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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: duck]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/duck</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2008 23:04:22 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links List 10.31.08]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/9428945f69b50703993282159a9d8676</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/9428945f69b50703993282159a9d8676</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Happy Halloween

What an interesting time to hold a technology conference. The DLA Piper Global Technology Leaders Summit last week brought together CXOs from Amazon, Walmart.com, Stanford, Safeway,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><b>Happy Halloween!</b>
<p><a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/em7-pumpkin.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="184" alt="EM7_pumpkin" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/em7-pumpkin-thumb.jpg" width="244" border="0"></a>
<p>What an interesting time to hold a technology conference. The <a href="http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Management/CxOs-Get-Together-for-Candid-OfftheRecord-Chat/?kc=EWKNLNAV10272008STR3" target="_blank">DLA Piper Global Technology Leaders Summit last week</a> brought together CXOs from Amazon, Walmart.com, Stanford, Safeway, Microsoft, Sun, Cisco and others to discuss the state of IT in general and how the economy is impacting it. Some highlights:<br />
<blockquote>
<p>&#8220;Cloud computing for large enterprises is a dead duck, in the opinion of several venture capital firms.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
<blockquote>
<p>&#8220;The current slowdown in the U.S. macroeconomy is definitely going to hurt the IT industry, as it will most of the nation&#8217;s businesses, for at least the next year and most likely into the next two years.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;
<p><a href="http://blogs.eweek.com/storage_station/content/general/netapp_cancels_first_user_conference_cites_travel_issues.html" target="_blank">NetApp cancelled its first user conference</a> slated for 2009 citing economy-driven restrictions on <a href="http://www.btnonline.com/businesstravelnews/headlines/frontpage_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003875472" target="_blank">business travel</a>.
<p>We recently wrote about the possible <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/are-there-recession-proof-it-products/10/2008" target="_blank">upside for MSPs</a> in this economic downtown. A <a href="http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/10/29/Recession_set_to_boost_outsourcing_1.html?source=NLC-TB&amp;cgd=2008-10-30" target="_blank">survey from EquaTerra</a> of more than 200 outsourcing service suppliers announced that “more than 40 percent of those polled had seen increased demand levels, despite the economic downturn.” The survey suggests that outsourcing projects are changing, with a strong focus on quick return on investment replacing longer-term initiatives to improve end-to-end business processes, according to InfoWorld. So as we saw during <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-survey-top-it-challenges-trends-and-what-it-is-spending-money-on/09/2008" target="_blank">our own surveys</a> this year, it looks like IT will spend time and money against the practical projects that should and could get done and not taking on ITIL and CMDB projects.
<p>Jonathan Schwartz as a puppet talking about open source and his ponytail. The driest Sesame Street take-off you’ll ever see. Check out the <a href="http://www.techcrunchit.com/2008/10/14/continuous-partial-innovation/" target="_blank">video here</a>. For those of you playing a drinking game at home, “ponytail”.
<p>Denise Dubie <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/nsm/2008/102708nsm2.html?nlhtnsm=ts_102908&amp;nladname=102908networksystemsmanagemental" target="_blank">posted a follow up</a> to her article <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/33996" target="_blank">Novell’s Managed Objects buy</a>, and shared insights from different commenters, including <a href="http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/33996#comment-191253" target="_blank">yours truly</a>.
<p>One of our favorites, the IT Skeptic was <a href="http://www.johnmwillis.com/itil/5-questions-for-the-itskeptic/" target="_blank">featured on John Willis’ blog</a> this week, answering some questions about CMDB, ITSMF and more. He also provided his insight into IBM Tivoli, although he “tries to stay non-partisan”.
<p>Inexplicable. HP posted <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/10/27/h-p-commercializes-halloween-with-monsters-that-speak-technobabble/" target="_blank">Halloween-themed videos about datacenters</a> on YouTube this week. Unlike the great <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSqXKp-00hM" target="_blank">IBM videos about the mainframe</a>, these videos speak techno-babble without tempering the lingo with being funny or tongue-in-cheek. Various frightening creatures share information on service management processes and discuss virtualization techniques to help consolidate hardware. Scary.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 18:10:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/projects">projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/practical projects">practical projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/discuss virtualization techniques">discuss virtualization techniques</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/discuss">discuss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cmdb projects">cmdb projects</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cmdb">cmdb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibm videos">ibm videos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/videos">videos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/survey suggests">survey suggests</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/links-list-103108/10/2008">Links List 10.31.08</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Plan Ahead in Case Critical Employees Quit]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dec90112212e8807977627e3407dbb9e</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dec90112212e8807977627e3407dbb9e</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[HRWorld has a recent article on how to handle Lame Duck employees those who have turned in their resignation letters. In IT this is particularly critical since many admins have access to critical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>HRWorld has a <a rel="nofollow" target="_blank" href="http://www.hrworld.com/features/lame-duck-employees-073008/">recent article</a> on how to handle Lame Duck employees &#8212; those who have turned in their resignation letters. In IT this is particularly critical since many admins have access to critical information about the company. Sometimes it makes sense to escort them directly off premises, instead of keeping them around&#8230;</p>
