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  <channel>
    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: distribute]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2008 05:25:12 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hackers spoof MSNBC alerts in new twist on massive malware ruse]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8da128fc823587718e6bc7213808229c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8da128fc823587718e6bc7213808229c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[A group of hackers that last week was touting CNN to distribute malware this week changed its message to push stories said to be from rival network...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A group of hackers that last week was touting CNN to distribute malware this week changed its message to push stories said to be from rival network MSNBC.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=RQX4ZZ"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=RQX4ZZ" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/364182025" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rival network msnbc">rival network msnbc</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/push stories">push stories</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/week">week</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hackers">hackers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cnn">cnn</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/message">message</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/364182025/article.do">Hackers spoof MSNBC alerts in new twist on massive malware ruse</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Software Liabilities and Free Software]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dd4800aaf10918236391882307e39b57</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dd4800aaf10918236391882307e39b57</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Whenever I write about software liabilities , many people ask about free and open source software. If people who write free software, like PasswordSafe , are forced to assume liabilities, they will...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Whenever I <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jul/17/internet.security">write</a> <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/information_sec_1.html">about</a> <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-116.html">software</a> <a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-025.html">liabilities</a>, many people ask about free and open source software.  If people who write free software, like <a href="http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html">PasswordSafe</a>, are forced to assume liabilities, they will simply not be able to and free software would disappear.</p>

<p>Don't worry, they won't be.</p>

<p>The key to understanding this is that this sort of contractual liability is part of a contract, and with free software -- or free anything -- there's no contract.  Free software wouldn't fall under a liability regime because the writer and the user have no business relationship; they are not seller and buyer.  I would hope the courts would realize this without any prompting, but we could always pass a Good Samaritan-like law that would protect people who distribute free software.  (The opposite would be an Attractive Nuisance-like law -- that would be bad.)</p>

<p>There would be an industry of companies who provide liabilities for free software.  If Red Hat, for example, sold free Linux, they would have to provide some liability protection.  Yes, this would mean that they would charge more for Linux; that extra would go to the insurance premiums.  That same sort of insurance protection would be available to companies who use other free software packages.</p>

<p>The insurance industry is key to making this work.  Luckily, they're good at protecting people against liabilities.  There's no reason to think they won't be able to do it here.</p>

<p>I've written more about liabilities and the insurance industry <a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6">here</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=eikXNJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=eikXNJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=znVSvJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=znVSvJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 10:42:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free software">free software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free software packages">free software packages</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute free software">distribute free software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software liabilities">software liabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/liabilities">liabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/assume liabilities">assume liabilities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free linux">free linux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/07/software_liabil.html">Software Liabilities and Free Software</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Distributed Memory in Blackboard Systems]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c8294d6fcd37560ac3558a8a3914fdaa</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c8294d6fcd37560ac3558a8a3914fdaa</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Paul Vincent, ex-colleague at TIBCO, kindly responds to A Brief Introduction to Blackboard Architectures with Blackboards for Complex Event Processing . Paul correctly mentions that TIBCOs...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paul Vincent, ex-colleague at TIBCO, kindly responds to <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/20/a-brief-introduction-to-blackboard-architectures/" target="_blank">A Brief Introduction to Blackboard Architectures</a> with <a title="Permalink" href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/07/25/blackboards-for-complex-event-processing/">Blackboards for Complex Event Processing</a>.   Paul correctly mentions that TIBCO&#8217;s BusinessEvents software is an excellent scheduling component in a blackboard systems architecture.</p>
<p>However, I should briefly clarify Paul&#8217;s note that &#8220;<em>blackboard systems historically used a single memory model (i.e. multiple threads or processes using a single machine’s memory model)</em>&#8220;.</p>
<p>In fact, there were many blackboard systems, some more than a decade old, that used a distributed memory data-model.   What I think Paul meant to say, and my apologies to Paul for being so literal, is that &#8220;<em>blackboard systems <strong>originally </strong>used a single memory model (i.e. multiple threads or processes using a single machine’s memory model)</em>&#8221;</p>
