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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: deployment]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/deployment</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links List 11.24.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f209f4653ec3034a29d9cf1ff2ca5cd8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f209f4653ec3034a29d9cf1ff2ca5cd8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The hunt for the nations first CTO continues . Although names have been suggested, such as standout nominees include Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane and now chief security technology officer at...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 5px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/markcuban.jpg" border="0" alt="markcuban" width="240" height="164" align="left" /> The hunt for the <a href="http://weblog.infoworld.com/robertxcringely/archives/2008/11/the_once_and_fu.html?source=NLC-NOTES&amp;cgd=2008-11-17" target="_blank">nation’s first CTO continues</a>. Although names have been suggested, such as standout nominees include Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane and now chief security technology officer at BT; Mark Cuban for his obvious business sense – and in spite of the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/17/mark-cuban-insider-tradin_n_144320.html" target="_blank">insider trading indictment</a> – and Carly Fiorina, former controversial CEO of HP, the next question is what policies should this CTO pursue? Visit <a href="http://obamacto.org/" target="_blank">ObamaCTO.org</a> to view and vote for policies.</p>
<p>SaaS is taking a bite out of the $18 billion IT management market. A <a href="http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2008/11/will_it_managem.html?cid=RSSfeed_IWK_ALL" target="_blank">new Forrester Research report forecasts SaaS-based IT management accounts will be 10%</a> of the market by 2013. The reason: high level of interest from medium-sized and large enterprises. Forrester also predicts that enterprises with 1,000 or more employees will account for 50% of SaaS installations in 2009. We’ve seen this on the service desk side with the <a href="http://www.redmonk.com/cote/2007/01/17/service-nowcom-briefing-itil-saas/" target="_blank">rapid growth of upstart Service-now.com</a>. Companies are looking for easier and rapid deployment, lower upfront and capital costs and rapid time to value – all benefits of SaaS as well as our own <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/appliancebenefits.htm" target="_blank">appliance model</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://chucksblog.emc.com/chucks_blog/2008/11/the-speculation-game-ibm-buys-transitive.html" target="_blank">IBM snapped up Transitive</a> this week. Their QuickTransit software dynamically translates native code <a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081120-ibm-to-buy-transitive.html" target="_blank">between architectures</a>, enabling apps compiled for one processor to be run on another without any modification. Apple was the first licensee and used it to build Rosetta, a translation system that allowed users of Intel Macs to seamlessly run legacy PowerPC apps. IBM plans to use the technology to move workloads onto IBM systems without recompiling, allowing customers to “save on energy costs due to hardware consolidation and reduced TCO.”</p>
<p>At CA World, CA announced a partnership with Amazon to provide “<a href="http://stage.vambenepe.com/archives/442" target="_blank">management capabilities around Amazon’s EC2</a> utility computing platform, potentially including discovery of software running on EC2 instances, performance monitoring, configuration management, software deployment capabilities and provisioning”. John Willis, in spite of some pretty funny potshots and stories about CA (don’t we all have them), writes that “<a href="http://www.johnmwillis.com/amazon/what-color-is-your-cloud/" target="_blank">CA is the first of the Big Four to take the cloud serious</a>”.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2008 11:15:36 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software deployment capabilities">software deployment capabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibm plans">ibm plans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibm">ibm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/apps">apps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legacy powerpc apps">legacy powerpc apps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saas">saas</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saas installations">saas installations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/links-list-112408/11/2008">Links List 11.24.08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-10-31 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b05d6d2494c08b538b298ff9e1125820</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b05d6d2494c08b538b298ff9e1125820</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Mining enterprise SIM logs for relevant security event data
Security School: Getting the most out of your SIM deployment
Data loss prevention: Data Protection Security School: Security Schools:...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid14_gci1327864_tax312277,00.html">Mining enterprise SIM logs for relevant security event data</a></li>
<li><a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/guide/securitySchool/category/0,296296,sid14_tax312277,00.html">Security School: Getting the most out of your SIM deployment</a></li>
<li><a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/guide/securitySchool/category/0,296296,sid14_tax311996,00.html">Data loss prevention: Data Protection Security School: Security Schools: SearchSecurity.com</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.modsecurity.org/blog/archives/2008/01/is_your_website.html">ModSecurity Blog: Is Your Website Secure? Prove It.</a></li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/438745750" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/enterprise sim logs">enterprise sim logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data loss prevention">data loss prevention</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security school">security school</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/website secure">website secure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/modsecurity blog">modsecurity blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sim deployment">sim deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security schools">security schools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/prove">prove</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/searchsecurity">searchsecurity</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/438745750/anton18">Links for 2008-10-31 [del.icio.us]</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Data Mining for Terrorists Doesn't Work]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/205a9261660e694f495f2a2726701cd2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/205a9261660e694f495f2a2726701cd2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[According to a massive report from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn't work. Here's a good summary: The report was written by a committee whose members include William...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>According to a <a href="http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12452">massive report</a> from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn't work.  <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10059987-38.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20">Here's</a> a good summary:</p>

