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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: directory]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/directory</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 16:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/62296c3643a587ae28183112d47c0996</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/62296c3643a587ae28183112d47c0996</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Trust is vital, and coming up with ways to multiply the trust factor is crucial for a successful malware campaign spreading across social networks . Excluding the publicly available malware modules...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVZhfsUzjI/AAAAAAAACH0/KTs0CyEnwvY/s1600-h/imageshack_flash_malware.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVZhfsUzjI/AAAAAAAACH0/rKZA6eLgyX8/s200-R/imageshack_flash_malware.JPG" /></a>Trust is vital, and coming up with ways to multiply the trust factor is crucial for a successful <a href="http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_148955.htm">malware campaign spreading across social networks</a>. Excluding the publicly available malware modules for spreading across <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/myspace-phishers-now-targeting-facebook.html">popular social networking sites</a>, using the presumably, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">already phished accounts</a> for the foundation of the trust factor, the recent malware campaigns spreading across Facebook and Myspace are all about plain simple social engineering and a combination of tactics.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVdgajolNI/AAAAAAAACH8/p5BY3A1kV5s/s1600-h/facebook_flash_redirector.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVdgajolNI/AAAAAAAACH8/EyJLoN6fQxg/s200-R/facebook_flash_redirector.JPG" /></a>However, in between combining typosquatting and on purposely introducing longer subdomains impersonating a web application's directory structure, there are certain exceptions. Like this flash file hosted at ImageShack and spammed across Facebook profiles, which at a particular moment in the past few days used to redirect to client-side exploits served on behalf of a shady affiliate network that's apparently geolocating the campaigns based on where the visitors are coming from.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVjHR-P9vI/AAAAAAAACIE/Cx_1BIXZ1kY/s1600-h/facebook_blogspot_obfuscation.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVjHR-P9vI/AAAAAAAACIE/WPYZNHd88gs/s200-R/facebook_blogspot_obfuscation.JPG" /></a><b>img228.imageshack .us/img228/3238/gameonit4.swf</b> redirects to <b>ermacysoffer .info</b> - (216.52.184.243) and to <b>tracking.profitsource .net</b> (67.208.131.124) that's also responding to <b>p223in.linktrust .com</b> (67.208.131.124). Just for the record, we also have <b>halifax-cnline.co.uk</b> parked at 216.52.184.243, 69.64.145.229 and 69.64.145.229, known badware IPs related to previous fraudulent activity.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVmUiQTZJI/AAAAAAAACIM/kpCUSo21ipU/s1600-h/facebook_malware_wall.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SLVmUiQTZJI/AAAAAAAACIM/d-GYBiTRhOI/s200-R/facebook_malware_wall.png" /></a>Moreover, cross-checking this campaign with <a href="http://www.bangky.net/blog/?p=257">another Facebook malware campaign</a> enticing users to visit <b>whitneyganykus.blogspot .com </b>where a javascript obfuscation redirects to <b>absvdfd87 .com</b> and from there to the already known <b>tracking.profitsource .net/redir.aspx?CID=9725&amp;AFID=28836&amp;DID=44292</b>, and given that absvdfd87.com is parked at the now known 69.64.145.229, we have a decent smoking gun connecting the two campaigns. <br />
<br />
Facebook is often advising that users stay away from weird URLs, does this mean ignoring <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/imageshack-typosquatted-to-serve.html">ImageShack</a> and Blogspot altogether? The next malware campaign could be taking advantage of <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/malware-abuses-doubleclicks-open-redirects">DoubleClick</a> and <a href="http://www.virusbtn.com/news/2008/06_03a.xml?rss">AdSense redirectors</a> - for starters.<div class="feedflare">
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</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/376254144" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2008 06:04:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware campaign">malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful malware campaign">successful malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook">facebook</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/facebook malware campaign">facebook malware campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaigns">campaigns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaigns based">campaigns based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trust factor">trust factor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/trust">trust</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/376254144/facebook-malware-campaigns-rotating.html">Facebook Malware Campaigns Rotating Tactics</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Throwplace.com can help in these hard times]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/fd15950218eb383fb4127301c6c5d76f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/fd15950218eb383fb4127301c6c5d76f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Of course you wont see any of our Politicians there, they are not having hard times. Throwplace also has a recycle directory and a green directory


clipped from www.enn.com

Free Goods At...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div > Of course you wont see any of our Politicians there, they are not having hard times.<br/>Throwplace also has a recycle directory and a green directory. </div>
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<td valign="top"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/clipmark/E2D45BF5-33C3-4737-80F4-17388A4A2136/" title="go to this clipmark"><img src="http://content.clipmarks.com/blog_icon/288a468d-7da7-4fa5-b5c3-8a9e4775a4d4/E2D45BF5-33C3-4737-80F4-17388A4A2136/" alt="" width="19" height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align: middle; margin: 0px 4px; display: inline; border: none; float:none;" /></a>clipped from <a title="http://www.enn.com/press_releases/2598" href="http://www.enn.com/press_releases/2598" style="font-size: 11px;">www.enn.com</a></td>
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<div style="margin: 4px 0px; color: #000000; font-size: 20px;">Free Goods At Throwplace.com Help Consumers in Tough Times</div>
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<td valign="top"><!-- CLIPPED FROM: http://www.enn.com/press_releases/2598 --><P><br />
At Throwplace.com, charities, businesses and individuals from all over the world can<br />
&#8220;throw&#8221; their excess onto the Internet where others can view and &#8220;take&#8221; what they need<br />
