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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: ecosystem]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/ecosystem</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 15:39:32 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6228ebb081126296ff70b5f6268fd2a3</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6228ebb081126296ff70b5f6268fd2a3</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Is the once popular in the second quarter of 2007, embedded malware tactic on the verge of irrelevance, and if so, what has contributed to its decline? Have SQL injections executed through botnets...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlq1uSeDFI/AAAAAAAACDM/l4bxcru-BQk/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains1.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKlq1uSeDFI/AAAAAAAACDM/ho301JgoMUs/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains1.png" /></a> Is the once popular in the second quarter of 2007, embedded malware tactic on the verge of irrelevance, and if so, what has contributed to its decline? Have SQL injections executed through botnets turned into the most efficient way to infect hundreds of thousands of legitimate web sites? Depends on who you're dealing with.<br />
<br />
A cyber criminal's position in the "underground food chain" can be easily tracked down on the basis of tools and tactics that he's taking advantage of, in fact, some would on purposely misinform on what their actual capabilities are in order not to attract too much attention to their real ones, consisting of high-profile compromises at hundreds of high-profile web sites.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmDVdDGnPI/AAAAAAAACDU/qNbLBUKlHp0/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmDVdDGnPI/AAAAAAAACDU/ZsmcK9HMeUs/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains3.jpg" /></a>Embedded malware may not be as hot as it used to be in the last quarter of 2007, but thanks to the oversupply of stolen accounting data, certain individuals within the underground ecosystem seem to be abusing entire portfolios of domains on the basis of purchasing access to the compromised accounts. In fact, the oversupply of compromised Cpanel accounts is logically resulting in their decreasing price, with the sellers differentiating their propositions, and charging premium prices based on the site's page ranks and traffic, measured through publicly available services, or through the internal statistics.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmMyr4CWEI/AAAAAAAACDc/UafOTCKAb-0/s1600-h/cpanel_multiple_domains22.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKmMyr4CWEI/AAAAAAAACDc/7IRBMNndy-w/s200-R/cpanel_multiple_domains22.JPG" /></a><br />
SQL injections may be the tactic of choice for the time being, but as long as stolen accounting data consisting of Cpanel logins, and web shells access to misconfigured web servers remain desired underground goods, goold old fashioned embedded malware will continue taking place.<br />
<br />
Interestingly, from an economic perspective, the way the seller markets his goods, can greatly influence the way they get abused given he continues offering after-sale services and support. It's blackhat search engine optimization I have in mind, sometimes the tactic of choice especially given its high liquidity in respect to monetizing the compromised access.<br />
<br />
The bottom line - for the time being, there's a higher probability that your web properties will get SQL injected, than IFRAME-ed, as it used to be half a year ago, and that's because what used to be a situation where malicious parties would aim at launching a targeted attack at high profile site and abuse the huge traffic it receives, is today's pragmatic reality where a couple of hundred low profile web sites can in fact return more traffic to the cyber criminals, and greatly extend the lifecycle of their campaign taking advantage of the fact the the low profile site owners would remain infected and vulnerable for months to come.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/embedding-malicious-iframes-through.html">Embedding Malicious IFRAMEs Through Stolen FTP Accounts</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/injecting-iframes-by-abusing-input.html">Injecting IFRAMEs by Abusing Input Validation</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast-flux Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-massive-sql-injection.html">Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-hacking-for-vulnerabilities.html">Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1394">Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1118">Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 06:42:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injections">sql injections</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injection">massive sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profile site">profile site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site">site</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site sql">site sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection">sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tactic">tactic</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/368194376/compromised-cpanel-accounts-for-sale.html">Compromised Cpanel Accounts For Sale</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/35bdaf104e9aecf7703834d959f39050</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/vEaSMC2S8nI/s1600-h/76service.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKs5L3ihpI/AAAAAAAACBs/qhgjQh39ej8/s200-R/76service.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Disintermediating the intermediaries in the cybercrime ecosystem, ultimately results in more profitable operations. Controversial to the concept of outsourcing, some cybercriminals are in fact so self-sufficient, that the stereotype of a mysterious 76service server offered for rent could in fact easily cease to exist in an ecosystem so vibrant that literally everyone can partion their botnet and start offering access to it on a multi-user basis. Evil? Obviously. Extending the lifecycle of a proprietary malware tool? Definitely.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lw9IeuKkNbc">The infamous 76service</a>, a cybercrime as a service web interface where customers basically collect the final output out of the banking malware botnet during the specific period of time for which they've purchases access to the service, is going mainstream, with 76Service's Spring Edition apparently leaking out, and cybercriminals enjoying its interoperability potential by introducing different banking trojans in their campaigns. <br />
<br />
In this post, I'll discuss the 76service's spring.edition that has been combined with a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/metaphisher-malware-kit-spotted-in-wild.html">Metaphisher banking malware</a>, an a popular <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/crimeware-in-middle-zeus.html">web malware exploitation kit</a>, with two campaigns currently hosting 5.51GB of stolen banking data based on over 1 million compromised hosts 59% of which are based in Russia. Screenshots courtesy of an egocentric underground show-off.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cio.com/article/print/135500">Some general info on the 76service</a> :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/JXHZFuBb6Rs/s1600-h/76service1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKyWAXgYGI/AAAAAAAACB0/2qZfVy6YfU8/s200-R/76service1.