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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: details]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/details</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 06:57:35 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/c7TMX064n4w/s1600-h/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/CaeHtWn_06M/s200-R/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known <a href="http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/ConsumerProtection/scamnet/Scams/Cash-Transfers_Inc.html">money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers</a> is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, <a href="http://www.banksafeonline.org.uk/moneymule_explained.html">the money mule recruitment site</a> is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (<b>cashtransfers.tk</b>; <b>cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu</b>; <b>sid57.tk</b>; <b>catdbw.mobi</b>; <b>cdrpoex.com </b>etc.&nbsp; ) anyway?<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">"<i>Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:</i></div><i><br />
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.<br />
<br />
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.<br />
<br />
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/qtHLcMs6sVs/s1600-h/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/y-aSv2_Sztk/s200-R/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :<br />
<br />
<b>ns10.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns11.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns1.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns12.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns2.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns13.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns3.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns14.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns4.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns15.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns5.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns16.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns6.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns17.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns7.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns8.cashtransfers.tk</b><br />
<br />
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/storm-worms-fast-flux-networks.html">Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks</a><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-flux-spam-and-scams-increasing.html">Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-fluxing-yet-another-pharmacy-scam.html">Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/storm-worm-hosting-pharmaceutical-scams.html">Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=aMnYfJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=aMnYfJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wo8AkJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wo8AkJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=22rmej"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=22rmej" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ec2OKj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ec2OKj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LfbMJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LfbMJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LYf9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LYf9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LO3zj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LO3zj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/338919917" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 02:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux networks">fast flux networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux">fast-flux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cashtransfers">cashtransfers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux provider">fast flux provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux spam">fast flux spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/transfer money">transfer money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux infrastructure">fast-flux infrastructure</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/338919917/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Study finds huge rise in malware this year]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a576a93bc914b6fdba327f9cce385bfd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a576a93bc914b6fdba327f9cce385bfd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Malware has risen by a staggering 278% in the first half of 2008, thanks in part to the large number of Web sites comprised last month, so says a new study by ScanSafe. And it warns that things are...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Malware has risen by a staggering 278% in the first half of 2008, thanks in part to the large number of Web sites comprised last month, so says a new study by ScanSafe. And it warns that things are only going to get worse, especially after Dan Kaminsky goes public with details about his 20 year-old DNS vulnerability.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/year-old dns vulnerability">year-old dns vulnerability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web sites">web sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dan kaminsky">dan kaminsky</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/study">study</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/half">half</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/month">month</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scansafe">scansafe</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/071808-study-finds-huge-rise-in.html?fsrc=rss-security">Study finds huge rise in malware this year</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Backup Tape With Private Details Stolen From Greensboro Gynecology Associates]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7ae3b6b68e5e21daa4a091e5ff7a6fbd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7ae3b6b68e5e21daa4a091e5ff7a6fbd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Patients