for free. Each &#8220;throw&#8221; and &#8220;take&#8221; is recycled and reused, keeping countless goods out of<br />
landfills, and helping people and non-profits make ends meet during tough economic times.<br />
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<td style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;">&nbsp;</td>
<td align="right" style="background:transparent;border-width:0px;padding:0px;width:107px" width="107"><a href="http://clipmarks.com/share/E2D45BF5-33C3-4737-80F4-17388A4A2136/blog/" title="blog or email this clip"><img src="http://content7.clipmarks.com/images/c2b-foot.png" border="0" alt="blog it" width="107" height="17" style="border-width:0px;padding:0px;margin:0px;" /></a></td>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2008 13:34:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/throwplace">throwplace</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hard times">hard times</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/directory">directory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/recycle directory">recycle directory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tough economic times">tough economic times</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tough times">tough times</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/landfills">landfills</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/world">world</category>
      <source url="http://spywarebiz.com/spywarebizblog/?p=560">Throwplace.com can help in these hard times</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8cbf69361bdc83216c6de0e5e5d551a0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8cbf69361bdc83216c6de0e5e5d551a0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In the very same way a cybercrime analyst is reverse engineering and sandboxing a particular piece of malware in order to get a better understanding of who's being it, and how successful the campaign...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr2wBCCcbI/AAAAAAAACAU/4ibYnLwvG5E/s1600-h/olly_pinch1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr2wBCCcbI/AAAAAAAACAU/vIpz-Oz9m-I/s200-R/olly_pinch1.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>In the very same way a cybercrime analyst is reverse engineering and sandboxing a particular piece of malware in order to get a better understanding of who's being it, and how successful the campaign is once access to the command and control interface is obtained, cybercriminals themselves are actively reverse engineering the most popular crimeware kits, looking, and actually finding remotely exploitable vulnerabilities allowing them to competely hijack someone's command and control, and consequently, their botnet. <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus crimeware kit</a>, which I've been discussing and analyzing for a while, is the perfect example of how once a popular underground kit start acting as the default crimeware kit, cybercriminals themselves start looking for vulnerabilities that they could take advantage of. And those who look, usually end up finding.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr4tst_etI/AAAAAAAACAc/CS74dFmlSnI/s1600-h/olly_pinch2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr4tst_etI/AAAAAAAACAc/bsEI2r8i-pQ/s200-R/olly_pinch2.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>A remotely exploitable flaw allowing cybercriminals to remotely inject a web shell within another cybercriminal's web command and control interface of the popular Pinch crimeware that's been around VIP underground forums since June, 2007, is starting to receive the necessary attention from script kiddies catching up with the possibility of hijacking someone's malware campaign due to misconfigured command and control servers.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsF-ZurkWI/AAAAAAAACAs/LVKZqt0ByJ8/s1600-h/pinchy_xploit_2007.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsF-ZurkWI/AAAAAAAACAs/QG5JJkQkpdA/s200-R/pinchy_xploit_2007.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>With the exploit now in the wild, retro cybercriminals still taking advantege of the ubiqutous command and control interface that could be easily used by other malware rathar than Pinch, "cybercriminals are advised" to randomize the default file name of the gate, and apply the appropriate directory permissions.<br />
&nbsp; <br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr8JNV5sSI/AAAAAAAACAk/11YT40IAhXY/s1600-h/pinchy.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJr8JNV5sSI/AAAAAAAACAk/uR5fQjtRtb4/s200-R/pinchy.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Monocultural insecurities are ironically started to emerge in the IT underground with the increasing commoditization of what used to be a proprietary web exploitation malware kit or a banker malware kit, allowing easy entry into the malware industry through the unregulated use of what some would refer to as an "advanced technology" that only a few cybercriminals used to have access to an year ago.&nbsp; Just like legitimate software vendors, <a href="https://forums.symantec.com/syment/blog/article?message.uid=319059">authors of crimeware kits are also trying to enforce their software licenses</a> and forbidding any reverse engineering of their kits in order to enjoy the false feeling of security provided by the security through obscurity. The result? <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598">Cybercrime groups filing for bankruptcy unable to achieve a positive return on investment</a> due to their intellectual property getting pirated and their inability to enforce the licenses that they issue to their customers.<br />
<br />
We're definitely going to see more trivial, but then again, remotely exploitable vulnerabilities within popular crimeware kits, which can assist both the cybercrime analysts and naturally the cybercriminals themselves. For the time being, even the most sophisticated malware campaigns aren't fully taking advantage of the evasive and stealth tactics that the kits, or their common sense allows them to - let's see for how long.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/russias-fsb-vs-cybercrime.html">Russia's FSB vs Cybercrime </a><b><br />
</b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">Crimeware in the Middle - Zeus </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><b><b><br />
</b></b><br />
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      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 06:22:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular crimeware kits">popular crimeware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crimeware kits">crimeware kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pinch">pinch</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crimeware">crimeware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zeus crimeware kit">zeus crimeware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular pinch crimeware">popular pinch crimeware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/banker malware kit">banker malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/default crimeware kit">default crimeware kit</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/358495127/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</source>
