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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: discussion]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/discussion</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2008 11:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Fun Reading on Security - 8]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d60cc90ef226fd7624953a3c03f282d4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot; Fun Reading on Security .&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008
Great...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Instead of my usual &quot;blogging frenzy&quot; machine gun blast of short posts, I will just combine them into my new blog series &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Fun Reading on Security</a>.&quot; Here is an issue #7, dated October 2nd, 2008.</p>  <ol>   <li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=162936">Great paper</a> that complements the whole &quot;SIEM is dead?&quot; saga - &quot;Most enterprises are looking for a product that <em>will solve all of their problems in some sort of off-the-shelf miracle</em>, and when they find out that the currently available tools can't do it, they either postpone their deployment or put them on the back burner. &quot; </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001093.html">The Mess: looking for someone to blame?</a>&quot; is an awesome piece on Internet security and its architecture - and so is Gunnar's follow-up (&quot;<a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/if-a-tree-falls-in-someone-elses-silo.html">If a tree falls in someone else's silo...</a>&quot;) </li>    <li>Mike call to &quot;<a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/rise-up-against-mediocrity">Rise up against Mediocrity</a>.&quot;&#160; - &quot;Dilbert makes the risk of the lowest common denominator approach abundantly clear.&quot;; in other words, you say 'best practices', I say 'mediocrity!' Mike also remind us, in vain, to do &quot;Security FIRST!&quot; (and compliance second) </li>    <li>A great piece from Burton: &quot;<a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">On Response</a>&quot; - I think the world needs another 10-20 million reminders that PREVENTION FAILS. <a href="http://srmsblog.burtongroup.com/2008/08/on-response.html">This</a> is definitely a good one for those still in the &quot;we'll just block the threat world&quot; - &quot;we will not win a continuing war of escalation&quot; and &quot;using response can be more cost effective than installing the latest and greatest preventative tool&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/2008/08/security-metric.html">More on metrics</a>, including the highly-awaited ISO27004. </li>    <li><a href="http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/64598.html">Pretty dumb paper</a> by a person confused by why PCI DSS exists (the guy needs to read <a href="http://treasuryinstitute.org/blog/index.php?itemid=174">this</a>). PCI doesn't &quot;fall short,&quot; it helps people who will otherwise not do <em>anything</em> and their systems will &quot;power&quot; those botnets of the future... </li>    <li>While we are on this subject: <a href="http://pcianswers.com/2008/10/01/pci-dss-version-12-differences-and-updates/">a really good coverage of PCI 1.2. changes</a>, released Oct 1st. More PCI fun <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/11/recap-cso-executive-seminar-on-pci-compliance-by-james-deluccia/">here.</a> And more <a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">here</a> (&quot;<a href="http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/stuart_king/2008/09/i-was-supposed-to-be.html">PCI Compliance - dispelling some common myths</a>&quot;). And, <a href="http://www.estoregfoa.org/StaticContent/staticpages/TM0508.htm#1c">more PCI myths</a>. And <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-29-2008">more good ideas</a> on PCI from Mike R. Sorry, can't stop thinking about PCI :-)&#160; - also <a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/09/19/the-inside-story-of-pci-confessions-of-a-qsa-commentary-by-james-deluccia/">this is good.</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/23/behavioral-monitoring/">Adrian on behavioral monitoring</a>; mostly in DAM, but also elsewhere in security. </li>    <li>&quot;<a href="http://www.darkreading.com/blog.asp?blog_sectionid=327&amp;doc_id=164144">Premature Chasm-Crossing</a>&quot;&#160; - a must-read for all security vendors and especially their marketing (and&#160; their easily-excitable PR teams...) - &quot;Shouldn't vendors be spending more time fighting the problems that security managers are facing today, right this minute?&quot; (Mike R <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/the-daily-incite-september-24-2008">also comments</a> on that). A related - and&#160; just as interesting point is made here: &quot;<a href="http://blogs.computerworld.com/security_is_not_a_solution">Security is not a solution</a>&quot; </li>    <li><a href="http://www.csoonline.com/article/print/450190">More</a> on compliance and security checklists, good and bad: &quot;I think this is a dangerous trend unless the &quot;checklist&quot; is all inclusive.&quot; (how can a checklist include <strong>ALL? :-)</strong>) </li>    <li><a href="http://forensics.sans.org/community/top7_forensic_trends.php">&quot;SANS Top 7 New IR/Forensic Trends In 2008&quot;</a> </li>    <li>Read &quot;<a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/09/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html">The three approaches to computer security!</a>&quot;&#160; Why? Come on, it is from <a href="http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com">Joanna</a>! :-) </li>    <li><a href="http://rationalsecurity.typepad.com/blog/2008/09/ids-vitamins-or-prophylactic.html">A fun discussion</a> about a hot new technology:<em> network IDS. </em>Is IDS <em>absolutely</em> indispensable to <em>ALL</em> companies? No. Can it be incredibly useful? You bet. End of discussion. </li>    <li>On an unrelated note, are lasers the future of warfare? <a href="http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/why-lasers-wont.html">Some say no.</a> </li>    <li>Finally, some security humor from Gartner (!): &quot;<a href="http://blogs.gartner.com/greg_young/2008/09/30/get-rich-quick-with-network-security/">Get Rich Quick With Network Security</a>&quot; </li> </ol>  <p>Enjoy!</p>  <p><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/reading">Previous security reading.