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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: direct]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/direct</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:39:20 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Google Trends Labs Abused By Cybercriminals To Spread Malware]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4ea1cd9db70bcac5a0266b22111315ab</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4ea1cd9db70bcac5a0266b22111315ab</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[According to a recent advisory issued by Webroot, cybecriminals are exploiting the search engines by monitoring the peak traffic for popular search queries using Googles Trend Labs and syndicating the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[According to a recent advisory issued by Webroot, cybecriminals are exploiting the search engines by monitoring the peak traffic for popular search queries using Google’s Trend Labs and syndicating the keywords in order to acquire the traffic and direct it to malware serving blogs primarily hosted at Windows Live’s Spaces.
For the first time, hackers are [...]]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 17:59:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/windows lives spaces">windows lives spaces</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/googles trend labs">googles trend labs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/traffic">traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/peak traffic">peak traffic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blogs primarily">blogs primarily</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recent advisory">recent advisory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/engines">engines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/direct">direct</category>
      <source url="http://cyberinsecure.com/google-trends-labs-abused-by-cybercriminals-to-spread-malware/">Google Trends Labs Abused By Cybercriminals To Spread Malware</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[How to Clone and Modify E-Passports]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d87db1f435de50bdfb362a781b2835de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d87db1f435de50bdfb362a781b2835de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Hackers Choice has released a tool allowing people to clone and modify electronic passports
The problem is self-signed certificates
A CA is not a great solution: Using a Certification Authority...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Hackers Choice has <a href="http://blog.thc.org/index.php?/archives/4-The-Risk-of-ePassports-and-RFID.html">released</a> a tool allowing people to clone and modify electronic passports.</p>

<p>The problem is self-signed certificates.</p>

<p>A CA is not a great solution:</p>

<blockquote>Using a Certification Authority (CA) could solve the attack but at the same time introduces a new set of attack vectors:

<ol><li>The CA becomes a single point of failure. It becomes the juicy/high-value target for the attacker. Single point of failures are not good. Attractive targets are not good.

<p>Any person with access to the CA key can undetectably fake passports. Direct attacks, virus, misplacing the key by accident (the UK government is good at this!) or bribery are just a few ways of getting the CA key.</p>

<p><li>The single CA would need to be trusted by all governments. This is not practical as this means that passports would no longer be a national matter.</p>

<p><li>Multiple CA's would not work either. Any country could use its own CA to create a valid passport of any other country. Read this sentence again: Country A can create a passport data set of Country B and sign it with Country A's CA key. The terminal will validate and display the information as data from Country B.This option also multiplies the number of 'juicy' targets. It makes it also more likely for a CA key to leak.</p>

<p>Revocation lists for certificates only work when a leak/loss is detected. In most cases it will not be detected.</ol></p>

