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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: decline]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/decline</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 15:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A Less Tasteful Internet]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b19c7cf98c66ff2dc769035ceccaf72a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b19c7cf98c66ff2dc769035ceccaf72a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It may take awhile, but ICANN can change things for the good. The public comment period is still open on the formal policy on AGP DELETEs , but the stopgap budget measure in place seems to be very...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[It may take awhile, but ICANN can change things for the good. <a href="http://blogs.eweek.com/cheap_hack/content/dns/public_comment_open_on_icann_agp_limits.html">The public comment period is still open on the formal policy on AGP DELETEs</a>, but the stopgap budget measure in place seems to be very effective.

<a href="http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-13nov08-en.htm">ICANN announced that AGP DELETEs declined</a> "... from approximately 17.6M in June 2008 to 2.8M in July 2008." 2.6M of the 2.8M were subject to the fee, so it would seem that even those would continue to decline as the people paying them realize they're wasting their money.

AGP DELETEs are the mechanism used by "domain tasters" who register a domain, throw PPC ads up on it and DELETE the registration before five days are up for a full refund of all fees. Under the new budget policy, registrars who exceed a certain threshold of DELETEs as a percentage of total registrations can no longer refund the 20 cent ICANN fee. This alone has led to the massive decline in DELETEs, showing how little margin is involved in each domain.

Let's hope that ICANN keeps the policy at least as restrictive as this. Domain tasting may no longer be a problem.

<a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/ICANN-Puts-EstDomains-Registrar-Back-on-Chopping-Block/">ICANN has placed the EstDomains registrar back on death row. Read about it here.</a>
<p><a href="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/0q6A0Sf5URQ2YhSlomweriQ7Ckw/a"><img src="http://feedads.googleadservices.com/~a/0q6A0Sf5URQ2YhSlomweriQ7Ckw/i" border="0" ismap="true"></img></a></p><img src="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~4/hifnLdxsPoY" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 2008 04:59:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/agp deletes">agp deletes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cent icann fee">cent icann fee</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/icann">icann</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/deletes">deletes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/policy">policy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/formal policy">formal policy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain">domain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain tasters">domain tasters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fee">fee</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.ziffdavisenterprise.com/~r/RSS/cheap_hack/~3/hifnLdxsPoY/a_less_tasteful_internet.html">A Less Tasteful Internet</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Integrated Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f019b5d7dfb1fe329de2cdcc311d5ad1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f019b5d7dfb1fe329de2cdcc311d5ad1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Tom Barnett on what the big consulting companies are doing
Now we're into a world where asking companies to pay you millions for a massive PPT slide deck that says, &quot;This is your company now and this...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2008/10/i_have_waited_years_for_this_a.html">Tom Barnett</a> on what the big consulting companies are doing:</p>
<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<p>Now we&#39;re into a world where asking companies to pay you millions for a massive PPT slide deck that says, &quot;This is your company now and this is what your company should look like tomorrow,&quot; is simply a non-starter. So while the tech-heavy firms like Accenture and Cap Gemini do well at the bottom and the high-end starts like the Monitor Group do well at the top of the pyramid, a lot of mid-range, standard cookie-cutter management consulting firms are seeing their market decline. Everyone wants the super-integrated solution now that combines compliance, security, systems-integration, performance metrics—and they want it delivered in a service-oriented architecture that frees companies up to evolve in ways commensurate with globalization&#39;s many demands and opportunities.</p></blockquote>
<p dir="ltr">I see efforts in all the compliance, security, systems-integration, performance metrics, and SOA rabbit holes. I don&#39;t see very much unification. In my swamp - SOA security. I do see a lot of starter efforts where companies build out services, but forget the security - &#0160;and then either an auditor comes asks &quot;so how are you doing authN and authZ for your web services&quot; or a security event happens, or a diligent director comes along and asks variant of the auditor question. Then some things start to happen, usually a purchase of a XML gateway, but Data Power, Vordel and Cisco can&#39;t help you if its just shelfware.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Integration is inherently difficult and messy. Information security groups need to get good at engaging with development and architecture in a proactive way to deiver these security services to the system. I call it &quot;playing offense&quot;, infosec spends most of its time defending against bad guys, and that is ok, it is a huge part of infosec&#39;s job, but sometimes you need to go on offense and raise the bar. Make the bad guys&#39; job harder, build security in.