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      <title><![CDATA[The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems ]]></title>
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      <description><![CDATA[The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems
Quality of Protection Keynote
Alexandria, VA
October 27. 2008

Gunnar Peterson
Managing Principal, Arctec Group
Blog:...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems&#0160;</div><div><a href="http://qop-workshop.org/Program.htm">Quality of Protection Keynote</a></div><div>Alexandria, VA</div><div>October 27. 2008</div><br /><div>Gunnar Peterson</div><div>Managing Principal, Arctec Group</div><div>Blog: http://1raindrop.typepad.com</div><br /><div>When Andy Ozment asked me over the summer to do this talk at QoP, I knew back in August that the topic I wanted to address was security and economics. So to that end I would like to start by thanking all of our friends on Wall Street and here in Washington DC for providing such a rich tapestry of recent events that I can speak to.</div><br /><div>Like many people in this industry, my focus on security was fundamentally altered by Dan Geer&#39;s speech &quot;Risk Management is Where the Money Is&quot;[1], there are not many people who can call a ten year shot in the technology business, but Dan Geer did. The talk revolutionized the security industry. Since that speech, the security market, the vendors, consultants, and everyone else has realized that security is really about risk management.</div><br /><div>Of course, saying that you are managing risk and actually managing risk are two different things. Warren Buffett started off his 2007 shareholder letter [2] talking about financial institutions&#39; ability to deal with the subprime mess in the housing market saying, &quot;You don&#39;t know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out.&quot; In our world, we don&#39;t know whose systems are running naked, with no controls, until they are attacked. Of course, by then it is too late.</div><br /><div>So the security industry understands enough about risk management that the language of risk has permeated almost every product, presentation, and security project for the last ten years. However, a friend of mine who works at a bank recently attended a workshop on security metrics, and came away with the following observation - &quot;All these people are talking about risk, but they don&#39;t have any assets.&quot; You can&#39;t do risk management if you don&#39;t know your assets.</div><br /><div>Risk management requires that you know your assets, that on some level you understand the vulnerabilities surrounding your assets, the threats against those, and efficacy of the countermeasures you would like to use to separate the threat from the asset. But it starts with assets. Unfortunately, in the digital world these turn out to be devilishly hard to identify and value.</div><br /><div>Recent events have taught us again, that in the financial world, Warren Buffett has few peers as a risk manager. I would like to take the first two parts of this talk looking at his career as a way to understand risk management and what we can infer for our digital assets.</div><br /><div>Warren Buffett&#39;s evolution as an investor can be broken up into two parts. He began his career very much influenced by Ben Graham, who sought to buy &quot;cheap stocks&quot;, comparing the price of the stock to value of the company&#39;s assets, and placing many, diversified bets on companies whose share price was below the total assets. Note that the businesses may have been of unremarkable quality, but when the price was right Graham would buy in, wait for it to rise and then sell. This was the dawn of value investing.</div><br /><div>Buffett&#39;s later career departed from Graham&#39;s strict, statistical measures, where he sought to buy into companies that were selling at a fair price, but were also high quality businesses. We will examine high quality in Part 2 of this talk, but first we go to Part 1 which is asset value.</div><br /><div>Why does a talk on finding and fixing vulnerabilities start with valuing assets? The reason is that vulnerabilities are everywhere, we are literally marinating in them. Interesting vulnerabilities are attached to high value assets. In a world that quite literally presents us with too much information, we need screens to sift out what is worth paying attention to. &#0160;You can run your vulnerability assessment tool of choice on your system, and come back with hundreds or thousands of vulnerabilities, but which ones should you pay attention to and act on? The first part of answering this question is asset value.</div><br /><div>When Warren Buffett was 19 years old studying at the University of Nebraska, he read Ben Graham&#39;s book &quot;The Intelligent Investor&quot;, Buffett said he thought it was the best book on investing he has ever read and still feels that way today. In the Intelligent Investor Graham lays out the framework of value investing. Specifically, Graham talks about three concepts - Mr. Market, a stock is a piece of a business, and Margin of Safety.</div><br /><div>Mr. Market is a fictional, teaching device invented by Graham. You imagine that you have a somewhat manic depressive business partner called Mr. Market. Every day, Mr. Market comes into the office and offers you quotes on companies, some days he is in a good mood and the prices are high, other days he is gloomy and prices are low. The market is a quote machine, for quoting prices, not a value assessment machine. Your job is to wait for the right price, and you are free to take as many passes and be as patient as you would like, Mr. Market will just show up the next day and throw out a new price.&#0160;</div><br /><div>Graham used Mr. Market to teach us the separation between a price of a stock, and the value of a company. The second big concept from Intelligent Investor is that buying a stock is buying a small piece of the underlying business. You are not buying a roulette chip, or a number that fluctuates in the newspaper every day, rather you are buying a piece of the company&#39;s existing and future cash flow. What the stock market says General Electric is worth yesterday, today or tomorrow is separate from GE&#39;s actual ability to generate cash flow.</div><br /><div>The last big concept in &quot;The Intelligent Investor&quot; and the one seemingly most applicable to information security is the Margin of Safety. Graham&#39;s margin of safety involved calculating the intrinsic value of a business and then buying stock where the market cap of a company is less than its intrinsic value. So if a company has $100 million in assets and a market capitalization of $75 million, then an investor would get a 25% margin of safety. Ideally, Graham wanted to buy stocks that were selling for one half of their book value, i.e. with a 50% margin of safety. Graham said that buying stocks without a margin of safety, above their book value, speculation, not investing.</div><br /><div>So price is readily available, but how do we calculate intrinsic value so that we can ascertain the margin of safety? Graham used quantitative statistical measures, relying heavily on the company&#39;s book value, like its hard assets. What would it take for a competitor to reproduce the company&#39;s assets - its factories, distribution system, and so on. The difference between the book value of the assets and market cap is the margin of safety.</div><br /><div>What can we learn in information security from this quantitative approach? Where price and value are readily ascertainable we should build countermeasures and eliminate on vulnerabilities that give our assets a wide margin of safety. Since budgets are not unlimited we should prefer vulnerabilities that are cheap to find, cheap to fix.</div><br /><div>First to the asset question, information security budgets like all IT budgets are crufty, they are not a reflection of today&#39;s top issues and priorities so much as an accumulating snowball of decisions, legacy contracts, and solution attempts to yesteryear&#39;s problems. Today the normal Information Security budget is just a legacy artifact from bygone years when the network was the purported greatest vulnerability. If you were around in 1995, you remember the great gnashing of gears as the enterprises opened up their networks, connected their back ends to the Web and began to transact business in the giant virtual space.</div><br /><div>The security people huffed and puffed that it was dangerous but there was simply too much money to be made, so businesses went ahead. The security people would not go down without a fight and insisted on countermeasures. They got two - the network firewall and SSL. The firewall was used to separate the average Fortune 500s network of hundreds of thousands of machines, employees, consultants, and partners from the web at large. SSL was used to protect the network channel between the web server and the client browser. so the network firewall separated the network segments, and SSL in effect encrypted the last mile of many million complex transactions and computations.