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>"<i>Subscribers could log in with their assigned user name and     password any time during the 30-day project. They’d be     met with a screen that told them which of their bots was     currently active, and a side bar of management options. For     example, they could pull down the latest drops—data     deposits that the Gozi-infected machines they subscribed to     sent to the servers, like the 3.3 GB one Jackson had     found. A project was like an investment portfolio. Individual     Gozi-infected machines were like stocks and subscribers bought     a group of them, betting they could gain enough personal     information from their portfolio of infected machines to make a     profit, mostly by turning around and selling credentials on the     black market. (In some cases, subscribers would use a few of     the credentials themselves). Some machines, like some stocks, would under perform and     provide little private information. But others would land the     subscriber a windfall of private data. The point was to     subscribe to several infected machines to balance that risk,     the way Wall Street fund managers invest in many stocks to     offset losses in one company with gains in another.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/uGe8GuhDvRg/s1600-h/76service2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKKy5q1ebVI/AAAAAAAACB8/88IxypeBf74/s200-R/76service2.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The 76service empowers everyone who is either not willing to spend time and resources for building and maintaining a botnet, launching campaigns, and SQL injecting hundreds of thousands of sites in order to take advantage of the long tail of malware infected sites that theoretically can outpace the traffic that could come from a SQL injected high-profile site.<br />
<br />
Next to the spring.edition, <a href="http://secureworks.com/research/threats/gozi/">the winter edition's price starts from $1000 and goes to $2000</a>, which is all a matter of who you're buying it from, unless of course you haven't come across leaked copies :<br />
<br />
"<i>Assuming that the dealer offering what he claimed was the 76service kit was correct, the profit is not only in the kit, but in selling value added services like exploitation, compromised servers/accounts, database configuration, and customization of the interface. Prices start between $1000 to $2000 and go up based on added services. The underground payment methods generally involve hard-to-track virtual currencies, whose central authority is in a jurisdiction where regulation is liberal to non-existent, and feature non-reversible transactions. The individual or group called "76service" was easy to track down on the Web, but not in person.</i>" <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/nl-OA3FHPs0/s1600-h/76service3.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLUyA7g9LI/AAAAAAAACCE/8zS6gcoEdvk/s200-R/76service3.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>It's interesting to monitor how services aiming to provide specific malicious services are vertically integrating by expanding their portfolio of related services -- taka a spamming vendor that will offer the segmented email databases, the advanced metrics, and the localization of the spam messages to different languages -- or letting the buyer have full control of anything that comes out of a particular botnet for a specific period of time in which he has bought access to it. For instance, DDoS for hire matured into botnet for hire, which evolved into today's "What type of stolen data do you want?" for hire mentality I'm starting to see emerging, next to the usual interest in improving the metrics and thereby the probability for a more succesful campaign. <br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/4s3Mkgb-NOY/s1600-h/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SKLa2TO4yAI/AAAAAAAACCM/Bt7wKW7IPcE/s200-R/metafisher1_ukstories.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Ironically, this cybercrime model is so efficient that the people behind it cannot seem to be able to process all of the stolen data, which like a great deal of underground assets loses its value if not sold as fast as possible. The result of this oversupply of stolen data are the increasing number of services selling raw logs segmented based on a particular country for a specific period of time.<br />
<br />
Time for a remotely exploitable vulnerability in yet another malware kit about to go mainstream? Definitely, unless of course backdooring it and releasing it doesn't achieve the obvious results of controlling someone else's cybercrime ecosystem.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/underground-economys-supply-of-goods.html">The Underground Economy's Supply of Goods and Services</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/dynamics-of-malware-industry.html">The Dynamics of the Malware Industry - Proprietary Malware Tools</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/using-market-forces-to-disrupt-botnets.html">Using Market Forces to Disrupt Botnets</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/multiple-firewalls-bypassing.html">Multiple Firewalls Bypassing Verification on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed Spamming Appliances - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/localizing-cybercrime-cultural.html">Localizing Cybercrime - Cultural Diversity on Demand</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/e-crime-and-socioeconomic-factors.html">E-crime and Socioeconomic Factors</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/malware-as-web-service.html">Malware as a Web Service</a><b>&nbsp;</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/zeus-crimeware-kit-vulnerable-to.html">The Zeus Crimeware Kit Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/08/pinch-vulnerable-to-remotely.html">Pinch Vulnerable to Remotely Exploitable Flaw</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">Managed "Spamming Appliances" - The Future of Spam</a><br />
<br />
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      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/76service">76service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cybercrime">cybercrime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware botnet">malware botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/botnet">botnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/mysterious 76service server">mysterious 76service server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web service">web service</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/363878623/76service-cybercrime-as-service-going.html">76Service - Cybercrime as a Service Going Mainstream</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6ccaae3434fe8c6502ba9a6fc0cfb3e0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled &quot; There is No Free...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/wxZZ1xFCjPk/s1600-h/phishing_pages.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJsXrRQtHeI/AAAAAAAACA8/TiCS7pP_jF0/s200-R/phishing_pages.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>There seems to be no such thing as a free phishing page these days, with phishers scamming one another at an alarming rate according to a recently published research entitled "<a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/woot08/tech/full_papers/cova/cova_html/">There is No Free Phish:An Analysis of “Free” and Live Phishing Kits</a>".<br />
<br />
Cybercriminals attempting to scam other cybercriminals has been happening for years, with old school cases where backdoored malware tools such as crypters and binders are offered for free, or a newly released RAT whose client is in fact infected with a third-party malware. Realizing and definitely not enjoying the fact that the lowered entry barriers into cybercrime are empowering yesterday's script kiddies will malware kits that used to be utilized by a set of people who invested time and money into the process several years ago, this unethical competitive practice is only going to get more common. Backdooring phishing pages is one thing, <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1641">backdooring entire web malware exploitation kits, next to the possibility to remotely exploit a competitor's command and control server is entirely another</a> : <br />