<p>So what's the solution? We know that humans are good at Border Control. In the end they protected us well for the last 120 years. We also know that humans are good at pattern matching and image recognition. Humans also do an excellent job 'assessing' the person and not just the passport. Take the human part away and passport security falls apart.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=UYU6L"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=UYU6L" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=z7bQL"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=z7bQL" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 08:24:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passports">passports</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passport">passport</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passport security falls">passport security falls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/passport data set">passport data set</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/set">set</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/electronic passports">electronic passports</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country">country</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key">key</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/undetectably fake passports">undetectably fake passports</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/09/how_to_clone_an.html">How to Clone and Modify E-Passports</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hype Alert: Internet Shopping Carts Are Secure]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0706e64d78d354492017803497a079</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6f0706e64d78d354492017803497a079</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[My blog reader fed me a nugget today that set off my hype monitor, specifically a post entitled Internet Shopping Carts are Secure
OMG...really
To be fair, I realize the author is speaking from the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[My blog reader fed me a nugget today that set off my hype monitor, specifically a post entitled <a href="http://hubpages.com/hub/Internet-Shopping-Carts-Are-Secure" taget="_blank">Internet Shopping Carts are Secure</a>. <br />OMG...really?<br />To be fair, I realize the author is speaking from the eCommerce perspective, rather than that of an information security practitioner, but here's where the trouble begins:<br /><span style="font-style:italic;">"Shopping cart service providers have developed secure ecommerce shopping cart solutions for any business owner looking to enhance their current online store, or create a new one. Some ecommerce shopping cart solution providers are even receiving PABP (Payment Application Best Practice) certification which supports PCI compliance requirements for all businesses accepting credit card payments online."</span><br />This may be true in part, but it is by no means an all-inclusive claim. Shopping carts continue to be sieve-like, even when apparently reviewed per <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml" target="_blank">PCI</a> standards.<br />Allow me to elaborate.<br />We'll kick off our hype eliminating effort with a simple Google dork: <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=inurl%3A%22cart.cfm%22&btnG=Search" target="_blank"{>inurl:"cart.cfm"</a> (picking on ColdFusion again, but man, they make it easy)<br /><a href="http://www.gmpartsdirect.com/cart.cfm" target="_blank">GM Parts Direct: Your Shopping Cart</a> jumped right out at me for a number of reasons.<br />First, I sensed XSS vulns lurking like a Geiger counter senses radiation. Sound <a href="http://www.ringelkater.de/Sounds/2geraeusche_gegenst/geigerzaehler.wav" target="_blank">effect</a> for edification. :-)<br />Second, the page contained one of the growing number of aforementioned conversion-driving website <a href="http://sealserver.trustwave.com/cert.php?customerId=w6ordzctHpqOVGcB1cmBsViTpDGC2k&size=105x54&style=normal&language=en" target="_blank">security</a> seals. <br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SN1tYvapkkI/AAAAAAAAADg/6k1ncKqufL4/s1600-h/GMparts.png" target="_blank"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SN1tYvapkkI/AAAAAAAAADg/6k1ncKqufL4/s320/GMparts.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5250473012396397122" /></a><br /><br />Tick, tick, click...the Gieger counter is getting louder. <br />Trustwave claims that the site operator "is enrolled in Trustwave's Trusted Commerce™ program to validate compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) mandated by all the major credit card associations including: American Express, Diners Club, Discover, JCB, MasterCard Worldwide, Visa, Inc. and Visa Europe."<br />Methinks that <a href="https://www.trustwave.com/" target="_blank">Trustwave's</a> Trusted Commerce program is missing a few fundamental security checks. Remember, XSS in PCI regulated sites, according to the <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml" target="_blank">PCI DSS</a>, indicates that a site is not compliant (see section 6.5.4) if vulnerable to XSS.<br />Uh-oh.<br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SN1wVI4q8FI/AAAAAAAAADo/ZzFA7u8xNCA/s1600-h/GMparts_xss_trustwave.png" target="_blank"><img style="cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kVOWaY1TAF0/SN1wVI4q8FI/AAAAAAAAADo/ZzFA7u8xNCA/s320/GMparts_xss_trustwave.png" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5250476249048608850" /></a><br />All it takes is a fake login page, as opposed to our friends at <a href="http://xssed.com/" target="_blank">XSSED.com</a>, and...well, you get the point.<br />Simply, this is one of an endless number of shopping cart not secure, and not PCI compliant. For shame. You need only browse the <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/content/category/6/23/45/" target="_blank">Holisticinfosec.org Advisories</a> page to find multiple ecommerce platforms and shopping carts that are missing the mark. Trust me, these are a fraction of the <a href="http://secunia.com/advisories/search/?search=shopping+cart" target="_blank">problem</a>.<br />ecommerce<>security<br />ecommerce<><a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995349.aspx" target="_blank">SDL</a><br />ecommerce<>PCI<br />website security seal<>security<br />Sigh.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecommerce">ecommerce</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/multiple ecommerce platforms">multiple ecommerce platforms</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecommerce sdl">ecommerce sdl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecommerce perspective">ecommerce perspective</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss">pci dss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cart solutions">cart solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cart">cart</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecommerce security">ecommerce security</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/09/hype-alert-internet-shopping-carts-are.html">Hype Alert: Internet Shopping Carts Are Secure</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[250k of Harvested Hotmail Emails Go For?