</a></p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 06:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security managers">security managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/previous security">previous security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci">pci</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci dss exists">pci dss exists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci fun">pci fun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security checklists">security checklists</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network security">network security</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/409462346/fun-reading-on-security-8.html">Fun Reading on Security - 8</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Modelling The Global Financial Meltdown]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/15c8ebf58fa47d569eb7cdbc4039c683</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/15c8ebf58fa47d569eb7cdbc4039c683</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday I received a call from Penny Grosman , Senior Editor, Wall Street &amp; Technology . Penny was interested in my opinion, Will risk management applications be the next killer app for CEP on Wall...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday I received a call from <a href="http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/penny-crosman/" target="_blank">Penny Grosman</a>, Senior Editor, <a href="http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/" target="_blank">Wall Street &amp; Technology</a>.   Penny was interested in my opinion, &#8220;Will risk management applications be the next killer app for CEP&#8221; on Wall Street.    I enjoyed talking with Penny.  She caught up with me leaving a tailor&#8217;s shop in Chiang Mai, so I hope she did not mind hearing my stories of buying unique Northern Thai cotton fabric and designing my own casual shirts in the economic turndown.</p>
<p>We read many stories on the net where folks claim that the current financial crisis could have been avoided with more or better use of technology.     This is expected, as software companies and IT professionals will often try to piggy-backtheir business development strategy on the &#8220;crisis of the day&#8221; to sell more goods and services.    Honestly, in this current situation, the main technology that we needed was simple, accurate financial models.</p>
<p>For example, in the chart above, the US economy was doing quite well with US federal funds rates low.   Housing prices in the US were skyrocketing and there was a concern about inflation.    There was an understandable concern the sustainability of that economy.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><img class="aligncenter" style="vertical-align: bottom;" src="http://www.thewrittenblog.com/main_1/images/97kcpv16xjh0uvsi8k7kdhaw.gif" alt="" width="277" height="415" /></p>
<p>So, in perhaps one the most ill-advised Federal Reserve actions of many decades, the folks at the helm of the Fed decided to raise their lending rates around 500 percent over a two year period.</p>
<p>As we all know, primarily because of the action by the Fed, the world faces perhaps the worst economic disaster in modern times, while the US Executive Branch and the Congress fight over how to spend $700 Billion taxpayer dollars to inject liquidity into the markets to try to head off a global financial disaster.</p>
<p>It is amazing to me that the US Federal Government, or their advisors, does not have simple financial models with cause-and-effect analysis such as:</p>
<ul>
<li>Homeowners with adjustable rate mortuages will not be able to make payments;and</li>
<li>Housing prices will fall dramatically; then</li>
<li>Homeowners will default on loans where the collateral is much less than the asset value, and</li>
<li>Banks will suffer great losses, and</li>
<li>Lending will come to a halt, then</li>
<li>Banks will collapse, then</li>
<li>Wall Street will exit the markets in panic</li>
<li>&#8230; and more trouble&#8230;.. !!</li>
</ul>
<p>There are and continue to be a lot of discussion and opinions about how risk management needs improvement. and I agree.   We will also read folks talk about how technology can be used to help solve this problem, including CEP/EP and related software (see also <!-- This wrapper class appears only on Page and Single Post pages. --><a title="Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land" rel="bookmark" href="../2008/06/23/capital-market-cep-fantasy-land/">Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land</a>). However, as much I would be pleased to see more CEP/EP applications and use cases, I do not believe that event processing technology is really very useful to solve the core problem of the current financial crisis.</p>
<p>The core problem is, seemingly, that our &#8220;financial experts&#8221; do not even have simple models that will illustrate what will or could happen when you raise the fed lending rates 500 percent in two years in an economy pregnant with adjustable rate mortgages.</p>
<p>To me, this does not appear to be rocket science.  The negligence by the US Federal Reserve and their advisors is astonishing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 02:33:20 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple financial models">simple financial models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial models">financial models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current financial crisis">current financial crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crisis">crisis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simple">simple</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technology">technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall street">wall street</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/main technology">main technology</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/folks">folks</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/10/02/modelling-the-global-financial-meltdown/">Modelling The Global Financial Meltdown</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Monthly Blog Round-Up - September 2008]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7bcc00d7fa1280bf6a276c7c821e4445</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7bcc00d7fa1280bf6a276c7c821e4445</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[As we all know, blogs are a bit &quot;stateless&quot; and a lot of good content gets lost since many people, sadly, only pay attention to what they see today . These monthly round-ups is an attempt to remind...