<br />
"<i>Taking a more strategic approach, a cybercriminal wanting to scam another cybercriminal would backdoor <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1598" title="The Neosploit cybercrime group abandons its web malware exploitation kit">a highly expensive web malware exploitation kit</a>, then start distributing it for free, and in fact, there have been numerous cases when such kits have been distributed in such a fraudulent manner. The result is a total outsourcing of the process of coming up with ways to infect hundreds of thousands of users though client side exploits <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122" title="Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet">embedded or SQL injected at legitimate sites</a>, and basically collecting the final output - the stolen E-banking data and the botnet itself.</i>"<br />
<br />
What's to come in the long term? Why just backdoor the phishing page, when you can embedd it with a live exploit URL in an attempt to both, infect the cybercriminal about to use and obtain all of the already stolen virtual assets has has already stolen, and also, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/skype-phishing-pages-serving-exploits.html">have a third-party maintain a blended attack campaign without even knowing it</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/phishing-campaign-spreading-across.html">Phishing Campaign Spreading Across Facebook </a><b><br />
</b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/phishing-pages-for-every-bank-are.html">Phishing Pages for Every Bank are a Commodity</a> <br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/rbns-phishing-activities.html">RBN's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/inside-botnets-phishing-activities.html">Inside a Botnet's Phishing Activities</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/large-scale-myspace-phishing-attack.html">Large Scale MySpace Phishing Attack</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/update-on-myspace-phishing-campaign.html">Update on the MySpace Phishing Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/01/myspace-phishers-now-targeting-facebook.html">MySpace Phishers Now Targeting Facebook</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/myspace-hosting-myspace-phishing.html">MySpace Hosting MySpace Phishing Profiles</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/diy-phishing-kits.html">DIY Phishing Kits</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-phishing-kit-goes-20.html">DIY Phishing Kit Goes 2.0</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/paypal-and-ebay-phishing-domains.html">PayPal and Ebay Phishing Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/average-online-time-for-phishing-sites.html">Average Online Time for Phishing Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/02/phishing-ecosystem.html">The Phishing Ecosystem</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/assessing-rock-phish-campaign.html">Assessing a Rock Phish Campaign</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/04/taking-down-phishing-sites-business.html">Taking Down Phishing Sites - A Business Model?</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/03/take-this-malicious-site-down.html">Take this Malicious Site Down - Processing Order..</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/209-host-locked.html">209 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/2091-host-locked.html">209.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/661-host-locked.html">66.1 Host Locked</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/confirm-your-gullibility.html">Confirm Your Gullibility</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/12/phishers-spammers-and-malware-authors.html">Phishers, Spammers and Malware Authors Clearly Consolidating</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/08/economics-of-phishing.html">The Economics of Phishing</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 11:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/phishers">phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace phishers">myspace phishers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/campaign">campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/myspace">myspace</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rock phish campaign">rock phish campaign</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free phish">free phish</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/free">free</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/kits">kits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/358721854/phishers-backdooring-phishing-pages-to.html">Phishers Backdooring Phishing Pages to Scam One Another</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=dMjxcK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=dMjxcK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IC3AVK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IC3AVK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=d2XWZk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=d2XWZk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=vRFZyk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=vRFZyk" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6ZdeKK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6ZdeKK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=jVlXIK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=jVlXIK" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=W4mAWk"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=W4mAWk" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/352993637" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/ae553b37ba0ec150b5a4c344ba27652b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/ae553b37ba0ec150b5a4c344ba27652b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[In between the massive SQL injections , that as a matter of fact remain ongoing, copycats taking advantage of the very same SQL injection tools using public search engine's indexes as a reconnaissance...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2ac7mO18I/AAAAAAAAB9c/usiNWVgrooU/s1600-h/chinese_sql_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2ac7mO18I/AAAAAAAAB9c/97ckqqWaQ14/s200-R/chinese_sql_injection.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>In between the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">massive SQL injections</a>, that as a matter of fact remain ongoing, copycats taking advantage of the very same SQL injection tools using public search engine's indexes as a reconnaissance tools, are also starting to take advantage of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">localized and targeted attacks</a>, attacking specific online communities. Among these is <b>mx.content-type.cn /day.js </b>using <b>day.js</b> to attempt multiple exploitation using publicly obtainlable exploits such as Adodb.Stream, MPS.StormPlayer, DPClient.Vod, IERPCtl.IERPCtl.1, GLIEDown.IEDown.1, and targeting primarily Chinese web communities.<br />
<br />
Compared to a bit more sophisticated <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/diy-exploit-embedding-tool-proprietary.html">attack tactics applied by Chinese hackers</a>, taking advantage of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">localized versions</a> of the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">de facto web malware exploitation kits</a>, those who don't have access to such continue using cybercrime 1.0 <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/diy-exploits-embedding-tools.html">DIY exploit embedding tools</a> at large. The rest of the SQL injected domains as well as the exploits themselves are parked on the same plaee - <b>222.216.28.25</b>, also responding to :<br />
<br />
<b>down.goodnetads .org<br />
ads.goodnetads .org<br />
real.kav2008 .com<br />
hk.www404 .cn<br />
err.www404 .cn<br />
mx.content-type .cn<br />
sun.63afe561 .info<br />
ads.633f94d3 .info<br />
ads.1234214 .info<br />