<p>John McManus, <a href="http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ocio/about/j_mcmanus_bio.html" target="_blank">former CTO of NASA</a>, wrote an excellent PhD dissertation in 1992,  <a href="http://www.thecepblog.com/tb/pdf/mcmanus_thesis_blackboard.pdf" target="_blank">Design and Analysis Techniques for Concurrent Blackboard Systems</a>.    John&#8217;s thesis, now more than 16 years old, examined many details of concurrent blackboards where memory is distributed.  For example, refer to<em> Figure 2.3. Distributed Blackboard System with Distributed Blackboard Data Structure, </em> page 36 of John&#8217;s dissertation.</p>
<p>Quoting directly from page 37 of John&#8217;s disseration;</p>
<blockquote><p>Rice, Aiello and Nii [20] present several options for gaining speedups in a distributed blackboard system.</p>
<ul>
<li>1) Eliminate the centralized scheduling mechanism</li>
<li>2) Optimize system design for a distributed memory, message-passing hardware</li>
<li>3) Distribute the data across the blackboard to reduce hotspots</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<p>Quoting further from the same page;</p>
<blockquote><p>Poligon [21] is based on a distributed memory hardware model when each processor is viewed as a blackboard node. They define a blackboard node as follows: <em>“a blackboard node is a process on a processor, surrounded by a collection of processors able to service its requests to execute rules.” </em>[22] The implicit assumption in this definition is that all knowledge sources are rule–based systems. This assumption may severely limit the performance of systems implemented using Poligon, and limits the types of problems it is suited to address.</p></blockquote>
<p>In <a title="Permalink" href="http://tibcoblogs.com/cep/2008/07/25/blackboards-for-complex-event-processing/">Blackboards for Complex Event Processing</a>, Paul concludes, <em></em></p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;One suspects the blackboard systems domain and terminology is overdue some updates thanks to developments in the Complex Event Processing space.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>If you look at the historical literature, I would say that the following restatement is more accurate:</p>
<blockquote><p><em>&#8220;The CEP domain and terminology is overdue some updates because folks working in CEP did not reference or incorporate the advanced event processing prior art in a number of very important areas, blackboard systems being only one.&#8221;</em></p></blockquote>
<p>On the other hand,  commercial off-the-shelf rule-processing technology such as TIBCO&#8217;s BusinessEvents (BE), advances the ability to economically implement myriad complex problems that blackboard systems are designed to address.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 26 Jul 2008 03:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard systems architecture">blackboard systems architecture</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard">blackboard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concurrent blackboard systems">concurrent blackboard systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard architectures">blackboard architectures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard system">blackboard system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/memory">memory</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard systems domain">blackboard systems domain</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blackboard systems">blackboard systems</category>
      <source url="http://www.thecepblog.com/2008/07/26/distributed-memory-in-blackboard-systems/">Distributed Memory in Blackboard Systems</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With all this talk and reporting about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the potential security benefits of Cloud Computing
In my view, there are some strong technical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Is the glass half empty or half full?" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/94094843@N00/2292559560/" target="_blank"><img class="alignright" style="border: 0; float: right; margin: 3px;" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3004/2292559560_378f226531_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Is the glass half empty or half full?" /></a></p>
<p>With all this <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org">talk</a> and <a href="http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=685308">reporting</a> about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the <strong>potential security benefits</strong> of Cloud Computing.</p>
<p>In my view, there are some strong technical security arguments in favour of Cloud Computing - assuming we can find ways to manage the risks.</p>
<p>With this new paradigm come challenges <strong>and </strong>opportunities.  The challenges are getting plenty of attention - I&#8217;m regularly afforded the opportunity to <a href="http://www.gridtoday.com/grid/2422309.html">comment</a> on them, plus obviously I cover them on this blog.  However, lets not lose sight of the potential upside.</p>
<p>In this post, I walk through seven technical security benefits.  Some are immediate, others may arise over time and have conditions attached (some unstated for the sake of brevity).  However, I&#8217;m including the longer-range benefits now to raise awareness.  Some of the outcomes listed are available today without the Cloud, but they are either complex and slow to implement (and thus less likely to happen) or prohibitive for capital cost reasons.  I don&#8217;t claim this is a definitive list - it reflects where my thinking is today.</p>
<p>Some benefits depend on the Cloud service used and therefore do not apply across the board.  For example; I see no solid forensic benefits with SaaS.  Also, for space reasons, I&#8217;m purposely not including the &#8216;flip side&#8217; to these benefits, however if you read this blog regularly you should <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org/2008/04/24/cloud-stacks-please-mind-the-gap/">recognise some</a>.</p>
<p>On a sidenote, I believe the Cloud offers Small and Medium Businesses major potential security benefits.  Frequently SMBs struggle with limited or non-existent in-house INFOSEC resources and budgets.  The caveat is that the Cloud market is still very new - security offerings are somewhat foggy - making selection tricky.  Clearly, not all Cloud providers will offer the same security.</p>
<h4>Seven Technical Security Benefits of the Cloud</h4>