</div><br /><div>In 1995, this seemed like a good security architecture. When we built out these security architectures, the eCommerce market was derided as a toy. Amazon famously lost money for years - losing a little on every transaction but making it up in volume. When the market is nascent, a quaint security architecture offers cost effective protection. But what about 2008? Those cute little eCommerce buggers have grown they even make profits now - market caps measured in the tens of billions, accumulating large cash hordes, no debt, and the largest ones are in better financial shape than the financial services players that kicked sand in their face in the dotcom era.&#0160;</div><br /><div>And its not just eCommerce, the &quot;real&quot; economy Fortune 500 types are all connected as well. Directly and indirectly the Web is seeping into all businesses. Major changes from when the security architecture of the web was built out. But has the security architecture changed to reflect these new business realities? Not a bit of it!</div><br /><div>We can use the book value of the IT budget investments and the book value of the Information Security investments to see what kind of Margins of Safety Information Security groups are engineering.</div><br /><div>Let&#39;s look at some market data, Gary McGraw reviewed the numbers [2] in software security for 2007, breaking down software security sectors like tools and services. Here is a summary of his findings on software security tools:</div><br /><div>&quot;One of the most important developments in the software security market can be seen in the tools space which, combined, almost doubled to $150-180 million. Top of list are two major acquisitions that closed in 2007: Watchfire&#39;s purchase by IBM (somewhere in the range of $120-150 million on 2006 revenue of $26 million) and SPI Dynamics&#39;s purchase by HP (for around $100 million on 2006 revenue of $21.2 million).</div><br /><div>...</div><br /><div>The black box space was flat in 2007, with IBM/Watchfire checking in at $24.1 million and HP/SPI Dynamics earning $22.3 million. Smaller companies in the space, including Cenzic, Codenomicon, WhiteHat and the like had combined revenues around $12.5 million (a growth of 25%, though Cenzic grew 16% and WhiteHat 52%). Most of the growth &quot;hiccup&quot; in the black box market can be attributed to the serious challenges posed by any acquisition. So far 2008 looks to be back on track from a growth perspective in the black box testing space. The global reach that IBM and HP offer are already making a big difference.</div><br /><br /><div>On a more positive note, static analysis tools for code review grew at a healthy clip in 2007 into a $91.9 million dollar market. Fortify was up 83% to $29.2 million. Klocwork grew over 60% to $26 million. Coverity grew over 50% to $27.2 million. Ounce Labs tripled their revenue to $9.5 million.&quot;</div><br /><div>These are very nice growth numbers, what company doesn&#39;t want 83% growth? However, the let&#39;s look at the total picture and compare the software security countermeasures against other security mechanisms. Gary McGraw&#39;s estimate shows the software security space coming in at $150 Million total, yet we see a company like Checkpoint that won the network security war in 1995 with earnings of around $900 Million! One single network security vendor is 6 times bigger than the entire software security space, in what alternate universe does this make sense?</div><br /><div>This is where we begin to see that decisions in the People&#39;s Republic of Information Security have no real risk management thinking, they truly are swimming naked and hoping the tide doesn&#39;t go out.</div><br /><div>Let&#39;s look at network assets. Obviously Cisco is the biggest, they earned $39.5 Billion last year. Pretty stellar. So spending $900 Million (Checkpoint) to defined $39.5 Billion seems like a pretty good deal.</div><br /><div>Except, let&#39;s compare software security spending - last year Microsoft earned $60 Billion, SAP $16 billion, and Oracle $22 Billion. So that is about $98 Billion in just three vendors and you are going to &quot;defend&quot; that with allocating $150 Million worth of software security tools?</div><br /><div>On the network side we are buying $900 million of security countermeasures (Checkpoint firewalls) to protect $39.5 billion worth of Cisco gear, about 2.3% of the network investment goes to security.</div><br /><div>On the software side, we are buying $150 million of security countermeasures (like static analysis and black box scanners) to protect $98 billion of software (you know the stuff that runs the whole business), roughly coming to about 0.2% of the software budget goes to security.</div><br /><div>This is very disturbing. From a prioritization standpoint The People&#39;s Republic of Information Security is misaligned by an order of magnitude at least. Next time you read about a data breach, or see an auditor&#39;s report with thousands of findings you won&#39;t have to wonder how it happened. It happened because Information Security doesn&#39;t have its eye on the ball, it invests in network security not because those controls have greater efficacy (the whole point of networks is they are dumb), no, they invest in network firewalls because they bought a bunch in 1995, some more in 1998, and heck they just kept buying them, the Checkpoint rep kept showing up and taking CISOs out to play golf, contracts got renewed, and poof - there goes the security budget.</div><br /><div>Consider that software security tools could grow 50% a year for five years and still be half of where Checkpoint is today.</div><br /><div>The optimistic way of looking at all this data is that there is major room for growth for software security, if you take network security as a target for a mature industry and assume that 2.3% is a reasonable margin of safety, then the software security space should evolve to around 2% of the software space meaning that it should evolve into a $2 billion space around fifteen times larger than it is today. Unprotected assets will either be protected or will cease to be assets, VCs get your check books ready.</div><br /><div>My friend Brian Chess has a nice way of looking at this he says 2007 was the turning point - &quot;the first year there was a bigger market for products that help you get code right than there was for products that help you demonstrate a problem exists.&quot;</div><br /><div>Now I am not suggesting that Information Security budgets have to be aligned with IT budget one for one, but I do think that looking at the overall IT budget is the starting point. If Information Security has a more cost effective security mechanism they should deploy it, but the starting point should be aligned to the business. Businesses spend most of their money on software, and there are very good reasons - competitive advantage, increased revenues and lower costs. Information Security spends most of its money on network security, and there is no good reason why, except that it was a seemingly good idea in 1995. You really don&#39;t have to go beyond the book value of IT investment as a whole versus Information Security to see a stunning disparity. Information Security&#39;s job is to deliver a Margin of Safety to the business, but they are not.&#0160;</div><br /><div>To deliver a real Margin of Safety to the business, I propose the following based on a defense in depth mindset. Break the IT budget into the following categories:</div><br /><div>- Network: all the resources invested in Cisco, network admins, etc.</div><div>- Host: all the resources invested in Unix, Windows, sys admins, etc.</div><div>- Applications: all the resources invested in developers, CRM, ERP, etc.</div><div>- Data: all the resources invested in databases, DBAs, etc.</div><br /><div>Tally up each layer. If you are like most business you will probably find that you spend most on Applications, then Data, then Host, then Network.</div><br /><div>Then do the same exercise for the Information Security budget:</div><br /><div>- Network: all the resources invested in network firewalls, firewall admins, etc.</div><div>- Host: all the resources invested in Vulnerability management, patching, etc.</div><div>- Applications: all the resources invested in static analysis, black box scanning etc.</div><div>- Data: all the resources invested in database encryption, database monitoring, etc.</div><br /><div>Again, tally each up layer. If you are like most business you will find that you spend most on Network, then Host, then Applications, then Data. Congratulations, Information Security, you are diametrically opposed to the business!</div><br /><div>Its not just about alignment for alignment&#39;s sake, its about applying controls as a way to have a Margin of Safety properly placed so that when not if there is a failure on a higher value asset you are relatively better positioned to deal with it.&#0160;</div><br /><div>The pure statistical approach can only take us so far. Buffett said he would be a lot poorer if all he did was listen to Ben Graham. Book value is great to see the diametric opposition mentioned above, but it doesn&#39;t really tell us much about the efficacy of the security mechanisms.</div><br /><div>What we do get out of this statistical approach is a screen. The asset value screen filters out subjective opinion and narrows the field for where we need to dig in to do the high value, time consuming analytical work.</div><br /><div>The second part of Warren Buffett&#39;s career and the second part of this talk leave behind pure statistical measures. In Warren Buffett&#39;s case he was joined by a guy named Charlie Munger who talked him out of the pure Ben Graham approach. Charlie Munger has a saying - &quot;a great business at a fair price beats a fair business at a great price.