The event runs during 14-16 October 2008. I’m delivering the same four presentations I gave at TechEd US (and have used at most other TechEds around the world, too):

• Do these ten things now or else get 0wn3d!
• Virtualization and security: what does it mean for me?
• Privacy: the why, the what, and the how
• 21st century networking: throw away your medieval gateways

That’s gonna be a crazy week, because I’ll have been in Hong Kong for TechEd there the week prior. I get home from Hong Kong on Saturday, spend the night in Seattle, then on Sunday fly down to Sao Paulo! Oh well, I still love my job :)

If you’re headed to TechEd Brazil, be sure to introduce yourself to me after one of my talks. See you soon!

Based in Europe, the Rock Phish group is a criminal collective that has been targeting banks and other financial institutions since 2004. According to RSA, they are responsible for half of the worldwide phishing attacks and have siphoned tens of millions of dollars from individuals' bank accounts. The group got its name from a now discontinued quirk in which the phishers used directory paths that contained the word "rock."

The first sign the group was expanding operations came in April, when it introduced a trojan known alternately as Zeus or WSNPOEM, which steals sensitive financial information in transit from a victim's machine to a bank. Shortly afterward, the gang added more crimeware, including a custom-made botnet client that was spread, among other means, using the Neosploit infection kit.

[...]

Soon, additional signs appeared pointing to a partnership between Rock Phishers and Asprox. Most notably, the command and control server for the custom Rock Phish crimeware had exactly the same directory structure of many of the Asprox servers, leading RSA researchers to believe Rock Phish and Asprox attacks were using at least one common server. (Researchers from Damballa were able to confirm this finding after observing malware samples from each of the respective botnets establish HTTP proxy server connections to a common set of destination IPs.)

The Cisco 7600 OSR consists of a 256 Gbps switching fabric and a 30 million packets per second (mpps) forwarding engine. Its breadth of IP services comes from Cisco IOS, which provides features such as security, enhanced QoS, and destination sensitive services. In addition, the Cisco 7600 OSR allows the migration of existing port adapters from Cisco 7500 series routers, via the Cisco FlexWAN module, giving service providers one the industry’s widest array of interface options in any single platform. This provides service providers great flexibility in deploying the Cisco 7600 OSR for a variety of applications, protects their investment in existing systems, and gives them a practical migration path to the New World Optical Internet.

A Revolutionary Platform For Evolving Networks

The Cisco 7600 OSR helps service providers break through service and bandwidth barriers today, while designing networks to scale for future growth. The Cisco 7600 OSR achieves this through “adaptive network processing,” or the ability to evolve the platform for new IP services without hardware upgrades. Unlike fixed, ASIC-based platforms, which are hardware encoded, the Cisco 7600 OSR relies on the highly flexible Parallel eXpress Forwarding (PXF) technology for scalable performance of services. PXF is a patented, Cisco-developed network processor capable of line-rate IP services delivery that can support new IP services through periodic software upgrades. Each OSM has two PXF processors capable of 12 mpps of IP services delivery per interface card.

“IP+Optical combines the dynamism of the Internet world with the foundation of the transport world, creating an infrastructure that can deliver the services that service providers need,” said Lele Nardin, vice president of the Internet Systems Business Unit at Cisco. “Cisco will continue to add innovative solutions on top of this solid foundation to make service providers better equipped to meet the constantly escalating and changing customer demands for new networking services.”

Pricing and Availability

The base Cisco 7600 OSR system is list priced at $73,000 and the entry level system, with interfaces, start at $100,000. The interfaces modules are priced between $27,000 to $180,000. The Cisco 7600 OSR is available now worldwide.

Companies think they own their reputation, but in reality they don’t. A reputation is the aggregate of the popular opinion about you. Opinions, or thoughts, belong to an individual, true or not, and a company doesn’t own a person’s thoughts, therefore a company doesn’t own its reputation. QED.

Yes.  Absolutely.  In fact, there are already changes in the works to the FAIR model that reflect this line of thinking that will allow us to approach reputation damage in a much more rational manner that anything else I’ve seen to date.

Second, RE:  Hansei & Kaizen, Richard left the following comment.

I don’t agree with your view on Gemba even if we live in a virtual world. Look into any company’s wiring closet and you’ll immediately see a reflection in its maturity from the state of the equipment, the labeling / documentation and overall neatness. “Man with messy wiring closet, will have messy virtual servers.”

However, the true benefit in Gemba is not in the actual visual inspection. It is in in the journey from your desk to the data center / wiring closet.

