<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: crimeware]]>

<![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: crimeware]]> http://securityratty.com/tag/crimeware Thu, 02 Oct 2008 03:33:00 +0000 iRatty Engine http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss <![CDATA[Yet Another Web Malware Exploitation Kit in the Wild]]> http://securityratty.com/article/5caa05f53942f1ddb87a74f20c2c3599 http://securityratty.com/article/5caa05f53942f1ddb87a74f20c2c3599

With business-minded malicious attackers embracing basic marketing practices like branding, it is becoming increasingly harder, if not pointless to keep track of all XYZ-Packs currently in circulation. How come? Due to their open source nature allowing modifications, claiming copyright over the modified and re-branded kit, the source code of core web malware exploitation kits continue representing the foundation source code for each and every newly released kit.

In fact, the practice is becoming so evident, that anecdotal evidence in the form of monitoring ongoing communications between sellers and buyers reveals actual attempts of intellectual property enforcement in the form of exchange of flames between an author of a original kit, and a newly born author who seems to have copied over 80% of his source code, changed the layout, re-branded it, added several more exploits and started pitching it as the most exclusive kit there is available in the underground marketplace.

What's new about this particular kit anyway? Changed iframe and js obfuscation techniques, doesn't require MySQL to run, with several modified Adobe Acrobat and Flash exploits - all patched and publicly obtainable. This is precisely where the marketing pitch ends for the majority of malware kits released during the last quarter.

As always, there are noticable exceptions to the common wisdom that time-to-underground market isn't allowing them to innovate, but thankfully, these exceptions aren't yet going mainstream. What is going to change in the upcoming 2009? Web malware exploitation kits are slowly maturing into multi-user cybercrime platforms, where traffic management coming from the SQL injected or malware embedded sites is automatically exploited with access to the infected hosts or to the traffic volume in general offered for sale under a flat rate, or on a volume basis.

Converging traffic management with drive-by exploitation and offering the output for sale, all from a single web interface, is precisely what malicious economies of scale is all about.

Related posts:
Cybercriminals release Christmas themed web malware exploitation kit
New Web Malware Exploitation Kit in the Wild
Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Performance Boost
Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Carding Layout
Web Based Malware Emphasizes on Anti-Debugging Features
Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kit Comes with Disclaimer
Web Based Malware Eradicates Rootkits and Competing Malware
Two Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits in the Wild
Copycat Web Malware Exploitation Kits are Faddish
Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0
BlackEnergy DDoS Bot Web Based
A New DDoS Malware Kit in the Wild
The Small Pack Web Malware Exploitation Kit
The Nuclear Grabber Kit
The Apophis Kit
Nuclear Malware Kit
The Random JS Malware Exploitation Kit
Metaphisher Malware Kit Spotted in the Wild

]]> Tue, 02 Dec 2008 03:24:43 +0000 kit malware exploitation kit nuclear malware kit zeus crimeware kit malware exclusive kit nuclear grabber kit apophis kit ddos malware kit Yet Another Web Malware Exploitation Kit in the Wild <![CDATA[New Web Malware Exploitation Kit in the Wild]]> http://securityratty.com/article/b14bf267debe94a6c65be57f5460b9a5 http://securityratty.com/article/b14bf267debe94a6c65be57f5460b9a5

Oops, they keep doing it, again and again - trying to cash-in on the biased exclusiveness of web malware exploitation kits in general, which when combined with active branding is supposed to make them rich. However, despite the low price of $300 in this particular case, this copycat kit is once again lacking any signification differentiation factors besides perhaps the 20+ exploits targeting Opera and Internet Explorer included within.

Marketed for novice users, despite lacking any key features worth being worried about, it's still managing to maintain a steady infection rate of unpatched Opera browsers. Such statistics obtained in an OSINT fashion always provide a realistic perspective on publicly known facts, like the one where millions of end users continue getting exploited due to their overall misunderstanding of today's threatscape driven by the ubiquitous web exploitation kits.