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      <title><![CDATA[Even More Logging Questions - Answered]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/42419cabc2c6779620c8b8bb44fe54c9</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/42419cabc2c6779620c8b8bb44fe54c9</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I did this fun webcast on logging for accountability ( here ) and people asked a lot of good questions. Here are some of the answers for them and all my blog readers

Q1: How do you handle variety of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I did <a href="http://isc2.brighttalk.com/node/403">this fun webcast</a> on logging for accountability (<a href="http://isc2.brighttalk.com/node/403">here</a>) and people asked a lot of good questions. Here are some of the answers for them and all my blog readers.</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q1: How do you handle variety of log sources? There are so many, almost beyond my capability. </p>  <p>A1: Sorry to ponder the meaning of &quot;is&quot; here, but what is meant by &quot;handle&quot;? It is really not that hard to collect logs from a large number of diverse sources (as long as the logs can be delivered via syslog or exist as files and can be collected). Now, there will certainly be challenges&#160; when the volume of logs gets large, but if by &quot;handle&quot; you mean &quot;collect + store&quot;, it is really not that hard, given <a href="http://www.loglogic.com">the right tools.</a> Now, if &quot;handle&quot; means &quot;make sense of what all those logs are trying to tell you,&quot; it is a different story altogether.</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q2: You talked about the importance of logging; however for an intermediate or novice admin what are the starting steps .. what are the minimal logs they should start at once?</p>  <p>A2: Answered in <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/log-management-day-1.html">&quot;Log Management - Day 1&quot;</a> If you want a simple list of things to &quot;enable today,&quot;&#160; I cannot really answer it since I know neither your needs, nor your environment. In other words, this is the &quot;what is the meaning of life question?&quot; :-)</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q3: What regulations, rules or guidance exist regarding sharing or visibility of logs to users?</p>  <p>A3: PCI DSS says in Requirement 10.5:&#160; &quot;Secure audit trails so they cannot be altered.    <br /><em>10.5.1 Limit viewing of audit trails to those with a job-related need      <br /></em>10.5.2 Protect audit trail files from unauthorized modifications     <br />10.5.3 Promptly back-up audit trail files to a centralized log server or media that is difficult to     <br />alter&quot; </p>  <p>NIST guidance for FISMA also says something similar (for example, look in <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf">NIST 800-92 doc</a>). Overall, <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">log protection and security</a> are mentioned in many other regulations as well. </p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q4: Privileged groups membership monitoring in AD one of the most important from my point of view. However I did not find effective way to monitor/report on changes in those groups. Any recommendations?</p>  <p>A4: This is indeed a tricky one which might take more space to answer than I have here; it might also take you 'beyond logs.' One good source of information is <a href="http://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/encyclopedia.aspx">Randy Smith's site</a> and, specifically, his webinar on 'Active Directory &quot;Logging Gap&quot;' (<a href="http://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/aaad/">here somewhere</a>) - which covers how to audit things of that sort when then native logging is not sufficient.</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q5: How I can learn what exactly I need to log?</p>  <p>A5: OMG, this is a $1,000,000 question :-) Let me answer &quot;how can I learn&quot; part and not the &quot;what exactly I need to log part,&quot;&#160; (also see discussion on &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/02/must-do-logging-for-pci.html">MUST-DO Logging for PCI?</a>&quot;) as it is actually answerable. To learn what you need to log, first ask &quot;Why?&quot; (and then see <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/log-management-day-1.html">this</a>) - basically establish what you want to accomplish with logs, catalogue your systems, figure how to tweak the logging knobs - and then do it!</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q6: How granular should logging be? What is your recommendation for enterprise servers like domain servers and Windows servers?</p>  <p>A6: Again, too long to answer here in details (it will become a subject of a longer blog post later), but some pointers follow: <a href="http://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/blog/blog_commento.asp?blog_id=23&amp;month=05&amp;year=2007&amp;giorno=&amp;archivio=OK">here for Windows</a> (MS site also have a few recommendations on audit policies)</p>  <p>&#160; </p>  <p>Q7: What is &quot;more control&quot; and what is &quot;less control&quot; that you <a href="http://isc2.brighttalk.com/node/403">mention in the webcast</a>? Can you give an example?</p>  <p>A7: OK, I did say that &quot;sometimes when you implement more controls, you actually have less control.&quot; What do I mean? If you buy a firewall (a network security control) and then - over time, of course - configure it with 7800 rules (!) that are supposed to give you control over who can and cannot access your network, you will not gain control over your environment. You will actually be less in control of who is touching your network, compared to, say, having only 20 rules.</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q8: What about mandated NIST controls for government systems? Auditing is a specific control for Moderate and High risk systems. What list of events do you recommend for auditing?</p>  <p>A8: This is too long to answer here, but <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf ">NIST 800-92 Guide</a> is a really good source of such info (&quot;<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-92/SP800-92.pdf">Guide to Computer Security Log Management [PDF]</a>&quot;) Also, see my presentation on <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/nist-80092-log-management-guide-in-the-real-world/">NIST 800-92 Guide in the Real World</a>.</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Q9: The issue that many organizations get stuck on, is the monitoring process, and defining what exceptions to monitor for? Is there guidance / framework for this? How much of it is system specific and how much is applicable generally to all systems?