at a Greensboro doctors office have been notified that their personal information - including Social Security numbers and addresses - was stolen in May. In a letter mailed to patients,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Patients at a Greensboro doctors’ office have been notified that their personal information - including Social Security numbers and addresses - was stolen in May. In a letter mailed to patients, Greensboro Gynecology Associates said a backup tape of their computer database was stolen. The letter was dated June 16, but some letters weren&#8217;t postmarked [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 19:35:59 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro gynecology">greensboro gynecology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/backup tape">backup tape</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/greensboro doctors office">greensboro doctors office</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer database">computer database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letter">letter</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/social security">social security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/patients">patients</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/letters">letters</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/backup-tape-with-private-details-stolen-from-greensboro-gynecology-associates/">Backup Tape With Private Details Stolen From Greensboro Gynecology Associates</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Formula language button manages Deny Access list searches]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/27be8898a60c9589e509a961b01ab6ad</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/27be8898a60c9589e509a961b01ab6ad</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Get details on how to create a button using Formula language code to search Deny Access lists from the toolbar of a Lotus Notes administrator...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Get details on how to create a button using Formula language code to search Deny Access lists from the toolbar of a Lotus Notes administrator client.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~4/338096880" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 06:00:52 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/deny access lists">deny access lists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/formula language code">formula language code</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/button">button</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/toolbar">toolbar</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/WhatisEnterpriseItTipsAndExpertAdvice/~3/338096880/0,289483,sid4_gci1320819,00.html">Formula language button manages Deny Access list searches</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Perfect Storm]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32f71212618ca9738aa75adab4f5a3b5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32f71212618ca9738aa75adab4f5a3b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Its time to get your raincoats and lifeboats - the perfect storm is finished brewing - it is about to rain down upon us

This may sound dramatic but I think that I may not be conveying the amount of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Its time to get your raincoats and lifeboats - the perfect storm is finished brewing - it is about to rain down upon us.<br /><br />This may sound dramatic but I think that I may not be conveying the amount of pain that Information Security is about to receive. We will certainly have to step up our game.<br /><br /><span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0">Symantec</span> and Verizon have done some interesting research into the underground hacker community and their findings are rather interesting. A bit scary too.<br /><br />There is an entire community of totally different players that all work together to get from the point where a nerdy kid finds a vulnerability to where a hacker uses that to get into a PC, steal personal information and credit card details, sell them or use them and move on.<br /><br />So far, it seems, that the community has been quite lazy and have just <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1">discarded</span> company information to get to the credit card information and personal information (ID numbers, social security numbers, addresses etc).<br /><br />This has provided us in Information Security with a perfect <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2">opportunity</span>. We have been able to observe how hackers work while they have been taking information that is not our own. Companies that have credit card information have been the ones that were most under attack but those that don't handle credit card information have largely been ignored by hackers except for some members of staff who have been caught out but then they have only lost their own personal information.<br /><br />There just really isn't a (black/underground) market for information that is not credit card or personal finance related.<br /><br />However, it was always my feeling that the credit card/personal finance market would become saturated at some stage and the <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">loosely</span>-bound-but-still-very-organised-and-co-ordinated <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">underground</span> market would start to look elsewhere.<br /><br />Essentially, the infrastructure is there for wide-scale information theft but the will wasn't there. I have thought this for a while my question was always - when will the will be there? When will Jack-the-hacker decide that credit card theft is no longer worth his time and start to deal in company information ?<br /><br /><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/07/16/the-data-supply/">Adrian Lane from <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Securosis</span> </a>thinks that the falling prices in the underground economy is <span class="blsp-spelling-corrected" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">humorous</span>. I disagree. I look at it as very scary and the final puzzle-piece.