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/efaf965e7dacf43f06479ec7778d04e6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/efaf965e7dacf43f06479ec7778d04e6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[50 in this particular case, however, keeping in mind that the email harvester is anything but ethical, this very same database will be sold and re-sold more times than the original buyer would like to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNuLDFWiz9I/AAAAAAAACLo/fQ_TqPImTk0/s1600-h/harvested_hotmail_sale.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="113" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNuLDFWiz9I/AAAAAAAACLo/YJqc75ZUQgE/s200-R/harvested_hotmail_sale.png" width="200" /></a>$50 in this particular case, however, keeping in mind that the email harvester is anything but ethical, this very same database will be sold and re-sold more times than the original buyer would like to know about. Moreover, what someone is offering for sale, may in fact be already available as a value-added addition to a managed spamming service.<br />
<br />
With metrics and quality assurance applied in a growing number of spam and phishing campaigns, filling in the niche of email harvesting by distinguishing between different types of obfuscated emails by releasing an easily embeddable module, was an anticipated move. What's to come? <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/harvesting-youtube-usernames-for.html">Spam and malware campaigns across social networks</a> "as usual" will propagate faster thanks to the ongoing harvesting of usernames within social networks, that would later on get imported in Web 2.0 "marketing" tools targeting the high-trafficked sites and automatically spamming them.<br />
<br />
From a spammer's perspective, geolocating these 250k emails could increase their selling prices since the buyers would be able to launch localized attacks with messages in the native languages of the receipts. Is the demand for quality email databases fueling the developments of this market segment, or are the spammers self-serving themselves and cashing-in by reselling what they've already abused a log time ago? That seems to be the case, since there's no way a buyer could verify the freshness of the harvested emails database and whether or not it has already been abused. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNvGk2eGKcI/AAAAAAAACL4/yhy61idSl6I/s1600-h/segmented_harvested_emails.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SNvGk2eGKcI/AAAAAAAACL4/xFYzYTCaDes/s200-R/segmented_harvested_emails.JPG" width="152" /></a>For the time being, we've got several developed and many other developing market segments within spamming and phishing as different markets with different players. On one hand are the legitimately looking spamming providers offering "direct marketing services" working with lone spammers who find a reliable business partner in the face of the spamming vendor whose customers drive both side's business models. On the other hand, you've got the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1835">spammers excelling in outsourcing the automatic account registration process</a>, coming up with ways to build a spamming infrastructure -- already available as a module to integrate in <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1899">managed spamming services</a> -- using legitimate services as a provider of the infrastructure.<br />
<br />
Despite that the arms race seems to be going on at several different fronts, spammers VS the industry and spammers VS spammers fighting for market share, the entire underground ecosystem is clearly allocating a lot of resources for research and development in order to ensure that they are always a step ahead of the industry.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/harvesting-youtube-usernames-for.html">Harvesting  Youtube Usernames for Spamming</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/thousands-of-im-screen-names-in-wild.html">Thousands  of IM Screen Names in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/automatic-email-harvesting-20.html">Automatic  Email Harvesting 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - the Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/01/inside-email-harvesters-configuration.html">Inside an Email Harvester's Configuration File</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/segmenting-and-localizing-spam.html">Segmenting and Localizing Spam Campaigns</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/shots-from-malicious-wild-west-sample.html">Shots from the Malicious Wild West - Sample Four</a><br />
<b> </b><div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/402968423" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 08:13:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/emails">emails</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email harvester">email harvester</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam campaigns">spam campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lone spammers">lone spammers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spammers">spammers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/250k emails">250k emails</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/automatic email">automatic email</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/402968423/250k-of-harvested-hotmail-emails-go-for.html">250k of Harvested Hotmail Emails Go For?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Eye-Fi Adds Upgrade Track at Yearly Fee]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3e1647519eaf22ed342316fc64fccf49</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3e1647519eaf22ed342316fc64fccf49</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Wi-Fi sharing digital memory card Eye-Fi adds another option for its product line: If you've purchased or plan to purchase an Eye-Fi, starting 5-Oct-2008, you can upgrade the model of card you...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="http://www.eye.fi/news/press-releases/">The Wi-Fi sharing digital memory card Eye-Fi adds another option for its product line:</a></strong> If you've purchased or plan to purchase an Eye-Fi, starting 5-Oct-2008, you can upgrade the model of card you purchased by paying a yearly subscription fee. This provides more of a try-and-see mode for Eye-Fi's slightly more expensive offerings.</p>