]]> Wed, 19 Nov 2008 01:15:01 +0000 malware malware exploitation kit web based malware nuclear malware kit ddos malware kit zeus crimeware kit wild key features worth metaphisher malware kit New Web Malware Exploitation Kit in the Wild <![CDATA[Will Code Malware for Financial Incentives]]> http://securityratty.com/article/30eebfa1383ce3a671879e2f1f0af37d http://securityratty.com/article/30eebfa1383ce3a671879e2f1f0af37d

A couple of hundred dollars can indeed get you state of the art undetectable piece of malware with post-purchase service in the form of automatic lower detection rate for sure, but what happens when the vendors of such releases start vertically integrating just like everyone else, and start offering OS-independent spamming, flooding, modifications and tweaking of popular crimeware kits in the very same fashion? The quality assurance process gets centralized into the hands of experienced programmers that have been developing cybercrime facilitating tools for years.

It's interesting to monitor the pricing schemes that they implement. For instance, the modularity of a particular malware, that is the additional functions that a buyer may want or not want, increase or decrease the price respectively. Others, tend to leave the price open topic by only mentioning the starting price for their services and they increasing it again in open topic fashion.

Let's take look at some recently advertised (translated) "malware coding for hire" propositions, highlighting some of the latest developments in their pricing strategies :

Proposition 1 :
"Programs and scripts under the following categories are accepted :
grabbers; spamming tools for forums, spamming tools for social networking sites, modifications of admin panels for (popular crimeware kits), phishing pages

Platform: software running on MAC OS to Windows
Multitasking: have the capacity to work on multiple projects
Speed and responsibility: at the highest level
Pre-payment for new customers: 50% of the whole price, 30% pre-pay of the whole price for repreated customers
Support: Paid
Rates: starting from 100 euros

If, after speaking ultimate price, you decide to add to your order something else - the price change. Prepare the job immediately, which will understand what to do and how much it will cost you, if you have any suggestions for a price, then lays them immediately and not after the work is completed. If you order something that requires parsing your logs, and their continued use, you agree to provide "a significant portion of the logs, so that after putting the project did not raise misunderstandings due to the fact that some logs are no longer "fresh", because of their "uniqueness". In this case, for the finalization of the project will be charged an additional fee."

This is an example of an "open topic pricing scheme" with the vendor offering the possibility to code the malware or the tool for any price above 100 euro based on what he perceives as features included within worth the price.

Proposition 2:
"Starting price for my malware is 250 EUR. Additional modules like P2P features, source code for a particular module go for an additional 50 EUR. If you're paying in another currency the price is 200 GBP or 395 dollars. I sell only ten copies of the builder so hurry up. The trading process is simple - a password protected file with the malware is sent to you so you can see the files inside. You then sent the money and I mail you back the password. If you don't like this way you lose.

I can also offer you another deal, I will share the complete source code in exchange to access to a botnet with at least 4000 infected hosts because I don't have time to play around with me bot right now.

This proposition is particularly interesting because the seller is introducing basic understanding of exchange rates, but most of all because he's in fact offering a direct bargain in the form of access to a botnet in exchange for a complete source code of his malware bot. Both propositions are also great examples that vendors engage by keeping their current and potential customers up-to-date with TODO lists of features to come next to the usual CHANGELOGS, and, of course, establish trust by allowing potential customers to take a peek at the source code of the malware they're about to purchase.

Related posts:
Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire
The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services
The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools
Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets
Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand
Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam
Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand
E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors
Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime
Malware as a Web Service
Localizing Open Source Malware
Quality and Assurance in Malware Attacks
Benchmarking and Optimising Malware

]]> Tue, 18 Nov 2008 10:57:55 +0000 malware code source malware malware attacks malware bot proprietary malware tools source code complete source code tools Will Code Malware for Financial Incentives <![CDATA[Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Carding Layout]]> http://securityratty.com/article/2dadca90df89c26f3f517a1e2b237afd http://securityratty.com/article/2dadca90df89c26f3f517a1e2b237afd

With cybercriminals clearly expressing their nostalgia for several notorious and already shut down credit card fraud communities, they seem to have found a way to once again give their self-esteem a boost. Following the ongoing modification of open source crimeware kits and the inevitable innovation introduced by third parties, last week a new layout was introduced for Zeus, once again courtesy of a group that's piggybacking on Zeus popularity.

It's particularly interesting to see how a one-man operation evolves into a group of third-party developers starting to claim ownership rights over the modified versions despite that they're basically brandjacking the Zeus brand and building business models on the top of it.