I agree that the benefit is in the journey.  I can’t see the wiring closet as the main destination (I just don’t see it as a useful prior).  Maybe I wasn’t clear, or was taking for granted that you guys have been reading the blog for the past 2 years, but the journey needs to be to the LOB that owns the application.  The example most given when describing Gemba is going to the production line to look at the issue that causes a problem in the ability to create and sell a car.  The “security” journey is not to the wiring closet, but to the system itself and the logs that we have for the system and whatever network-based controls might be applicable.  And we, as an industry, are just starting to understand that this “security” is only part of the picture.  The whole picture is represented by the factors that create risk.

And for our “risk journey” that security journey is only a one of serveral useful pieces of prior information for use in analysis.  For risk we have to also journey back to the “production line”, or, in our case, to the application/LOB owner.  It may also be to corporate counsel, to marketing, to all sorts of other places in the enterprise because probable losses (a necessary measurement we need in order to understand risk) may come from many different sources in the organization.  For those with FAIR knowledge, think of the six forms of loss to get an idea of what sorts of journeys we need to make.

This is why tomorrow’s post is designed to look at what should we be reflecting about, and what is needed for reflection.

Hint:  our models for risk & risk management can give us an idea of how to create structure around Hansei for the IRM program.

adaptive process management (n.) an element of resource and business process management, adaptive search and event processing. Sometimes referred to as “Level 4” event processing or process refinement.

application concept (n.) a definition of a set of properties that represent the data fields of an application entity. An application concept can describe relationships among themselves. For example, an order concept might have a parent/child relationship with an item concept. A department concept might be related to a purchase requisition concept based on the shared property, department_id. Application concepts can include an application state model.

application state modeler (n.) a UML-compliant application that allows you to model the life cycle of a concept instance — that is, for each instance of a given concept, you can define which states it will pass through and how it will transition from state to state. States have entry actions, exit actions, and conditions, providing precision control over the behavior of an event processing agent. Transitions between states also may have rules. Multiple types of states and transitions maximize the versatility and power of the application state modeler.

derived event (n.) an event that is created as a result of processing one or more other events.

complex event (n.) an event that is a situation-entity abstraction of two or more simple, derived or other complex events.

complex event processing (n.) CEP is a technology for extracting information from message-based systems. CEP is primarily an event processing concept that deals with the task of processing multiple events from an event cloud with the goal of identifying the meaningful events within the event cloud. CEP employs techniques such as detection of complex patterns of many events, event correlation and abstraction, event hierarchies, and relationships between events such as causality, membership, and timing, and event-driven processes.

event (n.) a instance of an event definition. It is an immutable object that represents a business activity that happened at a single point in time. Just as one cannot change the fact that a given activity occurred, one cannot change an event — events are immutable.

event aggregation (n.) the aggregation of simple, derived or complex events into higher levels of event abstractions.

event definition (n.) a set of properties related to a given activity that represents an important or interesting change of state in a human, system or computational activity. An event definition includes event properties such as event priority, event time to live (TTL), and a description of the payload, which is comprehensive information related to the activity that occurred. Events expire when the TTL has elapsed, unless the event processing agent has instructions to consume them prior to that time.

event channel (n.) a communications channel in which events are transmitted from event source to event receivers, typically received as electronic messages. Each channel can have multiple destination and. events can be configured to transmit to a default destination. JMS is an example of an event channel.

event cloud (n.) a partially ordered set of events (poset), either bounded or unbounded, where the partial orderings are imposed by the causal, timing and other relationships between the events. Typically an event cloud is created by the events produced by one or more distributed systems. An event cloud may contain many event types, event streams and event channels. The difference between a cloud and a stream is that there is no event relationship that totally orders the events in a cloud.

event-driven (n.) the behavior of a human, system or computational entity whose execution or actuation is in response to events, typically received as electronic messages.

event-driven architecture (n.) an architectural style for distributed computing applications in which some of the components are event-driven and communicate by means of events.

event processing (n.) computing that performs operations on events, including modifying, creating and destroying events.

event-object (n.) an software object that represents an event, generally for the purpose of computer processing, that exhibits both encapsulation, inheritance and polymorphism.

event prediction (n.) computational activity where the impact of events, complex events, and situations caused by events identified, including both opportunity or threat. Sometimes referred to as “Level 2” event processing, impact assessment or predictive analytics.

event pre-processing (n.) computational activity where events are cleansed or normalized to produce semantically understandable data. Sometimes referred to as “Level 0” event processing.

event processing (n.) computational activities on events dealing with the association, correlation, and combination of event data and information from single and multiple event sources to achieve refined identity and situation estimates for observed event objects, and to achieve complete and timely assessments of opportunities, threats, and their significance. Event processing is characterized by continuous refinements of event estimates and assessments and by evaluation of the need for additional sources, or modification of the process itself, to achieve improved results.

event processing agent (n.) an EPA is a computational entity that performs event processing.