<p>Eye-Fi divided its Wi-Fi SD card line-up into three parts earlier in the year: Home, which transfers to a computer ($80); Share, which uploads to a computer and to Eye-Fi's servers, which relay them to gallery, print, and social services ($100); and Explore, which ties in Wi-Fi positioning and one year of a Wayport hotspot subscription for uploads ($130). I wrote <strong><a href="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008418.html">a long review of the Eye-Fi Explore</a></strong> on 12-Aug-2008.</p>

<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com//images/2008/eye-fi_cards_sharer_sm.jpg" align="right"/>If you bought a Home, you can upgrade to the Share service for $10 per year, and if you bought either a Home or Share, you can add geotagging for $15 per year and hotspot access for $15 per year. It's a smart move, since original Eye-Fi card buyers already had a firmware upgrade that converted their card into a Share model; they'll now be able upgrade to the full featureset. This is something I thought the company was offering at launch months ago, and I speculated it would be easy to add.</p>

<p>Eye-Fi also added two new photo sharing services: Apple's MobileMe and AdoramaPix. I cannot think of any other firm that Apple has partnered with to allow direct MobileMe uploads, although this may be technically less a big deal than it sounds. But I believe it's unique--only the iPhone and iPhoto software can transfers images into MobileMe's galleries; I'll need to investigate further. It's a good feather in Eye-Fi's cap.</p>