Open source crimeware and web malware exploitation kits on the other hand undermine the business model of a great number of "malware/spyware for hire" vendors, which surprisingly doesn't stop them from continuing offering their services and products which are often using the de facto crimeware kits as the foundations for their propositions. Are the buyers even aware of this fact? From a buyer's perspective in times when most of the output is sold in bulk form, or access to the botnet rented for a specific period of time, the buyer doesn't care about the cybercrime platform of use, but is looking for transparent ways to justify the investment he's made into renting the service.

Now that Zeus administrators and their cybercrime clerks in the face of those managing the campaigns knowingly or unknowingly knowing the type of campaigns and the data that they manage, can listen to their favorite music within Zeus and choose different layouts for the command and control interfaces while commiting cybercrime, what's next?

Convergence and improved monetization.

]]> Mon, 10 Nov 2008 02:53:52 +0000 zeus zeus administrators zeus popularity source crimeware kits cybercrime cybercrime clerks source crimeware zeus brand cybercrime platform Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Carding Layout <![CDATA[Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Performance Boost]]> http://securityratty.com/article/206d70045cec21b7f158d2fdc041b855 http://securityratty.com/article/206d70045cec21b7f158d2fdc041b855

Oops, they did it again - modifying an open source crimeware kit like Zeus in order to improve its performance, fix previously known bugs, and release the improved administration script for free at the end of October.

It's important to point out that both of these modifications haven't been released by the original author of Zeus, but by third parties filling in the gaps he has left open. The very nature of open source web based malware exploitation kits is one of the key factors for the ongoing convergence of traffic management, exploits serving, ddos, and cybercrime as a service features into a simplified cybercrime platform available on demand.

Following the discovery of a remotely exploitable flaw within Zeus in June -- a flaw affecting Pinch leaked out two months later -- allowing cyberciminals to inject their own credentials and hijack the botnet of other cybercriminals, this modified version claims to have fixed three vulnerabilities within the original Zeus release, namely, a remote file inclusion flaw and two SQL injections within the administration panel. Here's the new CHANGELOG :

"- code improvements and optimizations
- internal data checkings added
- exit() function instead of die()
- echo() function instead of print()
- mysql_affected_rows () changed to mysql_num_rows () everywhere
- all queries are fixed in system or mod .php files
- no text password in the database and clear text password in $_SESSION, cookies authentication is gone and md5 hashes are everywhere
- Geo IP support has been added
- umask () bug fixed, the file has been created (chmoded) with different permissions
- language improvements and pre-installation checks
- checking for php version/safe_mod/open_basedir as you're required to run php 5.1.0 or higher to run it successfully
- fixed sql injection in credentials checking
- GetUserData () function has been rewritten - possible sql injection fixed
- possible remote file inclusion fixed
- socket error definition changed
- gcnt () function has been rewritten so you can use geolication - GeoIP which is free and GeoIPCity which is paid
- ip address checking improved through validIP() function improvement
- all queries are now fixed, input data has been sanitized
- fs () function has been fixed in order to improve the quality of the log names
- formatFilePath () function has been added for file upload purposes
- arbitrary file upload bug has been fixed so that you can now upload only images with original names
- the Log2SQL () function has been changed and stricter data checking/sanitizing is added
- internal file sorting mechanism is improved so that files/dirs are sorted by file modification time"

As it's becoming increasingly clear that what once used to be a proprietary crimeware kits whose business model got undermined by their open source nature and the fact that they've started leaking for average cybercriminals and script kiddies to take advantage of, are today's "open source projects" - and therefore maintaining static lists of exploits and features included within a particular kit is getting even more irrelevant these days. In the long term, the quality assurance processes applied within crimeware kits courtesy of third party cybercriminals, is prone to shift from performance to improving the infection rates.