<blockquote><p>
But it is sometimes desirable to transition the employee out of the organization as quickly as possible. For example, you would not want a lame-duck network engineer to continue to have access to critical IT infrastructure. In such cases, it is appropriate to relieve the employee of keys, computer access and other company property and to escort him or her off the premises immediately.</p></blockquote>
<p>Of course, it&#8217;s good to plan ahead for this event &#8212; make sure all critical admins are documenting their jobs, and keeping documentation for their network as they go. It would be highly annoying, and probably embarrassing, to escort your newly resigned network admin off premises, only to realize he was the only guy who knew how to access your important file systems.</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 09:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical">critical</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lame-duck network engineer">lame-duck network engineer</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical information">critical information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/admins">admins</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer access">computer access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/critical admins">critical admins</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/access">access</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/premises">premises</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/itsecurity/~3/356764295/">Plan Ahead in Case Critical Employees Quit</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Links for 2008-07-11 [del.icio.us]]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/0bf0e240a5df01f907e45dba421e99a0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/0bf0e240a5df01f907e45dba421e99a0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Prevent Fraud and Increase Revenue by 6% Payment Card Security &amp; IT Controls Explained
iPhone Smackdown: Security vs. Consumerization - Desktop Security - Dark Reading
What the heck is IT...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul>
<li><a href="http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2008/06/09/prevent-fraud-and-increase-revenue-by-6/">Prevent Fraud and Increase Revenue by 6% &laquo; Payment Card Security &amp; IT Controls Explained</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=158122&f_src=drweekly">iPhone Smackdown: Security vs. Consumerization - Desktop Security - Dark Reading</a></li>
<li><a href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9952825-7.html?hhTest=1&tag=bl">What the heck is IT consumerization? | Tech news blog - CNET News.com</a></li>
<li><a href="http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20080425/what-was-your-epiphany/">ha.ckers.org web application security lab - Archive &raquo; What Was Your Epiphany?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4528">SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc</a></li>
<li><a href="http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2008/06/can-wafs-protect-against-business-logic.html">Jeremiah Grossman: Can WAFs protect against business logic flaws?</a></li>
<li><a href="http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/2008/06/19/on-compliance/">Not Bad For a Cubicle &raquo; Blog Archive &raquo; On Compliance</a><br/>
If it sounds like a duck, quacks like a duck its Security. I believe IRM is a marketing scheme for non-security professional to dictate security controls through business models. Security does use risk management principles to identify threats and should</li>
<li><a href="http://www.secureworks.com/blog/index.php/2008/07/10/siem-tools-come-up-short/">News Blog - Media - SecureWorks</a><br/>
In the review, Greg attributes the problems he had to SIEM products still being immature even though they’ve been on the market for 10 years. I believe that’s true, but I also think it’s because SIEM products – even those at the leading edge of th</li>
</ul><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/333283780" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/non-security professional">non-security professional</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/desktop security">desktop security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/payment card security">payment card security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security controls">security controls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internet security">internet security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/news blog">news blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tech news blog">tech news blog</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/siem products">siem products</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/333283780/anton18">Links for 2008-07-11 [del.icio.us]</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[If you want to talk to me your caller ID should not come up unknown]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/427746d3c5f04a375d02d2a3d3613d57</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/427746d3c5f04a375d02d2a3d3613d57</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Image via Wikipedia
Much has been written lately about annoying sales tactics and how many in the security field try to duck vendor calls. Believe it or not, I get my share of annoying sales calls as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div class="zemanta-img" style="DISPLAY: block; FLOAT: right; MARGIN: 1em"><a href="http://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Skype-Call.jpg"><img alt="The caller ID information is masked when a Sky..." src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3b/Skype-Call.jpg/202px-Skype-Call.jpg" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; DISPLAY: block; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a> <p class="zemanta-img-attribution">Image via <a href="http://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Skype-Call.jpg">Wikipedia</a></p></div>