<p>Finally, Eye-Fi says they'll release tweaked firmware on 5-Oct as well that will double the speed of photo transfers from their cards to a computer on the local network.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2008 18:07:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/eye-fi">eye-fi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/upgrade">upgrade</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/eye-fi explore">eye-fi explore</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/explore">explore</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/direct mobileme uploads">direct mobileme uploads</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/share service">share service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mobileme">mobileme</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/share">share</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/transfers">transfers</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008453.html">Eye-Fi Adds Upgrade Track at Yearly Fee</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[About the SDL Pro Network]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dc28bc3dae82ee1f5322434291949577</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dc28bc3dae82ee1f5322434291949577</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Hello all, Dave here
I expect that a number of you have seen the announcement and various press articles or Steve Lipner's Tuesday post about our launch of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.0, the SDL...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hello all, Dave here... 
<P>I expect that a number of you have seen the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/sep08/09-16lipnersdl.mspx" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2008/sep08/09-16lipnersdl.mspx">announcement</A> and various press articles or <A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx" mce_href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx">Steve Lipner's Tuesday post</A> about our launch of the SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.0, the SDL Optimization Model and the <A href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/E/9/0E9AC448-30B2-4451-9E23-46244AFABB7F/Microsoft%20SDL%20Pro%20Network%20_Fact%20Sheet.pdf" mce_href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/E/9/0E9AC448-30B2-4451-9E23-46244AFABB7F/Microsoft%20SDL%20Pro%20Network%20_Fact%20Sheet.pdf">SDL Pro Network</A>.&nbsp; Since I was intimately involved with the creation of the SDL Pro Network, I thought I'd write a few words about our objectives and chat a bit about the thinking behind our partner choices for the pilot phase.</P>
<P>So, what are we hoping to gain by creating a network of security consulting and training experts to work with customers who want to implement the SDL?&nbsp; Generally speaking, this question has a two-part answer:&nbsp; First, Microsoft is, and always will be a partner-driven company - we rely on the skills and capabilities of our partners to provide specialized services and broad geographic coverage for Microsoft products and services.&nbsp; Second, even though there are talented folks in the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/default.mspx" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/default.mspx">Microsoft Services</A> organization, it's clear that we will need help from our partners to scale to meet the demand.&nbsp; I can't tell you how many times the folks on the SDL team have been approached by people - after an executive briefing, or a session at TechEd - asking for guidance in implementing SDL in their own organizations.&nbsp; When we look at the demand and pair it with the geographic diversity of our customer base, it's clear that a partner approach is the right answer.</P>
<P>Now a few words about the partners who will be participating in the pilot phase...</P>
<P>After the decision was made to work with partners on SDL delivery, we had two primary criteria that we had to address; partner quality, and manageability of the SDL Pro Network pilot. We have all seen instances where individuals or consulting organizations have represented themselves to the IT community as having security expertise when in reality the "experts for hire" were simply reading a page or two ahead of the customer in whatever security tome was "in vogue" at the time.&nbsp; </P>
<P>Based on those observations, it was clear that partner "quality" was a critical criterion. &nbsp;Fortunately for us, we didn't have to look far to satisfy our quality bar - many of the companies in the SDL Pro Network pilot have direct experience with executing portions of the SDL on <I>our</I> products, or have delivered services to Microsoft in a security context. Design reviews, code reviews, penetration testing, training&nbsp;and other tasks critical to SDL implementation were (and are) common fare for these folks.</P>
<P>Despite the customer demand for SDL that I alluded to above, starting with a small pilot was the right thing to do; a small group of trusted consultancies supports our imperative for quality and it allows us to pragmatically grow the SDL Pro Network as the market matures. &nbsp;As we continue to evolve and innovate with the SDL, we'll have a strong core of partners to help drive the software security message. </P>
<P>Will we grow the SDL Pro Network?&nbsp; The qualified answer is: "When the market demands it..." - there are a number of talented potential partners who meet the quality bar - and clearly, the need for security in software development will grow to demand additional talented specialists. However, it's our plan to begin with a small set of partners of known expertise, and then respond to growing demand as it materializes.</P>
<P>So there you have it - the nuanced beginning and bright future of the SDL Pro Network...&nbsp; I invite your comments, and encourage you to check in at the <A href="http://www.microsoft.com/sdl" mce_href="http://www.microsoft.com/sdl">SDL Portal</A> as we continue to build out the program</P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8958114" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 23:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl">sdl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl pro network">sdl pro network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl implementation">sdl implementation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl delivery">sdl delivery</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl optimization model">sdl optimization model</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/quality">quality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/partner quality">partner quality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/18/about-the-sdl-pro-network.aspx">About the SDL Pro Network</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Learning From Sarah Palins Yahoo Mail Compromise]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e9950fb79770bdb2ef7e55345529ce18</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e9950fb79770bdb2ef7e55345529ce18</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The password reset functionality of any online service is a major source of risk . They are especially problematic when they use only a secret question concerning personal information only and dont...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The password reset functionality of any online service is a major source of risk</strong>.  They are especially problematic when they use only a &#8220;secret question&#8221; concerning personal information only and don&#8217;t tie back to another email account or a text message.  Another account or cell phone number is something &#8220;out of band&#8221; from a direct transaction with the online service.  It becomes 2-factor authentication.</p>
<p>When an alternate email account or cell phone number is not tied to an account, online services often use personal information, supposedly only known by the account holder, to verify identity and reset a password. The risk here is the personal information is often known to other individuals and if the account holder is a public figure then the information may be easily researched.  <strong>Birthdays, names of pets, locations of homes, schools, and events can often be discovered online or guessed.</strong> </p>
<p><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/21/paris_hacked/">Paris Hilton&#8217;s T-Mobile account</a>, and thus all her Sidekick cell phone contents which were mirrored online, was compromised when someone &#8220;guessed&#8221; the answer to her secret question.  The secret questions was, &#8220;What is your pet&#8217;s name.&#8221; The answer of course was, &#8220;Tinkerbell&#8221;.  Something easily researched.  Many people would not have their pet&#8217;s name online but friends, family members, or perhaps an ex would know the answer.  Using a pet&#8217;s name is a very bad security practice.</p>
<p>Now we have Sarah Palin, another public figure, having her online account compromised because someone <a href="http://michellemalkin.com/2008/09/17/the-story-behind-the-palin-e-mail-hacking/">used the password reset functionality and guessed the answer to Sarah Palin&#8217;s secret question</a>. This is how the attacker says he found out her personal information and guessed the answer to her secret question. He details this on 4chan.org:</p>
<blockquote><p>rubico 09/17/08(Wed)12:57:22 No.85782652</p>
<p>Hello, /b/ as many of you might already know, last night sarah palin’s yahoo was “hacked” and caps were posted on /b/, i am the lurker who did it, and i would like to tell the story.</p>
<p>In the past couple days news had come to light about palin using a yahoo mail account, it was in news stories and such, a thread was started full of newfags trying to do something that would not get this off the ground, for the next 2 hours the acct was locked from password recovery presumably from all this bullshit spamming.</p>
<p>after the password recovery was reenabled, it took seriously 45 mins on wikipedia and google to find the info, Birthday? 15 seconds on wikipedia, zip code? well she had always been from wasilla, and it only has 2 zip codes (thanks online postal service!)</p>
<p>the second was somewhat harder, the question was “where did you meet your spouse?” did some research, and apparently she had eloped with mister palin after college, if youll look on some of the screenshits that I took and other fellow anon have so graciously put on photobucket you will see the google search for “palin eloped” or some such in one of the tabs.</p>
<p>I found out later though more research that they met at high school, so I did variations of that, high, high school, eventually hit on “Wasilla high” I promptly changed the password to popcorn and took a cold shower…</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Best practices for setting up the password reset functionality of any online service:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Tie an account to another email account or cell phone number if that is an option. This will cause the service to send an out of band message and in essence make the password reset a 2-factor authentication.</li>
<li>Do not use any personal information that can be guessed as the answers to secret questions. Treat these answers like passwords. Don&#8217;t use dictionary words. Add some numbers or symbols to the answer. For example is Sarah Palin had used &#8220;Wasilla high 1964&#8243; or &#8220;!Wasilla high!&#8221; it is far less likely it would be guessed.  Pick a scheme to modify your secret answers so they aren&#8217;t guessable.</li>
<li>Try resetting your password.  See if there are downgrade attacks which make it easier to reset the password.  Yahoo for instance will allow you to specify that you don&#8217;t have access to the email address tied to your account and thus not send a password reset email.  Since an attacker can do this the safety of using another account is eliminated thus making the answers to the secret question all that more important.</li>
<p>
</ol>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 09:31:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password reset email">password reset email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/reset">reset</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password reset functionality">password reset functionality</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online postal service">online postal service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password reset">password reset</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online">online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online service">online service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/password">password</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/09/learning-from-sarah-palin-yahoo-email-compromise/">Learning From Sarah Palins Yahoo Mail Compromise</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[One More Thing About GOVCERT.NL 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f7e8fb94bb3d48a516f499a3c2ac93ee</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f7e8fb94bb3d48a516f499a3c2ac93ee</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This is a post that I forgot to post from my drafts folder