</p>  <p>A9: I outlined some general ideas <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anton_chuvakin/what-every-organization-should-log-and-monitor">back in 2004 via this presentation</a>&#160;<em>(note to self - update that to be more 2008-relevant);</em> it is mostly general, but also has pointers to specific system. Keep in mind that it is focused on security, not operational monitoring (which is often no less important - in fact, often <a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/02/omg-availabilit.html">MORE important</a>)</p>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p>Enjoy! Sorry for being brief with some of the answers - I am woefully late with this even as they are...</p>  <p><strong>Other questions that I answered in the past:</strong></p>  <ul>   <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/05/more-log-management-questions-answered.html">More Log Management Questions - Answered!</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/04/some-burning-logging-questions-answered.html">Some Burning Logging Questions - Answered!</a> </li> </ul>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=juyDeK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=juyDeK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=o5WeXK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=o5WeXK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=mnNGqK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=mnNGqK" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/357664119" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2008 07:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log server">log server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log">log</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log sources">log sources</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log management">log management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/control">control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/questions">questions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific control">specific control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security control">network security control</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/log protection">log protection</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/357664119/even-more-logging-questions-answered.html">Even More Logging Questions - Answered</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cross-site scripting CAN be used to hack a server]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/731632e92c0fca2d6e043211ca4b8c08</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/731632e92c0fca2d6e043211ca4b8c08</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Likely you remember when Joseph Pierini at McAfee Secure / Hacker Safe said XSS wasn't important because &quot;cross-site scripting can't be used to hack a server. You may be able to do other things with...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Likely you remember when Joseph Pierini at McAfee Secure / Hacker Safe said XSS wasn't important because <span style="font-style:italic;">"cross-site scripting can't be used to hack a server. You may be able to do other things with it. You may be able to do things that affect the end-user or the client. But the customer data protected with the server, in the database, isn't going to be compromised by a cross-site scripting attack, not directly."</span><br />That gem has made McAfee <a href="http://pwnie-awards.org/2008/awards.html#lamestvendor" target="_blank">Pwnie</a> worthy (winners announced tomorrow!); may the Lamest Vendor win. <br />That said, anyone with a clue knows that XSS attacks are ideal for credential theft, and if you can steal credentials, you can hack a server.<br />Looking for a textbook example? Check out <a href="http://skeptikal.org/static.php?page=about_mckt" target="_blank">mckt's</a> new blog, <a href="http://skeptikal.org/" target="_blank">skeptikal.org</a>.<br /><span style="font-weight:bold;">Here's a highlight:</span><br /><span style="font-style:italic;">"Every cPanel user's account contains a file titled .contactemail in its home directory. This is used to tell the server and administrators who to email when things go south, and can be changed by the user through the cPanel interface, the file manager tool, FTP, or through local scripts. It's only a text file, after all. Assuming we set our email address to:<br />"onmouseover="alert(1337)<br />When the friendly system administrator tries to reset our email address (because we forgot our password, obviously), he will receive an alert box in his browser.<br />But an alert box doesn't really demonstrate anything. Fortunately the WHM (Web Hosting Manager) interface has enough functionality that we can perform just about any system-level task we want. This one will reset the root password to 'owned':<br />"onmouseover="f=document.forms[0];f.action='/scripts/passwd';f.user.value='root';<br />f.removeChild(f.domain);d=document.createElement('input');f.appendChild(d);<br />d.name='password';d.value='owned';d=document.createElement('input');f.appendChild(d);<br />d.name='password2';d.value='owned';f.submit()<br />Of course, the only limit is your imagination- WHM can set up cron jobs, add and delete users, send full backups to a server of your choice, and reformat hard drives."</span><br /><br />Hmm...I'd say that would be a server hack. ;-)<br />Welcome, Mike...keep up the good work.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/cross-site-scripting-can-be-used-to.html&title=Cross-site%20scripting%20can%20be%20used%20to%20hack%20a%20server " title="Cross-site scripting can be used to hack a server ">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/cross-site-scripting-can-be-used-to.html" title="Cross-site scripting can be used to hack a server ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 18:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server hack">server hack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hack">hack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/manager">manager</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file manager tool">file manager tool</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file">file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/root password">root password</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cpanel user">cpanel user</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/08/cross-site-scripting-can-be-used-to.html">Cross-site scripting CAN be used to hack a server</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/980eb4d1bd34b658bcb6d139b3d762f1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/980eb4d1bd34b658bcb6d139b3d762f1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Following the recent, and now fixed false positive blocking sans.org due to the already considered malicious dshield.org and giac.org it's also interesting to note that n.runs AG ( nruns.com ), whose...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJHp1ZiyMHI/AAAAAAAAB-8/ALBebqDtrl0/s1600-h/nruns_siteadvisor_false.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJHp1ZiyMHI/AAAAAAAAB-8/1_qCXyFB8b8/s200-R/nruns_siteadvisor_false.bmp" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Following the recent, and now fixed <a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4799">false positive blocking sans.org</a> due to the already considered malicious <b>dshield.org</b> and <b>giac.org</b> it's also interesting to note that n.runs AG (<b>nruns.com</b>), whose <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">research into vulnerabilities in antivirus products</a> received a lot of attention lately, is also flagged as <a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/nruns.com/downloads/15713425/">a dangerous site</a>.</div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><br />
