The Defense Department's geeks are spooked by a rapidly spreading worm crawling across their networks. So they've suspended the use of so-called thumb drives, CDs, flash media cards, and all other removable data storage devices from their nets, to try to keep the worm from multiplying any further.

The ban comes from the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, according to an internal Army e-mail. It applies to both the secret SIPR and unclassified NIPR nets. The suspension, which includes everything from external hard drives to "floppy disks," is supposed to take effect "immediately." Similar notices went out to the other military services.

In some organizations, the ban would be only a minor inconvenience. But the military relies heavily on such drives to store information. Bandwidth is often scarce out in the field. Networks are often considered unreliable. Takeaway storage is used constantly as a substitute.

I’ve often read people who say that we (security, risk management) need to “think like the attacker”.  And when you read this sort of article, that usually alludes to trying to anticipate the tactics an attacker might use to mess with your C, I, or A.  Smart stuff, that, and very useful when architecting security solutions.  But as I was training some folks Monday, I was thinking in the back of my head about Threat Capability (TCap) in FAIR.  As you might know, we like to estimate the capability of a threat to apply some level of “force” against our assets.  This ability to apply force is a byproduct of the attacker’s skills and resources.  And thinking of how an attacker applies skills and resources, I came across another way we might “think” like an attacker.

Traditionally, I’ve thought of “skills” as being a byproduct of the toolset an attacker has.  This mindset probably stems from my time with Penetration Testing teams, where in the process of scoping the  PenTest I would ask our clients to select the level of effort that they wanted us to throw at them.  If a client chose “high” we’d throw every ‘spoit we had at them.  If they chose “low” we’d limit ourselves to a more commonly available toolset.

But while the resources part of TCap is time & materials (money) - the skills are really more than just the toolset.  Skills would include the ability of the attacker to be creative and innovative.    As an example of that innovation from those PenTesting days - when we got a “high” effort request, we would always try to couple that with some “social engineering”-type of attack, or some unique means of delivering an existing exploit.  Our creativity was not necessarily a byproduct of a unique exploit or tool we had, but the process by which we might deliver pre-existing or commonly available exploits.  I remember when we first got ahold of a handful of 32mb thumb drives (hey, 32mb was huge back then) and “dropped” a few in the lobby of a client’s retail space.  The keystroke loggers and phone-home script weren’t new, but using the thumb drive as delivery vehicle certainly was.

So I’ve started to really think about this concept of innovation, and how if “thinking like an attacker” means to be innovative, we ought to do the same.  I’ve been thinking of two main categories of innovation this morning.

INNOVATION

The first I’ll call Technology Innovation.  And by Technology Innovation, I mean some new, unique, “ahead of the curve” technology that an attacker can use against us.  The obvious example of which is a zero-day.  It’s that “high” tool set our PenTesters would use against the clients.  For security departments, this might be the latest security product designed to enhance our ability to P, D, and/or R.

Alternately, we can be creative in the way we deliver (manage) existing technology.  I think of this as Process Innovation.  It’s doing more with what we already have, just like the PenTest team would be creative in the delivery of an existing exploit.

Unfortunately for us - attackers have traditionally had quite a leg up on us in terms of Process Innovation.  It is much easier fro them to be creative, as they are free of political constraints and bureaucracy.  In contrast, when the security industry tries Process Innovation, the results are checklists and “standards”.  It’s committees and consensus.  An extreme example of which might be something like SABSA - a great work if you want to understand some very smart people’s comprehensive understanding of organizational security  - but the “adoption”of which will do very little to help you be innovative in P/D/R.

It’s worth noting that ultimately, this is one reason I don’t like regulatory compliance efforts - they simply serve to prove how mundane your security department is,  wasting valuable resources that could be spent on creating ways to be more effective.

PROCESS INNOVATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION

As we come to the close of 2009, some surveys suggest that security spending isn’t horribly impacted yet by the economy (the latest from E&Y points to only 5% of their respondents getting budget cuts).  But if this is a protracted downturn, and because InfoSec is an operational expense, I would expect cash to become more and more difficult to keep.  And regardless if technology spends do slow, I believe it makes sense to think about Process Innovation because I see Process Innovation as a means to increase effectiveness without significant capital expenditures (effectiveness increases because our ability to manage risk has a direct correlation to the amount of risk we have).

The bad news is, of course, that great innovation is hard.  It is R & D.  Failure is usually a pre-requisite to success.