I am [ well, I was :-) when I create it ] flying back from GOVCERT.NL 2008 and lemme tell you! I have not ever seen a security conference...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[This is a post that I <span style="font-style: italic;">forgot </span>to post from my drafts folder...<br /><br />I am [<span style="font-style: italic;">well, I was :-) when I create it</span>] flying back from <a href="http://www.govcert.nl/symposium/programme.html">GOVCERT.NL 2008</a> and lemme tell you! I have not ever seen a security conference which were THAT well-organized. Really! Everything just worked. Keynotes (<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/live-blogging-from-govcertnl-2008.html">first</a>, <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/live-blogging-from-govcertnl-2008-david.html">second</a>) were - gasp! - fun and useful (<span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/RSA">take that, RSA!</a> :-)</span>)<br /><br />My presentation was "<a href="http://www.govcert.nl/symposium/programme.html"><span class="title">Logging for Incident Response and Forensics: Key Issues</span></a>" and I promise to post it online (<a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/logs-for-incident-response-and-forensics-key-issues-for-govcertnl-2008-presentation-620704">here</a>). BTW, if you attended the presentation, feel free to send the questions direct to me (since I didn't have time to answer them all at the end)<div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=oHM4M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=oHM4M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=HxOjM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=HxOjM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=RXg2M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=RXg2M" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/408598333" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 20:07:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/post">post</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions direct">questions direct</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security conference">security conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presentation">presentation</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/govcert">govcert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/incident response">incident response</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drafts folder">drafts folder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key issues">key issues</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/time">time</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/408598333/one-more-thing-about-govcertnl-2008.html">One More Thing About GOVCERT.NL 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/54303a8239cd0becf5843fb3552a50a8</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has &quot; ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week &quot;, and also, that it &quot; has a reliable ally in its battle against...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/aUL1ohUu-Zc/s1600-h/estdomain_alert.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SM7tc-r3kHI/AAAAAAAACKc/yiFaA33Sfdw/s200-R/estdomain_alert.png" /></a>Surreal, especially when you get to read that EstDomains has "<i>ruthlessly suspended over five thousand domains only for last week</i>", and also, that it "<i>has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc</i>".<br />
<br />
Here's <a href="http://www.domainnews.com/en/general/estdomains-denies-links-to-malware-distribution.html">the press release</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>The EstDomains, Inc management does not deny the fact that no one is secured from having a customer who uses provided services for delinquent purposes. But it must be noted that the carefully planned infrastructure of EstDomains, Inc makes the special provision for the cases of malware distribution that may originate from the domain name registered under the company's name. Such domain names are suspended immediately along with domain holder's account if there is an evidence of malware presence on the web site. <b>According to the most recent statistics over five thousand domain names were detected and ruthlessly suspended by EstDomains, Inc specialists only last week.</b><br />
<br />
<b>The company also has a reliable ally in its battle against malware in a face of Intercage, Inc which provides company with the hosting services of the highest quality.</b> But the outstanding performance of hosting services is not the sole reason why EstDomains, Inc appreciates this partnership so greatly. Intercage, Inc generously provides EstDomains, Inc specialists with reports regarding discovered malware vehicles. As the main database for additional domain name management services is located in Intercage Data Center, EstDomains, Inc has the perfect opportunity to get notifications of the slightest mark of malware presence in the shortest time and take measures in advance.</i> "<br />
<br />
The press release reminds me of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">RBN's defacement of my blog</a> posted on the 1st of April, and despite that <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">EstDomains started "performing for the community"</a> as of recently, thanks to the collective intelligence and persistence of everyone turning their research into actionable intelligence against them, this performance aiming to minimize the effect of the negative PR is more or less futile considering <a href="http://www.spyware-techie.com/malicious-website-list/">all the cybercrime activities that they've been tolerating or ignoring</a> for the past couple of years. For future generations to see, <a href="http://www.malwarebytes.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=6159">this is how EstDomains "performs for the community"</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>We've suspended all the domains listed in this topic. But please don't make posting these domains on this forum a habit. We have a 24/7 online tech support which can be contacted at <a href="https://support.estdomains.com/" target="_blank">https://support.estdomains.com</a><br />
<br />
Best regards,<br />
EstDomains Team&nbsp;</i><br />
<br />
<i>EstMate says : Ihatemondayand.com and antispycheck.com - both suspended. If any of the suspended websites are still active to you it maybe be because of your computer's or ISP's DNS-cache, others won't be able to access these websites</i><br />
<br />