<br /><br />I think that the perfect storm is about to be unleashed.<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~4/337832309" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 03:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company information">company information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card theft">credit card theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wide-scale information theft">wide-scale information theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card information">credit card information</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~3/337832309/perfect-storm.html">The Perfect Storm</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[More CEP Misinformation: Overhyped is not Mere Hype]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d5cd03af615c343d658ac200f78627bd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d5cd03af615c343d658ac200f78627bd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Paul Vincents blog post CEP: hype, or the next best thing since sliced bread? mispresents the dialog going on the the CEP community
First of all, we have notread anyone saying that CEP is mere hype as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paul Vincent&#8217;s blog post <a href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/07/15/cep-hype-or-the-next-best-thing-since-sliced-bread/" target="_blank">CEP: hype, or the next best thing since sliced bread?</a> mispresents the dialog going on the the CEP community.</p>
<p>First of all, we have not read anyone saying that CEP is &#8220;mere hype&#8221; as Paul Vincent has distorted the discussion.  What people have have said is that CEP is overhyped. There is a huge difference in &#8220;Mere Hype&#8221; (Paul Vincent&#8217;s misinformation) and &#8220;Overhyped&#8221;.  </p>
<p>In addition, Paul goes a step further and calls the entire discussion, one he did not participate in, &#8221;over-discussed (but ultimately uninteresting)&#8221; as a sideline observer who has offered nothing to the dialog.  TIBCO&#8217;s customers have not released a CEP announcement in a very long time and they are not contributing to the critical technical discussions.</p>
<p>Instead of sniping at community discussions on the blogosphere,  as a lead-in for a blog post, why not offer the details of a TIBCO customer use case?  Also, instead of misquoting the community discussions, why not be accurate, not misleading and condescending?     How about getting into the details of TIBCO Event Processing Language?  Maybe discussing the plans, if any, for the integration of Insightful and Spotfire with BusinessEvents?  </p>
<p>I greatly admire TIBCO and their technology, but Paul&#8217;s post <a href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/07/15/cep-hype-or-the-next-best-thing-since-sliced-bread/" target="_blank">CEP: hype, or the next best thing since sliced bread?</a> is both misleading and inaccurate. We expect more out of the TIBCO bloggers, for example, a strong public customer reference detailing a CEP use case.   Something we have not seen on the TIBCO blog.</p>
<p>PS:  A quick Google search reveals that the only person on the net calling <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=th&amp;q=CEP+%22mere+hype%22&amp;meta=" target="_blank">CEP &#8220;Mere Hype&#8221;</a> is Paul Vincent.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2008 03:47:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mere hype">mere hype</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep">cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep mere hype">cep mere hype</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hype">hype</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pauls post cep">pauls post cep</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep community">cep community</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep announcement">cep announcement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paul vincent">paul vincent</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/entire discussion">entire discussion</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/16/more-cep-misinformation-overhyped-is-not-mere-hype/">More CEP Misinformation: Overhyped is not Mere Hype</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ac3c26a14f128a8ecb49f7c474cbb36e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday we featured our initial Q&amp;A with Doug McClure , who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday we featured <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-is-bsm-lite-the-answer/07/2008" target="_blank">our initial Q&amp;A</a> with <a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/" target="_blank">Doug McClure</a>, who took some time to answer some strategic questions on BSM Lite. Today, Doug shares his thoughts on BSM and CMDB strategies for companies and how his stint in the U.S. Navy helped shape his future passion for BSM.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> Can you share any of the strategies/advice that you give to companies embarking on their BSM journeys?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> Well, first they&#8217;ve got to have a BSM strategy. Nearly all the clients I talk to or hear about wanting to do BSM do not have a BSM strategy. I talk a lot about this on my blog and with clients and it is relevant whether you&#8217;re going to think about &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; or &#8220;BSM Heavy&#8221; approaches.</p>
<p>Once we have a BSM strategy, we need to establish a BSM roadmap that guides us in how we’ll implement the BSM strategy in a more tactical manner, focusing on short term iterative quick wins and 30-60-90 day projects. For more of my thoughts on BSM strategy and roadmapping, see the following blog posts.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/03/elements-of-business-service-management-part-3-getting-business-service-management-on-the-radar-screen/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 3: Getting Business Service Management on the Radar Screen</a></h3>