<h4>1. Centralised Data</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduced Data Leakage</strong>: this is the benefit I hear most from Cloud providers - and in my view they are right.  How many laptops do we need to lose before we get this?  How many backup tapes?  The data &#8220;landmines&#8221; of today could be greatly reduced by the Cloud as thin client technology becomes prevalent.  Small, temporary caches on handheld devices or Netbook computers pose less risk than transporting data buckets in the form of laptops.  Ask the CISO of any large company if all laptops have company &#8216;mandated&#8217; controls consistently applied; e.g. full disk encryption.  You&#8217;ll see the answer by looking at the whites of their eyes.  Despite best efforts around asset management and endpoint security we continue to see embarrassing and disturbing misses.  And what about SMBs?  How many use encryption for sensitive data, or even have a data classification policy in place?</li>
<li><strong>Monitoring benefits</strong>: central storage is easier to control and monitor.  The flipside is the nightmare scenario of <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/most-attractive-targets-saas/">comprehensive data theft</a>.  However, I would rather spend my time as a security professional figuring out smart ways to protect and monitor access to data stored in one place (with the benefit of situational advantage) than trying to figure out all the places where the company data resides across a myriad of thick clients!  You can get the benefits of Thin Clients today but Cloud Storage provides a way to centralise the data faster and potentially cheaper.  The logistical challenge today is getting Terabytes of data to the Cloud in the first place.</li>
</ul>
<h4>2. Incident Response / Forensics</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Forensic readiness</strong>: with Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, I can build a dedicated forensic server in the same Cloud as my company and place it offline, ready for use when needed.  I would only need pay for storage until an incident happens and I need to bring it online.  I don&#8217;t need to call someone to bring it online or install some kind of remote boot software - I just click a button in the Cloud Providers web interface.  If I have multiple incident responders, I can give them a copy of the VM so we can distribute the forensic workload based on the job at hand or as new sources of evidence arise and need analysis.  To fully realise this benefit, commercial forensic software vendors would need to move away from archaic, physical dongle based licensing schemes to a network licensing model.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence acquisition time</strong>: if a server in the Cloud gets compromised (i.e. broken into), I can now clone that server at the click of a mouse and make the cloned disks instantly available to my Cloud Forensics server.  I didn&#8217;t need to &#8220;find&#8221; storage or have it &#8220;ready, waiting and unused&#8221; - its just there.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate or reduce service downtime</strong>: Note that in the above scenario I didn&#8217;t have to go tell the COO that the system needs to be taken offline for hours whilst I dig around in the RAID Array hoping that my physical acqusition toolkit is compatible (and that the version of RAID firmware isn&#8217;t supported by my forensic software).  Abstracting the hardware removes a barrier to even doing forensics in some situations.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence transfer time</strong>: In the same Cloud, bit fot bit copies are super fast - made faster by that replicated, distributed filesystem my Cloud provider engineered for me.  From a network traffic perspective, it may even be free to make the copy in the same Cloud.  Without the Cloud, <strong>I </strong>would have to a lot of time consuming and expensive provisioning of physical devices.  I only pay for the storage as long as I need the evidence.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate forensic image verification time</strong>: Some Cloud Storage implementations expose a cryptographic checksum or hash.  For example, Amazon S3 generates an MD5 hash <a href="http://docs.amazonwebservices.com/AmazonS3/2006-03-01/index.html?RESTObjectPUT.html">automagically</a> when you store an object.  In theory you no longer need to generate time-consuming MD5 checksums using external tools - its already there.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease time to access protected documents</strong>: Immense CPU power opens some doors.  Did the suspect password protect a document that is relevant to the investigation?  You can now test a wider range of candidate passwords in less time to speed investigations.</li>
</ul>
<h4>3. Password assurance testing (aka cracking)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decrease password cracking time</strong>: if your organisation regularly tests password strength by running password crackers you can use Cloud Compute to decrease crack time and you only pay for what you use.  Ironically, your cracking costs go up as people choose better passwords ;-).</li>
<li><strong>Keep cracking activities to dedicated machines</strong>: if today you use a distributed password cracker to spread the load across non-production machines, you can now put those agents in dedicated Compute instances - and thus stop mixing sensitive credentials with other workloads.</li>
</ul>
<h4>4. Logging</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>&#8220;Unlimited&#8221;, pay per drink storage</strong>: logging is often an afterthought, consequently insufficient disk space is allocated and logging is either non-existant or minimal.  Cloud Storage changes all this - no more &#8216;guessing&#8217; how much storage you need for standard logs.</li>
<li><strong>Improve log indexing and search</strong>: with your logs in the Cloud you can leverage Cloud Compute to index those logs in real-time and get the benefit of <a href="http://blogs.splunk.com/thewilde/2008/06/24/splunk-ninja-inside-the-cloud/">instant search results.</a> What is different here?  The Compute instances can be plumbed in and scale as needed based on the logging load - meaning a true real-time view.</li>
<li><strong>Getting compliant with Extended logging</strong>: most modern operating systems offer extended logging in the form of a C2 audit trail.  This is rarely enabled for fear of performance degradation and log size.  Now you can &#8216;opt-in&#8217; easily - if you are willing to pay for the enhanced logging, you can do so.  Granular logging makes compliance and investigations easier.</li>
</ul>
<h4>5. Improve the state of security software (performance)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Drive vendors to create more efficient security software</strong>: Billable CPU cycles get noticed.  More attention will be paid to inefficient processes; e.g. poorly tuned security agents.  Process accounting will make a comeback as customers target &#8216;expensive&#8217; processes.  Security vendors that understand how to squeeze the most performance from their software will win.</li>