<blockquote>The report was written by a committee whose members include William Perry, a professor at Stanford University; Charles Vest, the former president of MIT; W. Earl Boebert, a retired senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories; Cynthia Dwork of Microsoft Research; R. Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle's police chief; and Daryl Pregibon, a research scientist at Google.

<p>They admit that far more Americans live their lives online, using everything from VoIP phones to Facebook to RFID tags in automobiles, than a decade ago, and the databases created by those activities are tempting targets for federal agencies. And they draw a distinction between subject-based data mining (starting with one individual and looking for connections) compared with pattern-based data mining (looking for anomalous activities that could show illegal activities).</p>

<p>But the authors conclude the type of data mining that government bureaucrats would like to do--perhaps inspired by watching too many episodes of the Fox series 24--can't work. "If it were possible to automatically find the digital tracks of terrorists and automatically monitor only the communications of terrorists, public policy choices in this domain would be much simpler. But it is not possible to do so."</p>

<p>A summary of the recommendations:</p>

<ul><li>U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic process to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or unclassified, for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be deployed, and periodically thereafter.

<p><li>Periodically after a program has been operationally deployed, and in particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy makers should (carefully review) the program before allowing it to continue operations or to proceed to the next phase.</p>

<p><li>To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be conducted with synthetic population data... At all stages of a phased deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the full safeguards of the framework.</p>

<p><li>Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the operations of that program, a part of which would entail a practice of using the same data mining technologies to "mine the miners and track the trackers."</p>

<p><li>Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.</p>

<p><li>The U.S. government should periodically review the nation's laws, policies, and procedures that protect individuals' private information for relevance and effectiveness in light of changing technologies and circumstances. In particular, Congress should re-examine existing law to consider how privacy should be protected in the context of information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.</ul></blockquote></p>