<p>Much has been written lately about annoying sales tactics and how many in the security field try to duck vendor calls.&nbsp; Believe it or not, I get my share of annoying sales calls as well.&nbsp; Whether it is the great conference that is being organized with all of the CIOs that I would ever want to speak to or the latest, greatest new product that is going to make my life easier and define the road to riches, I am swamped with spam telephone calls (on my cell phone no less) every day.&nbsp; </p>

<p>One thing that I have come to see is that many of these unsolicited calls come in with an unknown caller ID. I don't mean no name for entity, but no number either.&nbsp; Most of these people don't leave a voice mail either, they just keep calling until the get an answer.&nbsp; My view is that if the caller has to go to the effort of hiding their name and number, than they have something to hide and are not being upfront.&nbsp; I don't want to do business with anyone like that. I think this just puts two strikes against anyone calling.&nbsp; Why are you hiding who you are?&nbsp; Are you ashamed of what you are doing?</p>

<p>So here is my Shimel rule on sales calls. If your caller ID does not identify you, than I don't want to talk to you!</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/b21add9c-1c17-43f7-bd95-e49607bf0da7/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=b21add9c-1c17-43f7-bd95-e49607bf0da7" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 06:45:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/calls">calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/duck vendor calls">duck vendor calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/caller">caller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam telephone calls">spam telephone calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales calls">sales calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unknown caller">unknown caller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales tactics">sales tactics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security field">security field</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life easier">life easier</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/07/if-you-want-to.html">If you want to talk to me your caller ID should not come up unknown</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[If you want to talk to me your caller ID should not come up unknown]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/47c273e4aee7161cc021c753e12757e7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/47c273e4aee7161cc021c753e12757e7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Image via Wikipedia
Much has been written lately about annoying sales tactics and how many in the security field try to duck vendor calls. Believe it or not, I get my share of annoying sales calls as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><div class="zemanta-img" style="DISPLAY: block; FLOAT: right; MARGIN: 1em"><a href="http://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Skype-Call.jpg"><img alt="The caller ID information is masked when a Sky..." src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3b/Skype-Call.jpg/202px-Skype-Call.jpg" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; DISPLAY: block; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a> <p class="zemanta-img-attribution">Image via <a href="http://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Skype-Call.jpg">Wikipedia</a></p></div>

<p>Much has been written lately about annoying sales tactics and how many in the security field try to duck vendor calls.&nbsp; Believe it or not, I get my share of annoying sales calls as well.&nbsp; Whether it is the great conference that is being organized with all of the CIOs that I would ever want to speak to or the latest, greatest new product that is going to make my life easier and define the road to riches, I am swamped with spam telephone calls (on my cell phone no less) every day.&nbsp; </p>

<p>One thing that I have come to see is that many of these unsolicited calls come in with an unknown caller ID. I don't mean no name for entity, but no number either.&nbsp; Most of these people don't leave a voice mail either, they just keep calling until the get an answer.&nbsp; My view is that if the caller has to go to the effort of hiding their name and number, than they have something to hide and are not being upfront.&nbsp; I don't want to do business with anyone like that. I think this just puts two strikes against anyone calling.&nbsp; Why are you hiding who you are?&nbsp; Are you ashamed of what you are doing?</p>

<p>So here is my Shimel rule on sales calls. If your caller ID does not identify you, than I don't want to talk to you!</p>