</ul>
<h4>6. Secure builds</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Pre-hardened, change control builds</strong>: this is primarily a benefit of virtualization based Cloud Computing.  Now you get a chance to start &#8217;secure&#8217; (by your own definition) - you create your Gold Image VM and clone away.  There are ways to do this today with bare-metal OS installs but frequently these require additional 3rd party tools, are time consuming to clone or add yet another agent to each endpoint.</li>
<li><strong>Reduce exposure through patching offline</strong>: Gold images can be kept up securely kept up to date.  Offline VMs can be conveniently patched &#8220;off&#8221; the network.</li>
<li><strong>Easier to test impact of security changes</strong>: this is a big one.  Spin up a copy of your production environment, implement a security change and test the impact at low cost, with minimal startup time.  This is a big deal and removes a major barrier to &#8216;doing&#8217; security in production environments.</li>
</ul>
<h4>7. Security Testing</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduce cost of testing security: </strong>a SaaS provider only passes on a portion of their security testing costs.  By sharing the same application as a service, you don&#8217;t foot the expensive security code review and/or penetration test.  Even with Platform as a Service (PaaS) where your developers get to write code, there are potential cost economies of scale (particularly around use of code scanning tools that sweep source code for security weaknesses).</li>
</ul>
<h4>Your Thoughts?</h4>
<p>What benefits do you see that I haven&#8217;t included in the above list?  Where do you agree/disagree and importantly, why?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/341289594" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security benefits">technical security benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/based">based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization based cloud">virtualization based cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficient security software">efficient security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud market">cloud market</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/341289594/">Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Kaspersky Labs Trying to Crack 1024-bit RSA]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/aa0caaeca17e311bedbbcd607ba03d1b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/aa0caaeca17e311bedbbcd607ba03d1b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I can't figure this story out. Kaspersky Lab is launching an international distributed effort to crack a 1024-bit RSA key used by the Gpcode Virus. From their website : We estimate it would take...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I can't figure <a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9965381-7.html">this</a> <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9094818">story</a> out.  Kaspersky Lab is launching an international distributed effort to crack a 1024-bit RSA key used by the Gpcode Virus.  From their <a href="http://forum.kaspersky.com/lofiversion/index.php/t71652.html">website</a>:</p>

<blockquote>We estimate it would take around 15 million modern computers, running for about a year, to crack such a key.</blockquote>

<p>What are they smoking at Kaspersky?  We've never factored a 1024-bit number -- at least, not outside any secret government agency -- and it's likely to require a lot more than 15 million computer years of work.  The current factoring record is a <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/05/307digit_number.html">1023-bit number</a>, but it was a special number that's easier to factor than a product-of-two-primes number used in RSA.  Breaking that Gpcode key will take a lot more mathematical prowess than you can reasonably expect to find by asking nicely on the Internet.  You've got to understand the current best mathematical and computational optimizations of the Number Field Sieve, and cleverly distribute the parts that can be distributed.  You can't just post the products and hope for the best.</p>

<p>Is this just a way for Kaspersky to generate itself some nice press, or are they confused in Moscow?</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=r4mqbI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=r4mqbI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=MsgTZI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=MsgTZI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2008 08:30:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rsa">rsa</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/1024-bit">1024-bit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kaspersky">kaspersky</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/1024-bit rsa key">1024-bit rsa key</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key">key</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crack">crack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kaspersky lab">kaspersky lab</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mathematical">mathematical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/million modern computers">million modern computers</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/kaspersky_labs.html">Kaspersky Labs Trying to Crack 1024-bit RSA</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated Identity Management]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ef093eaea3b874268cd0b9e351ce05ad</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ef093eaea3b874268cd0b9e351ce05ad</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Digital identities can be associated with everything from people to software applications to entire companies, but human digital identities prove the most interesting and challenging. Human digital...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Digital identities can be associated with everything from people to software applications to entire companies, but human digital identities prove the most interesting and challenging. Human digital identities can simplify network usage and enable new classes of applications, but they also introduce security and privacy risks. Federated identity management addresses scenarios in both enterprise and consumer contexts by defining how to dynamically distribute identity information and delegate identity tasks across security domains. This article explains federated identity's components, discusses security and privacy risks and architectural challenges, surveys the SAML, OpenID, and InfoCard protocols, and reviews new developments in federated identity management.