<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08data.html">Here</a> <a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/data-mining-for.html">are</a> <a href="http://techdirt.com/articles/20081007/1242002479.shtml">more</a> news articles on the report.  I <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-108.html">explained</a> why data mining wouldn't find terrorists back in 2005.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=w2YwM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=w2YwM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=sK5kM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=sK5kM" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 02:35:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/synthetic population data">synthetic population data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorists">terrorists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program">program</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/program enters">program enters</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research scientist">research scientist</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/research">research</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect">protect</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft research">microsoft research</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/data_mining_for_1.html">Data Mining for Terrorists Doesn't Work</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fun Reading on Security - 8]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot; Fun Reading on Security .&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008
Great...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Fun Reading on Security</a>.&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008.</p>  <ol>   <li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=162936">Great paper</a> that complements the whole &quot;SIEM is dead?&quot; saga - &quot;Most enterprises are looking for a product that <em>will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle</em>, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. &quot; </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001093.html">The Mess: looking for someone to blame?</a>&quot; is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up (&quot;<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html">If a tree falls in someone else's silo...</a>&quot;) </li>    <li>Mike call to &quot;<a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/rise-up-against-mediocrity">Rise up against Mediocrity</a>.&quot;&#160; - &quot;Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear.&quot;; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do &quot;Security FIRST!&quot; (and compliance second) </li>    <li>A great piece from Burton: &quot;<a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">On Response</a>&quot; - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. <a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">This</a> is definitely a good one for those still in the &quot;we'll just block the threat world&quot; - &quot;we will not win a continuing war of escalation&quot; and &quot;using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2008/08/security-metric.html">More on metrics</a>, including the highly-awaited ISO27004. </li>    <li><a href="http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64598.html">Pretty dumb paper</a> by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read <a href="http://treasuryinstitute.org/blog/index.php?itemid=174">this</a>). PCI doesn't &quot;fall short,&quot; it helps people who will otherwise not do <em>anything</em> and their systems will &quot;power&quot; those botnets of the future... </li>    <li>While we are on this subject: <a href="http://pcianswers.com/2008/10/01/pci-dss-version-12-differences-and-updates/">a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes</a>, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/11/recap-cso-executive-seminar-on-pci-compliance-by-james-deluccia/">here.</a> And more <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">here</a> (&quot;<a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths</a>&quot;). And, <a href="http://www.estoregfoa.org/StaticContent/staticpages/TM0508.htm#1c">more PCI myths</a>. And <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-29-2008">more good ideas</a> on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-)&#160; - also <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/19/the-inside-story-of-pci-confessions-of-a-qsa-commentary-by-james-deluccia/">this is good.</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/23/behavioral-monitoring/">Adrian on behavioral monitoring</a>; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security. </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://www.darkreading.com/blog.asp?blog_sectionid=327&amp;doc_id=164144">Premature Chasm-Crossing</a>&quot;&#160; - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and&#160; their easily-excitable PR teams...) - &quot;Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?&quot; (Mike R <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-24-2008">also comments</a> on that). A related - and&#160; just as interesting point is made here: &quot;<a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/security_is_not_a_solution">Security is not a solution</a>&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/print/450190">More</a> on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: &quot;I think this is a dangerous trend unless the &quot;checklist&quot; is all inclusive.&quot; (how can a checklist include <strong>ALL? :-)</strong>) </li>    <li><a href="http://forensics.sans.org/community/top7_forensic_trends.php">&quot;SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008&quot;</a> </li>    <li>Read &quot;<a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/09/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html">The three approaches to computer security!</a>&quot;&#160; Why? Come on, it is from <a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com">Joanna</a>! :-) </li>    <li><a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/09/ids-vitamins-or-prophylactic.html">A fun discussion</a> about a hot new technology:<em> network IDS. </em>Is IDS <em>absolutely</em> indispensable to <em>ALL</em> companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion. </li>    <li>On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/why-lasers-wont.html">Some say no.</a> </li>    <li>Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): &quot;<a href="http://blogs.gartner.com/greg_young/2008/09/30/get-rich-quick-with-network-security/">Get Rich Quick With Network Security</a>&quot; </li> </ol>  <p>Enjoy!</p>  <p><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Previous security reading.