ad.50db34d5 .info<br />
ads.50db34d5 .info<br />
ad.8d77b42a .info<br />
web.adsidc .info<br />
free.idcads .info<br />
free.cjads .info<br />
ads.adslooks .info<br />
list.adslooks .info<br />
ad.5iyy .info</b><br />
<br />
The SQL injected domains :<br />
<b>ads.633f94d3.info/day .js<br />
ad.8d77b42a.info/day .js<br />
ad.5iyy.info/day .js<br />
free.idcads.info/day .js<br />
efreesky.com/day .js<br />
v.freefl.info/day .js</b><br />
<br />
The internal structure :<br />
<b>free.idcads.info/f/index .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/014 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/real11 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/real10 .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/lz .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/bf .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/kong .htm<br />
free.idcads.info/f/swfobject .js<br />
ad.50db34d5.info//rm%5C/rm .exe</b><br />
<br />
Parked domains responding to the command and control locations, <b>60.191.223.76 </b>and <b>222.216.28.100</b> :<br />
<b>ftp.gggjjj .info<br />
live.ads002 .net<br />
log.goodnetads .org<br />
dat.goodnetads .org<br />
root.51113 .com<br />
sun.update999 .cn<br />
abb.633f94d3 .info<br />
up.50db34d5 .info</b><br />
<b>web.cn3721 .org&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
dat.goodnetads .org<br />
cs.rm510 .com<br />
sb.sb941 .com<br />
k.sb941 .com<br />
info.sb941 .com<br />
day.sb941 .com<br />
post.ad9178 .com<br />
v.91tg .net</b><br />
<br />
Centralizing their scammy ecosystem always makes it easier to monitor, keep track of, and of course, expose. <br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware </a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/yet-another-massive-sql-injection.html">Yet Another Massive SQL Injection Spotted in the Wild</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/malware-domains-used-in-sql-injection.html">Malware Domains Used in the SQL Injection Attacks</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">SQL Injection Through Search Engines Reconnaissance</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/google-hacking-for-vulnerabilities.html">Google Hacking for Vulnerabilities</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1394">Sony PlayStation's site SQL injected, redirecting to rogue security software</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1118">Redmond Magazine Successfully SQL Injected by Chinese Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9XdgSJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9XdgSJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3nv7jJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3nv7jJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=3DXSvj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=3DXSvj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=exadYj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=exadYj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=kp9u0J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=kp9u0J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=y5pfDJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=y5pfDJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Lkbwwj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Lkbwwj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/348288922" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 01:51:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql">sql</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection tools">sql injection tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injections">massive sql injections</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection attacks">sql injection attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injection">sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/massive sql injection">massive sql injection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/site sql">site sql</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/348288922/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA["Walking" with the SDL - Part 3]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/32d81dd05e4ad116720be1d3cc3ea0bd</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/32d81dd05e4ad116720be1d3cc3ea0bd</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Jeremy Dallman here. This is Part Three in my multi-part series on Walking with the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [ Part 1 , Part 2 ]. So far I have discussed getting management approval and...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Jeremy Dallman here. This is Part Three in my multi-part series on “Walking” with the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [</FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/18/walking-with-the-sdl-part-1.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Part 1</FONT></A><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>, </FONT><A href="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/21/walking-with-the-sdl-part-2.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Part 2</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>]. So far I have discussed getting management approval and expanding security training. In this post I will discuss formalizing requirements and effective ways to reuse your threat model and attack surface review data. I’ll wrap up with a look into final security reviews and managing post-release documentation.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><B style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Formalize Requirements for long-term use<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></B></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Now that you are making security development a lifecycle, it is time to lock down and formalize your security requirements. At this point, you need to take what you’ve learned and begin translating your security principles into something that can apply to multiple releases and multiple levels of your development process. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>At a product level, you need to use the security rules created in prior projects to define long-term security requirements. Those requirements will become your core security policies. <SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp;</SPAN>Then, at the version level, you should create security requirements that are version-specific and are defined by the security objectives and features you want to address in that version. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Both of these sets of requirements can be formalized in a way that makes them easier to transfer across future product cycles and to modify based on the unique features or security issues of each version.<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>Making these a staple of your development lifecycle will also ease adoption of these requirements as team become familiar with them over multiple releases.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>I would like to touch on one topic before moving on – enforcing requirements. As your team grows and your SDL matures, there is an inherent complexity that comes with managing and enforcing your requirements. In our experience, we’ve found that it is critical to identify a security advisor. Up until now, your company has probably had someone championing security and best practices – either as a formal role or simply as a informal advocate. However, making it a feature of your lifecycle requires dedicated effort to enforce and sustain the requirements as well as monitoring the security ecosystem for changes that may add requirements to your process. The security advisor(s) are the people who will help guide the creation of the security requirements both broadly and for each product cycle; for a smaller team, this may be a single individual. For a larger organization, a team of people may be needed. The security advisor should also evaluate your security policy and apply changes where needed, ensure the product bug database is tracking security issues that can be reviewed later (I’ll get to the Final Security Review in our next post), and guide the definition and enforcement of a security “bug bar”. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Security requirements serve as the backbone of your SDL. The amount of effort you put in defining and enforcing requirements, and keeping them up to date with the current threat landscape will have a direct return on investment in the security and privacy of the product you create. Be careful to document and clearly communicate your requirements to your team, and use them as evidence when talking to your customers about how you ensure the security and privacy of your product. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><B style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Reference &amp; Reuse Threat Modeling results &amp; Attack Surface Reviews<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></B></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Your developers and testers should have access to and be familiar with the attack surface analysis or threat model documents you have created. These documents are invaluable reference tools. Use them to perform evaluate your security from multiple angles: <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Think about component-level architecture <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>List common pitfalls in writing code, or begin defining and building test cases. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Code reviewers can reference threat models and attack surface documents to verify specific attacks were addressed in the code. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Architects can use them to identify new areas of potential attack surface based on how new code is written or interacts with existing code. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt 37.5pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; mso-add-space: auto" class=MsoListParagraphCxSpLast><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>·</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Project leadership can reference threat models or attack surface documents to ensure the completed project meets all security goals.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Building a “live” library of threat models that is accessible by everyone and is designed to be easily maintained or updated is a big undertaking. Based on experience, I would strongly encourage doing this early in the evolution of your security lifecycle to avoid losing valuable data and to prevent the sheer volume of data from becoming unusable. I have heard of some companies using wiki technology as their library for threat modeling while others may use searchable documents, spreadsheets, or websites to store/sort/share the information. Whatever method you use, it is important to anticipate the accumulation of a large set of information that should be easily used and shared across the organization.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>I would like to do a deeper dive on the importance of security code reviews as part of your “walk” evolution. Security code reviews focus on identifying insecure coding techniques and vulnerabilities that could lead to security issues. The goal of a review is to identify as many potential security vulnerabilities as possible before the code is deployed. The cost and effort of fixing security flaws at development time is far less than fixing them later in the product deployment cycle [from </FONT><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa302437.aspx"><FONT size=3 face=Calibri>Improving Web Application Security</FONT></A><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>]. You should create a process where top security developers actively review code within the context of known threats prior to deploying your code. Leveraging the existing documentation about feature design is a vital reference piece to make those security reviews successful.<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>Later this week, I’ll close the series with a look at final security reviews (FSRs) and how to document your work for post-release and next-release reference. <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 10pt" class=MsoNormal><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>In the meantime, we’d like to hear from you:<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>How do you express your security requirements? Do you use a checklist, a whitepaper, or something else?<o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>What challenges have you faced in enforcing requirements across your teams? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P>
<P style="TEXT-INDENT: -0.25in; MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt 0.5in; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo1" class=MsoNoSpacing><SPAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol"><SPAN style="mso-list: Ignore"><FONT size=3>?</FONT><SPAN style="FONT: 7pt 'Times New Roman'">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </SPAN></SPAN></SPAN><FONT size=3><FONT face=Calibri>How have you implemented threat models or attack surface reviews? <o:p></o:p></FONT></FONT></P><img src="http://blogs.msdn.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8767328" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2008 12:43:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security requirements serve">security requirements serve</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security requirements">security requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security development lifecycle">security development lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security development">security development</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/requirements">requirements</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lifecycle">lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security lifecycle">security lifecycle</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security ecosystem">security ecosystem</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/07/23/walking-with-the-sdl-part-3.aspx">"Walking" with the SDL - Part 3</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6215851b79c397250e5f1b5a07d047b4</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6215851b79c397250e5f1b5a07d047b4</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The result of building extra confidence into your malicious hosting provider's ability to remain online , is a scammy ecosystem that's constantly jumping from one netblock to another, whose very...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXAHtEXmGI/AAAAAAAAB8c/T7J6WUyV9a4/s1600-h/avxp08.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXAHtEXmGI/AAAAAAAAB8c/qDKYv6DcETA/s200-R/avxp08.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>The result of building extra confidence into your <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/malicious-isps-you-rarely-see-in-any.html">malicious hosting provider's ability to remain online</a>, is a scammy ecosystem that's constantly jumping from one netblock to another, whose very latest exploit URLs and rogue security software nexto to the codecs served, always represent a decent sample of malicious activities to analyze.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/geolocating-malicious-isps.html">UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a> (<i>85.255.112.0-85.255.127.255 UkrTeleGroup UkrTeleGroup Ltd. 27595 ASN ATRIVO</i>), a personal favorite due to its historical connection with the Russian Business Network, and hosting provider for a countless of number of injected and malware embedded campaigns during the last two years, is still keeping it as lazy as possible, a laziness allowing you to easily expose a great deal of the malicious activities going on there, and establish the connections between the hosting provider, its current and historical customers.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXJBRIoucI/AAAAAAAAB8k/r9Y6CPtAE0Y/s1600-h/rogue_software_codecs_UkrTeleGroup.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXJBRIoucI/AAAAAAAAB8k/cHCoWY8V1RY/s200-R/rogue_software_codecs_UkrTeleGroup.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Take <b>microsoftcodecs.com</b> (88.214.198.220) for instance, and <b>avxp08.com</b> where it redirects the user into yet another rogue security software. <b>avxp08.com</b> is responding to 194.110.162.114; 216.195.41.11; 216.195.41.11; 216.240.139.169, and to UkrTeleGroup Ltd's 85.255.117.163.<br />