<div class="zemanta-pixie" style="MARGIN-TOP: 10px; HEIGHT: 15px"><a class="zemanta-pixie-a" title="Zemified by Zemanta" href="http://reblog.zemanta.com/zemified/b21add9c-1c17-43f7-bd95-e49607bf0da7/"><img class="zemanta-pixie-img" alt="Zemanta Pixie" src="http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=b21add9c-1c17-43f7-bd95-e49607bf0da7" style="BORDER-RIGHT: medium none; BORDER-TOP: medium none; FLOAT: right; BORDER-LEFT: medium none; BORDER-BOTTOM: medium none" /></a></div></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=KXZW7H"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=KXZW7H" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=HhXNmJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=HhXNmJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IdNFHJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IdNFHJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IcgbaJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IcgbaJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=6nHjZJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=6nHjZJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=6MS4wj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=6MS4wj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=4d47tj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=4d47tj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/330837693" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2008 05:45:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/calls">calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/duck vendor calls">duck vendor calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/caller">caller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam telephone calls">spam telephone calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales calls">sales calls</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unknown caller">unknown caller</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sales tactics">sales tactics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security field">security field</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/life easier">life easier</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/330837693/if-you-want-to.html">If you want to talk to me your caller ID should not come up unknown</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Great Fear-Mongering Product: Subway Emergency Kit]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/791def4c2c2b30486f86252fa03beb00</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/791def4c2c2b30486f86252fa03beb00</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Is Subivor even real? Whether it is a train fire, a highrise building fire or worse. People should have more protection than a necktie, their shirt or paper towel to cover their mouth, nose and eyes....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Is <a href="http://www.subivor.com/">Subivor</a> even real?</p>

<blockquote>Whether it is a train fire, a highrise building fire or worse. People should have more protection than a necktie, their shirt or paper towel to cover their mouth, nose and eyes. As you know an emergency can happen at anytime and in anyplace, leaving one vulnerable. Don't be a sitting duck. The Subivor® Subway Emergency Kit can aid you in seeing and breathing while exiting. This all-in-one compact, portable and easy to use subway emergency kit contains some items never seen before in a kit.</blockquote>