</a></p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=pqMsM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=pqMsM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=avlNM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=avlNM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=EvcjM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=EvcjM" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/409462346" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 06:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security managers">security managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous security">previous security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss exists">pci dss exists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci fun">pci fun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security checklists">security checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/409462346/fun-reading-on-security-8.html">Fun Reading on Security - 8</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Can you keep users from importing their own applications?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7086a257099ae412ea77872cdc0f0144</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7086a257099ae412ea77872cdc0f0144</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Shadow IT is all the IT that was neither planned nor approved by anyone but gets chosen, deployed and used by end users. Some see this as grass-roots deployment of cool technologies; some see it as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Shadow IT is all the IT that was neither planned nor approved by anyone but gets chosen, deployed and used by end users. Some see this as grass-roots deployment of cool technologies; some see it as weeds growing from any crack in the IT plan. If you don't build it, they will go find it elsewhere. And even if you build it, if it isn't adequate, comprehensive, flexible and easy to use, they will go find it elsewhere.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/grass-roots deployment">grass-roots deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cool technologies">cool technologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flexible">flexible</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shadow">shadow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weeds">weeds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/easy">easy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comprehensive">comprehensive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2008/092908-andreas.html?fsrc=rss-security">Can you keep users from importing their own applications?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The opt-out from hell]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e2ac86231138c2d34a97b7acfc4cd2ec</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e2ac86231138c2d34a97b7acfc4cd2ec</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[One problem with making your email address available (which I will continue to do, don't worry) is that folks with something to sell assume you're interested in their stuff. To wit, let's consider an...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One problem with making your email address available (which I will continue to do, don't worry) is that folks with something to sell assume you're interested in their stuff. To wit, let's consider an email I received today (copied, headers and all, after my griping).</p>  <p>Note that if I want to opt out of further communications, I have to do <em>two separate things</em> -- which actually becomes three things.</p>  <ul>   <li>First I have to click the last link to opt out of future TechTarget spam. (Yes, I deleted the actual links. But certainly none of <em>my</em> trustworthy readers would attempt to re-subscribe me, right...? &lt;g&gt; </li>    <li>But that isn't enough -- I <em>also</em> have to separately opt out of future Avaya spam! (Why does the no-more-from-Avaya link live on a techtargetmail.com server? Whatever.) Clicking on that link eventually does land me on an avaya.com page, where I have to confirm my email address and indicate they don't have my permission to send me spam. Hmm, too difficult to embed my email in that link, when the other techtargetmail.com link <em>did</em> embed my email? </li>    <li>Then after submitting it, another page pops up telling me that I'll soon receive an email with <em>additional</em> instructions! In this email there's a link -- to avaya.com with my email address embedded -- that I must click, I guess to double plus confirm that yes, I really really really do wish never to hear from you again. Clicking that link takes me to a page that promises my &quot;permissions have successfully been set. Thank you.&quot; </li> </ul>  <p>A pox on both your houses, TechTarget and Avaya. I never asked for your stuff. Go away.</p>  <p>Spam, my friends, is only going to <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/12/AR2008091201211.html?hpid=topnews" target="_blank">get</a> <a href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/09/virginia_anti-spam_law_overtur.html?hpid=news-col-blogs" target="_blank">worse</a>. It was so easy to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junk_fax" target="_blank">ban junk faxes</a> in 1991. But even those regulations were <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junk_Fax_Prevention_Act_of_2005" target="_blank">weakened in 2005</a>. So do you really think we'll see anything even remotely logical for outlawing spam? I doubt it, unless we the citizens foment a revolt. Let's get cracking! </p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <hr />  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">Received: from SVC-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.24.242)      <br />by tk5-exhub-c102.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.18.53) with Microsoft       <br />SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.1.291.1; Tue, 16 Sep 2008 11:27:56 -0700       <br />Received: from mail139-wa4-R.bigfish.com (216.32.181.113) by       <br />mail04.microsoft.com (10.253.160.184) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id       <br />8.1.291.1; Tue, 16 Sep 2008 11:27:55 -0700       <br />Received: from mail139-wa4 (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1])&#160;&#160;&#160; by       <br />mail139-wa4-R.bigfish.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 018C11184C2&#160;&#160;&#160; for       <br />&lt;steriley@microsoft.com&gt;; Tue, 16 Sep 2008 18:27:50 +0000 (UTC)       <br />X-BigFish: ps16(zz18c1K1936K2b7wcak69jzzzz2af1jz2fh6bh5eh65h)       <br />X-Spam-TCS-SCL: 4:0       <br />Received: by mail139-wa4 (MessageSwitch) id 1221589667478982_28100; Tue, 16       <br />Sep 2008 18:27:47 +0000 (UCT)       <br />Received: from pp.techtargetmail.com (pp.techtargetmail.com [65.211.80.227])       <br />&#160;&#160;&#160; by mail139-wa4.bigfish.com (Postfix) with SMTP id 46566978071&#160;&#160;&#160; for       <br />&lt;steriley@microsoft.com&gt;; Tue, 16 Sep 2008 18:27:47 +0000 (UTC)       <br />DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=pp.techtargetmail.com; b=iOmibOrM91/1Ugy2gj3QbWo74T2m3GuhmwxZCXJQpFT+nwRES8QKg+4vjt48SNp7WWJExG61Ge+DtnKD3KVI3KwqTKzkPRVrEBF0DCHhYot6VAG/EyEr5vb5RhBz+91yvNhbIqITzGnuQ+uBDJzyc6gU0FHfBl0Fa3S/phcPELM=;       <br />Message-ID: &lt;a818b044.724694.236c8ee748f7dd97.1.n.4.2971370188@pp.techtargetmail.com&gt;       <br />Date: Tue, 16 Sep 2008 14:27:47 -0400       <br />thread-index: a818b044.724694.236c8ee748f7dd97.1.n.4       <br />Reply-To: Avaya &lt;a818b044.724694.236c8ee748f7dd97.1.n.4@pp.techtargetmail.com&gt;       <br />From: Avaya &lt;Avaya@pp.techtargetmail.com&gt;       <br />To: Steve Riley &lt;steriley@microsoft.com&gt;       <br />Subject: 7 Tips to Ensure Readiness for UC Deployment       <br />MIME-Version: 1.0       <br />Content-Type: text/plain       <br />Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit       <br />Content-Class: urn:content-classes:message       <br />Importance: normal       <br />Priority: normal       <br />X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.3790.4133       <br />Return-Path: a818b044.724694.236c8ee748f7dd97.1.n.4@pp.techtargetmail.com       <br />X-MS-Exchange-Organization-PRD: pp.techtargetmail.com       <br />Received-SPF: Pass (SVC-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com: domain       <br />of Avaya@pp.techtargetmail.com designates 65.211.80.227 as permitted sender)       <br />receiver=SVC-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com;       <br />client-ip=65.211.80.227; helo=mail139-wa4-R.bigfish.com;       <br />X-MS-Exchange-Organization-PCL: 2       <br />X-MS-Exchange-Organization-Antispam-Report: DV:3.3.6916.600;SV:3.3.6916.813;SID:SenderIDStatus Pass;OrigIP:65.211.80.227       <br />X-MS-Exchange-Organization-SCL: 2       <br />X-MS-Exchange-Organization-SenderIdResult: PASS</font></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">The following message was sent to you as a subscriber to third party offers from a TechTarget property, including our network of Search sites, Bitpipe.com, CIO Decisions Magazine, Information Security Magazine, Storage Magazine, KnowledgeStorm, TheServerSide.com and/or TheServerSide.NET. To unsubscribe, see below.      <br />____________________________________________________________ </font></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">How should you evaluate the move to unified communications (UC)? Who within which parts of an organization will benefit? Will UC reduce the time to market? Read this E-Guide for answers to these questions and a better look at how the value of UC will, at first, be less of a financial issue and more of a productivity improvement issue that translates into financial benefits. Download this white paper now: </font><a href="http://pp.techtargetmail.com/c.asp?724694&amp;236c8ee748f7dd97&amp;1"><font face="Courier New" size="2">http://pp.techtargetmail.com/c.asp?724694&amp;236c8ee748f7dd97&amp;1</font></a></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">When implementing unified communications, there are a number of important issues to think about and questions to ask. This E-Guide analyzes seven phases to ensure you reap the full benefits of UC in each. If you're ready to take the plunge but you're not sure your business or your infrastructure is - download this E-Guide now. </font></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">Click here to learn more: </font><a href="http://pp.techtargetmail.com/c.asp?724694&amp;236c8ee748f7dd97&amp;1"><font face="Courier New" size="2">http://pp.techtargetmail.com/c.asp?724694&amp;236c8ee748f7dd97&amp;1</font></a></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">&quot;If you do not wish to receive future promotions directly from Avaya please forward this e-mail to <u>{link removed}</u> ; please note that there is a separate opt-out procedure below to be removed from the list from which this email originated.&quot;       <br />____________________________________________________________ </font></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">Please do not reply to this email.&#160; To unsubscribe from all future third party offers from all TechTarget properties, simply click here: <u>{link removed}</u></font></a></p>  <p><font face="Courier New" size="2">TechTarget | 117 Kendrick Street, Suite 800 | Needham, MA 02494</font> </p>  <hr /><img src="http://blogs.technet.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=3124873" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 15:22:03 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smtp server">smtp server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smtp">smtp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/x-spam-tcs-scl">x-spam-tcs-scl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/future avaya spam">future avaya spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft smtp server">microsoft smtp server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/avaya">avaya</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/09/16/the-opt-out-from-hell.aspx">The opt-out from hell</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-09-11 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5fc8d88b3db9b7e7ca09f8f03b4c3cd0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5fc8d88b3db9b7e7ca09f8f03b4c3cd0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[OPEN Forum by American Express OPEN Blog Archive How to Save a Billion Dollars
The Daily Incite - September 11, 2008 | Security Incite: Analysis on Information Security But I think many security...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://blogs.openforum.com/2008/09/10/how-to-save-a-billion-dollars/">OPEN Forum by American Express OPEN &raquo; Blog Archive How to Save a Billion Dollars</a></li>
<li><a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-11-2008">The Daily Incite - September 11, 2008 | Security Incite: Analysis on Information Security</a><br/>
But I think many security managers are missing the point of what a security management platform is supposed to do. It&#039;s about control and automation. The reality is no human can wade through the morass of data that comes out of our security devices.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=162936">Security Management: A Chicken &amp; Egg Problem - Discovery and management - Dark Reading</a><br/>
Most enterprises are looking for a product that will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle, and when they find out that the currently available tools can&#039;t do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner.</li>
<li><a href="http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/080908/20080908005257.html?.v=1">Trusted Computer Solutions Acquires CounterStorm to Broaden Portfolio of Security Solutions: Financial News - Yahoo! Finance</a></li>
<li><a href="http://briefingsdirectblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/systems-log-analytics-offers-operators.html">Dana Gardner's BriefingsDirect: Systems log analytics offers operators performance insights that set stage for IT transformation</a></li>
<li><a href="http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001091.html">Financial Cryptography: Yet more evidence: your CISO needs an MBA</a><br/>
Yet more evidence: your CISO needs an MBA</li>
<li><a href="http://www.webadminblog.com/index.php/2008/06/23/the-velocity-2008-conference-experience-part-iii/">The Velocity 2008 Conference Experience - Part III - Web Admin Blog</a><br/>
Logging should be actionable - concise, express symptoms. Anything logged is something fixable. It should be giving you less downtime - shorter time to resolution. Logging takes resources, so make it worth it.