The good news is, our current state is so bad that many of us don’t need to come up with a whizbang new way of reducing software defects in the SDLC as innovation.  Simply inserting a risk analyst into the PMO’s processes might count as a big enough victory. Be cautioned, though,  that if we’re substituting the risk reductions provided by technology acquisition - Process Innovation might actually be even more “expensive” as it requires us to expend political capital.   But there are (forgive the term) innovative ways to spend this political capital.

For example, by taking a second now and figuring out the 3 things that the rest of the organization can do to make your life easier, when that “I need to reduce your budget” talk comes, you can be prepared to negotiate.  Get a political capital “loan” or “investment” from the C-Suite reducing your budget.  Something to the effect of: “I expected this, and am happy to give up my budget.  But if our tolerance for risk hasn’t changed, what I’d like to do is get you to personally back my office on three projects I’ve identified that can reduce our risk without requiring significant capital expenditure.”

…the FBI and the Secret Service came to the campaign with an ominous warning: “You have a problem way bigger than what you understand,” an agent told Obama’s team. “You have been compromised, and a serious amount of files have been loaded off your system.” The following day, Obama campaign chief David Plouffe heard from White House chief of staff Josh Bolten, to the same effect: “You have a real problem … and you have to deal with it.” The Feds told Obama’s aides in late August that the McCain campaign’s computer system had been similarly compromised.

This information demonstrates that the US government has a sophisticated intrusion detection capability. This is likely part of the NSA internet surveillance system that was made public by an AT&T technician in 2006.

It is likely that the system has a set of watch IP ranges that are sensitive from a national security perspective. The campaigns’ computers were probably on this list. The traffic between foreign IP addresses and these watch IPs is then scrutinized for espionage. The pattern of activity flagged would be Microsoft Office documents and PDFs being retrieved or other intruder signs such as an encrypted tunnel with a foreign endpoint.

This shows that the US Government has the capability to detect some types foreign attacks although they probably have to be selective of the IP ranges they monitor. It’s nice to know that if the White House computers were leaking documents to China or Russia that there is some detection capability, but the fact that this is done at the Internet backbone level means any IP could be targeted and it might not just be to look for foreign intrusions.

TECHNOLOGY AREAS: Air Platform, Information Systems, Space Platforms, Human Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals, their country of origin, and what tasks each would accomplish in the statement of work in accordance with section 3.5.b.(7) of the solicitation.

OBJECTIVE: Develop visualization techniques for planning and execution of Cyberspace operations.

DESCRIPTION: Fulfilling the Air Force mission “… to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” requires effective C2 tools for the observation, planning and execution of cyberspace operations. Conventional battlespace visualization tools were developed for the physical world (i.e., geospatially oriented), where the battlespace, weapons and effects are concrete, often observable entities. Cyberspace and its critical electronic infrastructures are an artificial world that must be created, modified and sustained by the warfighter. This artificial world of cyberspace has concrete links back to the physical world that shape the information landscape, affect the decision-making process, and control the communication channels crucial to C2.

Standard, geospatially oriented C2 tools are not suitable for providing cyber combatants with comparable situation awareness to understand events, evaluate options, and make decisions in the electromagnetic domain. The combatants in the cyber domain needs to be able to quickly see and understand not just the physical relationships of the traditional battlespace, but also the logical relationships and information dependencies in the abstract landscape of cyberspace. Cyber C2 visualizations need to provide information for strategy, tactics and execution of effects that may, or may not, have physical correlates. Examples of these cyber events include network attack detection, attack identification, damage assessment, denial of service (DOS) warnings, and information warfare or cyber-attack operations.

For example, a commander may be planning to intentionally disrupt a portion of his network to investigate a cyber-attack. He will need to understand what ripple effects will occur across the functionally diverse and geographically distributed network. These ripple effects will have both a cyber component (e.g., locations that will lose connectivity or suffer degraded performance characteristics) and a real-world component (e.g., information about enemy forces may be unavailable or delayed, reducing blue force effectiveness) that must be visualized, explored and tasked from within his C2 tools.

Decision makers will greatly benefit from innovative visualization tools that can improve their understanding of all aspects of the Cyber domain. These aspects include 1) the current state of the information environment, the physical and virtual battlespace and enemy and friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities; 2) the scope and scale of courses of action that affect information or information networks; 3) the primary effects and ripple effects of an operation in both the physical and cyber battlespaces, and 4) the risks for collateral damage associated with cyber warfare activities.

PHASE I: Identify cyberspace characteristics relevant to C2 visualization. Identify correlation methods and visualization techniques to understand battlespace, operations, and effects. Define metrics to evaluate efficacy. Document results in a written report, including mockups of proposed visualizations.