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 13:05:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soa security">soa security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web services">web services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security event">security event</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security services">security services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/companies">companies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/frees companies">frees companies</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/10/integrated-security.html">Integrated Security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Report Warns U.S. Could Lose Space-Spy Dominance]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f9525b9f094418f1164fb209069b3622</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f9525b9f094418f1164fb209069b3622</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[America is becoming so lousy at building spy satellites that &quot;the United States is losing its preeminence in space,&quot; a Congressional intelligence report declares. What's worse, the decline comes as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[America is becoming so lousy at building spy satellites that "the United States is losing its preeminence in space," a Congressional intelligence report declares. What's worse, the decline comes as "emerging space powers such as Russia, India and China" are getting
better and better at snooping from above.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=8a230a0d26fdb503886dbd007c3fd876"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=8a230a0d26fdb503886dbd007c3fd876"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=8a230a0d26fdb503886dbd007c3fd876" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=PK0vM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=PK0vM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=Uyukm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=Uyukm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=qhxSm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=qhxSm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=8ao9M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=8ao9M" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=WsF4M"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=WsF4M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=hyeNm"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=hyeNm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=IHDNm"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=IHDNm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=hgzMM"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=hgzMM" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/414257220" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/414257223" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2008 18:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/space">space</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/space powers">space powers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spy satellites">spy satellites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/russia">russia</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/india">india</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/america">america</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/decline">decline</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lousy">lousy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/preeminence">preeminence</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/414257223/intel-report-us.html">Report Warns U.S. Could Lose Space-Spy Dominance</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Real Artists Ship]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;, but they are at very, very different stages of development and more importantly are taking different paths. You can easily think of software security as an emerging discipline - despite a lot of talk and papers about Saltzer and Schroeder, we really don&#39;t have this stuff figured out.&#160;</p><br /><div>So China is following a well worn path similar to South Korea, Japan, and the early US. India is taking a totally different and unproven path towards growth. Tata Motors has been innovative in building the cheapest car - the Tata Nano which is a $2500 car, and<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/01/to-those-about.html"> engineering triumph</a>, driven by a mantra that an engineer would stand behind &quot;do we really need that?&quot;</div><br /><div>Now the progress to executing on this is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/asia/03tata.html?_r=1&amp;ref=world&amp;oref=slogin">held back</a> by India&#39;s dysfunctional environment:</div><br /><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In a tale rich with incongruities, the Communist-run government of West Bengal State invited the&#160;<a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/tata_group/index.html?inline=nyt-org" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; text-decoration: none; color: #006683; " title="More articles about the Tata Group.">Tata Group</a>, a symbol of Indian capitalism, to set up its plant in an area called Singur. It acquired 1,000 acres from farmers on the company’s behalf.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">As the project advanced, some farmers who had sold their land demanded it back. The main state-level opposition party, the Trinamool Congress, led protests demanding that the land be returned. Most people sympathetic to Tata accused the opposition of inducing the farmers to protest, while Tata’s critics said the farmers had legitimate grievances.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The issue simmered for months. But in recent days, protesters began surrounding the plant, blocking roads and preventing Tata workers from reaching the plant. “The existing environment of obstruction, intimidation and confrontation has begun to impact the ability of the company to convince several of its experienced managers to relocate and work in the plant,” Tata said in a statement on Tuesday.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The halt to the plant has caused many Indian business people to warn of a chilling effect on investment in the country. It is also unclear how Tata will be able to keep the Nano’s cost so low, since part of the affordable price reflects the company’s savings on the land in Singur.