security costs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security runtime costs">security runtime costs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tool">security tool</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tool inefficiency">security tool inefficiency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tools plays">security tools plays</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plays">plays</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/281672030/">Your Turn At The Bar Again? Security Costs in a Pay Per Drink Cloud</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[OMG, This Is So 20th Century :-)]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a800908127eff064d77702f3103d7b5e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a800908127eff064d77702f3103d7b5e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[SANS folks debunk the old idiocy There is nothing on my computer that a hacker would be interested in

Holy chao! :-) I was hoping that people - by now!!! - would already know that their CPUs, disks,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[SANS folks debunk the old idiocy <a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=3672">“There is nothing on my computer that a hacker would be interested in”</a><br /><br />Holy chao! :-)  I was hoping that people -<span style="font-weight: bold;"> by now!!! </span>- would already know that their CPUs, disks, connections are pretty useful to criminals .... And, yes, so is their data!<br /><br />Forward <a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=3672&amp;rss">the SANS piece</a> to all you non-computer / non-IT friends ... (sadly, some IT folks too ;-))<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=fI3cC9C"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=fI3cC9C" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=Fq5annC"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=Fq5annC" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/199062975" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2007 20:32:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/folks">folks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sans folks debunk">sans folks debunk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-it friends">non-it friends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-computer">non-computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/holy chao">holy chao</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sans piece">sans piece</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer">computer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sadly">sadly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/connections">connections</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/199062975/omg-this-is-so-20th-century.html">OMG, This Is So 20th Century :-)</source>
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