</li>
<li>
<h3><a href="http://dougmcclure.net/blog/2007/09/elements-of-business-service-management-part-4-what%e2%80%99s-your-business-service-management-strategy/" target="_blank">Elements of Business Service Management Part 4: What’s your Business Service Management Strategy?</a></h3>
</li>
</ul>
<p>As I&#8217;ve alluded to previously, a client first must define and understand what &#8220;BSM Lite&#8221; may mean to them. Don&#8217;t take what the analysts or the vendors pitch for what you should do to achieve BSM or what value you should get from it.</p>
<p>For any type of BSM to be successful, each client must define what BSM means to them and state what they expect to get from BSM. They must make it personal, make it a part of their company culture and elevate it to be as an important initiative as compliance, risk management, SOA, ITIL, or other initiatives may be within the company.</p>
<p>Please don&#8217;t get scared off from this strategy thing. Please don&#8217;t blow this off as something that the secret enterprise architecture council should be doing. If you&#8217;re unable to get an audience in these areas within your company, start within your own sphere of influence.</p>
<p>Your strategy could be as simple as enabling the local operations center to more efficiently classify, triage and resolve problems based on a simple business service or application contextual understanding. Focus on how this changes the game within your environment. Come up with your own metrics and measures to assess the value this has to this organizational use. Trust me, you&#8217;ll need to justify your investment some time in the future.</p>
<p>Another trait of successful BSM implementations is that of the formal monitoring and management tools group has established some sort of database or knowledge repository that enables them to &#8220;manage the business of IT management and monitoring&#8221; if you will. In my opinion, the vendor community has let their clients down significantly in this area. The CMDB may be the correct answer, but most companies just don’t value monitoring enough to demand that this be included in their formal CMDB initiatives.</p>
<p>In my last job, we developed an application that I referred to as the &#8220;Service Management Database&#8221; or &#8220;SMDB&#8221;. Others may call it something else, but in essence, it was the database that captured what was monitored, how it was monitored, who owned it, what business services and applications it supported, the impact an outage or event from it had on the business services or applications, etc.</p>
<p>One key component of this “SMDB” was establishing the relationships of real and synthetic user and transaction monitoring steps to associated servers and applications. This is a significant gap area in many tools and vendor CMDBs.</p>
<p>Clients who have instituted something formal such as this generally have a very good handle on management and monitoring within their environment. Far too many clients do not have adequate monitoring (read visibility) in place to begin their BSM journey.</p>
<p>I&#8217;d strongly recommend a good hard look at how well the client&#8217;s monitoring and management practices are implemented and managed. Simply put, if they don&#8217;t have adequate visibility into how well those business services and applications are performing, you can&#8217;t expect to manage what you can&#8217;t “see” that may be impacting the business, clients, revenue, etc.</p>
<p>Just ask yourself this – can you explicitly state what monitoring is in place for a given business service or application? Can you quantify the impact of a simple event to a business service or application? Can you explain why something is red, yellow, purple or green and what causes it to change from one color to another? If you can’t, your BSM journey will be challenging.</p>
<p>Those with formal CMDB initiatives have their hands full with high risk, long time to value projects to just get a handle with traditional configuration management models. Taking these low level configuration items (CI&#8217;s) and establishing application and service dependencies comes after a lot of work getting through the organizational challenges of getting systems access to populate the CMDB.</p>
<p>I strongly recommend that the formal monitoring and management tools group create an authoritative database that enables them to establish end-to-end visibility into the service and application delivery chain and the impacts it has on the business, customer, etc. This ultimately becomes part of a more realistic federated CMDB within the business.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Can you provide an example of a successful implementation of BSM? Were there specific factors that especially contributed to its success?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I&#8217;ve touched on the highlights of the most successful BSM implementations throughout my previous answers. Clients that have rallied around an organizational change or transformation focusing every team member’s efforts and energy towards ensuring that the business goals and objectives are being met through the delivery of highly available business services and applications.</p>
<p>Far too often the “change” never happens and it’s the “talking heads” that are preaching to the choir about what should be done. Every person on the front line, in the support teams, at the help desk, etc. must understand how they support or impact the business in business terms. Try putting this simple phrase after job titles “Hi, my name is Doug. I’m a Systems Administrator, Supporting the Business”.</p>
<p>That was a mouthful, but simply put, these clients have an impressively instrumented business and IT environment with the right amount of visibility into each area, joined together with an organization that thinks, operates and responds based on their understanding of the business goals and objectives and how these business services and applications enable business success.</p>