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As we all know, blogs are a bit &quot;stateless&quot; and a lot of good content gets lost since many people, sadly, only pay attention to what they see <em>today</em>. These <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/Monthly">monthly round-ups</a> is an attempt to remind people of useful content from the past month!</p>  <p>So, here is my next <strong>monthly <a href="chuvakin.blogspot.com/">&quot;Security Warrior&quot; blog</a> </strong>round-up of top 5 popular posts and topics.</p>  <ol>   <li>Shockingly, <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/monthly-blog-round-up-august-2008.html">AGAIN</a> this month, the &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/top-11-reasons-to-secure-and-protect.html">Top 11 Reasons to Secure and Protect Your Logs</a>&quot; came up as #1 most popular post (maybe driven by <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/08/poll-9-how-much-log-security-do-you.html">my poll</a>).&#160; BTW, see <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/poll">my other logging polls</a>. </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/ROI">Security ROI</a> - and its parent topic &quot;security metrics&quot;/&quot;measuring security&quot; - is definitely an ongoing <strong>HOT</strong> debate. Indeed, the old post <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/07/security-roi-pile-up.html">&quot;</a><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/07/security-roi-pile-up.html">Security ROI Pile-Up!</a><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/07/security-roi-pile-up.html">&quot;</a> takes the #2 spot this month, possibly propelled by a more recent post &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/second-roi-war.html">Second ROI War</a>.&quot;</li>    <li>Some say that &quot;short blog posts rule&quot;, but, in reality, good, fun content is the best. Here is an example:&#160; &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/dumb-luck-is-strategy.html">Dumb Luck IS a Strategy!</a>&quot; post makes the top list. In it, I try to explore why people still ignore security concerns even if stare people in the face...</li>    <li>Discussion on what you can do to soften the impact of &quot;getting 0wned&quot; ( &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/what-can-you-do.html">What CAN You Do?</a>&quot;) made the top list. Good!</li>    <li>As before, my post &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/06/11-signs-that-your-siem-is-dog-or-you.html">11 Signs That Your SIEM Is A Dog or &quot;Raffy, You Killed SIM!&quot;</a>&quot;. It is both humorous and sadly true (and <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/cgi-bin/mailto/x.cgi?pagetosend=/export/home/httpd/htdocs/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&amp;pagename=/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&amp;pageurl=http://www.networkworld.com/reviews/2008/063008-test-siem.html&amp;site=security">backed up by other sources</a>) </li>    <li>Still burning hot is a post with my irreverent comments on a Terry Childs saga. Namely, &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/on-doomsaying-terry-childs-case.html">On Doomsaying (Terry Childs case)</a>&quot;, &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/on-doomsaying-terry-childs-case.html">So ... Am I? Maybe I Am!</a>&quot; and &quot;<a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/admins-good-guys-or-am-not-idiot.html">Admins , Good Guys or &quot;I am NOT an Idiot!&quot;</a>&quot; </li> </ol>  <p><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/Monthly">See you</a> in October.</p>  <p><strong>Possibly related posts / past monthly popular blog round-ups:</strong></p>  <ul>   <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/monthly-blog-round-up-august-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - August 2008</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/08/monthly-blog-round-up-july-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - July 2008</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/07/monthly-blog-round-up-june-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - June 2008</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/06/monthly-blog-round-up-may-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - May 2008</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/05/monthly-blog-round-up-april-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - April 2008</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/04/monthly-blog-round-up-march-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - March 2008</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/03/monthly-blog-round-up-february-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - February 2008</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/02/monthly-blog-round-up-january-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - January 2008</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/01/monthly-blog-round-up-december-2007.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - December 2007</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/11/monthly-blog-round-up-november-2007.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - November 2007</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/11/monthly-blog-round-up-october-2007.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - October 2007</a>&#160;&#160; </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/10/monthly-blog-round-up-september-2007.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - September 2007</a> </li>    <li><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/08/monthly-blog-round-up-august-2007.