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /><div><span style="font-style: normal; "><a href="http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1585">Arvind Subramanian</a>&#160;compares China and India&#39;s trajectories:</span><br /></div><div><span style="font-style: normal;"><br /></span></div></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">There is a fundamental asymmetry between state and markets. It is easier to create markets than it is to create state capacity or to prevent its deterioration. Creating markets is a lot about letting go, establishing a reasonable policy framework, and allowing the natural hustling instinct to take over. In other words, hustling is the natural state. Building state capacity, on the other hand, is quite different. It involves overcoming collective action problems, mediating conflict, creating accountability mechanisms where outputs are multiple and fuzzy and links between inputs and outputs murky, and contending with the deep imprints of history. In Weber’s memorable words, building public institutions is like the “slow boring of hard boards”.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In that light, China’s task of improving its private sector seems easier to accomplish than India’s task of arresting institutional decline. So, while China and India can probably both count on more years of high growth, the odds still favour China pulling off that feat than India. That, and not just the meagre medal tally, should be what India mulls over after the Beijing Olympics.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">The Economist </span><a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2008/09/the_passion_of_the_tata.cfm">summarizes</a><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">It&#39;s easier to liberalise a functional state than it is to functionalise a dysfunctional one, of any ideological stripe.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></p><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;">What does all this have to do with ostensibly the topic at hand - Information Security? Well Tata Motors had the innovation but they didn&#39;t have the deployment model, at least not yet. More to the point, a lot of software security gets driven by infosec groups but real change is only coming when its driven by the development group. Why? Development groups are functional, they ship code.&#160;A lot of the success in software security is predicated by who you choose to partner with, it is more effective and easier to add security into a functional development group that ships code.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata">tata</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata workers">tata workers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tata motors">tata motors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/india">india</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/india mulls">india mulls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/functional development">functional development</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/real-artists-ship.html">Real Artists Ship</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reputation Damage & Measurement]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d9577961443ca1c3cd93223077fbca5f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around. In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well. Damage to things...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reputation damage can be one of the most difficult concepts to build measurements around.  In fact, it can be difficult to develop the actual metrics for the measurements, as well.  Damage to things like &#8220;corporate reputation&#8221; and &#8220;goodwill&#8221; and &#8220;brand equity&#8221; can be difficult to wrap even reasonable dollar estimates around (When I use FAIR, I really only care to use one metric when describing loss magnitudes - the almighty currency).</p>
<p>Complicating factors is the impact (or lack thereof) of incidents on stock price.  Many researchers who identify themselves with the <strong><a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-School-Information-Security/dp/0321502787">New School of Information Security</a></strong> (yours truly included) want to immediately look at stock price as a bell-weather metric for incident impact.  I think this stems from our days of slinging FUD, back when we could scream &#8220;Buy a firewall or we&#8217;ll have an incident and you&#8217;ll be on the front page of the paper and the stock price will go down!&#8221;  But these days notable incidents seem to suggest that the impact on stock price for an incident is short lived.  <em><strong>With qualifications, of course.</strong></em></p>
<p>So what would/should we make of this from <a href="http://www.money.co.uk/article/1001229-12-million-wiped-off-helphire-stock-after-malicious-gmail-sent-to-clients.htm">Money.co.uk</a>?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>£12million ($24m) Wiped off Helphire Stock after Malicious Email Sent to Clients</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Car hire firm Helphire have taken Google to court after a malicious email sent from a Gmail account saw their shares plummet £12million in a single day.</p>
<p>The Bath-based business who specialise in providing replacement cars to &#8216;no-fault&#8217; drivers involved in accidents on behalf of car insurance companies, initiated legal proceedings against the search engine giant as part of their attempt to find out who is responsible for sending the defamatory mailing.</p>
<p>Google are now known to have complied with the court order and have controversially supplied details of the email account and ISP used by the meddler.</p>
<p>Written under the psudoname Peter Franks, the 1200 word email is know to have been sent from a gmail account that was opened specifically for this purpose and closed a few minutes after the damage had been done&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230;The misdemeanour couldn’t have come at a worse time for the struggling firm who have undergone a £45million rights issue and seen a 75% drop in the value of their stock already this year.</p></blockquote>