<p>The operational model for an organization fully adopting BSM identifies ways to establish a service management mentality across the entire business service and application delivery and support chain. The delivery, operations and support organizations must be incented to manage the services and applications being delivered with this end-to-end context.</p>
<p>A leading, outside the box “service management organization” may include the traditional IT silos but within a matrixed fashion focused on one or more key business services and applications. The &#8220;service management organization&#8221; is then incented to work together, as a team, for the end-to-end delivery and support of these services or applications.</p>
<p>It’s no longer one’s job to just be the systems administrator, database administrator or network engineer, their job is now to support specific business services and applications. They provide the subject matter expertise needed to support the services and applications together, as a team, eliminating the finger pointing or “not my problem” attitudes that exist in the majority of IT organizations today.</p>
<p>Overall, the KISS approach is what will enable BSM of any type (lite, heavy) to be the most successful. If it just feels natural, doesn&#8217;t take any additional effort, clicks or tasks to do then it&#8217;s going to work. BSM should be transparent and not just another buzz word. It&#8217;s not a form that gets filled out or a special process to follow in the run book. It&#8217;s doing the right thing for the business, no matter what the situation, crisis, buzz word or technology initiative of the day is.</p>
<p><strong><em>ScienceLogic:</em></strong> How did you get involved in BSM?</p>
<p><strong><em>Doug McClure:</em></strong> I think the foundations of my service management background and passion were initially established during my service in the US Navy. Today, I relate that experience to what I call BSM for the Military or Mission Services Management (MSM).</p>
<p>We had been taught over and over that extreme attention to the details of the mission at hand (aka &#8220;the business&#8221;) was the number one priority and that all of our technology, services, and applications existed for those Sailors and Marines on the other end (the &#8220;customer&#8221;). I can recall countless instances where mission critical communications services (telephony, orderwires, teletypes, command and control systems, etc.) were impacted in one way or another. It was extremely critical that we understood who was impacted and to what degree so that contingency plans could be activated. We weren’t just talking about lost revenue, poor sales or customer experience; we were talking about human lives and the security of the United States.</p>
<p>It is that military bearing, attention to detail and real world experience that drives me with many of my modern day BSM endeavors. That migration from &#8220;Mission Services Management&#8221; to BSM was honed working for over 10 years working in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and datacenter, hosting and colocation business.</p>
<p>In those rapid growth businesses during the Internet boom, service differentiation was what &#8220;made you millions&#8221; or paved your way to bankruptcy. The companies I worked for had an extreme passion and focus on ensuring that their services, applications and Internet access products were of the highest quality, highly reliable and just plain better than the competition.</p>
<p>Again, the IT infrastructure, service quality and customer experience relationship was ingrained in all of our heads. It was all hands on deck when Webmail, Internet access, DNS, or the network experienced problems. We were measured in terms of how many customers experienced a busy signal or dropped connection or if you couldn’t log in fast enough to read your email. Companies like Keynote Systems and LionBridge/Veritest/Inverse tested the quality of our networks, services and applications and publicly ranked us against our competition. We thought in terms of customer experience and impact every minute of the day, 24&#215;7.</p>
<p>It was in my last job managing a traditional enterprise management and monitoring development group for a nationwide ISP where I was able to work with emerging technology to help get a handle on the complexities of these rapidly growing IT environments filled with emerging technologies and products. Applying this early technology to complex service problems in our environment proved to me that the technology, coupled with the right emphasis on how the technology was implemented and an emphasis on the people and processes within the organization could bring BSM to life.</p>
<p>Where I felt left out in the cold was with my vendor relationship. While their technology gave me the potential, they didn&#8217;t teach me how to work through the organizational and technological problems to successfully implement the BSM strategy. My very first end-to-end BSM pilot was extremely successful and provided visibility into the IT environment and business service impact that have never been available before.</p>
<p>And here I am today, working at a software vendor for the first time. Welcome to the &#8220;dark side&#8221; as they say. The approach and methodology we followed for BSM has become the basis of the core BSM Methodology that I teach IBMers and our clients around the world today.</p>
<p>My personal mission and drive here at IBM Tivoli is to ensure that BSM is something that the typical monitoring tools administrator can actually implement and that our BSM story is something that any of our clients can be successful with. The sales and marketing slicks must be backed up by something like this whomever you are these days. Clients shouldn&#8217;t put up for “marketecture”, me too and gee whiz buzz words.</p>