event processing network (n.) a set of event processing agents and a set of event channels connecting them.

event properties (n.) data representation of an event, typically by name-value pairs of type string, integer, real, boolean or a complex data type.

event refinement (n.) filter, identify and track events & make initial processing decisions based on association, correlation and state estimation. Sometimes referred to as “Level 1” event, or event-object, track and trace.

event stream (n.) a time-ordered sequence of events. An event stream may be bounded by a certain time interval or other contextual dimension (content, space, source, certainty), or be open ended and unbounded.

event stream processing (n.) a time-ordered sequence of events. An event stream may be bounded by a certain time interval or other contextual dimension (content, space, source, certainty), or be open ended and unbounded.

rule (n.) defines what triggers unusual, suspicious, problematic, or advantageous activity within an event processing agent and what the EPA does when it discovers these types of activities. Rules execute actions based on certain conditions on events, instances, or a combination of both. A rule includes a group of condition-rule statements and action-rule statements. The condition statements instruct the EPA what to look for in events, and action statements instruct the EPA how to respond when conditions are met. If all the conditions in a rule are satisfied by events or instances or both, the EPA fires the actions. The action might be to execute tasks, create an event instance, modify property values in an event instance, create and send an event, or something else.

rules engine (n.) a type of event processing agent that uses a declarative programming model to process events. Formally described as “an abstract structure that describes a formal language precisely, i.e., a set of rules that mathematically delineates a (usually infinite) set of finite-length strings over a (usually finite) alphabet“. Informally, it can be any system that uses rules, in any form, that can be applied to data to produce outcomes.

rule language (n.) is an artificial language that is used to control the behavior of an event processing agent. Rules languages, like human languages, have syntactic and semantic rules to define meaning.

situation refinement (n.) identify situations, or complex events, based on event clustering, event-event relationships and relationship analysis and context. Sometimes referred to as “Level 2” event processing.

simple event (n.) an event that is not an abstraction or composition of other events.

virtual event (n.) an event that is imagined, modeled or simulated.

It just so happens that I have been experimenting with Amazon Elastic Computing Services (EC2), documented in Computing in the Clouds with AWS over at The CEP Blog.  The server over at The UNIX and Linux Forums has been experiencing some very hardware-limited, high load averages recently. We thought we should take a look at moving the forum server up to the clouds.   

Then, a fellow system admin over at the forums suggested that maybe some rogue bots were causing high server loads; so I wrote a one-line command to do a bit of real-time spider hunting in the Apache2 logfiles.  Surprise!  I found there were a number of rogue, hungry spiders that would not follow our robots.txt directive not to crawl the site.   One of the bots was from Russia, one was from China, and another one was from Korea.  There were spiders from places I never heard of, all consuming precious  resources and denying our users!

So, I did what any Linux admin would do. I used iptables to block the networks of these rogue, hungry, spiders (sorry I was not very kind to these cyber creatures).  It probally comes to no surprise at this point in the story that four of the spiders were from the Amazon EC2 cloud.  Here is a sample of the output from iptables -L:

root@www:~# iptables -L
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)
target prot opt source destination
DROP all — ec2-67-202-45-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-243-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-197-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24
DROP all — ec2-75-101-213-0.compute-1.amazonaws.com/24

Well, imagine a not-so-distant future dystopian world where criminals or terrorists want to launch a massive denial-of-service attack against some critical infrastructure, like the root DNS servers, or an attack against major financial institutions, military or e-commerce sites.   

First, the bad guys create an instance of powerful operating system with a malicious network application, they test it, and they place it the cloud (without invoking the instance, paying a very small storage fee, no computing time fee) and they wait.   Then, at the precise moment of their planned attack, they launch 128 instances each with the equivalence of whatever is the mega-platform at the time, and just blast away at their attack target(s).    Even more damaging, they do this from many cloud computing infrastructures.  (Note: The cost of the attack is minimal because the criminals are only charged a few pennies an hour for each running instance and the attack runs an hour or two.)

My experience with cloud computing, which is still maturing, is that cloud computing has great promise for both good and evil.  The very real example of the “spiders from the clouds” is a harmless enough story of folks using a cloud computing infrastructure for web crawling, perhaps hoping to be the next Google billionaires. 

One the other hand, cloud computing brings with it an emerging and growing danger for the misuse of the power of cloud computing infrastructures.   The misuse could be malicious, or accidental, but never-the-less, the danger is real.

What an interesting world we have created!  Would would have ever dreamed 10 years ago that we could be attacked by ……

#include <horror_movie_sounds.mp3>

…. Spiders from the Clouds.

Reprinted by permission from The Attack of the Spiders from the Clouds by Tim Bass, CISSP