<p>That last paragraph, for me, explains some of the difficulty in tying reputation damage to stock decreases.  It&#8217;s like when you read the headlines from Bloomberg about why the days stocks (or commodity) prices are up or down.  You know, the &#8220;Oil closes $3 higher on news that a notable South American dictator has a rather unpleasant boil in a very uncomfortable area&#8221; type of headlines.  You really do have to question the causality and correlation.  So in the Helphire case above - is this new drop in stock really because of the email sent?  If so, should we view that $24mil number as an independent data point to describe this sort of attack on reputation, or is the magnitude aggravated due to the long-term trend of stock price?</p>
<p>Even when we have &#8220;Objective Data&#8221; (an in-joke for Adam S.) like this decline in stock price, it is really difficult to provide any sort of precise estimate or measurement - about the future, present or past.  The best we can do is use ranges, distributions, that are reasonable based on evidence and observation.</p>
<p>So it&#8217;s worth filing away this sort of datum for future use - while dutifully acknowledging the qualifiers we might place around it.</p>
<p>So the questions I ask here - what should we make of this new information, and how should we view the $24million drop - they&#8217;re not rhetorical.  I am very interested in your views and welcome your comments!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock">stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helphire stock">helphire stock</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation damage">reputation damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reputation">reputation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stock price">stock price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/damage">damage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email account">email account</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious email">malicious email</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=387">Reputation Damage &amp; Measurement</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4f945955ba8a424fe6b9352583602062</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK7vNKA_3xI/AAAAAAAACFk/bFba_0dWvI4/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK7vNKA_3xI/AAAAAAAACFk/TqKIw6bxpjw/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_1.JPG" /></a>The average web based command and control kit for a botnet consisting of single user, single campaign functions only, has just lost its charm, with a recent discovery of a proprietary botnet kit whose features clearly indicate that the kit's coder know exactly which niches to fill - presumably based on his personal experience or market research into competing products.<br />
<br />
What are some its key differentiation factors? <b>Multitasking</b> at its best, for instance, the kits provides the botnet master with the opportunity to manage numerous different task such as several malware campaigns and DDoS attacks simultaneously, where each of these gets a separate metrics page.  <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Bf1BEKoI/AAAAAAAACFs/Yicbw9alvSs/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Bf1BEKoI/AAAAAAAACFs/rzG7g1DxhQs/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_2.JPG" /></a><b>Automation</b> of malicious tasks, by setting up tasks, and issuing notices on the status of the task, when it was run and when it was ended. Just consider the possibilities for a scheduling malware and DDoS attacks for different quarters. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<b>Segmentation</b> in every aspect of the tasks, for instance, a DDoS attacks against a particular site can be scheduled to launched on a specific date from infected hosts based in chosen countries only. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8BqO4a_VI/AAAAAAAACF0/UMGxAh9uGF0/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8BqO4a_VI/AAAAAAAACF0/ZlxV-mc44fM/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_3.JPG" /></a><b>Customized DDoS</b> in the sense of empowering the botnet master with point'n'click ability to dedicate a precise number of the bots to participate, which countries they should be based in, and for how long the attack should remain active. <b>Quality and assurance in DDoS attacks</b> based on the measurement of the bot's bandwidth against a particular country, in this case the object of the attack, so theoretically bots from neighboring countries would DDoS the country in question far more efficiently. <b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B0rE_rgI/AAAAAAAACF8/NKwLnKmmH44/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_4.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B0rE_rgI/AAAAAAAACF8/pVosEgAltxk/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_4.JPG" /></a><b>Historical malware campaign performance</b>, is perhaps the most quality assurance feature in the entire kit, presumably created in order to allow the person behind it to measure which were the most effective malware and DDoS campaigns that he executed in the past. From an OSINT perspective, sacrificing his operational security by maintaing detailed logs from previous attacks is a gold mine directly establishing his relationships with previous malware campaigns.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B8T36-3I/AAAAAAAACGE/BhFmeDoa8Lk/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_5.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8B8T36-3I/AAAAAAAACGE/vij9THb60ow/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_5.JPG" /></a><b>Bot Description</b>:  &nbsp; <br />
<div dir="ltr" id="result_box">1. Completely invisible Bot work in the system.  <br />
2. Not loads system.  <br />
3. Invisible in the process.  <br />
4. Workaround all firewall.  <br />
5. Bot implemented as a driver.  </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CIQJHsKI/AAAAAAAACGM/SzpE6NqryP8/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_6.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CIQJHsKI/AAAAAAAACGM/CptzW9_ji-k/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_6.JPG" /></a><b>Functions Bot</b> (constantly updated):&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">1. Downloading a file (many options). <br />