<i>googlescanners-360.com isn't registered with us. As for other domains, the ones, which were registered through us, have been suspended. Regarding our preventive measures, the fact that you don't see them doesn't mean there isn't any. Yes, we don't write about them but in most cases we suspend whole accounts with problematic domains and look for connections to other accounts etc. During the last week we've suspended over 15000 different domains.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's more disturbing regarding this particular domain registrar is that it's a U.S based operation, namely, using the lack of international cybercrime cooperation as an excuse for not taking actions earlier doesn't fit into the picture. Moreover, this is just the tip of the iceberg, and taking into consideration a personal mentality that the cybercriminals you know are better than the cybercriminals you don't know, the RBN or any of its "leftovers" aren't fully taking advantage of the tactics they could be using in order to make it harder to shut them down, but how come? Simply, they don't have to put extra efforts and would once again remain online for years to come, which is perhaps more disturbing at the first place.<br />
<br />
What in the world is the Russian Business Network, is it still alive and kicking, are the same people that used to maintain my favorite netblock ever, still the ones running it, and what tactics are they taking advantage of in order to make it harder for the community to establish direct links with a particular netblock and the RBN itself?<br />
<br />
With RBN's "leftovers" -- <b>InterCage, Inc., Softlayer Technologies, Layered Technologies, Inc., Ukrtelegroup Ltd, Turkey Abdallah Internet Hizmetleri, and Hostfresh --</b> making headlines just like the way it should be, what I've been researching for the past couple of months is how they've migrated from the centralized hosting provider to what appears to be a fully operational franchise. The business model is very simple, the RBN through its extensive underground networking skills supplies to customers to franchisers operating small anti-abuse netblocks across the globe, where they offer dedicated hosting and share revenue with the RBN. Anyone trusted enough and capable of supplying such netblocks starts running the RBN anti-abuse franchise. It's also worth pointing out that these franchises are in fact starting to cut the middle man, and disintermediate the RBN by actively advertising their services in order for them to create a self-sustainable business model without having to rely on the RBN connecting them with customers.<br />
<br />
What used to be a centralized cybercrime powerhouse operating several highly visible anti-abuse netblocks, is today's decentralized infrastructure, with the profit margins for the anti-abuse services that it's logically capable to break-even and earn profits even with a few high profile dedicated hosting customers. Anyone can be the Russian Business Network, gain experience into the market segment, then disintermediate them by starting to advertise their own services. From a powerhouse to a franchise model, what the RBN had to offer can be easily duplicated by a countless number of local RBN's, and this is only starting to take place.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd. </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/malicious-isps-you-rarely-see-in-any.html">The Malicious ISPs you Rarely See in Any Report</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/geolocating-malicious-isps.html">Geolocationg Malicious ISPs</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/new-media-malware-gang-part-four.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Four</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/new-media-malware-gang-part-three.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Three</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/new-media-malware-gang-part-two.html">The New Media Malware Gang - Part Two</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-media-malware-gang.html">The New Media Malware Gang</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/hacked-by-rbn.html">HACKED BY THE RBN!</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/rogue-rbn-software-pushed-through.html">Rogue RBN Software Pushed Through Blackhat SEO</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-malware-puppets-need-their-master.html">RBN's Puppets Need Their Master</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/rbns-fake-account-suspended-notices.html">RBN's Fake Account Suspended Notices</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/diverse-portfolio-of-fake-security.html">A Diverse Portfolio of Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/go-to-sleep-go-to-sleep-my-little-rbn.html">Go to Sleep, Go to Sleep my Little RBN</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/exposing-russian-business-network.html">Exposing the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/detecting-and-blocking-russian-business.html">Detecting the Blocking the Russian Business Network</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/over-100-malwares-hosted-on-single-rbn.html">Over 100 Malwares Hosted on a Single RBN IP</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/rbns-fake-security-software.html">RBN's Fake Security Software</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/russian-business-network.html">The Russian Business Network</a><b> <br />
</b><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2008 05:09:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/single rbn">single rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn">rbn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rbn anti-abuse franchise">rbn anti-abuse franchise</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/estdomains">estdomains</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware distribution">malware distribution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thousand domain names">thousand domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/domain names">domain names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rogue rbn software">rogue rbn software</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/394232850/estdomains-and-intercage-vs-cybercrime.html">EstDomains and Intercage VS Cybercrime</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Zune Swoon 2.0]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/162d344e703b51b1f9a309987ebdb786</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/162d344e703b51b1f9a309987ebdb786</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Latest Zune firmware, software allows Wi-Fi music purchases, FM tagging: Microsoft confirmed the 16-Sept-2008 release of new Zune firmware and players, allowing users of old and new devices alike to...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.microsoft.com/Presspass/press/2008/sep08/09-08ZuneFallUpdatePR.mspx"><strong>Latest Zune firmware, software allows Wi-Fi music purchases, FM tagging:</strong></a> Microsoft confirmed the 16-Sept-2008 release of new Zune firmware and players, allowing users of old and new devices alike to purchase music over Wi-Fi from the Zune Marketplace. The new firmware also sports FM tagging that uses information that some broadcasters will embed in their analog programming to tag songs for immediate purchase (single track) or download (Zune Pass subscription) over a Wi-Fi hotspot, or to queue for later download.</p>