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=55404aba0883f2cbf2e6986645f4303d"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=55404aba0883f2cbf2e6986645f4303d"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=55404aba0883f2cbf2e6986645f4303d" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2008 02:22:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity">identity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity management">identity management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity tasks">identity tasks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/human digital identities">human digital identities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/digital identities">digital identities</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy risks">privacy risks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute identity information">distribute identity information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/software applications">software applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/applications">applications</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=55404aba0883f2cbf2e6986645f4303d">The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated Identity Management</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Oklahoma State University Parking Services server is compromised]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f74dd3d54ef8465c68b7797c38075517</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f74dd3d54ef8465c68b7797c38075517</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
5/14/08

Organization
Oklahoma State University (&quot;OSU

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
OSU Parking &amp; Transit Services

Victims
OSU faculty, staff and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/okstate.jpg" align="right" height="127" width="198"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>5/14/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://osu.okstate.edu/">Oklahoma State University ("OSU")</a>&nbsp; <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.parking.okstate.edu/">OSU Parking &amp; Transit Services</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>OSU faculty, staff and students who had purchased a parking permit between July 2002 and March 2008<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>as many as 70,000<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, addresses and Social Security numbers"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"Oklahoma State University has discovered that a server under the control of OSU Parking and Transit Services had been accessed from another country without authorization. The database contained confidential information, specifically the names, addresses and Social Security numbers of OSU faculty, staff and students who had purchased a parking permit between July 2002 and March 2008."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://idalert.okstate.edu/incident_00003.html">Oklahoma State University Alert</a> <br><a href="http://www.koco.com/news/16267153/detail.html">KOCO Channel 5 News</a> <br><a href="http://ocolly.com/2008/05/15/student-faculty-and-staff-info-exposed-in-osu-parking-server-breach/">The Daily O'Collegian</a> <br><a href="http://newsok.com/osu-admits-computer-security-breach/article/3243594/?tm=1210801442">The Oklahoman</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Oklahoma State University<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>STILLWATER, Okla. -- Personal information belonging to anybody who got a parking pass at Oklahoma State University over the last five years has been compromised, university officials said Wednesday.<br><br>Oklahoma State University has discovered that a server under the control of OSU Parking and Transit Services had been accessed from another country without authorization. The database contained confidential information, specifically the names, addresses and Social Security numbers of OSU faculty, staff and students who had purchased a parking permit between July 2002 and March 2008.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] What does the OSU Parking and Transit Services department need Social Security numbers for?&nbsp; Do you suppose information security personnel knew that sensitive personal information was stored on the server prior to this incident?</span><br><br>Upon discovering this intrusion, the IT Information Security Office immediately removed the server from the network to evaluate server activity to ascertain if personal information had been accessed.<br><br>The confidential information has been removed from the database.<br><br>The illegal access was limited to the parking and transit server.<br><br>As a result of its investigation, OSU believes the intruder's purpose and only action was to use the OSU server for storage capacity and bandwidth to upload and distribute illegal and inappropriate content.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder if I am getting this right.&nbsp; Was there a direct network path from the public Internet through a firewall to the compromised database server running http, ftp, or some other file transfer protocol?&nbsp; That's not cool.&nbsp; A database server storing confidential information should not be accessible from the internet directly through a firewall. It is generally a good practice to separate the database function from the file transfer function into different servers and different firewall DMZs.&nbsp; All this for parking?&nbsp; Ugh.</span><br><br>OSU contacted and worked with federal law enforcement authorities.<br><br>After evaluation of all available data related to this incident, OSU found no evidence which would indicate that the database was copied or viewed by the hacker; however, OSU cannot say with 100 percent certainty that the hacker did not access personally identifiable information.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder what evidence they looked for and how they went about gathering it.</span><br><br>We are not aware of any instances of misuse of this information or of any identify theft as a result of the temporary availability of this information.<br><br>OSU recommends you carefully review any bills or financial transactions you receive in the near future to ensure that the charges associated with your accounts are accurate.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Yeah!&nbsp; Review your bills (pay them occasionally) and financial transactions carefully.&nbsp; But wait, you do this already?&nbsp; Disappointing statement coming from an organization that did not carefully review their controls in securing your personal information.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>OSU President Burns Hargis said, "This breakdown in security is totally unacceptable. We are conducting a full review and will take whatever steps are necessary to protect our network from unauthorized access. This is a serious matter and we will deal with it aggressively. We regret the circumstances and concern this situation has caused."