2. HTTP DDoS (many options, including http authentication).  </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CQZXzF1I/AAAAAAAACGU/LI52hSDJhpA/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_7.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8CQZXzF1I/AAAAAAAACGU/AIaGhGUL0Fk/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_7.JPG" /></a><b>The web interface</b>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Convenient manager tasks. <br />
-- Every task can be stopped, put on pause, etc. ... <br />
-- Interest and visual scale of the task.&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- A task manager for DDoS and Loader <br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Cvw3fTbI/AAAAAAAACGc/Zqcrn6XWYEw/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_8.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8Cvw3fTbI/AAAAAAAACGc/0PQgE_timh4/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_8.JPG" /></a>-- <b>For DDoS tasks</b> </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">Bots involved in DDoS 'f. <br />
Condition of the victim (works, fell).  <br />
</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8C5JVrIeI/AAAAAAAACGk/HNHO_ar0MgA/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_9.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8C5JVrIeI/AAAAAAAACGk/Y1z0VIR3B9k/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_9.JPG" /></a>2. <b>Bots manager  </b><br />
-- Displays a list of bots (postranichno). <br />
-- Obratseniya date of the first and last. <br />
-- ID Bot. <br />
-- Country Bot. <br />
-- Type Bot. <br />
-- The status Bot (online / offline). <br />
-- Bot bandwidth to different parts of the world (europe, asia). <br />
-- The possibility of removing bots</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- When you click on ID Bot loadable still a wealth of information about it</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D0Vm4XxI/AAAAAAAACGs/BM5pm1_Rtag/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_11.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D0Vm4XxI/AAAAAAAACGs/mQEa7wVxDNc/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_11.JPG" /></a>3. <b>Statistics botneta  </b><br />
-- Statistics both common and build Bot. <br />
-- Information on the growth and decline botneta dates (and build). <br />
-- Bots online <br />
-- All bots</div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D6Gv_qnI/AAAAAAAACG0/JTOJS-ZHQek/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_12.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8D6Gv_qnI/AAAAAAAACG0/ujbOfFEX9TA/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_12.JPG" /></a>-- Dead bots. <br />
<br />
4. <b>Statistics botneta country</b></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- All countries to work on&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- New work by country&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Online work from country to country</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">-- Dead bots by country</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">5. <b>Detailed history botneta</b>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box">6. <b>Convenient user-friendly interface adding teams</b> <br />
8. <b>Admin minimal server loads</b>  <br />
-- Use php5/mysql  <br />
</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8EKSfrczI/AAAAAAAACG8/3oulo2cgTtM/s1600-h/web_botnet_cc_13.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SK8EKSfrczI/AAAAAAAACG8/xEI9xAwNGNM/s200-R/web_botnet_cc_13.JPG" /></a><b>Upcoming features : </b><br />
1. Form grabber (price increase substantially), for old customers will be charged as an upgrade <br />
2. Public key cryptography<br />
3. Clustering campaigns and DDoS attacks<br />
<br />
Despite it's proprietary nature, it's quality and innovative features will sooner or later leak out for everyone to take advantage of, a rather common lifecycle for the majority of proprietary malware kits in general.</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><br />
<b>Related posts:</b></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/blackenergy-ddos-bot-web-based-c.html">BlackEnergy DDoS Bot Web Based<br />
</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-ddos-malware-kit-in-wild.html">A New DDoS Malware Kit in the Wild</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_20.html">The Cyber Bot - Web Based Malware</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample_7672.html">The Black Sun Bot - Web Based Malware</a> </div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/custom-ddos-capabilities-within-malware.html">Custom DDoS Capabilities Within a Malware</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/botnet-on-demand-service.html">Botnet on Demand Service</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/loadsccs-ddos-for-hire-service.html">Loads.cc - DDoS for Hire Service</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a>&nbsp;</div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/botnet-communication-platforms.html">Botnet Communication Platforms</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/botnet-masters-to-do-list.html">A Botnet Master's To-Do List</a></div><div dir="ltr" id="result_box"><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/ddos-on-demand-vs-ddos-extortion.html">DDoS on Demand VS DDoS Extortion</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/how-does-botnet-with-100k-infected-pcs.html">How Does a Botnet with 100k Infected PCs Look Like?