Filter down your logs to be concise and actionable. Production logging has different goals from dev/QA logging. You’re looking for problem diagnosis and recovery, and then statistics and monitoring. Insight into what the app’s doing.</li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/390342450" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security management platform">security management platform</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security management">security management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web admin blog">web admin blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/conference experience">conference experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/american express">american express</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ciso">ciso</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concise">concise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mba">mba</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/390342450/anton18">Links for 2008-09-11 [del.icio.us]</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Premature Update on Philadelphia Wi-Fi]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/95922e41bb691a60a525baab81a41942</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/95922e41bb691a60a525baab81a41942</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I'm not sure why this article was written, as there appears to be nothing particularly newsworthy in it: The News.com reporter Marguerite Reardon has covered muni-Fi for as long as I have, and after...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/muni_icon.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10033386-94.html"><strong>I'm not sure why this article was written, as there appears to be nothing particularly newsworthy in it:</strong></a> The News.com reporter Marguerite Reardon has covered muni-Fi for as long as I have, and after reading this in-depth piece, I'm left wondering whether it was assigned far too early, and she was meeting an editorial desk requirement instead of feeling like the story was ready to "print." The article looks at Network Acquisition Corp. (NAC), the allegedly interim name for the group that's taken over Phila-Fi. </p>