&quot; Where Graham was focused on price and margin of safety, Munger wants a fair price but also a high quality business. This lead to Warren Buffett&#39;s company Berkshire Hathaway investing in companies like Coca Cola, Wells Fargo, and American Express, where the prices were far from dirt cheap (as Graham would have wanted), but the long term returns were outstanding.</div><br /><div>In our world of Information Security, we start by aligning our priorities with the business using the thumbnail defense in depth approach, but then we would like to invest in high quality, effective controls.</div><br /><div>To get at the notion of control quality and effectiveness, I am going to start part 2 of this talk with a brief history of software. The first web software was just static HTML, but web software really got interesting when developers started creating dynamic websites using CGI an PERL.</div><br /><div>Once websites were hooked up to company databases and were not just serving static content, the security people realized they needed a security architecture, and they sprung into action. What they came up was was model that divided the world into &quot;good stuff&quot; which was comprised of all their networks, systems, and data; and then there was everything else the &quot;bad stuff&quot; on the Internet. So job one of the early days Internet security architecture was to separate all your good stuff (i.e. your network) for the bad stuff (the Internet). To do this the security people used a sophisticated tool called Visio to draw a flaming brick wall on the network diagram, and this flaming brick wall was supposed to keep the good stuff and the bad stuff separate.</div><br /><div>The security people also realized that the data and session tokens that they served up from their Web server would have to traverse the &quot;bad&quot; neighborhood called the Internet, so they added one more security mechanism to secure the last mile of the transaction - SSL between the browser and the Web server.</div><br /><div>And this was the state of the art security architecture used circa 1995 to protect the earliest dynamic web applications.</div><br /><div>What happened next was that the dotcom boom started to happen and businesses realized they could make some real money on the Web, the web apps started to get more sophisticated, more personalization, richer session experiences and so on. This led the Java people to create JSP and the Microsoft people to create ASP, and of course the PERL people to create even greasier PERL scripts, all of this in the effort to pooling resources and sessions on the Web server. The security people defended this new application programming model with network firewall and SSL.</div><br /><div>Around 1998, developers began building out more distributed N tier or 3 tier applications that separated the business logic layer, the presentation layer and the data access layer. Among other things, your web application could seamlessly integrate data from multiple back ends systems. Let&#39;s say you have pricing data in Oracle, order data in SAP, and customer data in a Mainframe. You write separate data access objects, apply business logic in the middle tier and then you tie it all together in a friendly user interface. At this point the web applications are beginning to integrate across departments and geographic boundaries, huge critical chunks of the business are now connected to the web. How did the security people defend this part of the business? They applied the same 1995 security architecture - network firewall and SSL.</div><br /><div>Around 1999-2000 timeframe businesses relied on web applications for major parts of the revenue, and the apps were built in different technologies like Java and Microsoft technologies, but the customer didn&#39;t care (still doesn&#39;t), the customer wanted (and still wants) data access and functionality. So to integrate the disparate technologies, SOAP and XML were deployed so that Microsoft could talk to Java and so Websphere could talk to Weblogic and so on. And, oh yes, SOAP and XML were used to connect B2B networks so partners in a supply chain and business process can exchange data and interoperate. &#0160;SOAP and XML present a fundamentally new programming model based on a message document style integration, where XML is used to mesh together data and functionality across platforms. SOAP and XML have no security model by default for authentication, authorization, and confidentiality. How did the security people deal with this? They kept the security architecture the same as they had in 1995 - network firewalls and SSL.</div><br /><div>The software world did not stop innovating in 2000 of course, in the last few years we have seen Web services and XML form the basis of baroque and powerful SOAs and simple REST applications. We have seen Web 2.0 come on the scene, and entirely new networked applications built on top of that.</div><br /><div>What we have not seen, is a single meaningful change in security architecture in 13 years. Developers have evolved, businesses have increasingly bet their entire business models on the web and they have increased security budgets. But what has the security architecture as its deployed in the field got to show for all of this? More firewalls and more SSL connections.</div><br /><div>Since Information Security has proven incapable of evolving, it is time to learn from a discipline that has mastered innovation - software development, and yes, I will step back in case the lightning bolts hits.</div><br /><div>What does software development focus on these days? Well, let&#39;s look at Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), all hype aside I look at SOA as a set of technologies that delivers three things:</div><br /><div>Virtualization: we want Beijing, Bangalore and Boston to communicate.</div><br /><div>Interoperability: we want our .Net stuff to talk to our java stuff.</div><br /><div>Reusability: how many order/claim/pricing/customer systems does one company need?</div><br /><div>To build out their SOA, developers separated the application interface from its implementation. So you can host the interface in a variety of locations, but its separate from the application logic and data.</div><br /><div>This is also a useful trick for putting services like SOAP through the firewall. SOAP was designed as a firewall friendly protocol. When SOAP first came out, Bruce Schneier said calling SOAP a firewall friendly protocol is like having a skull friendly bullet. Which is a great line and explains why his books fly off the shelves, it does not explain, why security people think an architecture designed in 1995 is the one we should be using today. Maybe the problem is not that the developers figured out how to go through the firewall to get the data their customers want, maybe the problem is that the firewall is the sum total of the security architecture, and it never adapted.</div><br /><div>A big part of this problem is that we have left Newton&#39;s world behind and entered Einstein&#39;s universe. Mainframes are Newton’s world, we have THE computer, THE price, THE record and so on.</div><br /><div>As Pat Helland explained [4,5], Mainframes are Newron&#39;s world, but Distributed computing is Einstein’s world. More specifically in the Einstein world of distributed computing - &quot;Computers don’t make decisions, computers try &#0160;to make decisions.&quot; Our computers don&#39;t really make a decision, they say you can buy this book from Amazon at this price, we have it in stock and will deliver on such and such a date. But the warehouse runs out, the pallet gets dropped in the warehouse, your boo is crushed, and the package is stolen off your front step. The computer confirmed your transaction, but the real world intervened.</div><br /><div>So we don&#39;t have iron clad decisions, instead its all about Memories (last time I checked your book was in stock), Guesses (we should be able to ship on this date) and Apologies (sorry the forklift ran over your book)</div><br /><div>Translating this into security, security mechanisms don’t make policy-based decisions, security mechanisms try to make policy-based decisions</div><br /><div>Some examples of memories, guesses and apologies in security</div><br /><div>Memories</div><div>Security Policies - for example Triple A policy</div><div>Triple A policies can memorize a map of subjects, objects, and roles. They can even replicate these memories and play them back at runtime to try to make policy enforcement decisions.</div><br /><div>Guesses</div><div>Security Policy Enforcement Decision</div><div>Unfortunately, while the policy enforcement decisions can be based on memorized logic, the decision itself is still a guess, even in the case of Triple A. Any guesses why? Because, the authentication process itself is a guess. It happens to be a guess that you then bind to a principal so it looks very official once you bind your guess to a Kerberos ticket or SAML assertion, but it still a guess.</div><br /><div>Apologies</div><div>Giant Global Bank is sorry your account was compromised!</div><div>And this leads to lots and lots of apologies by companies with poor access control models.</div><br /><div>Some additional examples of information security memories, guesses and apologies.