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - August 2007</a> </li> </ul>  <p>&#160;</p>  <p></p>  <div class="wlWriterSmartContent" id="scid:0767317B-992E-4b12-91E0-4F059A8CECA8:7192e29b-e335-4630-8b0b-dc37806d54ee" style="padding-right: 0px; display: inline; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; padding-top: 0px">Technorati Tags: <a href="http://technorati.com/tags/blog" rel="tag">blog</a>,<a href="http://technorati.com/tags/security" rel="tag">security</a>,<a href="http://technorati.com/tags/loggings" rel="tag">loggings</a>,<a href="http://technorati.com/tags/monthly" rel="tag">monthly</a></div>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 12:19:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monthly blog round-up">monthly blog round-up</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog round-up">blog round-up</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/monthly">monthly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security roi pile-up">security roi pile-up</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security roi">security roi</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ignore security concerns">ignore security concerns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security metrics">security metrics</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/408700309/monthly-blog-round-up-september-2008.html">Monthly Blog Round-Up - September 2008</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4d2aae6d17ac0d88114660137a62c55f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Earlier this week, during the OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference , the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation the Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this week, during the <a href="http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=OWASP_NYC_AppSec_2008_Conference">OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference</a>, the people behind the ubiquitous CISSP certification announced their latest creation &#8212; the <a href="http://isc2.org/csslp">Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional</a> (CSSLP).  In front of a captive audience waiting for a 42&#8243; plasma TV to be raffled, the <a href="http://blog.isc2.org/isc2_blog/tipton/index.html">Executive Director of (ISC)2</a> outlined this new certification designed to appeal to application security professionals.  To his credit, Mr. Tipton stated very clearly that the CSSLP is not intended to measure one&#8217;s technical skillset.  Unfortunately, it&#8217;s inevitable that employers will treat it as such.</p>
<p>You can read all the details on their website (except for the part about the certification not being a measure of practical skills).  From what I can tell, the CSSLP is just the CISSP with different CBKs, or Common Bodies of Knowledge.  As with the CISSP, they are going for broad knowledge, not depth.  Starting in June 2009, you can get certified by taking a paper exam, likely a multiple choice test similar to the CISSP.  Why June?  Because the test isn&#8217;t even written yet &#8212; I&#8217;ve heard from several sources that they are actively soliciting their existing pool of CISSPs to help write test questions.</p>
<p>Ah, but what if you can&#8217;t wait that long and want to get certified <i>right away</i>?  You&#8217;re in luck. If you act before March 31, 2009, you can get grandfathered in without even having to take the exam!  That&#8217;s right, they call it the <a href="https://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?category=1691">CSSLP Experience Assessment</a>, and here are the requirements:</p>
<div style="float:right; margin-left: 15px"><a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money.jpg"><img src="http://www.veracode.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/101-hand_with_money-191x300.jpg" alt="" title="101-hand_with_money" width="191" height="300" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-372 photoborder" /></a></div>
<ul>
<li>Upload a resume showing three years of experience related to software security, or four years if you don&#8217;t have a college degree</li>
<li>Write short essays (500 words maximum) discussing four CBKs of your choice</li>
<li>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</li>
<li>Pay $650</li>
<p>
</ul>
<p>Let&#8217;s examine these requirements one at a time.</p>
<p><b>Three years of experience</b>.  (ISC)2 doesn&#8217;t provide any requirements on depth of experience, other than citing the broadly-defined CBKs.  Considering they are targeting everyone from software developers to security assessors to business analysts (yes, really), chances are they are going to accept any experience that is even tangential to the SDLC or software security.</p>
<p><b>Short essays on four of the CBKs</b>.  I asked the (ISC)2 exhibitors specifically what they are looking for to satisfy this requirement, and they said the essays should be a general discussion of the CBK topic, <i>optionally</i> citing your personal experience in that area if you have any.  This messaging is not quite aligned with the website guidance, which states that the essays should be &#8220;Accomplishment Records&#8221; which are self-reported descriptions of experience.  Either way, with a maximum essay length of 500 words, it&#8217;s pretty obvious that substance is not (ISC)2&#8217;s first priority.  Here&#8217;s one data point for you: I spoke to someone who has already submitted the CSSLP Experience Assessment, and he said it took about an hour to write the essays.</p>
<p><b>Get a CISSP to vouch for you</b>.  Actually this can be any (ISC)2 certified person, not just CISSPs.  Contrary to what you&#8217;d expect, though, the person isn&#8217;t vouching for your skillset so much as they are confirming that the attestations on your resume are accurate.</p>
<p><b>Pay $650</b>.  You knew it was coming.  After all, there is money to be made.  How is it that qualifying for the CSSLP through professional experience should cost $650?  If you&#8217;re taking the written exam, fair enough, (ISC)2 does incur the cost of administering and grading that exam (even though the <a href="http://www.scantron.com/datacollection/scanners.aspx">Scantron machine</a> is probably paid off by now).  But $650 for the submitted-online Experience Assessment?  If we assume that the person reading these essay submissions makes a rather generous $100k per year, then $650 accounts for roughly a day and a half.  Will it really take that long to read a <i>maximum</i> of 2,000 words and pass judgment?  Of course not.  (ISC)2 wants to get as many people as possible to qualify based on &#8220;experience&#8221;, seeding the initial pool of CSSLPs and netting them $650 per head for doing next to nothing.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.ljkushner.com/about_mstr.html">Lee Kushner</a> stated during his OWASP AppSec presentation (<i>7 Habits of Highly Effective Career Managers</i>), &#8220;the more people who own a cert, the less relevant it becomes.&#8221;  Irrelevant &#8212; that&#8217;s exactly what the CISSP has become, and it&#8217;s exactly where the CSSLP is headed.  Meanwhile, (ISC)2 will sit back and watch while you and your employers continue to fill their coffers.</p>
