• Low-tech is very effective. Movie-plot threats -- terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists with biological agents, terrorists targeting our water supplies -- might be what people worry about, but a bunch of trained (we don't really know yet what sort of training they had, but it's clear that they had some) men with guns and grenades is all they needed.

• At the same time, the attacks were surprisingly ineffective. I can't find exact numbers, but it seems there were about 18 terrorists. The latest toll is 195 dead, 235 wounded. That's 11 dead, 13 wounded, per terrorist. As horrible as the reality is, that's much less than you might have thought if you imagined the movie in your head. Reality is different from the movies.

• Even so, terrorism is rare. If a bunch of men with guns and grenades is all they really need, then why isn't this sort of terrorism more common? Why not in the U.S., where it's easy to get hold of weapons? It's because terrorism is very, very rare.

• Specific countermeasures don't help against these attacks. None of the high-priced countermeasures that defend against specific tactics and specific targets made, or would have made, any difference: photo ID checks, confiscating liquids at airports, fingerprinting foreigners at the border, bag screening on public transportation, anything. Evenmetal detectors and threat warnings didn't do any good:

  "If I look at what we had, which all of us complained about, it could not have stopped what took place," he told CNN. "It's ironic that we did have such a warning, and we did have some measures."

  He said people were told to park away from the entrance and had to go through a metal detector. But he said the attackers came through a back entrance.

  "They knew what they were doing, and they did not go through the front. All of our arrangements are in the front," he said.

If there's any lesson in these attacks, it's not to focus too much on the specifics of the attacks. Of course, that's not the way we're programmed to think. We respond to stories and not analysis. I don't mean to be sympathetic; this tendency is human and these deaths are really tragic. But eighteen armed people intent on killing lots of innocents will be able to do just that, and last-line-of-defense countermeasures won't be able to stop them. Intelligence, investigation, and emergency response. We have to find and stop the terrorists before they attack, and deal with the aftermath of the attacks we don't stop. There really is no other way, and I hope that we don't let the tragedy lead us into unwise decisions about how to deal with terrorism.

Since the election, the newspapers and Internet have been flooded with unsolicited advice for President-elect Barack Obama. I'll go ahead and add mine.

[...]

And by "revamp," I mean "start over." Most security experts agree that the rigmarole we go through at the airport is mere security theater, designed not to make us safer, but to make us feel safer by making it increasingly inconvenient to fly. TSA's approach to security is too reactionary -- too set on preventing attacks and attempted attacks that have already happened. And please, whatever you do, resist the temptation to let TSA workers unionize. Security from terror attacks should be a federal jobs program. You need the authority to fire underperforming screeners quickly and effortlessly. Three game-changing possibilities to head up TSA: security guru Bruce Schneier, Cato Institute security and technology scholar Jim Harper, or Ohio State University's John Mueller.

Although I'd be happy to see either Jim or John with it.

I don't want it because it's too narrow. I think the right thing for the government to do is to give the TSA a lot less money. I'd rather they defend against the broad threat of terrorism than focus on the narrow threat of airplane terrorism, and I'd rather they defend against the myriad of threats that face our society than focus on the singular threat of terrorism. But the head of the TSA can't have those opinions; he has to take the money he's given and perform the specific function he's assigned to perform. Not very much fun, really.

But I'd be happy to advise whoever Obama choses to head the TSA.

The job of the nation's CTO would be more interesting, but I don't think I want it, either. (Have you seen the screening process?)

Things are so bad in China that its gross domestic product growth rate may fall from double digits to the dowdy level of 8%. Eight percent, by the way, is a level at which the United States is unlikely to ever grow again. It can't. Our economy is simply fully developed. Thus the sobriquet "developed economy." I know, not exactly catchy.

..

All of the headlines show China sitting at a crossroads. But the reason I have faith in China is that it has historical proxies. Since 1970, with the exception of a few OPEC members, only four economies have made the transition from emerging to developed markets (meaning their per-capita incomes exceed $15,000 per year): Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea.

These four economies have two things in common. First, they have few natural resources; and second, they are dominated by Chinese values and the traditional Chinese work ethic. Mainland China is different only because it got a later start.

“When I wrote the book, I thought I was writing about the future. When it was going to press, I thought it was about current affairs. Now I wish it was about history.”

This part below reminds me a lot of 1995 security architectures used to defend 2008 integrated applications

The present crisis had been triggered because the international financial system had undertaken activities that had “far outpaced the ability of the infrastructure to sustain them”, said El-Erian.

And it was not just the markets that could not cope with their own changes, but governments as well. Significant weaknesses had been exposed “from the firms, to the regulatory agencies, to governments, to multilateral oversight”.

“Turbocharge that with financial innovations, which history tells us we tend to overproduce and overconsume, and it’s inevitable that you will get a series of market accidents,” he said.

Originally, researchers in CEP were not trying to solve a problem of streaming data or streaming events.   Often we read this mischaracterization by folks in the database/streaming domain, as they were focused on the low latency processing of streaming events.   A natural extension of this research has been stream processing software (often called “engines”) that process streaming data with continuous queries, for example market data feeds for algo-trading or best market order execution.  This mischaracterization is partly responsible for why we see many order processing applications in market data stream processing mislabled as “complex event processing” applications.

The genesis of complex event processing was not the stream processing need for “feeds and speed” but the processing capability to solve what can be characterized as the “problem of asymmetric capabilties”.   The term “asymmetric” has been used in the military domain. For example we often hear the term “asymmetric warfare.”  However, in general the concept of “asymmetrical processing capablities” is the true genesis for CEP and related processing concepts and domains.   It is this genesis that distinguishes CEP from EDA, SOA, SOR, and so many other technology oriented concepts.

In order to illustrate what I mean by “asymmetrical processing capablities” we will take the example of the evolution of rocketry.    In the early days, scientists learned how to make rockets, I assume with gunpowder and similar chemical compounds to launch rockets.   Over many years the application of rocketry advanced much faster than the ability to understand the situations created in the sky.    In other words, folks could fill the skies with rockets long before they had the capability to track and identify (or sense and respond to)  the rockets in real time.

Therefore, the concept of “asymmetrical processing capablities” is the situation where there is a capability, such as “launch a rocket, sense-and-respond,” that is asymmetric in nature.    In other words, the capability to detect multiple rocket launches creates an asymmetric situation where it is easy to launch rockets, but hard to detect and defend against those launches.

The same concept can be applied to everyday air travel.   If we could only fly airplanes, but did not have the capability to track the planes, understand situations in airspace, and then respond to changing situations, air travel would be quite difficult.   Lucky for us, the global traveller, there is symmetry in the capabilities to build and fly aircraft and the capabilities to detect, track and follow the evolving situations in the sky.

The genesis of CEP was to solve the problem of asymmetry in cyberspace, or if you prefer, distributed data networks.   The folks who identified, early on,  the problems associated with asymmetry in cyberspace were folks working the the field of network and security management.    This is because there has been, and is currently, a great asymmetry between the capablities to “launch a process or transaction” in cyberspace and the capabilties to detect and track what is going on in the same domain.

In my next post on this topic, we will go into some details of this asymmetry and review the first CEP projects from Stanford University in the context of asymmetric processing capabilities in cyberspace.