<p>One source at the Knight Center for Digital Excellence notes, "The new network owners are supposed to have a much more sustainable business model." <em>Supposed to.</em> Later, "Network Acquisition Company, which acquired the network, hasn't talked publicly about the details of its new plan, but it has hinted that its strategy will differ from EarthLink's." <em>Hasn't talked publicly.</em> Then, "[NAC and Tropos] spokespeople said the companies would talk more about the network later this month when details of the new business plan are ready." Huh.</p>

<p>Reardon explains digital divide issues and looks into what Wireless Philadelphia has been up to, although doesn't note that delays in EarthLink's deployment and other factors have led to just a few hundred individuals that have been assisted by the non-profit; numbers may have changed, but that was as of a few months ago. Still, Wireless Philadelphia has apparently diversified its funding sources--Reardon cites 30 now.</p>

<p>I think we're still coming off the doldrums of August.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2008 09:23:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network acquisition company">network acquisition company</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network acquisition corp">network acquisition corp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network owners">network owners</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wireless philadelphia">wireless philadelphia</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sustainable business model">sustainable business model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/editorial desk requirement">editorial desk requirement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital excellence notes">digital excellence notes</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008431.html">Premature Update on Philadelphia Wi-Fi</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Adapting to Shelf Life]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ea6547aa3e5e239ba69d1907590564e9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ea6547aa3e5e239ba69d1907590564e9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Dan Pritchett blogged about Architectural Shelf Life - &quot;The duration that a collection of patterns and technology are applicable when starting a new system design.&quot; He argues that this changes about...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dan Pritchett blogged about <a href="http://www.addsimplicity.com/adding_simplicity_an_engi/2008/08/architectural-s.html">Architectural Shelf Life</a> - &quot;The duration that a collection of patterns and technology are applicable when starting a new system design.&quot; He argues that this changes about every 5 years which is pretty fast when you think about it. Our story on the security is measured in decades not years. Kerberos, certificates, RSA, and other workhorse technologies are relatively unchanged since the 70s and 80s. So we security folk are multiple iterations behind developers.</p><div><br />