<p>In closing, let me acknowledge that this blog entry probably comes across as judgmental.  I accept that.  I&#8217;m not ranting against the idea of certifications, though admittedly <a href="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/04/not-a-cissp/">I&#8217;m not a fan of them either</a>.  I am disappointed that (ISC)2, an organization with tremendous influence, could have created something more meaningful but chose not to. Why bother when people will just fork over the cash anyway?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 11:08:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp">csslp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/csslp experience assessment">csslp experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience assessment">experience assessment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/certification">certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/experience">experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isc">isc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal experience">personal experience</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ubiquitous cissp certification">ubiquitous cissp certification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cissp">cissp</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/09/isc2s-newest-cash-cow-csslp/">(ISC)2s Newest Cash Cow: The CSSLP Certification</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The 10 Top Cybersecurity Threats for 2008, AMCHAM & OWASP Thailand]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/82f0bbf4754462f71a9f9c3ac66ff1bf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/82f0bbf4754462f71a9f9c3ac66ff1bf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Last year, in collaboration with IT security experts from (ISC)2 and the LinkedIn professional network, I published The Top Ten Cybersecurity Threats for 2008 . In a joint meeting with interested...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last year, in collaboration with IT security experts from (ISC)2 and the LinkedIn professional network, I published <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/01/05/the-top-ten-cybersecurity-threats-for-2008/" target="_blank">The Top Ten Cybersecurity Threats for 2008</a>.  In a joint meeting with interested <a href="http://www.amchamthailand.com" target="_blank">AMCHAM Thailand</a> guests from the Open Web Application Security Project (<a href="http://www.owasp.org" target="_blank">OWASP</a>), Thailand, Chapter, we will review the 2008 top 10 cybersecurity threats and facilitate an open discussion on these threats, including how these cybersecurity threats could impact AMCHAM members.  The presentation will be at the J. W. Marriott on October 21, 2008 (details to follow).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 06:06:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threats">threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cybersecurity threats">cybersecurity threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/thailand">thailand</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/top">top</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/amcham thailand guests">amcham thailand guests</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/linkedin professional network">linkedin professional network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impact amcham">impact amcham</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security experts">security experts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/owasp">owasp</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/29/the-10-top-cybersecurity-threats-for-2008-amcham-owasp-thailand/">The 10 Top Cybersecurity Threats for 2008, AMCHAM &amp; OWASP Thailand</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[CEP, Politics, and Decision Making]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/4e349d27b47bdef874454b93f7a7a6b2</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/4e349d27b47bdef874454b93f7a7a6b2</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I have changed my mind about injecting presidential politics into The CEP Blog. I thought about linking complex events and politics into a discussion on complex events and the decision making process...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have changed my mind about injecting presidential politics into The CEP Blog.  I thought about linking complex events and politics into a discussion on complex events and the decision making process.</p>
<p>However, this approach risks alienating folks who take their politics serious or have other concerns.   For that reason,  I am going to go another, less political, direction on The CEP Blog.  I will not blog on the US presidential election here.</p>
<p>In my next series of  blog posts I will discuss how asymmetric event processing and asymmetric situational awareness was the genesis for complex event processing.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 05:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/politics">politics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog">blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cep blog">cep blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex events">complex events</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential politics">presidential politics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blog posts">blog posts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/asymmetric situational awareness">asymmetric situational awareness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/presidential election">presidential election</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/complex event">complex event</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/09/29/cep-politics-and-decision-making/">CEP, Politics, and Decision Making</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Virtues and Dangers of Security and Compliance]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c851d24e675867c73b9ed6b8c8f43676</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c851d24e675867c73b9ed6b8c8f43676</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Last week I made a flying visit to NYC to appear on a panel at Interop with John Pironti of Getronics, Khalid Kark of Forrester, Jennifer Mack of the PCI Standards Council and Jim Routh of DTCC. The...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week I made a flying visit to NYC to appear on a panel at Interop with John Pironti of Getronics, Khalid Kark of Forrester, Jennifer Mack of the PCI Standards Council and Jim Routh of DTCC. The subject was &quot;Security By Compliance - A Discussion of Information Risk Management's Greatest Challenge&quot;.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pci standards council">pci standards council</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information risk management">information risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/khalid kark">khalid kark</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jennifer mack">jennifer mack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/jim routh">jim routh</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/compliance">compliance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/john pironti">john pironti</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/visit">visit</category>