Excluding the conspiracy theories, a false positive when your solution is integrated in the second most popular search engine is bad, especially when other <a href="http://www.google.com/safebrowsing/diagnostic?site=nruns.com">automated crawling approaches</a> are successfully detecting the site as a non-malicious one. How come? It's all a matter of how you define malicious activity, and what exactly are you trying to protect your users from.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJMiqmiaOxI/AAAAAAAAB_M/T74a9Ztjt8U/s1600-h/invisiblethings_siteadvisor.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJMiqmiaOxI/AAAAAAAAB_M/JtWk3WVLlug/s200-R/invisiblethings_siteadvisor.bmp" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>In this case, Site Advisor seems to be trying to protect the end user from herself, but flagging sites hosting some sort of hacking/pen-testing tool in a clear directory structure, since SiteAdvisor isn't capable of automatically flagging a SQL injected site as a malicious one, the approach it takes for assessing whether or not a specific site is malicious is flawed, namely integrating McAfee's signatures based malware database and flagging a site hosting anything detected as malware as a badware site itself. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/08/01/siteadvisor_sans_snafu/page2.html">McAfee's comments</a>:</div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><br />
"<i>Our tests are very accurate," Dowling said. "The frequency of false positives is fewer than one a month. Changes in classifications we make are almost always because sites have changed their behaviour. "The email tests are the ones than have the most false positives. Users can have confidence in our ratings.</i>"<br />
<br />
</div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJMjH58t8FI/AAAAAAAAB_U/jFxueEROzkM/s1600-h/hackinthebox_siteadvisor.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJMjH58t8FI/AAAAAAAAB_U/Wj65aLQMO3M/s200-R/hackinthebox_siteadvisor.bmp" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>There are even more surprising false positives, such as, <b>Hack in the Box security conference, Defcon.org, Zone-H France, Invisiblethings.org, AME Info - Middle East business and financial news</b> and more :</div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/milw0rm.com"><b>milw0rm.com</b></a></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/hackinthebox.org/summary/"><b>hackinthebox.org</b></a></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><b><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/defcon.org">defcon.org</a> <br />
<a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/hitb.org"><b>hitb.org</b></a></b></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><b><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/invisiblethings.org/summary/"><b>invisiblethings.org</b></a></b></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><b><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/zone-h.fr/summary/"><b>zone-h.fr</b></a></b></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><b><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/ussrback.com/summary/"><b>ussrback.com</b></a></b></div><div class="" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><b><b><a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/ameinfo.com">ameinfo.com</a></b><br />
<br />
</b>Take for instance the Hack in the Box security conference, which is considered as the <a href="http://www.siteadvisor.com/sites/hitb.org/downloads/11950271/">download publisher of a file hosted at packetstormsecurity.org</a>. What's interesting to point out is that just like a huge percentage of already flagged as potentially harmful sites that haven't been re-checked in months, with Hack in the Box's case the link was last checked in February, 2008. And since <b>hitb.org</b> is now distributing spyware, any site that it links to is also flagged as badware, like <b>hackinthebox.org</b> itself :<br />
<br />
"<i>When we tested this site we found links to hitb.org, which we found to be a distributor of downloads some people consider adware, spyware or other potentially unwanted programs.</i>'<br />
<br />
These sites aren't SQL injected, IFRAME-ed or embedded with malware whatsoever, so it's like flagging a gun store as a malicious store because of the inventory there - wrong generalization aiming to bring order into the underground chaos at the first place is prone to result in lots of false positives, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/insecure-bureaucracy-in-germany.html">a wrong mentality that certain countries are starting to embrace</a>.</div><br />
The bottom line - is the "<i>do not visit unknown or potentially harmful sites</i>" security tip on the verge of extinction? Probably, as these days, exploited legitimate sites are hosting or redirecting to more malware than potentially harmful sites are.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6BU3YK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6BU3YK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=WYGGVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=WYGGVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=osuqWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=osuqWk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ysc5ak"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ysc5ak" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=S0nWuK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=S0nWuK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=x7tmHK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=x7tmHK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ZdrCPk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ZdrCPk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/355386532" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 05:42:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site advisor">site advisor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/org due">org due</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/org">org</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/dangerous site">dangerous site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific site">specific site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malicious">malicious</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/harmful sites">harmful sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sites">sites</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/355386532/mcafees-site-advisor-blocking-nruns-ag.html">McAfee's Site Advisor Blocking n.runs AG - "for starters"</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Simulating Email in .NET]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0c454dbe28b5b63d07ee0089e019de77</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0c454dbe28b5b63d07ee0089e019de77</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I use email as a notification mechanism a lot, and often in class I'll demo sending email via a technique that I use frequently when developing code. It allows you to simulate sending an email...