PHASE II: Construct a working prototype to demonstrate integrated visualization of cyber data showing 1) the status of information environment, 2) its effect on the conventional battlespace, and 3) the status of information operations. Evaluate effectiveness using metrics defined in Phase I.

PHASE III / DUAL USE: Military application: Additional military applications include command and control environments, like the Air Operations Centers (AOCs). Commercial application: Monitoring and defending infrastructures (e.g., financial and energy) against cyber-attacks. Visualization cyberspace is beneficial for security of commercial communication and information networks.

REFERENCES:

1. ‘Air Force leaders to discuss new ‘Cyber Command’

2. Laura S. Tinnel, O. Sami Saydjari, and Joshua W. Haines, An Integrated Cyber Panel System, IEEE Computer Society,

3. Anita D’Amico and Stephen Salas, Visualization as an Aid for Assessing the Mission Impact of Information Security Breaches, IEEE 2003.

4. Tim Bass, “Cyberspace Situational Awareness Demands Mimic Traditional Command Requirements,” AFCEA Signal Magazine, February 2000.

KEYWORDS: visualization, cyber, human factors, planning, situation awareness, command and control, HCI

Reference. SITIS Topic Details, Visualization for Command and Control of Cyberspace Operations

See also:  http://www.dodsbir.net/solicitation/sbir083/af083.doc

One of the most interesting operations was the laundry mat [sic]. Having lost many troops and civilians to bombings, the Brits decided they needed to determine who was making the bombs and where they were being manufactured. One bright fellow recommended they operate a laundry and when asked "what the hell he was talking about," he explained the plan and it was incorporated -- to much success.

The plan was simple: Build a laundry and staff it with locals and a few of their own. The laundry would then send out "color coded" special discount tickets, to the effect of "get two loads for the price of one," etc. The color coding was matched to specific streets and thus when someone brought in their laundry, it was easy to determine the general location from which a city map was coded.

While the laundry was indeed being washed, pressed and dry cleaned, it had one additional cycle -- every garment, sheet, glove, pair of pants, was first sent through an analyzer, located in the basement, that checked for bomb-making residue. The analyzer was disguised as just another piece of the laundry equipment; good OPSEC [operational security]. Within a few weeks, multiple positives had shown up, indicating the ingredients of bomb residue, and intelligence had determined which areas of the city were involved. To narrow their target list, [the laundry] simply sent out more specific coupons [numbered] to all houses in the area, and before long they had good addresses. After confirming addresses, authorities with the SAS teams swooped down on the multiple homes and arrested multiple personnel and confiscated numerous assembled bombs, weapons and ingredients. During the entire operation, no one was injured or killed.

We read many stories on the net where folks claim that the current financial crisis could have been avoided with more or better use of technology.     This is expected, as software companies and IT professionals will often try to piggy-backtheir business development strategy on the “crisis of the day” to sell more goods and services.    Honestly, in this current situation, the main technology that we needed was simple, accurate financial models.

For example, in the chart above, the US economy was doing quite well with US federal funds rates low.   Housing prices in the US were skyrocketing and there was a concern about inflation.    There was an understandable concern the sustainability of that economy.

So, in perhaps one the most ill-advised Federal Reserve actions of many decades, the folks at the helm of the Fed decided to raise their lending rates around 500 percent over a two year period.

As we all know, primarily because of the action by the Fed, the world faces perhaps the worst economic disaster in modern times, while the US Executive Branch and the Congress fight over how to spend $700 Billion taxpayer dollars to inject liquidity into the markets to try to head off a global financial disaster.

It is amazing to me that the US Federal Government, or their advisors, does not have simple financial models with cause-and-effect analysis such as:

• Homeowners with adjustable rate mortuages will not be able to make payments;and
• Housing prices will fall dramatically; then
• Homeowners will default on loans where the collateral is much less than the asset value, and
• Banks will suffer great losses, and
• Lending will come to a halt, then
• Banks will collapse, then
• Wall Street will exit the markets in panic
• … and more trouble….. !!

There are and continue to be a lot of discussion and opinions about how risk management needs improvement. and I agree.   We will also read folks talk about how technology can be used to help solve this problem, including CEP/EP and related software (see also Capital Market CEP Fantasy Land). However, as much I would be pleased to see more CEP/EP applications and use cases, I do not believe that event processing technology is really very useful to solve the core problem of the current financial crisis.

The core problem is, seemingly, that our “financial experts” do not even have simple models that will illustrate what will or could happen when you raise the fed lending rates 500 percent in two years in an economy pregnant with adjustable rate mortgages.

To me, this does not appear to be rocket science.  The negligence by the US Federal Reserve and their advisors is astonishing.