<p>BSM takes a partnership and commitment to every client&#8217;s success, and I want to be involved in those BSM efforts in every industry or market worldwide. We need more thought leaders collaborating together in an open and public forum to change legacy attitudes about BSM and do what we can to enable client’s to be as successful as they can be.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26amp%3BA+with+Doug+McClure%3A+What+Makes+BSM+Successful%3F&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful%2F07%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management">management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management database">service management database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/management tools">management tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service management mentality">service management mentality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service management">business service management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service">business service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business service impact">business service impact</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mission services management">mission services management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database">database</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-doug-mcclure-what-makes-bsm-successful/07/2008">Q&amp;A with Doug McClure: What Makes BSM Successful?</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a67e13e215d163e122340bffab059502</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through credit card cloning or ATM skimming ) put into the process of obtaining the...]]></description>
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<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/9rHV8A0Ggz4/s1600-h/ccz.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHzyYjwnXTI/AAAAAAAAB6c/WQG5_Cal0xY/s200-R/ccz.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What is shaping the prices of stolen credit card details? The investments the cybercriminals or real life scammers ( through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/credit-card-data-cloning-tactic.html">credit card cloning</a> or <a href="http://www.snopes.com/fraud/atm/atmcamera.asp">ATM skimming</a>) put into the process of obtaining the details, or can we even talk about investments being made where an experienced scammer has just purchased 1GB of raw credit cards data from a novice botnet master who isn't really aware of the actual value of his "botnet output"?<br />
<br />
Depends on which economic theory you believe in, or whether or not you'll take the "bottom-up approach" or the "top-down" one. And since I'm not aware of the existence of "the invisible hand of the underground market" and centralized power to increase the supply or decrease it to boost prices for the stolen credit card details, also indicating the existence of underground cartels putting everyone in a "price taker" position.<br />
<br />
The basics of demand and supply for anything underground will always apply unless of course, The more they want, the cheaper it gets, the less they want, the higher the price on per credit card basis gets, since the investment on behalf of the malicious party that originally stolen them is virtually the same, and he can theoretically break-even in every single case since the credit card details were obtained efficiently. It's up to the seller to follow or entirely ignore economic behavior, and do what they feel like doing with this good which must on the other hand reach its market liquidity as soon as possible, else it becomes obsolete. The current market model can be further explained as a good example of competitive equilibrium :<br />
<br />
"<i>Competitive market equilibrium is the traditional concept of economic equilibrium, appropriate for the analysis of commodity markets with flexible prices and many traders, and serving as the benchmark of efficiency in economic analysis. <b>It relies crucially on the assumption of a competitive environment where each trader decides upon a quantity that is so small compared to the total quantity traded in the market that their individual transactions have no influence on the prices.</b></i>"<br />
<br />
This can be easily explained in a single sentence - it's a mess and every participant is doing whatever they want to, so generalizing on the prices charged for stolen credit card numbers would be unrealistic, since it's the price a single seller with no real impact on the "average" market price for the same good. As for the average market price itself, it would be hard to measure it depending on the quality of the sample you want to rely on, since this is a type of market where sellers don't have to report price changes in their goods for the purpose of statistical research.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.finjan.com/Content.aspx?id=827#SecurityTrendsReport">A recently released report by Finjan</a>, with whom I've been on the same page of several high profile incidents so far, <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080715/wr_nm/cybercrime_finjan_dc">touches this very same topic</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Prices charged by cybercriminals selling hacked bank and credit card details have fallen sharply as the volume of data on offer has soared, forcing them to look elsewhere to boost profit margins, a new report says. Researchers for Finjan, a Web security firm, said the high volumes traded had led to bank and credit card information becoming "commoditized" - account details with PIN codes that once fetched $100 or more each might now go for $10 or $20. In its latest quarterly survey of Web trends, the California-based company said cybercrime had evolved into "a major shadow economy ruled by business rules and logic that closely mimics the legitimate business world.</i>"<br />
<br />
