• Low-tech is very effective. Movie-plot threats -- terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists with biological agents, terrorists targeting our water supplies -- might be what people worry about, but a bunch of trained (we don't really know yet what sort of training they had, but it's clear that they had some) men with guns and grenades is all they needed.

• At the same time, the attacks were surprisingly ineffective. I can't find exact numbers, but it seems there were about 18 terrorists. The latest toll is 195 dead, 235 wounded. That's 11 dead, 13 wounded, per terrorist. As horrible as the reality is, that's much less than you might have thought if you imagined the movie in your head. Reality is different from the movies.

• Even so, terrorism is rare. If a bunch of men with guns and grenades is all they really need, then why isn't this sort of terrorism more common? Why not in the U.S., where it's easy to get hold of weapons? It's because terrorism is very, very rare.

• Specific countermeasures don't help against these attacks. None of the high-priced countermeasures that defend against specific tactics and specific targets made, or would have made, any difference: photo ID checks, confiscating liquids at airports, fingerprinting foreigners at the border, bag screening on public transportation, anything. Evenmetal detectors and threat warnings didn't do any good:

  "If I look at what we had, which all of us complained about, it could not have stopped what took place," he told CNN. "It's ironic that we did have such a warning, and we did have some measures."

  He said people were told to park away from the entrance and had to go through a metal detector. But he said the attackers came through a back entrance.

  "They knew what they were doing, and they did not go through the front. All of our arrangements are in the front," he said.

If there's any lesson in these attacks, it's not to focus too much on the specifics of the attacks. Of course, that's not the way we're programmed to think. We respond to stories and not analysis. I don't mean to be sympathetic; this tendency is human and these deaths are really tragic. But eighteen armed people intent on killing lots of innocents will be able to do just that, and last-line-of-defense countermeasures won't be able to stop them. Intelligence, investigation, and emergency response. We have to find and stop the terrorists before they attack, and deal with the aftermath of the attacks we don't stop. There really is no other way, and I hope that we don't let the tragedy lead us into unwise decisions about how to deal with terrorism.

If we can't keep contraband out of prisons, how can we possibly hope to keep it out of airports?

Is it supposed to make me feel better about getting my problem fixed if I’m talking to someone in the Midwest versus someone in Bangalore? (Please no hate mail – I’m from the Midwest.) Honestly, I just want my computer to stop showing me a blue screen of death.

But apparently, I might be in the minority. According to the Black Book of Outsourcing (yes, outsourcing has a black book), reverse outsourcing is on the rise with “India’s leading service providers opening offices on Main Street, USA” to be closer to customers (mainly North American) and draw from the “local talent pools”.

The one area of outsourcing bucking this trend – infrastructure management. Co-writer Scott Wilson says that infrastructure management is largely automated, low touch and does not involve a lot of interaction.

Speaking as a vendor of infrastructure management tools, that’s a bunch of malarkey. Perhaps at a very low level this is true (i.e., is the device responding), but that’s just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to monitoring performance, availability and SLAs for today’s networks, systems and applications.

Certainly as vendors, we try to put as much automation as possible into our toolsets – helping our customers to simplify IT management wherever possible, enabling them to be proactive by setting up “intelligent” alarms and thresholds that warn of problems before they become showstoppers and reacting at a speed in this increasingly virtual world that simply is not possible for human manual interaction.

But infrastructure management doesn’t happen in a vacuum and you can bet when something goes wrong which affects some mission-critical app state-side, that there is a LOT of communication and interaction. And it takes a lot of work and setup to get to a level of automation where the alerting is proactive and intelligent and customized for each business.

One of the main points of tools like ours is to automate where possible in order to free up the valuable time of the sysadmins, network engineers, IT managers, etc to do the higher order work – which is how they’ll get to the next level of infrastructure management. Beyond “is it up”, infrastructure management should be providing answers to questions like: “is it always up”, “is it doing what I expected it to do” and “will it still be working as expected as my company grows”.

Rob Enderle recently attended an EMC conference where, among the speakers, he heard from Uri Rivner regarding the growing sophistication–and mass-production capabilities—of the online fraud industry. In his excellent piece in Dark Reading on the subject entitled “How RSA/EMC Scared Me Half to Death”, Rob admitted to being more than a little scared by what he heard. And among his fears is that, in these tight economic times, companies will not make the investments needed to ensure that they and their customers are secure against these increasingly robust threats...