</div><br /><div>Example Memories - Triple A Security Policies, Audit logs, User account information , Authorization Logic - concrete mapping Subject, Resource, Condition, Action</div><br /><div>Example Guesses - Security Policy Enforcement Decision Points, Authentication Logic, Monitoring, detection, fraud response</div><br /><div>Example Apologies - Identity Management tools - provisioning, deprovisioning, Reimburse customer for fraud losses, Compensating Transaction - Giant Global Bank is still sorry your account was compromised!</div><br /><div>The point of this is that security memories, guesses and apologies utilize different processes, different people, and different capabilities to be effective.</div><br /><div>What trends can we identify to lead us toward better qualitative analysis based on the best practices of virtualization, interoperability and reusability.</div><br /><div>Virtualization</div><div>Finding Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because applications are more configured than coded. Runtime behavior and structure not apparent due to weak typing and inversion of control.</div><br /><div>Result - finding bugs becomes harder. Action - use screens to target finding time and resources</div><br /><div>Fixing Vulnerabilities in a Virtualized World is a problem because how do I locate the controls when interfaces run in Beijing, Bangalore and Boston?</div><br /><div>Result - synchronization and/or replication of security policy is problematic. Action - decentralized policy enforcement points and policy decision points. &#0160;</div><br /><div>Interoperability</div><div>Finding interoperable vulnerabilities</div><div>XSS - Javascript is an equal opportunity offender - interoperability for developers and attackers alike.</div><br /><div>Fixing interoperable vulnerabilities</div><div>App servers, ESBs, and services are the attacker’s red carpet to your enterprise, right into your book of business. Interoperable access control can be leveraged across the enterprise.</div><br /><div>Use XML signature for authentication and integrity&#0160;</div><br /><div>&lt;SOAP:Envelope&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;SOAP:Header&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;WSSE:Security&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">			</span>&lt;ds:Signature&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">				</span>&lt;ds:Reference URI=‘#body’&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;/WSSE:Security&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;/SOAP:Header&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;SOAP:Body wsu:Id=‘body’&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>…</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;/SOAP:Body&gt;</div><div>&lt;SOAP:Envelope&gt;</div><br /><div>Use XML encryption to protect sensitive data, don&#39;t pass sensitive data in the clear</div><br /><div>&lt;?xml version=&#39;1.0&#39; encoding=&#39;UTF-8&#39;?&gt;</div><div>&lt;soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=&quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/&quot;&gt;</div><br /><div>&lt;soapenv:Body&gt;&lt;ns1:echo xmlns:ns1=&quot;http://sample01.samples.rampart.apache.org&quot;&gt;</div><br /><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">	</span>&lt;param0&gt;My Credit Card Number&lt;/param0&gt;</div><div>&lt;/ns1:echo&gt;</div><div>&lt;/soapenv:Body&gt;</div><div>&lt;/soapenv:Envelope&gt;</div><br /><div>Encrypt the data</div><br /><div>&#0160;&lt;wsse:Security xmlns:wsse=&quot;http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd&quot; soapenv:mustUnderstand=&quot;1&quot;&gt;…</div><div>&#0160;&#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160;&lt;xenc:EncryptedKey Id=&quot;EncKeyId-3020592&quot;&gt;</div><div>&#0160;&#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &lt;xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=&quot;http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5&quot; /&gt;</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span> &lt;xenc:CipherValue&gt;</div><div>XNQ0a4legiie5mWFxO6CQkk2hhldYNnKroObue/LXS/VYtvaTgMbCujhGExDi+vlkU//Qc2/T6mx0WVTmBMT3z8rogha8jD+nS9Zr2Bc3CwoTh2lh8wL3D0DEu91iwJT9JByLGXvt7v9lyuxK0ooDOYEClsH974CPmTs3tBC+GQ=</div><div><span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space:pre">		</span>&lt;/xenc:CipherValue&gt; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160; &#0160;&#0160;</div><div>&lt;/xenc:CipherData&gt;</div><br /><div>To ensure that these controls are applied use automated tools like static analysis to scan for security mechanism use and coverage.</div><br /><div>In terms of reusability findings and fixes consider two bug findings</div><br /><div>Session management bug: session state is passed around to every component, service and user. Makes for many high priority findings in audit report, also the fix is required on virtually every program</div><br /><div>Data validation bug: Data access object (DAO) has a SQL injection hole. One major high priority finding in report. DAO used by many business logic classes, one fix location serves many classes&#0160;</div><br /><div>To bring these factors together, I generally use a scorecard index [6], so you can measure such things as transport security, message security, threat protection and so on. The hard work in developing the index is developing a useful scale. A scale for XML tokens could use the following</div><br /><div>0: no token</div><div>1: hashed token</div><div>2: hashed and signed token</div><div>3: hashed and signed token from standard authoritative source</div><br /><div>An example scale for XML validation could use:</div><br /><div>0: no validation</div><div>1: schema validation</div><div>2: schema validation against hardened schema</div><div>3: schema validation against standard, hardened schema</div><br /><div>These indexed scales are used to show maturity across the factors in the scorecard. The first part of the talk described value, the value assessment is used to focus time and effort on high value assets. The value assessment can be determined quantitatively. There is hard analytical work to qualitatively determine the scorecard, index, and scales, the quantitative value assessment is used to screen out high value targets for these endeavors. The scoring index is used to track progress and improve quality over time. In the best case scenario, automated tools are used to perform the checks described in the index, and once security is automated just like software developers we may see security innovation make progress in years not decades.</div><br /><div>Thank you for your time.</div><br /><div>1 &quot;Risk Management is where the Money Is&quot; by Dan Geer,&#0160;<a href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html">http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html</a></div><br /><div>2 Berkshire Hathaway 2007 Shareholder Letter by Warren Buffett, <a href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf">http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2007ltr.pdf</a></div><br /><div>3 &quot;Software [In]security: Software Security Demand Rising, by Gary McGraw</div><div><a href="http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978">http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1237978</a></div><br /><div>4 &quot;SOA and Newton&#39;s Universe&quot; by Pat Helland, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx">http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/20/soa-and-newton-s-universe.aspx</a></div><br /><div>5 &quot;Memories, Guesses and Apologies&quot; by Pat Helland, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx">http://blogs.msdn.com/pathelland/archive/2007/05/15/memories-guesses-and-apologies.aspx</a></div><br /><div>6 &quot;Web Servicres Security Checklist&quot; by Gunnar Peterson, <a href="http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf">http://arctecgroup.net/pdf/WebServicesSecurityChecklist.pdf</a></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 19:47:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security spends">information security spends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safety information security">safety information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versus information security">versus information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security budgets">information security budgets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security budget">information security budget</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security space">software security space</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/11/the-economics-of-finding-and-fixing-vulnerabilities-in-distributed-systems-.html">The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems </source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Keeping America Safe from Terrorism by Monitoring Distillery Webcams]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/97364c3b71b32b3988fc75fe4bcaf94a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/97364c3b71b32b3988fc75fe4bcaf94a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Really : We had an email recently from an observer &quot;curious as to why the webcam that was inside the shop/bar is no longer there, or at least, functional&quot;. The email was from the Defense Threat...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.bruichladdich.com/wmd_story.htm">Really</a>:</p>