Excluding the presence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/price-discrimination-in-market-for.html">price discrimination</a> for a while, as well as open topic offers in the lines of "how much for X amount of Y?" answered as "how much are you willing to pay?", it's all a matter of the seller in a particular situation.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, in real-life market there's always the scarcity problem, however, in the underground market there's no shortage of resources despite the ever growing wants of the buyers. Generalizing even more, take for instance the butterfly effect of a price change in petrol, and result of which is inevitable increase of prices in every single aspect of your life, but in the underground market mostly due to the malicious economies of scale achieved, a price increase in renting a botnet would have no effect in the prices charged for the stolen credit card details obtained through the infected hosts. How come? Basically, the price and resources for malware infection are prone to decrease, if we take a malware infected host as a static foundation for the basis of any upcoming cybercrime activities using it.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the most disturbing part is that the market for stolen credit card details is so mature, and its entry barriers so low these days, that the confidential data that cannot be efficiently obtained through real-life means like credit card cloning or ATM skimming on a large scale, is now purchased online for the purpose of abusing it in real-life by<a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/citibank-atm-se.html"> embedding the valid information into plastic cards</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=c5gmVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=c5gmVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=yABcqJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=yABcqJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=iuXpaj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=iuXpaj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Ctkd2j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Ctkd2j" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=KJLEOJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=KJLEOJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6teEcJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6teEcJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=XpeGzj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=XpeGzj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/336435935" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:36:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/price">price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/average market price">average market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market price">market price</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card">credit card</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card details">credit card details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/market">market</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/competitive market equilibrium">competitive market equilibrium</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card basis">credit card basis</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/336435935/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Very few details are available for Missouri National Guard breach]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a9da228def34f73b19354bb07ad9da29</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a9da228def34f73b19354bb07ad9da29</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/15/08

Organization
National Guard Bureau

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Missouri National Guard (&quot;MOGUARD

Victims
Citizen-Soldier and employee&quot;s
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/moguard.jpg" width="155" align="right" height="155"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/15/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.ngb.army.mil/default.aspx">National Guard Bureau</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.moguard.com/">Missouri National Guard ("MOGUARD")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"Citizen-Soldier and employee"s<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"approximately 2,000"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"some personal information"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The Missouri National Guard learned on Monday, July 14, 2008, that some personal information was compromised. Details of how this information was compromised are being withheld at this time, so as not to interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.moguard.com/What%20Happened%20in%20July%202008%20and%20How%20Does%20this%20Affect%20Me%20(Final%20Version)%2015JUL08.pdf">Missouri National Guard Press Release</a> <br><a href="http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/news/missouristatenews/story/ca0fe7785a2d8471862574870051f7fd?OpenDocument">St. Louis Post-Dispatch</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Missouri National Guard<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>The Missouri National Guard learned on Monday, July 14, 2008, that some personal information was compromised.<br><br>Details of how this information was compromised are being withheld at this time, so as not to interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Sounds like a good excuse to not reveal details.</span><br><br>It is important to note that we have no reason to believe that the information that was compromised was for the purpose of gaining Citizen-Soldier or employee information or that the information has been or will be used inappropriately.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It's nice that MOGUARD can make this judgment call on behalf of the victims.&nbsp; Its too bad the victims are not allowed to make a determination themselves based on the facts surrounding this breach.</span><br><br>The Missouri National Guard has a list of those Citizen-Soldiers or employees whose information was compromised.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Keyword is "was", and not the phrase "may have been".</span><br><br>Letters are being sent to these individuals and/or their Families.<br><br>The list includes approximately 2,000 individuals.<br><br>At this time we have no confirmation of misuse of Citizen-Soldier or employee information resulting from the loss.<br><br>"I am distressed that sensitive information has been compromised," <a href="http://www.moguard.com/tag/MONG.tag.asp">Major General King Sidwell</a> <br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am impressed when a leader of an organization steps forward and speaks about a breach.&nbsp; In my opinion it demonstrates strong leadership and the understanding that the "buck" ultimately stops with him.