<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is my favorite statement from this story!&nbsp; What do you suppose his stance was prior to being notified of the breach?&nbsp; </span><br><br><span style="font-style: italic;">In my experience, there are primarily ("primarily" because there are always exceptions) four types of senior information security management.&nbsp; You have the organizations that just don't get it and don't really care or know that they don't get it.&nbsp; These organizations lose information over and over and dangerously continue to operate in a business as usual manner. </span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Secondly, you have the organizations that didn't get it, suffer some adverse event, then HOLY &amp;$#^!&nbsp; They respond with all guns blazing and overspend on controls they don't need and run a very cost ineffective security program (I guess they really never got it either).&nbsp; </span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Thirdly, there is the company that didn't get it, suffered an adverse event and admitted they have a problem.&nbsp; These companies may seek guidance and consultation in the effort to build a comprehensive information security program.&nbsp; These programs should be built around business objectives and sound risk management.&nbsp; </span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-style: italic;">Lastly, there are the companies that were proactive and built a sound information security program because it was good business.&nbsp; These organizations didn't need an adverse event or breach before taking action.&nbsp; These organizations don't panic when an adverse event occurs.&nbsp; They know that eventually an adverse event will occur and they will be prepared when it does.</span><br style="font-style: italic;"><br>The server is believed to have been compromised on November 23, 2007. OSU learned of the breech [sic] on March 20, 2008 and blocked access to the server immediately.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Wow.&nbsp; The server was 0wn3d (like my 1337 5p34k?) for almost 4 months before anyone noticed?!&nbsp; That is way, way, way too long for a compromised server to go unnoticed.&nbsp; We can now assume that there was no effective IDS/IPS (host or network) and no effective logging and monitoring of the server.</span><br><br>The OSU Parking Department has altered their procedures for the collection of private information. Additionally, the server which was located at the OSU Parking Service's office will be relocated to the IT Data Center for enhanced security. OSU is conducting a full review and will be taking additional steps to protect our network from unauthorized access.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It's a very good idea to not collect private information if it is not required.&nbsp; It's too bad that it took a breach for this to happen.&nbsp; Moving the server from the Parking Service's office to the IT Data Center will help protect against physical security attacks, but this was a logical attack.&nbsp; Maybe the IT Data Center has better firewalls or something <img src="http://breachblog.com/emoticons/smile.png" border="0" />.&nbsp; I like the "full review".&nbsp; This should be done no less than annually.</span><br><br>The IT Information Security Office has made security recommendations to the OSU Parking Office which include physical relocation of their server and database to a more secure location, additional training for server administrators, and added vulnerability assessments.<br><br>Q. How will I know if any of my personal information was used by someone else? <br>A. The best way to find out is to obtain your credit reports from the three major credit bureaus: Equifax, Experian and Trans Union. If you notice accounts on your credit report that you did not open or applications for credit ("inquiries") that you did not make, these could be indications that someone else is using your personal information, without your permission.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] "If you notice accounts on your credit report that you did not open or applications for credit ("inquiries") that you did not make", then chances are you have <span style="font-weight: bold;">already</span> become an identity-theft victim.&nbsp; I'm not saying whether this is likely, or not.</span><br><br>Q. Why did you have my personal information? <br>A. You provided this information to us when you applied to Oklahoma State University, or during your tenure as a student or employee here. Oklahoma State, like other institutions, maintains records of all employees and students who have attended the University.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Great question!&nbsp; Why did you have my personal information (on a publicly accessible server used in a department that doesn't really need it without proper protections and without proper monitoring)?</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>This breach torques me a little, in case you didn't pick up on that from the comments above.&nbsp; I made plenty.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/05/15/okstate.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 11:08:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive personal information">sensitive personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server administrators">server administrators</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server immediately">server immediately</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server prior">server prior</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database server">database server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/05/15/okstate.aspx">Oklahoma State University Parking Services server is compromised</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Web Security SaaS: The Next Generation of Web Security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/71a0fa8b5aa14e422b0bf29627d95c68</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/71a0fa8b5aa14e422b0bf29627d95c68</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Source: Webroot Software) The Web is the new threat vector of choice for hackers and cybercriminals to distribute malware and perpetrate identity theft, financial fraud, and corporate espionage. This...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<b> (Source: Webroot Software) </b> The Web is the new threat vector of choice for hackers and cybercriminals to distribute malware and perpetrate identity theft, financial fraud, and corporate espionage. This paper outlines the challenges facing many SMBs and provides solutions for overall security effectiveness and reducing the burden on IT departments.