<p>This could have won my <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/third_annual_mo_1.html">Third Movie-Plot Threat Contest</a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=yWAzGI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=yWAzGI" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=0dNnPI"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=0dNnPI" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 08:11:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/subway emergency kit">subway emergency kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kit">kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/emergency">emergency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/train fire">train fire</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fire">fire</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/paper towel">paper towel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/movie-plot threat">movie-plot threat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/all-in-one compact">all-in-one compact</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/protection">protection</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/06/great_fearmonge_1.html">Great Fear-Mongering Product: Subway Emergency Kit</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Show 026 - An Interview with Adam Shostack]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c33fabcf5dc8851811ed58bff76a27ea</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c33fabcf5dc8851811ed58bff76a27ea</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The 26th episode of The Silver Bullet Security Podcast features Adam Shostack, a security expert on Microsofts Secure Development Lifecycle team who has also worked for Zero Knowledge and Reflective....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img align="right" alt="Adam Shostack" title="Adam Shostack" src="http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/ashostack-125.gif" style="padding-left: 7px;" /></p>
<p>The 26th episode of <em>The Silver Bullet Security Podcast</em> features Adam Shostack, a security expert on Microsoft&#8217;s Secure Development Lifecycle team who has also worked for Zero Knowledge and Reflective.  Gary and Adam discuss how Adam got started in computer security, how art/literature informs Adam’s current work, and the main ideas behind Adam’s new book <em>The New School of Information Security</em>.  They go on to chat about Adam&#8217;s aversion to the term &#8220;best practices,&#8221; the role IEEE Security &#038; Privacy magazine plays in bringing the science of security to a practical level, and whether the biggest problem of the CardSystems breach was the following the letter, rather than the spirit, of PCI.  Also on the agenda, duck-billed platypuses, Kandinski, and books by Pynchon.</p>
<p>(Beginning with this episode, Silver Bullet will be available as a 192k MP3.)</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.emergentchaos.com/">Emergent Chaos blog</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.amazon.com/New-School-Information-Security/dp/0321502787/"><em>The New School of Information Security</em></a></li>
<li><a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms995349.aspx">Microsoft&#8217;s SDL</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.cigital.com/justiceleague/category/software-security-touchpoints/">Cigital’s Touchpoints</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.computer.org/portal/site/security"><em>IEEE Security &#038; Privacy magazine</em></a></li>
<li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wassily_Kandinsky">Wassily Kandinsky</a></li>
<li><a href="http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/17/news/master_card/index.htm">The CardSystems breach</a> (2005)</li>
<li><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pynchon">Thomas Pynchon</a>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 15:17:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/role ieee security">role ieee security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ieee security">ieee security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security expert">security expert</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer security">computer security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/adam">adam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy magazine">privacy magazine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privacy magazine plays">privacy magazine plays</category>
      <source url="http://www.cigital.com/silverbullet/show-026/">Show 026 - An Interview with Adam Shostack</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hacker Free Site?...Yeah, right.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2ac70ca9cfe06689533e523c4b1398f4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2ac70ca9cfe06689533e523c4b1398f4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[So as not to seemingly pick only on McAfee Hacker Safe, I thought it appropriate to show just how ridiculous the entire premise of calling anything Hacker Safe, Hacker Proof, and now WebSafe Shield...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[So as not to seemingly pick only on McAfee Hacker Safe, I thought it appropriate to show just how ridiculous the entire premise of calling anything Hacker Safe, Hacker Proof, and now WebSafe Shield Hacker Free Site really is. For you, dear reader, a new  <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/video/hacker_free/hacker_free_site_yeah_right.html">video</a> for your streaming pleasure, courtesy of the WebSafe Shield Hacker Free Site.<br />My brother in arms in the battle against BS, Rafal Los, has already called out Comodo for their <a href="http://www.comodo.com/hackerproof/index.html">Hacker Proof</a> fluff on the <a href="http://preachsecurity.blogspot.com/2008/03/this-time-its-hackerproof-oh-boy.html">Digital</a> <a href="http://preachsecurity.blogspot.com/2008/03/hacker-proof-update-1.html">Soapbox</a>.