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I use email as a notification mechanism a lot, and often in class I&#39;ll demo sending email via a technique that I use frequently when developing code. It allows you to simulate sending an email message.</p> <p>The trick to doing this is not to hardcode things like host, port, etc. for your SMTP server when you use System.Net.Mail to send mail. Instead, use the default ctor for <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.net.mail.smtpclient.aspx" target="_blank">SmtpClient</a> as I&#39;ve done in the code below.</p> <blockquote><pre class="csharpcode"><span class="kwrd">static</span> <span class="kwrd">void</span> Main(<span class="kwrd">string</span>[] args)
{
    <span class="rem">// note the use of the MailAddress class</span>
    <span class="rem">// this allows me to specify display names as well as email addresses</span>
    MailAddress from = <span class="kwrd">new</span> MailAddress(<span class="str">&quot;admin@fabrikam.com&quot;</span>, <span class="str">&quot;Fabrikam Website&quot;</span>);
    MailAddress to = <span class="kwrd">new</span> MailAddress(<span class="str">&quot;mari@fabrikam.com&quot;</span>, <span class="str">&quot;Mari Joyce&quot;</span>);

    MailMessage msg = <span class="kwrd">new</span> MailMessage(from, to);
    msg.Subject  = <span class="str">&quot;Testing 123&quot;</span>;
    msg.Body = <span class="str">&quot;This is only a test!&quot;</span>;

    <span class="rem">// note use of default ctor</span>
    <span class="rem">// this looks in config to figure out how to send mail</span>
    <span class="kwrd">new</span> SmtpClient().Send(msg);
}</pre></blockquote>
.csharpcode, .csharpcode pre
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.csharpcode .rem { color: #008000; }
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<p>What you&#39;re telling .NET by using the default ctor for SmtpClient is, &quot;please use my config file to figure out how to send mail&quot;. Now you can use the system.net/mailSettings/smtp section in config to specify the details of your mail server, and all of the code in your app that is written to use the default SmtpClient ctor will inherit these settings. Here&#39;s an example of what the config on a production server might look like (if you put passwords in your config files, be sure to <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms998283.aspx" target="_blank">encrypt those sections</a>): </p><pre class="csharpcode"><span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">configuration</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
  <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">system.net</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">mailSettings</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
      <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">smtp</span> <span class="attr">deliveryMethod</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;Network&quot;</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
        <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">network</span> <span class="attr">host</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;mail.fabrikam.com&quot;</span>
                 <span class="attr">port</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;25&quot;</span>
                 <span class="attr">userName</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;WebsiteMailAccount&quot;</span>
                 <span class="attr">password</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;whatever&quot;</span><span class="kwrd">/&gt;</span>
      <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">smtp</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">mailSettings</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
  <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">system.net</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
<span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">configuration</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span></pre><pre class="csharpcode">&nbsp;</pre>
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<p>During development, I use different settings because I don&#39;t usually want to deal with the hassle of installing an SMTP server on my development box. Instead, I want email messages delivered as individual files in a directory on my hard drive (I always have a c:\mail directory on my development box for just this purpose):</p>
<blockquote><pre class="csharpcode"><span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">configuration</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
  <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">system.net</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">mailSettings</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
      <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">smtp</span> <span class="attr">deliveryMethod</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;SpecifiedPickupDirectory&quot;</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
        <span class="kwrd">&lt;</span><span class="html">specifiedPickupDirectory</span> <span class="attr">pickupDirectoryLocation</span><span class="kwrd">=&quot;c:\mail&quot;</span><span class="kwrd">/&gt;</span>
      <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">smtp</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
    <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">mailSettings</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
  <span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">system.net</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span>
<span class="kwrd">&lt;/</span><span class="html">configuration</span><span class="kwrd">&gt;</span></pre></blockquote>
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<p>Now when I run the program above, I get a .EML file in my c:\mail directory:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/keith/image_5F00_2.png"><img style="border-right:0px;border-top:0px;margin:0px 0px 0px 35px;border-left:0px;border-bottom:0px;" height="230" alt="image" src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/keith/image_5F00_thumb.png" width="404" border="0" /></a> </p>