</a></div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Y5dBtK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Y5dBtK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=WsNccK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=WsNccK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ToV4Pk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ToV4Pk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=I6a7ak"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=I6a7ak" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2S7WNK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2S7WNK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Qk66sK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Qk66sK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=8S5ask"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=8S5ask" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/372102101" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2008 10:02:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks based">ddos attacks based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks">ddos attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous malware campaigns">previous malware campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos attacks simultaneously">ddos attacks simultaneously</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country">country</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country bot">country bot</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos">ddos</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/372102101/web-based-botnet-command-and-control.html">Web Based Botnet Command and Control Kit 2.0</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6228ebb081126296ff70b5f6268fd2a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6228ebb081126296ff70b5f6268fd2a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Is the once popular in the second quarter of 2007, embedded malware tactic on the verge of irrelevance, and if so, what has contributed to its decline? Have SQL injections executed through botnets...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlq1uSeDFI/AAAAAAAACDM/l4bxcru-BQk/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains1.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlq1uSeDFI/AAAAAAAACDM/ho301JgoMUs/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains1.png" /></a> Is the once popular in the second quarter of 2007, embedded malware tactic on the verge of irrelevance, and if so, what has contributed to its decline? Have SQL injections executed through botnets turned into the most efficient way to infect hundreds of thousands of legitimate web sites? Depends on who you're dealing with.<br />
<br />
A cyber criminal's position in the "underground food chain" can be easily tracked down on the basis of tools and tactics that he's taking advantage of, in fact, some would on purposely misinform on what their actual capabilities are in order not to attract too much attention to their real ones, consisting of high-profile compromises at hundreds of high-profile web sites.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmDVdDGnPI/AAAAAAAACDU/qNbLBUKlHp0/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmDVdDGnPI/AAAAAAAACDU/ZsmcK9HMeUs/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains3.jpg" /></a>Embedded malware may not be as hot as it used to be in the last quarter of 2007, but thanks to the oversupply of stolen accounting data, certain individuals within the underground ecosystem seem to be abusing entire portfolios of domains on the basis of purchasing access to the compromised accounts. In fact, the oversupply of compromised Cpanel accounts is logically resulting in their decreasing price, with the sellers differentiating their propositions, and charging premium prices based on the site's page ranks and traffic, measured through publicly available services, or through the internal statistics.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmMyr4CWEI/AAAAAAAACDc/UafOTCKAb-0/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains22.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmMyr4CWEI/AAAAAAAACDc/7IRBMNndy-w/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains22.JPG" /></a><br />
SQL injections may be the tactic of choice for the time being, but as long as stolen accounting data consisting of Cpanel logins, and web shells access to misconfigured web servers remain desired underground goods, goold old fashioned embedded malware will continue taking place.<br />
<br />
Interestingly, from an economic perspective, the way the seller markets his goods, can greatly influence the way they get abused given he continues offering after-sale services and support. It's blackhat search engine optimization I have in mind, sometimes the tactic of choice especially given its high liquidity in respect to monetizing the compromised access.<br />
<br />
The bottom line - for the time being, there's a higher probability that your web properties will get SQL injected, than IFRAME-ed, as it used to be half a year ago, and that's because what used to be a situation where malicious parties would aim at launching a targeted attack at high profile site and abuse the huge traffic it receives, is today's pragmatic reality where a couple of hundred low profile web sites can in fact return more traffic to the cyber criminals, and greatly extend the lifecycle of their campaign taking advantage of the fact the the low profile site owners would remain infected and vulnerable for months to come.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/embedding-malicious-iframes-through.html">Embedding Malicious IFRAMEs Through Stolen FTP Accounts</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/injecting-iframes-by-abusing-input.html">Injecting IFRAMEs by Abusing Input Validation</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast-flux Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-massive-sql-injection.html">Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-hacking-for-vulnerabilities.html">Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1394">Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1118">Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ExzKaK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ExzKaK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=AgwoKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=AgwoKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=5JjO7k"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=5JjO7k" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=5Z85mk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=5Z85mk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=s4xhGK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=s4xhGK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ReebmK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ReebmK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=T0yjTk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=T0yjTk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/368194376" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 