]]> Mon, 03 Nov 2008 11:12:30 +0000 fixed sql injection fixed zeus fixed sql injection upload file upload purposes file function improvement function Modified Zeus Crimeware Kit Gets a Performance Boost <![CDATA[Crooks can make $5M a year shilling fake security software]]> http://securityratty.com/article/32391a8062ca2f1d530cfd760b824a25 http://securityratty.com/article/32391a8062ca2f1d530cfd760b824a25

]]> Fri, 31 Oct 2008 01:00:00 +0000 software worthless security software noted crimeware researcher bogus warnings users rake criminals million pcs Crooks can make $5M a year shilling fake security software <![CDATA[One Sinowal Trojan + One Gang = Hundreds of Thousands of Compromised Accounts ]]> http://securityratty.com/article/1a4969d994be490ce3b3ac9a5e6ec848 http://securityratty.com/article/1a4969d994be490ce3b3ac9a5e6ec848 Torpig and Mebroot. Our findings based on the data we have collected on this Trojan over the course of almost three years – including information regarding its design and its infrastructure – indicate that this may be one of the most pervasive and advanced pieces of crimeware ever created by fraudsters. We recently discovered that, dating back as early as February 2006, the Sinowal Trojan has compromised and stolen login credentials from approximately 300,000 online bank accounts... ]]> Thu, 30 Oct 2008 21:00:00 +0000 sinowal trojan trojan findings based online bank accounts login credentials fraudsters research design share One Sinowal Trojan + One Gang = Hundreds of Thousands of Compromised Accounts <![CDATA[The Shape of Crimeware to Come]]> http://securityratty.com/article/a1b404ad259e39c1abd23a1671850ad5 http://securityratty.com/article/a1b404ad259e39c1abd23a1671850ad5 ]]> Wed, 08 Oct 2008 00:42:02 +0000 attacks defenses The Shape of Crimeware to Come <![CDATA[Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code]]> http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4 http://securityratty.com/article/fac8ba92dd4114941015e75bba3149c4

In a self-contradicting social engineering attempt, a malware author is offering to sale a (updated version of Kardphisher) DIY fake Windows XP activation builder, which despite the fact that it claims "We will ask for your billing details, but your credit card will NOT be charged", is requesting and remotely uploading all the credit card details required for a successfully credit card theft.

Perhaps among the main reasons why such simplistic social engineering attempts never scaled in a "malicious economies of scale" approach, is because sophisticated crimeware kits capable of obtaining the very same data automatically, started leaking for everyone to start taking advantage of - including yesterday's cybercriminals using such DIY fake message builders.

Moreover, according to recently reseased survey results, end users cannot distinguish between fake popups and real ones, and on their way to continue doing what they were doing, click OK on that pesky warning message telling them that they're about to get infected with malware. Taking into consideration the fact that the popup windows the researchers used look like cheap creative compared to the average fake security software's layout high quality GUIs, it is perhaps worth restating your research questions with something in the lines of - What motivates end users to install an antivirus application going under the name of Super Antivirus 2009 or Mega Virus Cleaner 2008? The fact that the fake status bar is telling them that they're infected with 47 spyware cookies, or the fact that they ended up at the fake site while browsing their trusted web services?

The increase of rogue security software domains is happening due to the high payout affiliation based model, the standardized creative allowing the participants to come up with their own fake names if they want to, and due to the fact that the fake security threats scareware approach seems to be perfectly taking advantage of the overall suspicion on the effectiveness of their legitimate security software.

]]> Mon, 06 Oct 2008 15:01:01 +0000 credit card details credit card credit card theft details malware malware author social mega virus cleaner creative Fake Windows XP Activation Trojan Wants Your CVV2 Code <![CDATA[Monetizing Infected Hosts by Hijacking Search Results]]> http://securityratty.com/article/30b128b9fa2c48983d32dbcc4818d136 http://securityratty.com/article/30b128b9fa2c48983d32dbcc4818d136

When logs with accounting data are no longer of interest due to low liquidity on the underground market, monetization of the infected hosts comes into play.

This web based malware seems like an early BETA aiming to scale, however it's only unique features are its ability to hijack the infected user's searches and server relevant ads courtesy of the affiliate networks the administrator participates in, and also, an integrated DDoS module that the author simply stole from another kit. Strangely, it's 2008 yet the author also included the ability to turn on the telnet service on an infected host.

With the search queries feature easy to duplicate by other kits, this web based malware is a great example of how the time-to-market mentality lacking any kind of personal experience -- the malware cannot intercept SSL sessions compared to the majority of crimeware kits that can -- ends up in a weird hybrid of random features.

Customerization will inevitably prevail over the product concept mentality.

]]> Thu, 02 Oct 2008 03:33:00 +0000 malware web based malware kits author simply author crimeware kits intercept ssl sessions product concept mentality queries feature easy Monetizing Infected Hosts by Hijacking Search Results