<p><a href="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?a=CteD4Z"><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~a/Computerworld/Security/News?i=CteD4Z" border="0"></img></a></p><img src="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~4/290320405" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identity theft">identity theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web">web</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security effectiveness">security effectiveness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial fraud">financial fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribute malware">distribute malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper outlines">paper outlines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/webroot software">webroot software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threat vector">threat vector</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/source">source</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.computerworld.com/~r/Computerworld/Security/News/~3/290320405/whitepapers.do">Web Security SaaS: The Next Generation of Web Security</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Intrusion into UMass Amherst University Health Services network]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bf47c63d3967bee3e9de22405605c51a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bf47c63d3967bee3e9de22405605c51a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
4/18/08

Organization
University of Massachusetts System

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
University of Massachusetts System at Amherst
University Health...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/umassam.jpg" align="right" height="108" width="96"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>4/18/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.massachusetts.edu/index.html?CFID=3057800&amp;CFTOKEN=55165067">University of Massachusetts System</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://umass.edu/umhome/">University of Massachusetts System at Amherst</a> <br><a href="http://www.umass.edu/uhs/">University Health Services</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Patients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>Unknown<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"personal information" and "medical records"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"Hackers breached the computer system used by UMass Amherst's Health Services, potentially gaining access to thousands of medical records."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://www.cbs3springfield.com/news/local/18021744.html">CBS Channel 3 News (Springfield)</a> <br><a href="http://umass.edu/newsoffice/newsreleases/articles/74339.php">UMass Amherst Press Release</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Lesley Tanner, CBS Channel 3 News<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>Hackers breached the computer system used by UMass Amherst's Health Services, potentially gaining access to thousands of medical records.<br><br>More than half of the student population at UMass Amherst are patients on record at the University Health Services.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] According to the UMass Amherst web site, the school had an enrollment of 25,593 total undergraduate and graduate students in the fall of 2006.&nbsp; This just gives us a sense for how big the school is, not how many people may be affected by the supposed breach.</span><br><br>Though many of the most personal medical records are kept on paper files, officials say some personal information is available on the 150 computers used by the department.<br><br>The incident occurred April 11, and, after an initial investigation of the remote intrusion, the University decided to shut down the network<br><br>To date, about 30 workstations have been returned to service and officials project that the entire network will be operating within the next week.<br><br>The workstations in question contained limited patient information.<br><br>"What we're doing is going through as quickly as we can," says UMass Spokesperson Ed Blaguszewski. "And we are making an assessment and can't say for sure that the material wasn't breached."<br><br>Officials believe outside hackers wanted to use the server as a host for illegal music and video downloads, one that would make the culprits untraceable.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention, logging, etc.?&nbsp; Outside "hackers" for the most part are amongst the easiest to protect confidential information from.&nbsp; "Hackers" looking for a place to store and distribute files are typically opportunists and script-kiddies, and these are even easier to protect against.&nbsp; Were the affected machines workstations, or servers?</span><br><br>"It wasn't a case from what we can tell of someone being in the office and breaking into a computer," says Blaguszewski. "These things are done remotely often times from countries all over the world."<br><br>A fact that's even more unsettling for patients who were unaware of the breach more than a week after it occurred.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] It seems like the school doesn't know who may be affected and thus they don't know who to notify.</span><br><br>The University did post a notice on the Health Services website, and say they are notifying patients when they enter the clinic.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The </span><a style="font-style: italic;" href="http://umass.edu/newsoffice/newsreleases/articles/74339.php">notice</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> </span><br><br>Campus officials say it will be weeks before they are completely sure what information, if any, was taken off the computers.<br><br>The University has launched a detailed evaluation of the incident to find out if any of the files were accessed during the intrusion, and will keep the community advised of its findings.<br><br>They say the entire campus system is being looked at to avoid future breaches.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This should be a continuous effort.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reaction from Students:</span><br>"I've been here every time I've been sick this semester," says Freshman Brooke Quinn.<br><br>"That's my doctor, it's where I go," says Senior Jennifer Scott.