      <source url="http://www.rsa.com/blog/blog_entry.aspx?id=1356">The Virtues and Dangers of Security and Compliance</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Around The Web For Friday]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/854f3c7cd7fbfd4b803df29d7a415b9d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Were frequently asked what were reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed
COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We&#8217;re frequently asked what we&#8217;re reading and what we like in blog posts, so here are some interesting things that hit our RSS readers that you may have missed:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.itskeptic.org/node/692"><strong>COBIT rivals ITIL from The IT Skeptic</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Everyone is tiptoeing around the fact that COBIT offers a significant competitive body of knowledge (BOK) to ITIL. Sure ITIL goes into more depth in places, but to say COBIT sits over the top is to grossly understate the overlap. COBIT extends a long way down into the &#8220;how&#8221; and it does it with an intellectual rigour that ITIL lacks.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Interesting stuff that.  A detailed mapping might help some folks.  Either way, the good news for those keen on understanding risk management is that governance metrics, done right, allow us to understand a part of that &#8220;capability to manage risk&#8221; we&#8217;re always looking for.   Assurance, verification and the acquisition and interpretation of knowledge is king.   Speaking of which&#8230;.</p>
<p><a href="http://spiresecurity.typepad.com/spire_security_viewpoint/2008/09/how-to-tell-when-nothing-happens.html"><strong>How To Tell When &#8220;Nothing Happens&#8221; by Pete Lindstrom</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;&#8230;problem is that, it isn&#8217;t really true that &#8220;nothing happens&#8221; when you employ some specific security control to prevent an exploit. Not only that, but even when it is difficult to collect data on what didn&#8217;t happen, one can devise experiments to tell how frequently that nothing occurred.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Good</em> analysis is all about the uncertainty.   Speaking of accounting for uncertainty&#8230;</p>
<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2008/09/assets-good-until-reached-for.html"><strong>Assets Good Until Reached For by Gunnar Peterson</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you have a 100,000 dekstops or 100,000 servers it hard to manage. You will need to automate and to do that you need to abstract, but you should also realize that its a drawing on a whiteboard not reality. You need abstraction assurance.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And there&#8217;s the trick.  We might call &#8220;abstraction assurance&#8221; an analog to &#8220;confidence&#8221; or &#8220;uncertainty&#8221; in certain priors (metrics) or posteriors (calculated values based on those metrics).  The stronger that abstraction assurance is, the less uncertainty we have in our knowledge and the better our ability to create wisdom from that knowledge (you know, make decisions).</p>
<p><a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/archives/2005/12/epstein_snow_an.html"><strong>Epstein, Snow and Flake: Three Views of Software Security by Adam Shostack</strong></a></p>
<p>Adam&#8217;s focus is on software security, but the discussion here can be abstracted out into the broader realm of risk management quite nicely.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/825?ref=rss"><strong>Two-thirds of firms hit by cybercrime from Security Focus</strong></a></p>
<p>The US DoJ says that in 2005 (there&#8217;s some timely data) 2/3 of their surveyed firms detected at least one cybercrime.  &#8220;Cybercrime&#8221; is &#8220;classified &#8230; into cyber attacks, cyber theft, and other incidents.&#8221;  Pretty general.  Also from the report:  &#8220;Computer viruses made up more than half of all cyber attacks.&#8221;</p>
<p>(That sound you hear is me tapping my forehead lightly on large iron object)</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.ca-grc.com/2008/09/lessons-learned-from-%E2%80%9Cpersonal%E2%80%9D-risk-management/"><strong>Lessons Learned from “Personal” Risk Management By: Christopher Daugherty</strong></a></p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;This process is what I call “personal risk management.”  All of us have done it and will continue to do so.  Why is it, then, many companies have ignored following similar principles with the on-going health of the business?  This is a debate with many different answers so I ask you to select the best answer for your employer:</p>
<p>a) Have not ignored as this keeps me awake at night!</p>
<p>b) Please restate the problem, I cannot hear well with my head buried in the sand.</p>
<p>c) We passed our SOX audit so we checked this off the list!</p>
<p>d) We are informed of the challenge but we have a business to run and profits to make</p>