<br />I simply couldn't let this one pass without a little extra scrutiny. I Googled <span style="font-style:italic;">hacker safe</span> to see what else popped up and bam, there's WebSafe Shield in the sponsored links for "70% less than Hacker Safe" to boot! <br />I had literally about ten minutes to kill, and in less than two minutes, more XSS silliness courtesy of the sites with starring roles in the latest installation in our growing <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/video/hacker_free/hacker_free_site_yeah_right.html">video</a> series. The home page for WebSafe Shield lists <a href="http://frictionent.com/home.php">frictionent.com</a> and <a href="http://shoppingvale.com/">shoppingvale.com</a> with such inanities as <span style="font-style:italic;">"My customers feel more safe and more likely to sign up knowing I operate a secure website."</span> and <span style="font-style:italic;">"If you're interested in increasing your conversions, I'd suggest you sign up for WebSafe Shield."</span> Doesn't that sum it up? Forget protecting the consumer. Let's just blindly lead the sheep to the wolves with some Hacker Free Site logo that means nothing in order to "increase conversions."<br />WebSafe Shield vaguely discuss their methodology <a href="http://www.websafeshield.com/faq.html">here</a>; I just love: <br /><span style="font-style:italic;">#6 - How do you conduct your security scans?<br />"We use industry-standard software and methodologies to scan, test and identify security vulnerabilities.  We first scan for open ports, and for each open port, we identify the service and software for that port, and report any security vulnerabilities."</span> <br />Wow, open ports. Let me guess...you're using Nessus?<br />The only discussion of web application security is on their rather vague <a href="http://www.websafeshield.com/security.html">Security Tips</a> page. It's a perfectly generic read and they make no mention of actually scanning for those vulns, only open ports, and that they "report any security vulnerabilities." Maybe they keep it vague  intentionally so they can more easily duck the criticism. I can imagine the answer to this question. <span style="font-style:italic;">Why are both the sites proudly listed front and center on your home page vulnerable to XSS and yet showing their WebSafe Shield Hacker Free Site logos?</span> Likely because they only mention XSS, but don't actually scan for it. Probably not SQLi either. Just open ports. Please. Maybe that 70% discount over Hacker Safe means you're not making enough to build a service that can find XSS, the most prevalent of all web application vulnerabilities.<br />I'll say the same thing to WebSafe Shield that I've said to McAfee. Stop misleading  people with some crappy little logo that you wouldn't take down for anything in the world (you wouldn't want to tick off your customer base, right?). <br />What about the consumers using those sites who actually fall for your misleading false premises? What's your answer to them? XSS doesn't count because you can't hack the server with it? Who is the victim of a well executed XSS attack? <br /><span style="font-style:italic;">The consumer, not your ill-coding customers.</span><br />In case you missed it earlier, here's the <a href="http://holisticinfosec.org/video/hacker_free/hacker_free_site_yeah_right.html">video</a>.<br />The last little gem, and I quote: <a href="http://www.websafeshield.com/aboutus.html">"Our security professionals are CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional) certified."</a> Oh goody. Maybe you can charge a wee bit more than "70% less than Hacker Safe" and help your customers build secure web apps on behalf of consumers, rather than driving conversions on behalf of your customers, and ultimately your <a href="http://www.websafeshield.com/investors.html">investors</a>.<br /><br />WebSafe Shield, you're welcome to comment.<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/05/hacker-free-siteyeah-right.html&title=HAcker%20Free%20Site?%20Yeah,%20right." title="Hacker Free Site? Yeah, right. del.icio.us">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/05/hacker-free-siteyeah-right.html" title="Hacker Free Site? Yeah, right. ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2008 15:51:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mcafee hacker safe">mcafee hacker safe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hacker safe">hacker safe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/safe">safe</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/courtesy">courtesy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss silliness courtesy">xss silliness courtesy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/xss">xss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/websafe shield">websafe shield</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mention xss">mention xss</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security vulnerabilities">security vulnerabilities</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/05/hacker-free-siteyeah-right.html">Hacker Free Site?...Yeah, right.</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, it must be NAP]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/27945293aa3d638d0fc8c87709e07923</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/27945293aa3d638d0fc8c87709e07923</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I had an interesting meeting with Microsoft on NAP the other day. While, I think you would have to pretty delusional to not realize that eventually NAP will dominate pre-connect health checks of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/duckling.jpg"><img height="203" alt="duckling" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/duckling_thumb.jpg" width="235" align="left" border="0" style="MARGIN: 0px 10px 0px 0px" /></a>I had an interesting meeting with Microsoft on NAP the other day.&nbsp; While, I think you would have to pretty delusional to not realize that eventually NAP will dominate pre-connect health checks of devices, I was surprised at the &quot;Microsoft-ease&quot; they still speak about around NAP. First of all they insist that NAP is not a product or even in deference to my friend Hoff, a feature. Instead NAP is a platform. Implying that other products will run on top of it. Next they again reiterated what we have heard before, that NAP is not a security tool, but just a real estate play.&nbsp; Enabling devices to be up to spec.</p>