<br><br>"I think that it is scary that anybody on our campus could have our personal information and medical records," says Quinn. <br><br>"I wasn't aware of it, and no one I know was aware of it," says Scott. "If it's that easy for someone who just wanted to get music who knows what would happen for someone who was trying to get confidential information."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>There is too much uncertainty surrounding this (apparent) breach.&nbsp; If you are a concerned and potentially affected person, I would encourage you to contact officials with the school and seek answers.&nbsp; You could also contact Ed Blaguszewski, his contact information is on the <a href="http://umass.edu/newsoffice/newsreleases/articles/74339.php">press release</a>.&nbsp; They should be done with their investigation by now. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:54:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university health services">university health services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/university">university</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/health services">health services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protect confidential information">protect confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/contact information">contact information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/amherst">amherst</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/umass amherst">umass amherst</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/04/30/umassam.aspx">Intrusion into UMass Amherst University Health Services network</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Is IF-MAP the spark that will ignite theTCG/TNC and the security industry?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9bb14b4ce6033e3aaabea0ddf8020db1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9bb14b4ce6033e3aaabea0ddf8020db1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The big news at Interop yesterday was the new IF-MAP specification and standard announced by the Trusted Computing Group/ TNC group. Some may call it TCG NAC 2.0 but it actually goes way beyond just...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a onclick="window.open(this.href, '_blank', 'width=800,height=394,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false" href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/.shared/image.html?/photos/uncategorized/2008/04/30/if_map.jpg"><img title="If_map" height="147" alt="If_map" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/images/2008/04/30/if_map.jpg" width="300" border="0" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 5px 5px 0px"></img></a> The big <a href="https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/events/interop_2008/">news at Interop</a> yesterday was the new IF-MAP specification and standard announced by the Trusted Computing Group/ TNC group. Some may call it TCG NAC 2.0 but it actually goes way beyond just NAC. IF-MAP represents a method that allows disparate security technologies to talk to each other and leverage the information gathered from multiple sources to make better and more secure decisions about network devices, users and traffic. It has huge implications for not only NAC, but IDS/IPS, vulnerability management, SIMs, etc. Also, it represents a real opportunity for the TCG/TNC to move out beyond the shadow of NAP and really become a dominant standard for the network and security industry to rally around.<br><br>The idea behind IF-MAP is that data is stored in a central container called a MAP or meta-data access point. This data can be called upon or supplemented with more data from a wide variety of sources. You can publish, search or subscribe to the data. The format is XML. The diagram (which you can click on for a bigger version) on the left shows a sample multi-vendor configuration, but the combinations are endless. To get a better flavor for what you can do you can click <a href="https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/events/interop_2008/TCG_TNC_update_04282008_final.pdf">here</a> to see a PDF presentation by the TCG of IF-MAP.<br><br>I had a chance to speak about IF-MAP with Steve Hanna and Mike Fratto. If it does indeed become widely adopted this can have a profound impact on our industry. Also, Steve and the TNC is very much looking to diversify and distribute the administration of the MAP among many vendors so that it does not become a single vendor steered standard. I applaud Steve and the rest of the group for working so hard on MAP. I challenge the rest of the industry to take a look at it and work towards adopting it. It truly can help be a win for all security vendors, but most of all a win for security administrators who would finally be able to use best-of-breed products from different vendors and have them talk to and work with each other.</p>
<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=xDXXfo"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=xDXXfo" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=la83LG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=la83LG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=EoriIG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=EoriIG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=tyUWcG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=tyUWcG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=ZUZkEG"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=ZUZkEG" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=xGxxZg"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=xGxxZg" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IqTtrg"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IqTtrg" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/280801482" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2008 05:25:12 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/if-map">if-map</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/if-map specification">if-map specification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/map">map</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/if-map represents">if-map represents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/represents">represents</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security industry">security industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/industry">industry</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/meta-data access">meta-data access</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/280801482/is-if-map-the-s.html">Is IF-MAP the spark that will ignite theTCG/TNC and the security industry?</source>
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