<blockquote>We had an email recently from an observer "curious as to why the webcam that was inside the shop/bar is no longer there, or at least, functional". The email was from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the United States.

<p>When we replied that it was simply a short term technical problem, we asked why on earth they could be interested in the comings and goings of a small Distillery off the West Coast of Scotland. Were there secret manoeuvres taking place in Loch Indaal, or even a threat of terrorists infiltrating the mainland via Islay?</p>

<p>The answer we received was even more surreal. Evidently the mission of the DTRA is to safeguard the US and its allies from weapons of mass destruction -chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosives.   The department which contacted the Distillery deals with the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, going to sites to verify treaty compliance.  Funnily enough chemical weapon processes look very similar to the distilling process and as part of training there is a visit to a brewery for familiarization with reactors, batch processors and evaporators.  As they said, it just goes to show how "tweaks" to the process flow or equipment, can create something very pleasant (whisky) or deadly (chemical weapons).</p>

<p>As they say: "In the post-Cold War environment, a unified, consistent approach to deterring, reducing and countering weapons of mass destruction is essential to maintaining our national security. Under DTRA, Department of Defense resources, expertise and capabilities are combined to ensure the United States remains ready and able to address the present and future WMD threat. We perform four essential functions to accomplish our mission: combat support, technology development, threat control and threat reduction. These functions form the basis for how we are organized and our daily activities. Together, they enable us to reduce the physical and psychological terror of weapons of mass destruction, thereby enhancing the security of the world's citizens. At the dawn of the 21st century, no other task is as challenging or demanding".</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=pHqMM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=pHqMM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=KbK3M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=KbK3M" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 08:15:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chemical weapons convention">chemical weapons convention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chemical weapons">chemical weapons</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weapons">weapons</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threat">threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/future wmd threat">future wmd threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mass destruction -chemical">mass destruction -chemical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mass destruction">mass destruction</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distillery">distillery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threat control">threat control</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/keeping_america.html">Keeping America Safe from Terrorism by Monitoring Distillery Webcams</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Video: Solar Sunrise, the Best FBI-Produced Hacker Flick Ever]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b257db146426c2603b2608bc49f730e1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b257db146426c2603b2608bc49f730e1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With Ehud &quot;The Analyzer&quot; Tenenbaum back in legal hot water, we've dug up the old FBI training video Solar Sunrise: Dawn of a New Threat dramatizing his 1998 hack attacks against the Pentagon. It's not...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[With Ehud "The Analyzer" Tenenbaum back in legal hot water, we've dug up the old FBI training video Solar Sunrise: Dawn of a New Threat dramatizing his 1998 hack attacks against the Pentagon. It's not the most exciting movie in history, but it still beats Die Hard 4.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=36fb816901008a69e5ef3ac51676079b" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=36fb816901008a69e5ef3ac51676079b" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=UhnRL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=UhnRL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=Xmhxl"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=Xmhxl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=8loal"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=8loal" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=lMfML"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=lMfML" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=oP6bL"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=oP6bL" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=VOP3l"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=VOP3l" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=USvOl"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=USvOl" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=UJH8L"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=UJH8L" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/401064241" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/401064256" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2008 14:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/video solar sunrise">video solar sunrise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/beats die hard">beats die hard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legal hot water">legal hot water</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fbi">fbi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hack attacks">hack attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pentagon">pentagon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dawn">dawn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/history">history</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threat">threat</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/401064256/video-solar-sun.html">Video: Solar Sunrise, the Best FBI-Produced Hacker Flick Ever</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[On Stratfor]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3a9d4cea7cf308c71df112b7ea133337</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3a9d4cea7cf308c71df112b7ea133337</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I love Stratfor . I am addicted. They have a unique way of saying things, an elegant mix of insight, cynicism and humor. How about this one, for instance

But in Georgias twilight hour, Stratfors gaze...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I love <a href="http://www.stratfor.com"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Stratfor</span></a>. I am addicted.  They have a unique way of saying things, an elegant mix of insight, cynicism and humor. How about this one, for instance:<br /><br />"But in Georgia’s twilight hour, Stratfor’s gaze is not particularly riveted on Tbilisi. Georgia’s fate is more or less sealed. At dawn either the bombs will fall and the tanks will advance and depose the Georgian government by force, or a siege will begin that will depose it in time. Either way, the government of what is currently known as Georgia will evolve into a form that slavishly respects Russian wishes. The only reason Russian officials have not said they will enforce “regime change” is because they feel the term is too American. Whatever the nomenclature, the details of how this change happens pale in comparison to what such a change represents."<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=NXp5xK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=NXp5xK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=CZEzHK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=CZEzHK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=xNtdpK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=xNtdpK" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/363162187" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 07:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/change">change</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/change represents">change represents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enforce regime change">enforce regime change</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/georgias">georgias</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/georgias twilight hour">georgias twilight hour</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/georgian government">georgian government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reason russian officials">reason russian officials</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/love stratfor">love stratfor</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/363162187/on-stratfor.html">On Stratfor</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Gonzo: Two Thumbs In and Up]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6853c438c7bef73e63a300124d9cf5de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6853c438c7bef73e63a300124d9cf5de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just saw the Hunter S. Thompson movie - Gonzo , and if you are a fan you should to. Lots of good stuff in there, the film links various part of his life and career, and gives a pretty unvarnished view...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter_S._Thompson"></a><a style="float: left;" href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834-pi"><img  class="at-xid-6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834 " alt="180px-Gonzo_citation" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83451c75869e200e553c045c48834-320wi" style="margin: 0px 5px 5px 0px;"></a> Just saw the Hunter S. Thompson movie - <a href="http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/gonzo_the_life_and_work_of_dr_hunter_s_thompson/">Gonzo</a>, and if you are a fan you should to. Lots of good stuff in there, the film links various part of his life and career, and gives a pretty unvarnished view of the high highs and the low lows. Weaves in writing, politics, and fame seamlessly.