</span><br><br>"I am especially concerned about the problems and inconveniences this may cause for our Missouri National Guard Citizen-Soldiers and their families," King said.<br><br>Because Social Security Numbers may have been contained within the missing information, we advise individuals to monitor financial accounts continuously for suspicious activity as a matter of good practice.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This statement provide a clue as to what "some personal information" may be.</span><br><br>The Missouri National Guard has safeguards in place to protect private information.<br><br>We provide ongoing privacy training to all employees.<br><br>The Missouri National Guard has taken action to rectify this unfortunate situation, and is working to insure our Citizen-Soldier’s or employee’s information receives the highest standard of security and privacy protection.<br><br>Any soldier or family member with questions should call a hotline number at 1-888-526-6664 extension 7888.<br><br>If the soldier is deployed overseas, the soldier may use the Defense Switching Network and call 312-555-9500 extension. 7888. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>We have no idea as to what the cause of this breach may have been.&nbsp; Anyone want to guess?&nbsp; If so, post a comment.<br><br>It’s a little ironic.&nbsp; I was just typing an email response to an information security friend of mine about military breaches and the way the military has a completely different way of disclosing details (if any).&nbsp; This breach is proof positive.&nbsp; We'll have to see if further details emerge over time.<br><br>I sincerely hope that the owners of the "personal information" (the victims) get all of the answers that they require in order to evaluate risk themselves and make educated decisions on how they will proceed. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/15/moguard.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 10:15:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/missouri national guard">missouri national guard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employee information">employee information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive information">sensitive information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/employees information receives">employees information receives</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/details">details</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach description">breach description</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/15/moguard.aspx">Very few details are available for Missouri National Guard breach</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Lompoc's Comeback]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d8cd53c51e38bfdb65f16dbc0871b978</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d8cd53c51e38bfdb65f16dbc0871b978</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've been citing Lompoc, Calif., as a poster child of what can go wrong in municipal Wi-Fi for a few years: But I apparently have to change my tune. Lompoc, near Santa Barbara, had unreasonable...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com/images/lock.jpg" align="right" border="0" hspace="5" /><a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/pcworld/20080714/tc_pcworld/148403"><strong>I've been citing Lompoc, Calif., as a poster child of what can go wrong in municipal Wi-Fi for a few years:</strong></a> But I apparently have to change my tune. Lompoc, near Santa Barbara, had unreasonable expectations, if you read their first and second RFPs. The first provider built a network that Lompoc found unacceptable and they bid it out for a second network to be built (some of these details are murky and some under dispute).</p>

<p>What's been clear is that after spending more than $3m, the city couldn't acquire more than a few hundred regular subscribers, about 10 percent of the point they'd need to pay expenses and pay down capital outlay. But it turns out that the backend was as important as their network deployment, IDG News Service reports.</p>

<p>The latest city network administrator brought in Aptilo Networks for backend authentication and session processing, opened the network to 15-minute free trials, and started accepted ad hoc payment. The new network guru also let outsourced contracts expire and brought customer support and other services back in house to reduce expenses and improve the feedback loop. He discovered their existing authentication system was licensed for 500 users, so that might have explained their failure to grow, too.</p>

<p>The city now has 1,000 regular users at all levels, from pay-as-you-go to monthly household subscriptions. They've revised breakeven down to 2,000 subscribers, and say they are breakeven for expenses.</p>

<p>The other problem Lompoc had, by the way, is that the cable and telephone companies didn't sit still. I exaggerate, but when Lomopoc was planning its network, it had very poor coverage for its 42,000 residents for DSL and cable modem service. When the Wi-Fi network was announced, the incumbents started pulling copper, coax, and fiber, and dramatically improved network coverage. The $3m wasn't entirely ill spent so far: it was a kind of reverse incentive to the private companies to get their act together.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 06:57:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/city">city</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/city network administrator">city network administrator</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi network">wi-fi network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network coverage">network coverage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network guru">network guru</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lompoc">lompoc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network deployment">network deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cable">cable</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008396.html">Lompoc's Comeback</source>
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