<p>e) Is this what internal audit and risk management has been telling us?&#8221;</p></blockquote>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 08:56:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/call abstraction assurance">call abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/abstraction assurance">abstraction assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal risk management">personal risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk management">risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assurance">assurance</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil">itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/itil lacks">itil lacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cobit rivals itil">cobit rivals itil</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software security">software security</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=450">Around The Web For Friday</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[SDL Sessions at BlueHat]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bddb4f5b0c8437f73140811dafbc6401</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bddb4f5b0c8437f73140811dafbc6401</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Bryan here. Last January, I wrote a post on this blog bemoaning the difficulty of making security interesting and sexy to developers. Applied research conferences generally place a much greater...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Bryan here. Last January, I wrote a post on this blog bemoaning the difficulty of making security interesting and “</FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/01/29/sexy-development-lifecycle.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>sexy</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3>” to developers. Applied research conferences generally place a much greater emphasis on revealing new vulnerabilities and new attack techniques, and much less emphasis on educating people on how to actually fix those vulnerabilities. I was at </FONT><A href="http://www.rsaconference.com/"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>RSA Conference</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> last April, and I attended a session by a very well-regarded, high-profile security researcher. He gave an eloquent and educational presentation on the dangers of a significant new attack vector, but all the prescriptive guidance he gave for dealing with the threat amounted to something like, “If you’re worried about this kind of thing, talk to your browser manufacturer.” No offense to this presenter, but if I’m going to listen to 70 minutes of discussion of a dangerous threat, I want to leave the room with a clear understanding of what I can do to solve the problem! It’s not enough just to know that the problem exists.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>So, in conjunction with the </FONT><A href="http://blogs.technet.com/bluehat/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>BlueHat</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri> team, I am pleased to announce that the SDL team will be organizing the sessions for the second day of the fall BlueHat conference. The BlueHat SDL sessions will be laser-focused on not just describing vulnerabilities but also solving them. Every attendee should leave every presentation with a clear idea of exactly what he or she needs to do to protect themselves from the threat that was discussed during the session.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>The sessions will begin, appropriately, with the topic of secure design. Danny Dhillon of </FONT><A href="http://www.emc.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>EMC</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> and the SDL team’s own Adam Shostack will each present their organization’s approach to threat modeling. As a bonus, Adam will also be demonstrating the new </FONT><A href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/1/5/0/150636A9-9EA8-4D00-9E6B-2723F4C188B4/Microsoft%20SDL%20Threat%20Modeling%20Tool%203.0.pdf"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>SDL Threat Modeling tool</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> that you might have heard about </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/16/sdl-press-tour-announcements.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>last week</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Next up is Matt Miller, a recent and very welcome </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2008/08/18/matt-miller-joins-the-security-science-team.aspx"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>addition</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3> to the Microsoft Security Science team. Matt has a fantastic presentation on the evolution of buffer overflow attacks and on the corresponding development of overflow mitigations. From there we will switch gears to look at some managed code implementation issues: </FONT><A href="http://www.isecpartners.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>iSEC Partners</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>’ Scott Stender and Alex Vidergar will demonstrate coding techniques to mitigate elusive concurrency vulnerabilities in web applications.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>At this point we will have covered the Design and Implementation phases of the SDL; where better to go from here than Verification? One of the most important activities in the Verification phase is fuzzing, and we have a trio of security experts from the Microsoft Security Science team to talk about it. Jason Shirk, Lars Opstad, and Dave Weinstein will answer three of the most common fuzzing questions: How should I fuzz? When have I fuzzed enough? And what do I do now that I’ve fuzzed? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Finally, we will wrap up the Verification phase talks with a return appearance to BlueHat by </FONT><A href="http://www.stachliu.com/"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Stach &amp; Liu</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>’s Vinnie Liu. Vinnie will compare different approaches to security verification – static code analysis, blackbox analysis, and manual code review – and make recommendations as to when each approach is best used.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt"><FONT face=Calibri size=3>Even if you can’t make it in to BlueHat in person, you can still watch the sessions via streaming media on </FONT><A href="http://technet.microsoft.com/"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>TechNet</FONT></A><FONT face=Calibri size=3>. Additionally, webcast interviews with the speakers – condensed “Cliff’s Notes” versions of their full presentations – will be posted on </FONT><A href="http://channel9.msdn.com/Search/Default.aspx?Term=bluehat"><FONT face=Calibri color=#0000ff size=3>Channel 9</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>. And we’ll be continuing the BlueHat tradition of inviting speakers and other industry notables to guest blog about their topics and the latest security trends. More information on all of these resources will be posted here when it becomes available.