I have never really had as much fun as early on in my career in the early-mid 90s I was a web programmer in Aspen, hacking CGI/PERL. Among the most fun things was building and running HST's site. My boss, Ed, was his neighbor. Ed was also seriously allergic to bees. One day he was alone in his house and got stung. He was dying. Luckily Hunter was due over to his house to watch a basketball game, walked in and called 911. My boss woke up in the ambulance with Hunter pounding on him chest and screaming at him. Ed said - "Waking up to that face screaming at me, I didn't know if I was alive or dead."

Seeing the movie it was also great to see a lot of the Woody Creek folks again like George Stranahan, who lovingly said about Hunter - "my friend and neighbor who never paid his rent, broke up my marriage and taught my children to smoke dope. "

Of course, there was no way he could match his early productivity and this is true of almost all artists. Most of the last two decades were wasted from a writing standpoint. However his <a href="http://proxy.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?id=1250751">piece</a> written on 9/11 is as good as its gets:

</p><blockquote><p>
	The towers are gone now, reduced to bloody rubble, along with all hopes for Peace in Our Time, in the United States or any other country. Make no mistake about it: We are At War now -- with somebody -- and we will stay At War with that mysterious Enemy for the rest of our lives. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>It will be a Religious War, a sort of Christian Jihad, fueled by religious hatred and led by merciless fanatics on both sides. It will be guerilla warfare on a global scale, with no front lines and no identifiable enemy. Osama bin Laden may be a primitive "figurehead" -- or even dead, for all we know -- but whoever put those All-American jet planes loaded with All-American fuel into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did it with chilling precision and accuracy. The second one was a dead-on bullseye. Straight into the middle of the skyscraper. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Nothing -- even George Bush's $350 billion "Star Wars" missile defense system -- could have prevented Tuesday's attack, and it cost next to nothing to pull off. Fewer than 20 unarmed Suicide soldiers from some apparently primitive country somewhere on the other side of the world took out the World Trade Center and half the Pentagon with three quick and costless strikes on one day. The efficiency of it was terrifying. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>We are going to punish somebody for this attack, but just who or what will be blown to smithereens for it is hard to say. Maybe Afghanistan, maybe Pakistan or Iraq, or possibly all three at once. Who knows? Not even the Generals in what remains of the Pentagon or the New York papers calling for WAR seem to know who did it or where to look for them. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>This is going to be a very expensive war, and Victory is not guaranteed -- for anyone, and certainly not for anyone as baffled as George W. Bush. All he knows is that his father started the war a long time ago, and that he, the goofy child-President, has been chosen by Fate and the global Oil industry to finish it Now. He will declare a National Security Emergency and clamp down Hard on Everybody, no matter where they live or why. If the guilty won't hold up their hands and confess, he and the Generals will ferret them out by force. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Good luck. He is in for a profoundly difficult job -- armed as he is with no credible Military Intelligence, no witnesses and only the ghost of Bin Laden to blame for the tragedy.
	
</p></blockquote><p>


One unintended lesson I take away from Hunter's life is how important patience is. Obama is a politician and may yet disappoint us all, but I gotta believe Hunter would be seriously impressed. If he had waited another couple of years, he may have seen a lot of the stuff he fought for in 1968 and 72 come to fruition. Sometimes you are just 36-40 years ahead of your time and you have to be ok with that and figure out how to deal if possible. (Note - it sure sometimes feels this way in software security).

Speaking of security:

</p><blockquote>
	<p><a href="http://www.ram.org/contrib/security.html">Security</a> 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>by Hunter S. Thompson (1955). 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Security ... what does this word mean in relation to life as we know it today? For the most part, it means safety and freedom from worry. It is said to be the end that all men strive for; but is security a utopian goal or is it another word for rut? 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Let us visualize the secure man; and by this term, I mean a man who has settled for financial and personal security for his goal in life. In general, he is a man who has pushed ambition and initiative aside and settled down, so to speak, in a boring, but safe and comfortable rut for the rest of his life. His future is but an extension of his present, and he accepts it as such with a complacent shrug of his shoulders. His ideas and ideals are those of society in general and he is accepted as a respectable, but average and prosaic man. But is he a man? has he any self-respect or pride in himself? How could he, when he has risked nothing and gained nothing? What does he think when he sees his youthful dreams of adventure, accomplishment, travel and romance buried under the cloak of conformity? How does he feel when he realizes that he has barely tasted the meal of life; when he sees the prison he has made for himself in pursuit of the almighty dollar? If he thinks this is all well and good, fine, but think of the tragedy of a man who has sacrificed his freedom on the altar of security, and wishes he could turn back the hands of time. A man is to be pitied who lacked the courage to accept the challenge of freedom and depart from the cushion of security and see life as it is instead of living it second-hand. Life has by-passed this man and he has watched from a secure place, afraid to seek anything better What has he done except to sit and wait for the tomorrow which never comes? 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Turn back the pages of history and see the men who have shaped the destiny of the world. Security was never theirs, but they lived rather than existed. Where would the world be if all men had sought security and not taken risks or gambled with their lives on the chance that, if they won, life would be different and richer? It is from the bystanders (who are in the vast majority) that we receive the propaganda that life is not worth living, that life is drudgery, that the ambitions of youth must he laid aside for a life which is but a painful wait for death. These are the ones who squeeze what excitement they can from life out of the imaginations and experiences of others through books and movies. These are the insignificant and forgotten men who preach conformity because it is all they know. These are the men who dream at night of what could have been, but who wake at dawn to take their places at the now-familiar rut and to merely exist through another day. For them, the romance of life is long dead and they are forced to go through the years on a treadmill, cursing their existence, yet afraid to die because of the unknown which faces them after death. They lacked the only true courage: the kind which enables men to face the unknown regardless of the consequences. 	
	</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>As an afterthought, it seems hardly proper to write of life without once mentioning happiness; so we shall let the reader answer this question for himself: who is the happier man, he who has braved the storm of life and lived or he who has stayed securely on shore and merely existed?
</p></blockquote><p>

A ship is safest at port, but thats not why we build ships. 
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 06:10:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life">life</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sought security">sought security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal security">personal security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/national security emergency">national security emergency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/expensive war">expensive war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/war">war</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hunter">hunter</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/07/gonzo-two-thumbs-in-and-up.html">Gonzo: Two Thumbs In and Up</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Security Evolution]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2c8a88326c698077a84706f60b9de804</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2c8a88326c698077a84706f60b9de804</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[We have been in a world of faith based security for far too long. Probably the biggest factor is a lack of innovation and dynamism in the discipline of information security. Consider this rough...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We have been in a world of faith based security for far too long. Probably the biggest factor is a lack of innovation and dynamism in the discipline of information security. Consider this rough timeline of software development progress since the dawn of the web. </p>

<p>People pretty quickly realized that plain HTML was not enough, so developers invented CGI/PERL for more dynamic sites. Once they wanted to scale and pool they built out ASP and JSP, then to deliver middle tier components they developed EJB, J2EE, and DCOM. After that there were a lot of heterogeneous systems that needed to talk to each other so SOAP and XML came along to address that. This path diverged into ultra-simple (REST) and more powerful but baroque (SOA), and finally, the user side got some love with Web 2.0 technologies. That's a heck of a lot of engineering and innovation by the software development community for plus or minus 8 years.</p>