<p>Outlook Express is normally registered as the viewer for .EML files, so double-click the file to view it:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/keith/image_5F00_4.png"><img style="border-right:0px;border-top:0px;margin:0px 0px 0px 35px;border-left:0px;border-bottom:0px;" height="287" alt="image" src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/cfs-file.ashx/__key/CommunityServer.Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/keith/image_5F00_thumb_5F00_1.png" width="292" border="0" /></a> </p>
<p>If you&#39;ve never seen this method of simulating email before, I hope you find it as useful as I have. Happy coding!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=52305" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 09:59:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csharpcode pre">csharpcode pre</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pre">pre</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csharpcode">csharpcode</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/color">color</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email">email</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/email addresses mailaddress">email addresses mailaddress</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mailaddress">mailaddress</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail server">mail server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mail">mail</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/08/01/simulating-email-in-net.aspx">Simulating Email in .NET</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/274149f12bf7d146a0527dd85513a6a5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/274149f12bf7d146a0527dd85513a6a5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It's all a matter of how you put it, and putting it like represents a good example of tactical warfare, namely, combining different tactics for the sake of making it harder to keep track of the impact...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-jQi_d3HI/AAAAAAAAB60/xkYP_cMkqC0/s1600-h/obfuscated_SQL_injection_fast_flux.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-jQi_d3HI/AAAAAAAAB60/heB4xfAF32k/s320-R/obfuscated_SQL_injection_fast_flux.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>It's all a matter of how you put it, and putting it like represents a good example of tactical warfare, namely, combining different tactics for the sake of making it harder to keep track of the impact of a particular SQL injection campaign. Consider the following examples of obfuscated domains, naturally being in a fast-flux in the time of the SQL injection that several Chinese script kiddies were taking advantage of :<br />
<br />
%6b%6b%36%2e%75%73 - <b>kk6.us</b><br />
%73%61%79%38%2E%75%73 - <b>s.see9.us </b><br />
%66%75%63%6B%75%75%2E%75%73 - <b>fuckuu.us </b><br />
%61%2E%6B%61%34%37%2E%75%73 - <b>a.ka47.us</b><br />
%61%31%38%38%2E%77%73 - <b>a188.ws</b><br />
%33%2E%74%72%6F%6A%61%6E%38%2E%63%6F%6D - <b>3.trojan8.com</b><br />
%6D%31%31%2E%33%33%32%32%2E%6F%72%67 - <b>m11.3322.org</b><br />
<br />
As always, these obfuscations are just the tip of the iceberg considering the countless number of other URL obfuscations techniques that spammers and phishers used to take advantage of on a large scale. For the time being, one of the main reasons we're not seeing massive SQL injections using such obfuscations is mostly because the feature hasn't been implemented in popular SQL injectors for copycat script kiddies to take advantage of. However, with the potential for evasion of common detection approaches, it's only a matter of personal will for someone to add this extra layer to ensure the survivability of the campaign.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-rWx8Z7QI/AAAAAAAAB68/ELjRSL8Bobw/s1600-h/real_player_exploit.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp1.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-rWx8Z7QI/AAAAAAAAB68/kWffly78SVM/s200-R/real_player_exploit.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The folks behind these obfuscations are naturally <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/underground-multitasking-in-action.html">multitasking on several different underground fronts</a>. Take for instance <b>3.trojan8.com </b>(58.18.33.248) also responding to <b>w2.xnibi.com </b>which is also injected at several domains, <b>w2.xnibi.com/index.gif</b> to be precise.<b> </b>The fake .gif file in the spirit of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/fake-directory-listings-acquiring.html">fake directory listings for acquiring traffic in order to serve malware</a>, is actually attempting to exploit a RealPlayer vulnerability - JS/RealPlr.LB!exploit. The deeper you go, the uglier it gets.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-massive-sql-injection.html">Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-hacking-for-vulnerabilities.html">Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1394">Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1118">Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=qerf8J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=qerf8J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=M97n6J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=M97n6J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=bexghj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=bexghj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=7Q82Qj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=7Q82Qj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=zZiRyJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=zZiRyJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=X0fmeJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=X0fmeJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ntQNRj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ntQNRj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/338377430" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2008 11:31:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injections">massive sql injections</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection campaign">sql injection campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/popular sql injectors">popular sql injectors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injection">massive sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site sql">site sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection">sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/338377430/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fedora's FreeIPA offers identity, security services]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d337550c39dd5f28440d902c3b154d6f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d337550c39dd5f28440d902c3b154d6f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[An ambitious open source project hopes to provide a unified directory and authentication server, but needs more interoperability work to become a viable competitor for Novell Identity Manager or...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An ambitious open source project hopes to provide a unified directory and authentication server, but needs more interoperability work to become a viable competitor for Novell Identity Manager or Microsoft Active Directory.<p><A href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=1316?">