<p>My take on this is I don't know if the Microsoft folks are being disingenuous regarding these two points or just are they that naive?&nbsp; My gut tells me that Microsoft is usually not naive.Yes, third party vendors can show that they can add more tests than NAP will have. Yes, you can use SHVs and SHAs, but how much are people really going to value them?&nbsp; You can take the information it generates and do some reporting around it. But lets be clear the NAP &quot;platform&quot; is most certainly going to be used as a product.&nbsp; </p>

<p>It will be used as a product, it will be a security product at that.&nbsp; Configuration management could be said to be borderline security by some.&nbsp; But when you add the ability to deny access to those not up to snuff on configuration, I think you have clearly crossed the line into security.&nbsp; I think Microsoft would come of better saying that NAP is not meant to keep out the determined hacker, but saying it is not a security tool just doesn't ring well.</p>

<p>So what is the rest of the NAC vendor world to do?&nbsp; Should we all pack up and follow Vernier and Lockdown to the next cool thing?&nbsp; No, not at all.&nbsp; I think there are exciting opportunities at hand with NAP. Yes it is a security product, but it also is an enabler for more NAC features. The successful NAC vendor has to figure out what those are and capitalize on them.&nbsp; Also NAP is all about health checks.&nbsp; Post-connect, identity based NAC and other NAC&nbsp; features can be used here to enhance the health checks.&nbsp; Overall NAP will drive the NAC market to move beyond just health checks and that will be a good thing for the NAC market and customers.&nbsp; But guys lets be real, it is a security product!</p></div>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2008 00:04:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nap">nap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/borderline security">borderline security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tool">security tool</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security product">security product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/product">product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pre-connect health checks">pre-connect health checks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/health checks">health checks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft folks">microsoft folks</category>
      <source url="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/2008/03/if-it-quacks-li.html">If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, it must be NAP</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, it must be NAP]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c3f4309806d56a2221d7d4d16e887383</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c3f4309806d56a2221d7d4d16e887383</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I had an interesting meeting with Microsoft on NAP the other day. While, I think you would have to pretty delusional to not realize that eventually NAP will dominate pre-connect health checks of...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><a href="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/duckling.jpg"><img height="203" alt="duckling" src="http://www.stillsecureafteralltheseyears.com/ashimmy/WindowsLiveWriter/duckling_thumb.jpg" width="235" align="left" border="0" style="MARGIN: 0px 10px 0px 0px" /></a>I had an interesting meeting with Microsoft on NAP the other day.&nbsp; While, I think you would have to pretty delusional to not realize that eventually NAP will dominate pre-connect health checks of devices, I was surprised at the &quot;Microsoft-ease&quot; they still speak about around NAP. First of all they insist that NAP is not a product or even in deference to my friend Hoff, a feature. Instead NAP is a platform. Implying that other products will run on top of it. Next they again reiterated what we have heard before, that NAP is not a security tool, but just a real estate play.&nbsp; Enabling devices to be up to spec.</p>

<p>My take on this is I don't know if the Microsoft folks are being disingenuous regarding these two points or just are they that naive?&nbsp; My gut tells me that Microsoft is usually not naive.Yes, third party vendors can show that they can add more tests than NAP will have. Yes, you can use SHVs and SHAs, but how much are people really going to value them?&nbsp; You can take the information it generates and do some reporting around it. But lets be clear the NAP &quot;platform&quot; is most certainly going to be used as a product.&nbsp; </p>

<p>It will be used as a product, it will be a security product at that.&nbsp; Configuration management could be said to be borderline security by some.&nbsp; But when you add the ability to deny access to those not up to snuff on configuration, I think you have clearly crossed the line into security.&nbsp; I think Microsoft would come of better saying that NAP is not meant to keep out the determined hacker, but saying it is not a security tool just doesn't ring well.</p>

<p>So what is the rest of the NAC vendor world to do?&nbsp; Should we all pack up and follow Vernier and Lockdown to the next cool thing?&nbsp; No, not at all.&nbsp; I think there are exciting opportunities at hand with NAP. Yes it is a security product, but it also is an enabler for more NAC features. The successful NAC vendor has to figure out what those are and capitalize on them.&nbsp; Also NAP is all about health checks.&nbsp; Post-connect, identity based NAC and other NAC&nbsp; features can be used here to enhance the health checks.&nbsp; Overall NAP will drive the NAC market to move beyond just health checks and that will be a good thing for the NAC market and customers.&nbsp; But guys lets be real, it is a security product!</p></div>

<p><a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=AbG4aU"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~a/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=AbG4aU" border="0"></img></a></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=IFIWTfF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=IFIWTfF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=AvVDfnF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=AvVDfnF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=lr1WjAF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=lr1WjAF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=tRLvRqF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=tRLvRqF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=TWgQCzf"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=TWgQCzf" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?a=0MqczJf"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears?i=0MqczJf" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~4/258803408" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2008 23:04:22 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/nap">nap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/borderline security">borderline security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security tool">security tool</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security product">security product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/product">product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pre-connect health checks">pre-connect health checks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/health checks">health checks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft folks">microsoft folks</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/StillsecureAfterAllTheseYears/~3/258803408/if-it-quacks-li.html">If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, it must be NAP</source>
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