<p>Now lets' check in with the developer's brethren over in information security. Well, once the web came along the information security community quickly realized that network address translation was going to be important, and further that encrypting the communication channel between the browser and the web server was also crucial. And then, they addressed all the security issues ASP, JSP, EJB, J2EE, DCOM, SOAP, XML, REST, SOA, and Web 2.0 with....umm...more of the same!</p>

<p><br />
<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png"><img alt="Innovatecompare_2" title="Innovatecompare_2" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png" width="300" height="167" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p><br />
That's a pretty poor showing for innovation considering the enterprise investment into information security. Sure the software developers' have a bigger budget, but come on infosec - show some pride!</p>

<p>Infosec types like to throw developers under the bus for security issues, but its a collective failure. Sure developers need to learn more about secure coding, but as the table above shows - security is not keeping pace, and the gap is getting bigger. </p>

<p>Here is another dimension to the problem - attackers *do* evolve. The new technologies provide far greater attack surface (data, method and channels) for the attacker's to exploit and/or launch attacks from.</p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/archaic_2.png"><img alt="Archaic_2" title="Archaic_2" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/archaic_2.png" width="300" height="251" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p><br />
Because the defenses have not evolved its a simple evolutionary adaptation for attackers to go around or through the 1995 defenses. Its not about SOAP going through the firewall, its about never bothering to secure the apps and the data. Its like saying to your opponent, remember the how the Detroit Lions played defense in a certain game in 1995, we were just going to do that.</p>

<p>So with the software developer's latest evolution we get <a href="http://www.oreillynet.com/">Mr. O'Reilly's famous Web 2.0 meme map</a></p>

<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/web2.png" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=503,height=378,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img alt="Web2" title="Web2" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/web2.png" width="300" height="225" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p>but where is the co-evolution in infosec? there is non. There is co-evolution in the attacker space. here is a sample web 2.0 attacker meme map</p>

<p><br />
<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/web2attack.png" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=627,height=490,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img alt="Web2attack" title="Web2attack" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/web2attack.png" width="300" height="234" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p>So the firewall offers great protection if your adversary is using Visio, but otherwise its mostly useless.</p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/web2protect.png" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=547,height=387,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img alt="Web2protect" title="Web2protect" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/web2protect.png" width="300" height="212" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p>So we would want to see two things happen - developers start writing more high assurance code and second - infosec needs to evolve its security services to form fit to that which they are protecting. Hint - it ain't a Visio diagram.</p>

<p></p>

<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/formfit.png" onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=577,height=368,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img alt="Formfit" title="Formfit" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/formfit.png" width="300" height="191" border="0"  /></a></p>

<p>The thing is - we are getting getter tools. <a href="http://www.fortify.com/">Static</a> <a href="http://ouncelabs.com/">analysis</a> is a very powerful tool to improve your software security from a bottom up perspective and it can scale. These tools continue to get better. We are are getting better standards - WS-Security, WS-Trust, and company enable fundamentally new security architectures. And we're getting better primitives, especially in the identity space - SAML, Cardspace, and friends will one day let us live in a world where users are not typing username and password into a web browser to do online banking.</p>

<p>So maybe the innovation tide is turning, but there is a lot of ground to catch up, infosec about a decade behind the developers and probably close to that far behind the attackers. Its going to take something special to catch up, but is there any other way? I think a big part of catching up is putting together a <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/05/building-a-se-1.html">realistic pragmatic blueprint</a> to evolve your security architecture - a roadmap that addresses your people, processes, and technology. There are standards, primitives, and tools to leverage, but by themselves they are just pieces, they have to be brought together into a cohesive design. Its not an overnight thing to realize this, but the point is for infosec to *begin* the evolutionary process. Now. For real use cases. Using the security protocols, mechanisms, and skills we have available now. </p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p><a href="http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/larry.html"><img alt="Bilbo" title="Bilbo" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/bilbo.gif" border="0"  /></a></p>

<blockquote>
The Road goes ever on and on,

<p>Down from the door where it began.</p>

<p>Now far ahead the Road has gone,</p>

<p>And I must follow, if I can,</p>

<p>Pursuing it with eager feet,</p>

<p>Until it joins some larger way</p>

<p>Where many paths and errands meet.</p>

<p>And whither then? I cannot say.</p>

<p>-J.R.R. Tolkien,The Hobbit</blockquote></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2008 13:42:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/faith based security">faith based security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security issues asp">security issues asp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/asp">asp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security issues">security issues</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architecture">security architecture</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ws-security">ws-security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security architectures">security architectures</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/05/security-evolut.html">Security Evolution</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Another mortgage company out of business leads to more documents in the dumpster]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/85b93bd12c93d79cf76aababb75a2f48</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/85b93bd12c93d79cf76aababb75a2f48</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
3/19/08