06:42:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injections">sql injections</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injection">massive sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profile site">profile site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site sql">site sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection">sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tactic">tactic</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/368194376/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Economist.com - Confessions of a Risk Manager]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/536365450db644abfa519cdc03dc2c4c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/536365450db644abfa519cdc03dc2c4c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I was reading the Economist this week and came across an excellent article titled &quot; Confessions of a Risk Manager

In the article a risk manager for a major financial institution talks about managing...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I was reading the <a href="http://www.economist.com/">Economist </a>this week and came across an excellent article titled "<a href="http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11897037">Confessions of a Risk Manager</a>".<br /><br />In the article a risk manager for a major financial institution talks about managing risks and how the risk department was viewed as an obstacle by the rest of the business.  I'll just quote a section here so you can see that governance roles, especially those involving trade-offs of risk vs. return are difficult not just in security.<br /><blockquote>In their eyes, we were not earning money for the bank. Worse, we had the power to say no and therefore prevent business from being done. Traders saw us as obstructive and a hindrance to their ability to earn higher bonuses. They did not take kindly to this. Sometimes the relationship between the risk department and the business lines ended in arguments.   . . .<br /><br />Tactfully explaining why we said no was not our forte. Traders were often exasperated as much by how they were told as by what they were told.  <p>At the root of it all, however, was—and still is—a deeply ingrained flaw in the decision-making process. In contrast to the law, where two sides make an equal-and-opposite argument that is fairly judged, in banks there is always a bias towards one side of the argument. The business line was more focused on getting a transaction approved than on identifying the risks in what it was proposing. The risk factors were a small part of the presentation and always “mitigated”. This made it hard to discourage transactions. If a risk manager said no, he was immediately on a collision course with the business line. The risk thinking therefore leaned towards giving the benefit of the doubt to the risk-takers.<br /></p><p>Collective common sense suffered as a result. Often in meetings, our gut reactions as risk managers were negative. But it was difficult to come up with hard-and-fast arguments for why you should decline a transaction, especially when you were sitting opposite a team that had worked for weeks on a proposal, which you had received an hour before the meeting started. In the end, with pressure for earnings and a calm market environment, we reluctantly agreed to marginal transactions.</p></blockquote><br />Every time I read about decision making like this I refer back to an some excellent presentations I've come across by Reidar Bratvold.  He has done some excellent presentations on decision making in the face of risks/uncertainty.<br /><br /><ul><li><a href="www.spe.no/stavanger/doc/Bratvold%20-%20SPE%20Dist%20Lecturer.pdf">Would You Know a Good decision if You Saw One?</a></li><li><a href="http://www.reidar-bratvold.com/Decision%20Making%20Under%20Uncertainty%20-%20BadenBaden.pdf">Decision Making Under Uncertainty</a></li></ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityRetentive/~4/362069047" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2008 04:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk manager">risk manager</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk factors">risk factors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk-takers">risk-takers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business line">business line</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk managers">risk managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk department">risk department</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business lines">business lines</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityRetentive/~3/362069047/economistcom-confessions-of-risk.html">Economist.com - Confessions of a Risk Manager</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Reference Clients, the Global Meltdown and CEP]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5c50f1c1126cb365379b87a267642821</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5c50f1c1126cb365379b87a267642821</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Sometimes I get email from colleagues who ask me why I am working on compiling CEP/EP reference clients
My reply is that I dont care must about reported dollar sales because these numbers are, for the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sometimes I get email from colleagues who ask me why I am working on compiling CEP/EP reference clients.  </p>
<p>My reply is that I don&#8217;t care must about reported dollar sales because these numbers are, for the most part, meaningless and mythical at this point in time.  Large companies sell enterprise licenses and make up allocated numbers for the CEP/EP share of the pie based on a subjective formulation.   They can sell an enterprise site license for $2,000,000 USD that includes CEP/EP software and claim 20% is CEP revenue, regardless of if the software is used or not.</p>