<br />
Each of these IPs are also being shared by other rogue software and fake codecs simultaneously :<br />
<br />
(216.195.41.11)<br />
<b>antivirusxp2008 .com<br />
malwareprotector2008 .com<br />
antivirxp08 .com<br />
antivirusxp08 .com<br />
avxp08 .com<br />
youpornztube .com<br />
winifixer .com<br />
advancedxpfixer .com<br />
encountertracker .ws</b><br />
<br />
It gets even more UkrTeleGroup Ltd related upon the malware (Trojan:Win32/Tibs.HK) served at the <b>avxp08.com </b>gets sandboxed. The malware phones back home <b>stat.avxp08 .com </b>(85.255.118.172)<b> </b>announcing the successful infection <b>winifixer .com/log2.php?affid=980382bdb4e7b779ff6308b0b706571c&amp;uid=06f80eaf-94d7-4b8b-9cf0-5c6f75d2c69f&amp;tm=1211198022</b> (85.255.118.171), and the scammy ecosystem continues using the same hosting provider. The rest of the rogue tools are also using the same subdomain structure, and IP, <b>stat.antivirusxp2008 .com</b> (85.255.118.172), <b>stat.antivirxp08 .com</b> (85.255.118.172), <b>stat.antivirusxp08 .com</b> (85.255.118.172) in order to phone back home.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXMeEAQTmI/AAAAAAAAB8s/bax-CAw9xJ8/s1600-h/fake_windows_media_player.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIXMeEAQTmI/AAAAAAAAB8s/_hv8u7SKjP8/s200-R/fake_windows_media_player.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div><b>winifixer .com</b>, a well known rogue software, is entirely relying on UkrTeleGroup's hosting services hosted at 85.255.117.163; 85.255.118.171; 85.255.120.115; 85.255.120.139; 216.195.41.11 pinpoing several other obvious and well known netblocks hosting anything starting from fake celebrity video sites serving fake Windows Media Player videos, to rogue security software and live exploit URLs. Take for instance their efficiency centered approach to park numerous malicious domains on a single IP, like 85.255.117.218 in this case :<br />
<br />
<b>bestfunnyvids .com<br />
celebs69 .com<br />
celebsnofake .com<br />
celebstape .com<br />
celebsvidsonline .com<br />
codecservice1 .com<br />
freevidshardcore .com<br />
newfunnyvideo .com<br />
sexlookupworld .com<br />
starfeed1 .com<br />
starfeed2 .com<br />
topdirectdownload .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
topsearchresults1 .com<br />
topsoftupdate .com<br />
yourfavoritetube .com</b><br />
<br />
Now that it's becoming clear who's providing the hosting infrastructure, it's perhaps also worth pointing out who's using the hosting infrastructure to serve rogue security software and fake codecs on the basis of participating in an affiliate program? A great number of domains used by the rogue security software are registered by <b>krab@thekrab.com</b> behind which is supposidely Mishakov Viktor Ivanovich <b>support@tobesoftware.com</b>, and ironically <b>tobesoftware.com</b> is again hosting within UkrTeleGroup (85.255.120.115). The personal efforts into the number of the typosquatted domains and the persistence applied when registered and spamming them across the web, is the result of the incentives provided to them by the affiliate program they participate in.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=CNeYgJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=CNeYgJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=UZqVKJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=UZqVKJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=FhKPZj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=FhKPZj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=6DFhuj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=6DFhuj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=pxNm7J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=pxNm7J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=cYGFFJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=cYGFFJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=S2jU9j"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=S2jU9j" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/342489167" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2008 03:12:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ukrtelegroup">ukrtelegroup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/codecs">codecs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake codecs simultaneously">fake codecs simultaneously</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/rogue security software">rogue security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ukrtelegroup ukrtelegroup">ukrtelegroup ukrtelegroup</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fake codecs">fake codecs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home">home</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/home stat">home stat</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scammy ecosystem">scammy ecosystem</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/342489167/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/56322fa6d09fc3127cbaf772115cd182</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/c7TMX064n4w/s1600-h/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB2JwZOw4I/AAAAAAAAB7c/CaeHtWn_06M/s200-R/cash_transfers_money_mule_recruitment.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Just consider this scheme for a second. A well known <a href="http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/ConsumerProtection/scamnet/Scams/Cash-Transfers_Inc.html">money mule recruitment site Cash Transfers</a> is maintaining a fast-flux infrastructure on behalf of the Asprox botnet, that is also providing hosting services for several hundred domains used on the last wave of SQL injection attacks. Ironically, <a href="http://www.banksafeonline.org.uk/moneymule_explained.html">the money mule recruitment site</a> is sharing IPs with many of them. Who are these money launderers (<b>cashtransfers.tk</b>; <b>cashtransfers.eu; type53.eu</b>; <b>sid57.tk</b>; <b>catdbw.mobi</b>; <b>cdrpoex.com </b>etc.&nbsp; ) anyway?<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">"<i>Cash-Transfers Inc. is an online-to-offline international money transfer service. We offer a secure, fast, and inexpensive means of sending money from the UK to offline recipients worldwide. Recipients do not require a bank account or Internet connection to receive funds. We have teamed with select local disbursement partners to provide a convenient, secure, and cost-effective means of sending money to family, friends and business partners abroad. The basic requirements to send money/transfer money are:</i></div><i><br />
1) Senders must have Internet access and a bank account or credit/debit card to transfer money. However, recipients do not require either a bank account or Internet connection.<br />
<br />
2) Money sent through Cash-Transfers Inc. is available for pick up at the distribution partner instantly, or, in most countries, money can be delivered to the recipient in a matter of hours.<br />
<br />
3) Our local agents will call your recipient (during local business hours) to provide additional details, including: forms of identification required, hours of operation, and other locations. The sender will also receive an email confirmation with transaction details and tracking information.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/qtHLcMs6sVs/s1600-h/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIB3agOgfJI/AAAAAAAAB7k/y-aSv2_Sztk/s200-R/cash_transfers_asprox_SQL_injection.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>The fast-flux infrastructure they're currently using is also providing services to domains that are currently used, or have been used in previous SQL injection attacks. Some info on the current DNS servers used in the fast-flux :<br />