Organization
Affordable Realty

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
Customers

Number Affected
hundreds

Types of Data
Social Security...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/affordable.jpg" align="right" height="148" width="200"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>3/19/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.manta.com/coms2/dnbcompany_gswxbm">Affordable Realty</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Customers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"hundreds"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"Social Security numbers and financial records"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"Social Security numbers and financial records of customers of a Flint-based realty mortgage company have been found in a dumpster. "<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://abclocal.go.com/wjrt/story?section=news/local&amp;id=6029957">WJRT ABC Channel 12 News</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Dawn Jones, ABC12 News Team<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>The personal information of hundreds of local residents is now out in public view. <br><br>Social Security numbers and financial records of customers of a Flint-based realty mortgage company have been found in a dumpster.<br>&nbsp;<br>Affordable Realty occupied office space inside the Ben Agree building on Dort Highway for years.<br>&nbsp;<br>The company was evicted and all of its sensitive customer information ended up outside in a dumpster or on the ground nearby.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Maybe the company figured that they had nothing to lose and just vacated the property.&nbsp; There is liability however.&nbsp; The leader(s) of the company is/are morally, ethically, and probably legally responsible for proper document destruction.&nbsp; There really is no excuse.</span><br><br>Included in the papers are bankruptcy statements, financial records, Social Security numbers and addresses of clients who once did business with Affordable Realty.<br><br>Witnesses say the business had recently been evicted and they report seeing Genesee County Sheriff's Deputies clearing the office space a few days ago.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] So am I safe to assume that the Genesee County Sheriff's Deputies actually had a hand in the poor handling of sensitive documents?&nbsp; Perhaps they could have been more careful and taken the time to identify sensitive documents before throwing them in the dumpster.</span><br><br>Since that time, at least one person claims to have seen people rummaging through the dumpster, picking up papers, going through them very carefully and walking away with some.<br><br>We talked to Genesee County Sheriff Robert Pickell about how this type of personal information should be handled.<br>&nbsp;<br>"What the process server should have done is get the stuff, call the landlord and say 'I'm packing this up, I'm putting it into my truck, I'm taking it to my warehouse. You're gonna have to pay for the storage,'" Pickell told ABC12's Dawn Jones.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] And what the Sheriff's Deputies should have done is taken more care before throwing the documents in the dumpster.</span><br><br>The sheriff talks more about identity theft and how to protect your identity coming up later today on ABC12 News.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>This isn't the first time we have read about personal information being discarded/disclosed in a public dumpster after a company has gone out of business.&nbsp; Last month included <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/02/29/unionmortgage.aspx">Union Mortgage Services of Cleveland, Inc.</a> and <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/02/21/firstmagnus.aspx">First Magnus Financial Corporation</a>.&nbsp; Throwing large amounts of documentation containing personal information in the trash is completely in-excusable and lazy.&nbsp; The good thing is that the companies are now out of business; the bad thing is that they may have taken some good people along with them.<br><br>I am concerned and uneasy about the fact that the Genesee County Sheriff's Deputies did not notice or take the time to investigate what the documents contained. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/03/19/affordable.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:57:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company">company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abc12 news team">abc12 news team</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news">news</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dumpster">dumpster</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/documents">documents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sheriff">sheriff</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sheriff talks">sheriff talks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company isare">company isare</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abc12 news">abc12 news</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/03/19/affordable.aspx">Another mortgage company out of business leads to more documents in the dumpster</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Binary Analysis Seminar At UC Berkeley]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e177d8beb3c7ce28d0955c62f120f721</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e177d8beb3c7ce28d0955c62f120f721</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[On February 14th, Dawn Song of UC Berkeley is holding a seminar on binary analysis: TRUST Seminar: BitBlaze: a Binary-centric Approach to Computer Security . This seminar is open to the public
Binary...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p> On February 14th, Dawn Song of UC Berkeley is holding a seminar on binary analysis: <a href="http://events.berkeley.edu/index.php/calendar/sn/pubaff.html?event_ID=6415&amp;date=2008-02-14">TRUST Seminar: BitBlaze: a Binary-centric Approach to Computer Security</a>.  This seminar is open to the public.</p>
<blockquote><p>Binary analysis is imperative for protecting COTS (common off-the-shelf) programs and analyzing and defending against the myriad of malicious code, where source code is unavailable, and the binary may even be obfuscated. Also, binary analysis provides the ground truth about program behavior since computers execute binaries (executables), not source code. In this talk, I will present the BitBlaze project, a binary-centric approach to computer security: how we can address a wide-spectrum of different security problems by analyzing program binaries and automatically extracting security related properties from them. In particular, I will describe the two central research directions of BitBlaze: (1) the design and development of the underlying BitBlaze Binary Analysis Platform, and (2) applying the BitBlaze Binary Analysis Platform to addressing real-world security problems, including automatic vulnerability signature generation, a unified framework for malware analysis, and automatic deviation detection.</p></blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~dawnsong/">Dawn Song</a> is an Assistant Professor at UC Berkeley and oversees the <a href="http://bitblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/">BitBlaze binary analysis project</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2008 11:50:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/binary">binary</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/binary analysis">binary analysis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/binary-centric approach">binary-centric approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/seminar">seminar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real-world security">real-world security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bitblaze project">bitblaze project</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dawn song">dawn song</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=76">Binary Analysis Seminar At UC Berkeley</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Laptop stolen from Workers Compensation Fund auditor]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a3aeb5c2e8f55f2f7b477c90ac57375d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a3aeb5c2e8f55f2f7b477c90ac57375d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
1/2/08

Organization
Workers Compensation Fund (WCF

The Salt Lake City-based WCF provides worker compensation insurance coverage to more than 30,000...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/wcf.jpg" align="right" height="37" width="72"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>1/2/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="https://www.wcfgroup.com/wcfWebsite/homePage.do" target="_blank"> Workers Compensation Fund (WCF)</a>*<br><br><font size="1">*The Salt Lake City-based WCF provides worker compensation insurance coverage to more than 30,000 companies, representing about 61 percent of the businesses operating in the state.</font><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Client workers and companies<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>2,800 workers <span style="font-weight: bold;">AND </span>1,400 companies<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Social Security numbers and "other personal information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>A laptop computer was stolen from an auditor working for the Workers Compensation Fund on December 9, 2007 that contained sensitive personal and business confidential information.&nbsp; The laptop was inside a car which was inside the home garage of the employee.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.sltrib.com/ci_7867694" target="_blank"> The Salt Lake Tribune Story</a><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Dawn House, The Salt Lake Tribune<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the source cited above:<br><br>Officials with one of Utah's largest insurance companies are searching for a stolen laptop containing Social Security numbers and other personal information for about 2,800 people and 1,400 companies. <br><br>The computer was taken from a car parked in the home garage of an auditor for the Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) on Dec. 9.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The laptop was in the car which was in a home garage and was still stolen.</span><br><br>WCF said it chose not to issue a public statement at that time out of fear of alerting anyone that the laptop contained information that could be used for identity thefts. <br><br>The agency said it has informed companies and workers of the theft, and is covering fees for a professional security watch for the affected workers that could total $200,000, said WCF spokeswoman Peggy Larsen.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] $200,000 would cover the licensing, implementation and support costs of encrypting well over 1,000 laptops.&nbsp; We are in the process of encrypting 450 laptops (+ security tokens for two-factor authentication) for less that $90,000. </span><br><br>"As soon as this was discovered, every auditor brought in their laptops so that all information was removed," she said. "And, we've added additional levels of password protection."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder how many auditors this entails.&nbsp; Additional levels of password protection could add more risk by increasing a user's chances or writing passwords down.&nbsp; In a recent security audit we found that 20% (13 of 65) of one company's field laptop users were writing passwords down on Post-It notes (and similar) attached to the laptop itself</span>. <br><br>The stolen laptop was password protected<br><br>as an additional precaution, auditors are now not allowed to store personal information, such as Social Security numbers, in their laptops and the computer information will be better encrypted<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] "better encrypted"?&nbsp; Was the information ever encrypted?&nbsp; Encryption of confidential data at rest will certainly help given it is done right.</span><br><br>"This is the first time anything like this has happened," the agency's CEO Lane Summerhays said in a statement released Wednesday. "We are taking steps so it can be the last." <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Reactive vs. Proactive.&nbsp; The bad thing about reactive security is that there are victims.</span><br><br>there is no indication that the information has fallen into the hands of identity thieves, "and now the only information on laptops is what anyone can get from a telephone book,"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victim Reaction:</span><br>"WCF has failed to assure us that their procedures have changed to avoid such breaches of security in the future,"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I am somewhat amazed by the audacity that the thief displayed in stealing the laptop from a car in a garage.&nbsp; Maybe I shouldn't be.&nbsp; I guess this goes to show that information can be physically compromised in any place where strong physical controls are not present (i.e. a secure office or data center).&nbsp; Although this breach was easily prevented through the application of sound information security principles, I am always impressed with a CEO that speaks about information security matters.&nbsp; CEOs need to understand that ultimately, the information security buck stops with them. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2008 08:25:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/store personal information">store personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security matters">information security matters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/workers">workers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/workers compensation fund">workers compensation fund</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/laptop">laptop</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tokens">security tokens</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/01/03/wcf.aspx">Laptop stolen from Workers Compensation Fund auditor</source>
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