<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png"><img alt="Innovatecompare_2" border="0" height="167" src="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/images/2008/05/19/innovatecompare_2.png" title="Innovatecompare_2" width="300" /></a><p></p>
</div><div>Out of this comes the need for two things - one we need to innovate at a much higher rate, but equally important, we need better deployment models. The primitives we have that actually work need to be engineered better to form fit to the rapidly changing software side. Its not good enough to say &quot;<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/10/sacred-cow-gore.html">we have it all figured out</a>&quot;, we have to apply the stuff that works to real software architectures. Why is the a dab of firewalls and SSL still our answer after all these years?</div><br /><div>Two case studies of where security technologies were adapted to technical realities to provide effective security mechanisms in the real world are SAML, which learned a lot from Kerberos and then applied it to the Web and XML; WS-Trust/STS, which owes a lot to SDSI/SPKI and applied it to Web services/XML plumbing.</div><br /><div>Software security is starting to grow as an industry. But a lot of the answers I hear and see in the field are predicated on &quot;we want to reengineer the entire SDLC&quot;, etc. sometimes what is really needed is evolution not revolution, and an easy to use adapter that ships in a few weeks...I remember <a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2005/12/the_road_to_ass.html">Brian Snow&#39;s</a> talk at black hat several years ago when he talked about how the NSA putting certificate checks in all calls to the Solaris kernel. Its not all about new primitives, its also about finding the art of the possible of what we can do with what we already have. Chief among these is adapting to technical realities.</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:22:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security technologies">security technologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/real software architectures">real software architectures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software">software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security folk">security folk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical realities">technical realities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web servicesxml">web servicesxml</category>
      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/adapting-to-shelf-life.html">Adapting to Shelf Life</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Real Artists Ship]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/da6631c856e43a023c66515e59fbce16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a number of reasons I follow emerging economies, the biggies being China and India. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) generally get lumped in together as the &quot;next big thing&quot;, but they are at very, very different stages of development and more importantly are taking different paths. You can easily think of software security as an emerging discipline - despite a lot of talk and papers about Saltzer and Schroeder, we really don&#39;t have this stuff figured out.&#160;</p><br /><div>So China is following a well worn path similar to South Korea, Japan, and the early US. India is taking a totally different and unproven path towards growth. Tata Motors has been innovative in building the cheapest car - the Tata Nano which is a $2500 car, and<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/01/to-those-about.html"> engineering triumph</a>, driven by a mantra that an engineer would stand behind &quot;do we really need that?&quot;</div><br /><div>Now the progress to executing on this is <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/asia/03tata.html?_r=1&amp;ref=world&amp;oref=slogin">held back</a> by India&#39;s dysfunctional environment:</div><br /><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In a tale rich with incongruities, the Communist-run government of West Bengal State invited the&#160;<a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/tata_group/index.html?inline=nyt-org" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-right: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px; text-decoration: none; color: #006683; " title="More articles about the Tata Group.">Tata Group</a>, a symbol of Indian capitalism, to set up its plant in an area called Singur. It acquired 1,000 acres from farmers on the company’s behalf.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">As the project advanced, some farmers who had sold their land demanded it back. The main state-level opposition party, the Trinamool Congress, led protests demanding that the land be returned. Most people sympathetic to Tata accused the opposition of inducing the farmers to protest, while Tata’s critics said the farmers had legitimate grievances.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The issue simmered for months. But in recent days, protesters began surrounding the plant, blocking roads and preventing Tata workers from reaching the plant. “The existing environment of obstruction, intimidation and confrontation has begun to impact the ability of the company to convince several of its experienced managers to relocate and work in the plant,” Tata said in a statement on Tuesday.</span><br /><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; "><br /></span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">The halt to the plant has caused many Indian business people to warn of a chilling effect on investment in the country. It is also unclear how Tata will be able to keep the Nano’s cost so low, since part of the affordable price reflects the company’s savings on the land in Singur.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /><div><span style="font-style: normal; "><a href="http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1585">Arvind Subramanian</a>&#160;compares China and India&#39;s trajectories:</span><br /></div><div><span style="font-style: normal;"><br /></span></div></span></p><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">There is a fundamental asymmetry between state and markets. It is easier to create markets than it is to create state capacity or to prevent its deterioration. Creating markets is a lot about letting go, establishing a reasonable policy framework, and allowing the natural hustling instinct to take over. In other words, hustling is the natural state. Building state capacity, on the other hand, is quite different. It involves overcoming collective action problems, mediating conflict, creating accountability mechanisms where outputs are multiple and fuzzy and links between inputs and outputs murky, and contending with the deep imprints of history. In Weber’s memorable words, building public institutions is like the “slow boring of hard boards”.</span></p></blockquote><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal; ">In that light, China’s task of improving its private sector seems easier to accomplish than India’s task of arresting institutional decline. So, while China and India can probably both count on more years of high growth, the odds still favour China pulling off that feat than India. That, and not just the meagre medal tally, should be what India mulls over after the Beijing Olympics.</span></p></blockquote><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-style: italic; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">The Economist </span><a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2008/09/the_passion_of_the_tata.cfm">summarizes</a><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">:</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><blockquote class="webkit-indent-blockquote" style="margin: 0 0 0 40px; border: none; padding: 0px;"><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal; ">It&#39;s easier to liberalise a functional state than it is to functionalise a dysfunctional one, of any ideological stripe.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></p><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;">What does all this have to do with ostensibly the topic at hand - Information Security? Well Tata Motors had the innovation but they didn&#39;t have the deployment model, at least not yet. More to the point, a lot of software security gets driven by infosec groups but real change is only coming when its driven by the development group. Why? Development groups are functional, they ship code.&#160;A lot of the success in software security is predicated by who you choose to partner with, it is more effective and easier to add security into a functional development group that ships code.</span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: Verdana; line-height: normal;"><br /></span></div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2008 07:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
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      <source url="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/real-artists-ship.html">Real Artists Ship</source>
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