<br />
<b>ns10.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns11.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns1.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns12.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns2.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns13.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns3.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns14.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns4.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns15.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns5.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns16.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns6.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns17.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns7.cashtransfers.tk<br />
ns8.cashtransfers.tk</b><br />
<br />
With the distributed and dynamic hosting infrastructure courtesy of the malware infected user, scammers, spammers, phishers and malware authors are only starting to experiment with the potential abuses of such an underground ecosystem build on the foundations of compromises hosts.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/storm-worms-fast-flux-networks.html">Storm Worm's Fast Flux Networks</a><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">Managed Fast Flux Provider</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-flux-spam-and-scams-increasing.html">Fast Flux Spam and Scams Increasing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/fast-fluxing-yet-another-pharmacy-scam.html">Fast Fluxing Yet Another Pharmacy Spam</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast Fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/storm-worm-hosting-pharmaceutical-scams.html">Storm Worm Hosting Pharmaceutical Scams</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122">Fast-Fluxing SQL injection attacks executed from the Asprox botnet</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=aMnYfJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=aMnYfJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wo8AkJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wo8AkJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=22rmej"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=22rmej" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ec2OKj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ec2OKj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LfbMJJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LfbMJJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LYf9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LYf9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=2LO3zj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=2LO3zj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/338919917" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2008 02:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast">fast</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux networks">fast flux networks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/money">money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux">fast-flux</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cashtransfers">cashtransfers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux provider">fast flux provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast flux spam">fast flux spam</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/transfer money">transfer money</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fast-flux infrastructure">fast-flux infrastructure</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/338919917/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e5949393a0e7be6e2ea6b20dadaba58c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e5949393a0e7be6e2ea6b20dadaba58c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Certain hacktivist groups often come and go by the time the momentum of their particular cause is long gone. Excluding the hardcore hacktivists who are obliged to defend their country's infrastructure...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="" style="clear: both;"><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-6Lbjq6XI/AAAAAAAAB7M/dn0skav9XIg/s1600-h/AYYILDIZ_TEAM.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SH-6Lbjq6XI/AAAAAAAAB7M/mYlVgqX-mVU/s200-R/AYYILDIZ_TEAM.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Certain hacktivist groups often come and go by the time the momentum of their particular cause is long gone. Excluding the hardcore hacktivists who are obliged to defend their country's infrastructure and reputation on the international scene, smart enough to do on one front, there are certain hacktivist groups who ensure their future existence by declaring war and every single country that has ever made statements in contradiction with their vision. Quite a stimulating factor for ensuring the future of your script kiddies group, isn't it?<br />
<br />
One of these groups is the AYYILDIZ TEAM, a group of Turkish script kiddies who've been pretty active as of recently, targeting everyone, everywhere, leaving statements like the following :</div><br />
"<i>Me, as AYT-Admin Barbaros, swear to everything which is lovely and holy to me, that you will pay for your actions. We, AYT, as a Cyber Attacking Army will make it sure. Read right, what will we do:<br />
<br />
* The government websites will be inaccessible an all lawsuits will be manipulated</i><br />
<i>* We will infiltrate the server of inland revenues for the manipulation of the data which are there.</i><br />
<i>* At the same time we will insist into the server of banks and will care for chaos</i><br />
<i>* Websites of the press will be extinguished.</i><br />
<i>* If the offence of our prophet (s.a.v.) called your press freedom, we will show you this press freedom</i><br />
<i>* Websites of divers shops will be hacked. Databank information's and the dates which are there, for example credit card dates, will be policed in this page. (Don't worry, we wouldn't taste one cent of your moneys, we aren't thieves like you. However we don't take care of what happens, if other hackers see this dates and empty your account)</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIBtXRQhuII/AAAAAAAAB7U/WwX3npoBZvI/s1600-h/SQL_turkz.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SIBtXRQhuII/AAAAAAAAB7U/saIYE3fxpdA/s200-R/SQL_turkz.JPG" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>While this may sound inspiring, <b>some of the group's members are also involved in SQL injections in between the web site defacements</b>, which are naturally done by exploiting web application vulnerabilities. For instance, right after the defacement messages, they are also injecting the following fast-fluxed domains, part of the latest wave of SQL injections attacks.<b></b><br />
<br />
<b>bkpadd.mobi /ngg.js<br />
usaadw.com /ngg.js<br />
cliprts.com /ngg.js</b><br />
<br />
They are monetizing their defacements by either compiling lists of sites known to be SQL injectable since they've managed to defaced them, then reselling these to the SQL injectors, or are in fact part of the whole process in this scammy ecosystem. Speaking of SQL injections, here's the most recent list of fast-fluxed SQL injected domains participating in the last wave that I've been keeping track of for a while :<br />
<br />
<b>pyttco .com/ngg.js<br />
butdrv .com/ngg.js<br />
gitporg .com/ngg.js<br />
brcporb .ru/ngg.js<br />
korfd .ru/ngg.js<br />
adwnetw .com/ngg.js<br />
wowofmusiopl .com.cn/456.js<br />
adwbn .ru/ngg.js<br />
btoperc .ru/ngg.js<br />
nudk .ru/ngg.js<br />
bkpadd .mobi/ngg.js<br />