<IMG src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=1316?" border="0" width="468" height="60"></A>
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft active directory">microsoft active directory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/directory">directory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source project hopes">source project hopes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/novell identity manager">novell identity manager</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/authentication server">authentication server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/viable competitor">viable competitor</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide">provide</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ambitious">ambitious</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/071008-freeipa.html?fsrc=rss-security">Fedora's FreeIPA offers identity, security services</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Introducing Microsoft Code Name Zermatt]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/732b3e6ffabbf1bdf556615c13244f16</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/732b3e6ffabbf1bdf556615c13244f16</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For a couple of years now, I've been giving talks about &quot;claims-based identity&quot;, and &quot;claims-aware applications&quot;. The most concrete example of a claims-based identity architecture that I've been able...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For a couple of years now, I&#39;ve been giving talks about &quot;claims-based identity&quot;, and &quot;claims-aware applications&quot;. The most concrete example of a claims-based identity architecture that I&#39;ve been able to show so far is Active Directory Federation Services v1 (ADFS) and Windows CardSpace. And the claims programming model I&#39;ve been using is the one that shipped with WCF in the System.IdentityModel assembly.<br /><br />But today I&#39;m happy to announce that there&#39;s a new path forward in the claims world. <a href="https://connect.microsoft.com/Downloads/DownloadDetails.aspx?SiteID=642&amp;DownloadID=12937">Zermatt</a> is the &quot;identity framework&quot; that I&#39;ve been itching to talk about, but until today, hasn&#39;t been announced publicly.<br /><br />Well, <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/">Vittorio</a> just made the <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/archive/2008/07/09/announcing-the-beta-release-of-zermatt-developer-identity-framework.aspx">announcement</a> just a moment ago, and now you can get your hands on this new framework. With it, you can build web applications and services that rely on claims to discover identity details about users. And you can easily build a security token service (STS) that supplies those claims. Zermatt makes this possible by supplying all of the plumbing that implements WS-Trust (for web services) and WS-Federation (for browser-based web applications). All you have to do is figure out what claims you want to issue based on what you know about the user and what you know about the application (aka relying party).<br /><br />I was fortunate to be asked by the team to write the <a href="https://connect.microsoft.com/Downloads/DownloadDetails.aspx?SiteID=642&amp;DownloadID=12901">white paper</a> introducing Zermatt to developers. You can download it here. The paper introduces the ideas behind claims-based identity, and talks about how you can use Zermatt to centralize authentication (and to some degree, authorization) in an STS, thus making it easy to achieve single sign on in your applications, and even be ready to federate with other organizations or platforms should that need arise.<br /><br />Here are some highlights of what you&#39;ll find in Zermatt:<br /><br />Zermatt includes a new claims programming model, with IClaimsPrincipal and IClaimsIdentity, two new interfaces that extend the existing IPrincipal and IIdentity that you already know and love from the .NET Framework. IClaimsIdentity adds a collection of claims. Zermatt&#39;s claims programming model is in many ways simpler than that in WCF - the Claim class exposes the value of claims as strings (always) and calls the value of a claim &quot;Value&quot;, instead of &quot;Resource&quot; as WCF did. But the model is also more sophisticated - multi-hop delegation is supported, so one user can &quot;Act As&quot; another user, and the relying party will see the entire chain of delegation as a linked list of IClaimsIdentity objects.<br /><br />Zermatt includes an HttpModule that you can wire into your ASP.NET application that will implement WS-Federation for you. This module (called the FAM) is a lot like the &quot;Web Agent&quot; from ADFS, and it makes it quite easy to build a web application that relies on claims.<br /><br />Zermatt includes plumbing that sits on top of WCF and simplifies building claims-based web services and clients.<br /><br />Zermatt also includes a couple of ASP.NET controls for adding SignIn functionality to websites. The first is a passive sign-in control which simply redirects the browser to an STS to get claims. The second is the highly anticipated InformationCard control that pops the user&#39;s identity selector and lets her choose which identity she wants to use.<br /><br />Zermatt comes with a bunch of sample code to help you get started.<br /><br />All you need to test-drive Zermatt is Visual Studio 2008 and your curiosity. Download the beta now, read the whitepaper, experiment with the samples, and see what claims-based identity is all about!<br /><br />For more on Zermatt, you&#39;ll want to watch <a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/">Vittorio&#39;s blog</a>. I&#39;ll also be talking more about it in the future!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=51689" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 16:27:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zermatt">zermatt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims world">claims world</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims">claims</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/zermatt includes">zermatt includes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/includes">includes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/claims-aware applications">claims-aware applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/framework">framework</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity framework">identity framework</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/07/09/introducing-microsoft-code-name-zermatt.aspx">Introducing Microsoft Code Name Zermatt</source>
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