<p>Apple added access for iPhone and iPod touch users to a subset of its iTunes Store over Wi-Fi--the awkwardly named iTunes Wi-Fi Music Store--more than a year ago, along with the ability to access that store at no cost from handhelds and laptops <a href="http://www.apple.com/itunes/starbucks/"><strong>via Starbucks outlets</strong></a> in New York, Seattle, and throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. (Chicago and Los Angeles have been "coming soon" for a year, but the new AT&T/Starbucks deal may have delayed opening up those markets.)</p>

<p><img src="http://wifinetnews.com//images/2008/zune_tagging.jpg" alt="zune_tagging.jpg" border="0" width="175" height="385" align="right" hspace="5" />Terrestrial AM/FM radio stations would like to figure out how to remain meaningful in a world of streaming Internet radio. Their latest strategy is to embed information that allows a listener to mark a song they want, potentially getting a piece of music sold in this fashion. With FM tagging, Zune players tap into an existing very low-data-rate encoding protocols that allow stations to push out their call letters and current song information. By adding a very short code, broadcasters can allow Zunes to look up the appropriate song.</p>

<p>At launch, 450 stations from major networks, including Clear Channel, Entercom, and others, will broadcast tagging details. Note that Microsoft includes KEXP, a Seattle independent and alternative radio station, in its sample image, for the new models. KEXP, given a boost a few years ago through significant short-term funding by Paul Allen--funding that involved changing its call letters to his Experience Music Project museum initials--has an enormous listenership over the Internet ironically enough. KEXP will be a programming partner creating channels of music for the subscription-based Zune Pass service. (Zune Pass is $15 per month, all you can eat.)</p>

<p>This option could allow Microsoft to ink partnerships with hotspot networks to brand them with Zune compatibility, lets radio stations promote something other than iPods that they would have a direct relationship with (and, potentially, some kind of revenue stream from?), and may be part of breaking Apple's digital music hegemony. <em>May be.</em> Nobody's gotten rich betting against Apple for the last several years. (Details of revenue sharing with radio stations hasn't been discussed.)</p>

<p>Apple opted for a partnership with HD Radio broadcasters and equipment makers that has a relatively elaborate process of tagging songs. HD Radio is digital AM/FM, a patented and licensed method that has provoked a lot of controversy, and has lagged enormously in the marketplace, despite well over 1,000 stations (including many public radio stations) broadcasting in this digital format, some for over three years. </p>

<p>HD Radio tagging requires an HD radio receiver with a Tag button; pressing that button stores the song's tag information. The radio must also have an iPod dock. Docking an iPod syncs the tag information, and the next time the iPod is sync with iTunes, you can see which songs were tagged. Kind of tedious compared to "press a button while listening to an FM station and buy the song over Wi-Fi." (I've been writing about HD Radio for years, and even launched a blog that's gone moribund; the technology is interesting, but Internet radio on mobile devices coupled with on-demand music purchasing over cell and Wi-Fi may simply make HD Radio unnecessary for listeners.)</p>

<p>Microsoft has a more compelling "marketing story" for this feature than Apple, that's for sure. On the other hand, do you really need to tag songs from stations that play only the most popular music in a given format?</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 08 Sep 2008 12:39:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public radio stations">public radio stations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stations">stations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radio stations promote">radio stations promote</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radio">radio</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radio unnecessary">radio unnecessary</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radio receiver">radio receiver</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet radio">internet radio</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/radio stations">radio stations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wi-fi music purchases">wi-fi music purchases</category>
      <source url="http://wifinetnews.com/archives/008432.html">Zune Swoon 2.0</source>
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