<p>Small companies nearly give software away with the hope of developing a strong public reference client, which are few and far between in 2008.  Soon, I will start a Google spreadsheet, similar to what we did last year on this topic.  Some folks don&#8217;t seem to like this initiative because, unfortunately, we will see that for this half of 2008, this year has been very lean for CEP/EP.   Some would prefer I blog as a cheerleading evangelist versus an objective analyst.  Go Fight Win!  Rah Rah Rah!</p>
<p>Much of the current gloomy situation, of course, is because the entire market has fallen and IT spending is down.   Financial companies announce record losses.  Bankruptcies and restructuring are in the daily news.   </p>
<p>In this depressed market, some companies have tried to tie the subprime crash to CEP, somehow implying that CEP would have helped, but that positioning is mostly fantasy.  I work in the field of risk management at the corporate level and the current problems are not caused by a lack of technology, it is simply corporate greed - corporations taking high risks to stay competitive in a bull market and then they experience a frighteningly negative reversal during a market free fall.   </p>
<p>Of course, the US Federal Reserve did not help matters when they decided to poke a gaping hole in the real estate bubble by dramatically raising interest rates without thinking about how they would manage the consequences, but that is another story!    After all, the current top government executives in Washington DC are so politically, scientifically and economically incompetent that all we can do is hold our breath and count the days.</p>
<p>One risk management colleague often says,</p>
<blockquote><p> &#8220;When then tide is high, you can&#8217;t see that the swimmers are naked.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>&#8230;.and so it is in business.  The current problems in the global market are based on human, social, and political errors and incompetence; nothing that technology can cure at this point in the game. So, the entire market is in decline, and folks are overhyping all software to keep the buzz going, as if CEP or SOA or BPM would have helped stopped the current global meltdown.    Yes, CEP can stop global warming!  Buy one today, save a cute polar bear!</p>
<p>Then again, maybe we only need a CEP engine in Washington; even a simple rules-based one would be good.  Naturally, some would suggest that we need Neural Nets and Bayesian analytics; but I think just a simple rules-engine looking out the window that can process if-then-else conditions would be a great improvement over the mind-numbing leadership in Washington today.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 08:34:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market free">market free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cepep">cepep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/includes cepep software">includes cepep software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/global market">global market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cepep reference clients">cepep reference clients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep revenue">cep revenue</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/18/reference-clients-the-global-meltdown-and-cep/">Reference Clients, the Global Meltdown and CEP</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Bosses Nuked, Some Air Force Missileers Cheer]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2c03560cfc9a78359dbec02c9bd29386</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2c03560cfc9a78359dbec02c9bd29386</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Defense Secretary Robert Gates didn't just kick the Air Force's two top leaders to the curb yesterday. He signaled to the rest of the service that the long, slow decline of its nuclear corps is...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Defense Secretary Robert Gates didn't just kick the Air Force's two top leaders to the curb yesterday. He signaled to the rest of the service that the long, slow decline of its nuclear corps is officially over.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=f0b1f684093b047cca97ee57cafaeeb4" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=f0b1f684093b047cca97ee57cafaeeb4" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=LlqRJI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=LlqRJI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=YVeBki"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=YVeBki" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=ZkWtki"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=ZkWtki" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?a=ZxDANI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/wired/politics/privacy?i=ZxDANI" border="0"></img></a>
 <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=1kH9pI"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=1kH9pI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=Cv3QEi"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=Cv3QEi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=hNoURi"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=hNoURi" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?a=YcXMUI"><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~f/wired/politics/security?i=YcXMUI" border="0"></img></a> </div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/wired/politics/privacy/~4/306358309" height="1" width="1"/><img src="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~4/306358315" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2008 15:20:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/air force">air force</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/defense secretary robert">defense secretary robert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/curb yesterday">curb yesterday</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/top leaders">top leaders</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nuclear corps">nuclear corps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/slow decline">slow decline</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rest">rest</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kick">kick</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.wired.com/~r/wired/politics/security/~3/306358315/defense-secreta.html">Bosses Nuked, Some Air Force Missileers Cheer</source>
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