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8965212" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 12:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl">sdl</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat">bluehat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sessions">sessions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl team">sdl team</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sdl threat">sdl threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat sdl sessions">bluehat sdl sessions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bluehat conference">bluehat conference</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verification phase talks">verification phase talks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verification phase">verification phase</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/09/25/sdl-sessions-at-bluehat.aspx">SDL Sessions at BlueHat</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Is PCI DSS "Too Prescriptive"?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3dfc59dd4876349ed35372715a67d3d7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3dfc59dd4876349ed35372715a67d3d7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I did this fun panel on PCI compliance at SecureWorld Bay Area the other week. What is interesting is that almost every time there is a discussion about PCI DSS, somebody crawls out of the woodwork...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I did this <u><a href="http://secureworldexpo.com/events/index.php?id=255">fun panel on PCI compliance at SecureWorld Bay Area</a></u> the other week. What is interesting is that almost every time there is a discussion about PCI DSS, somebody crawls out of the woodwork and utters the following: &quot;<strong>PCI is too prescriptive!</strong>&quot;, as if it is a bad thing (e.g. I mentioned it before <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/04/rsa-impressions-2-compliance.html">here</a>)</p>  <p>I used to react to this with &quot;<em>Are you stupid?!</em> PCI being prescriptive is the best thing since sliced cake :-) Finally, there is some specific guidance for people to follow and be more secure!&quot; BTW, in many cases end users who have to comply with PCI DSS <strong>still</strong> think it is &quot;too fuzzy&quot; and &quot;not specific enough&quot; (e.g. see <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/02/must-do-logging-for-pci.html">&quot;MUST-DO Logging for PCI&quot;</a></u>); and they basically ask for&#160; &quot;<strong>a compliance TODO list</strong>.&quot; (also see <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/08/few-more-words-on-dlp-and-compliance.html">this</a> and especially <a href="http://securosis.com/2008/08/18/dont-sell-compliance-if-it-isnt-a-checkbox/">this</a> on compliance checklists)</p>  <p>But every time it happens, I can't stop but think - why do people even utter such utter heresy? :-) And you know what?&#160; I think I got it!</p>  <p>When people say &quot;PCI is too prescriptive,&quot; they actually mean that it engenders &quot;<u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/04/rsa-impressions-2-compliance.html">checklist mentality</a></u>&quot; and leads to following the letter of the mandate blindly, without thinking about WHY it was put in place (to protect cardholder data, share risk/responsibility, etc). For example, it says &quot;use a firewall&quot; and so they deploy a shiny firewall with a simple &quot;ALLOW ALL&lt;-&gt;ALL&quot; rule (an obvious exaggeration - but you get the point!) Or they have <u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2008/09/dumb-luck-is-strategy.html">a firewall with a default password unchanged</a></u>... In addition, the proponents of &quot;PCI is too prescriptive&quot; tend to think that fuzzier guidance (and, especially, prescribing the desired end state AND not the tools to be installed) will lead to people actually thinking about the best way to do it.</p>  <p>So the choices are:</p>  <ol>   <li><strong>Mandate the tools</strong> (e.g. &quot;must use a firewall&quot;) - <strong>and risk</strong> &quot;checklist mentality&quot;, resulting in BOTH insecurity and &quot;false sense&quot; of security. </li>    <li><strong>Mandate the results</strong> (e.g. &quot;must be secure&quot;) -&#160; <strong>and risk</strong> people saying &quot;eh, but I dunno how&quot; - and then not acting at all, again leading to insecurity. </li> </ol>  <p>Take your poison now?! Isn't compliance fun? What is the practical solution to this? I personally would take the pill #1 over pill #2 (and that is why I like PCI <a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2007/08/free-pci-compliance-book-chapter-on.html">that much</a>), but with some pause to think, for sure.&#160; I think organizations with less mature security programs will benefit at least a bit from #1, while those with more mature programs might &quot;enjoy&quot; #2 more...</p>  <p>BTW, this post was originally called &quot;Isn't Compliance Fun?!&quot;&#160; I had a few fierce debates with some friends and all of them&#160; piled on me to convince me that &quot;compliance is boring, while security is fun!&quot; The above does illustrate that there are worthy and exciting intellectual challenges in the domain of regulatory compliance. It is not [only] a domain of minimalists (who just &quot;want the auditor to go away&quot;) and <u><a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/rise-up-against-mediocrity">mediocrity</a></u>, as some think. What makes security fun - the people aspect, the ever-changing threat landscape, cool technology, high uncertainty, even risk - also apply to compliance ...</p>  <p>So, need a cool marketing slogan BUT <u></u><a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/pragmatic-cso-podcast-10-its-so-easy">hate &quot;making compliance easy&quot;</a>?&#160; Go for &quot;Making Compliance Fun!&quot; :-)</p>  <p><u><a href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/search/label/PCI">All posts on PCI</a></u> - some are fun:-)</p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2008 11:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/400214601/is-pci-dss-prescriptive.html">Is PCI DSS "Too Prescriptive"?</source>
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