cliprts .com/ngg.js<br />
adwr .ru/ngg.js<br />
bnrc .ru/ngg.js<br />
adpzo .com/ngg.js<br />
iogp .ru/ngg.js<br />
lodse .ru/ngg.js<br />
usabnr .com/ngg.js<br />
vcre .ru/ngg.js<br />
sdkj .ru/ngg.js<br />
rcdplc .ru/ngg.js<br />
7maigol .cn/ri.js<br />
j8heisi .cn/ri.js<br />
usaadp .com/ngg.js<br />
gbradp .com/ngg.js<br />
cdrpoex .com/ngg.js<br />
rrcs .ru/ngg.js<br />
gbradw .com/ngg.js<br />
hiwowpp .cn/ri.js<br />
cdport .eu/ngg.js<br />
nopcls .com/ngg.js<br />
loopadd .com/ngg.js<br />
tertad .mobi/ngg.js<br />
gbradde .tk/ngg.js<br />
tctcow .com/ngg.js<br />
ausbnr .com/ngg.js<br />
movaddw .com/ngg.js<br />
grtsel .ru/ngg.js<br />
sslwer .ru/ngg.js<br />
destad .mobi/ngg.js<br />
hdrcom .com/ngg.js<br />
addrl .com/ngg.js<br />
porttw .mobi/ngg.js<br />
bnsdrv .com/ngg.js<br />
drvadw .com/ngg.js<br />
crtbond .com/ngg.js<br />
usaadw .com/ngg.js</b><br />
<br />
What used to be plain simple cooperating among every single participant in the underground marketplace, seems to be evolving into long-term business relationships.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/monetizing-web-site-defacements.html">Monetizing Web Site Defacements</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/underground-multitasking-in-action.html">Underground Multitasking in Action</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/right-wing-israeli-hackers-deface.html">Right Wing Israeli Hackers Deface Hamas's Site</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/pro-serbian-hacktivists-attacking.html">Pro-Serbian Hacktivists Attacking Albanian Web Sites</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/rise-of-kosovo-defacement-groups.html">The Rise of Kosovo Defacement Groups</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/commercial-web-site-defacement-tool.html">A Commercial Web Site Defacement Tool</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/phishing-tactics-evolving.html">Phishing Tactics Evolving</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/web-site-defacement-groups-going.html">Web Site Defacement Groups Going Phishing</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/02/hacktivism-tensions.html">Hacktivism Tensions</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2006/07/hacktivism-tensions-israel-vs.html">Hacktivism Tensions - Israel vs Palestine Cyberwars</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/mass-defacement-by-turkish-hacktivists.html">Mass Defacement by Turkish Hacktivists</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/overperforming-turkish-hacktivists.html">Overperforming Turkish Hacktivists</a><div class="feedflare">
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sql injections attacks">sql injections attacks</category>
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    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a8772335cd8deda2e5469b0533d7c817</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a8772335cd8deda2e5469b0533d7c817</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Are malware authors and the rest of the participants in fact willing to violate their OPSEC (operational security) for the sake of increasing the probability of successful malware infection by on...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHf46B4X8KI/AAAAAAAAB5s/bNsyTU1Vchg/s1600-h/smitfraud_PC_hijacker.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHf46B4X8KI/AAAAAAAAB5s/ansREl9cVe0/s200-R/smitfraud_PC_hijacker.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>Are malware authors and the rest of the participants in fact willing to violate their OPSEC (operational security) for the sake of increasing the probability of successful malware infection by on purposely lowering down the security settings of Internet Explorer, by adding their malicious netblocks and domains into "Trusted Sites"? You bet.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">The infamous Smitfraud or PSGuard Desktop Hijacker, has been cooperating with known malicious parties for over an year now, a cooperation which exposes interesting relatinships between the usual suspects. Starting from the basic fact that a malware infected host is infected with many other totally unrelated to one another pieces of malware, Smitfraud's "pre-infection foreplay" demonstrates that they are willing to sacrifice operational security in order to increaes the probabilty of future infections on the same host.</div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
<br />
Rogue software added as trusted sites upon Smitfraud infection :<br />
<b>about-adult .net<br />
antivirus-scanner .com<br />
best-porncollection .com<br />
getadultaccess .com<br />
getavideonow .com<br />
ieantivirus .com<br />
malwarebell .com<br />
mega-soft-2008 .com<br />
mooncodec .com<br />
movsonline .com<br />
ruler-cash .com<br />
s-freeware .com<br />
sexysoftwaredom .com<br />
supersoft21freeware .com<br />
the-programsportal .com<br />
vwwredtube .com<br />
wetsoftwares .com<br />
youpornztube .com<br />
securewebinfo .com<br />
safetyincludes .com<br />
securemanaging .com<br />
myflydirect .com<br />
onlinevideosoftex .com<br />
scanner.malwscan .com<br />
scanner.shredderscan .com<br />
sex18tube2008 .com<br />
spywareisolator .com<br />
virus-scanner-online .com<br />
security-scanner-online .com<br />
virus-scanonline .com<br />
antivirus-scanonline .com<br />
topantivirus-scan .com<br />
topvirusscan .com<br />
virus-detection-scanner .com<br />
antivirus-scanner .com<br />
infectionscanner .com<br />
internet-security-antivirus .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
hotvid44 .com<br />
opaadownload .com<br />
somenudefuck .com</b><br />
<br />
Rogue netblocks and IPs added as trusted IP ranges upon Smitfraud infection :<br />
<b>"69.50.*.*"<br />
"69.31.*.*"<br />
"66.235.*.*"<br />
"66.230.*.*"<br />
"216.239.*.*"<br />
"205.188.*.*"<br />
"205.177.*.*"<br />
"195.225.*.*"<br />
"216.195.*.*"<br />
"82.179.*.*"<br />
"81.95.*.*"<br />
"70.84.*.*"<br />
"195.95.*.*"<br />
"194.187.*.*"<br />
"78.129.158.*"<br />
"78.129.166.*"<br />
"89.149.226.*"<br />
"195.93.218.*"<br />
"72.21.53.*<br />
"81.9.3.*"<br />
"213.189.27.*"<br />
"88.255.74.*"<br />
"79.143.178.*"<br />
"202.71.102.*"<br />
"64.202.189.170"<br />
"217.170.77.150"</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div>
<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div>
The second hardcoded trusted IP is also responding to :<br />
<a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHf8FAKzs7I/AAAAAAAAB50/ZR2egkY7iLY/s1600-h/ie7_trusted_sites.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SHf8FAKzs7I/AAAAAAAAB50/6CEouhwdlio/s200-R/ie7_trusted_sites.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><b>virusisolator .com<br />
virus-isolator .org<br />
virus-isolator .net<br />
soft-collections .com<br />
viruswebprotect .com<br />
virus-isolator .us<br />
codecvideo2008-18 .com<br />
sextubecodec55 .com<br />
sextubecodec67 .com<br />
soft-archives .com<br />
soft-collections .com<br />
codecreviews .com<br />
codecvideo2008-18 .com</b><br />
<br />
Such practices leave a great deal of malicious creativity, for instance, once rented a botnet's already infected malware PCs could start trusting the majority of sites in their scammy ecosystem. What's great is that by doing this they expose their affiliations with these affiliate based rogue security software programs, next to their infrastructure on which they may be that easily claiming ownership.<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 15:39:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smitfraud">smitfraud</category>
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      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware pcs">malware pcs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/infamous smitfraud">infamous smitfraud</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/333145852/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</source>
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