For example, the “Average Joe Investor” does not care about “best order execution” or “smart order routing,” this is for “the big boys.”  As we all know, saving a few pennies or dollars per transaction to “Average Joe Investor” does nothing for them when their retirement nest egg is lost due to corporate greed and negligence.     The folks who “really care” about shaving a few milliseconds off market execution are the companies that are trading high volumes of exotic derivatives and baskets who have, for the most part, zero interest in the personal financial portfolio of “Jane in Iowa” or “Joe in Kansas.”

I am really amazed to see the dominance of greed in corporate America and the lack of corporate social responsibility.  Risk taking and “split second trading” does little for any small. individual investor and has proven to destabilize our society.    Who cares about saving a few pennies or dollars in market executive?

The answer: Only the greedy corporations, the same people responsible for the current destabilization, chao and near collaspe of our entire financial system.   Homes lost, unprecedented bankruptcies. and money market funds less than par value!   You no doubt have read that folks in the Reserve Money Market funds cannot even withdraw their “safe money.”  Investors in the Reserve Funds are being told that for every dollar they invested in a money market, they now only have 97 cents and cannot withdraw their capital as the Reserve waits for a government bailout.

What is to blame? Greed and profits over corporate social responsibility are to blame.

I read where some folks think the government needs to regulate market-related news, supposedly to stabilize trading based on news.   Regulating news has another name -  “censorship” - but who cares about the US Constitution when money and split second algo trading is involved?    I am amazed.   Folks in financial services just will say or do anything to make a buck, or keep from losing one, even at the expense of society and our basic constitutional freedoms.  News is not regulated in our democratic society, nor should it be to make algorithmic trading “better”.     What we need is less split second, computerized algo trading and more stablity.   Machine processing should not dicate nor mandate changes to our democratic principles.

Nor should our lives in a free society be censored or regulated because of the trading requirements for split second transactions that benefit large corporations.    The average investor does not need an unstable financial system trading exotic derivatives and baskets at the speed of light.  This requirement is driven by corporate greed that destabilizes the core economy and fabric of our society.

Of couse, many of the same folks would like for us to believe that technology is the answer.  This is a fallacy.

Corporate greed is destabilizing society.   What need to be regulated is not the news, but corporate risk taking and corporate goverance.  Individual investors do not need lightspeed transactions in an unstable world.   Citizens and families need a secure, stable economic infrastructure, something that has been lost in the culture of corporate greed, but hopefully not forever.

No, I did not give him a cell phone. Didn't want to lose it. And no, I didn't trail him, like a mommy private eye. I trusted him to figure out that he should take the Lexington Avenue subway down, and the 34th Street crosstown bus home. If he couldn't do that, I trusted him to ask a stranger. And then I even trusted that stranger not to think, "Gee, I was about to catch my train home, but now I think I'll abduct this adorable child instead."

Long story short: My son got home, ecstatic with independence.

Long story longer, and analyzed, to boot: Half the people I've told this episode to now want to turn me in for child abuse. As if keeping kids under lock and key and helmet and cell phone and nanny and surveillance is the right way to rear kids. It's not. It's debilitating -- for us and for them.

It's amazing how our fears blind us. The mother and son appeared on The Today Show, where they both continued to explain why it wasn't an unreasonable thing to do:

And that was Skenazy's point in her column: The era is long past when Times Square was a fetid sump and taking a walk in Central Park after dark was tantamount to committing suicide. Recent federal statistics show New York to be one of the safest cities in the nation -- right up there with Provo, Utah, in fact.

"Times are back to 1963," Skenzay said. "It's safe. It's a great time to be a kid in the city."

The problem is that people read about children who are abducted and murdered and fear takes over, she said. And she doesn't think fear should rule our lives.

Of course, The Today Show interviewer didn't get it:

Dr. Ruth Peters, a parenting expert and TODAY Show contributor, agreed that children should be allowed independent experiences, but felt there are better -- and safer -- ways to have them than the one Skenazy chose.

"I'm not so much concerned that he's going to be abducted, but there's a lot of people who would rough him up," she said. "There's some bullies and things like that. He could have gotten the same experience in a safer manner."

"It's safe to go on the subway," Skenazy replied. "It's safe to be a kid. It's safe to ride your bike on the streets. We're like brainwashed because of all the stories we hear that it isn't safe. But those are the exceptions. That's why they make it to the news. This is like, 'Boy boils egg.' He did something that any 9-year-old could do."

Here's an audio interview with Skenazy.

I am reminded of this great graphic depicting childhood independence diminishing over four generations.

Today, there are more IT security books in the shops than ever before.

But what IT Security books can make a real difference to an aspiring Security Wannabe?

These are my Seminal 7…

Photo Credit: tanakawho

The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage

The book that ignited my passion for IT security. Clifford Stoll stalks the wily hacker Markus Hess in a true edge of the seat thriller. Computer security books boring? Then you haven’t read this one.  Be prepared to read in one sitting!

TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 1: The Protocols (Addison-Wesley Professional Computing Series)

I remember the day I read that the author of this book - Richard Stevens - had passed away. I was shocked and saddened. This may sound strange as I’d never met him, nor had any correspondence with him. The reason is simple: through his writing, he had an uncanny ability to meet you where you were and take you on what feels like a personally guided tour of TCP/IP. Simply put, this is essential reading. I’ve read some great networking books since, but none that give you the feeling that the author wrote the book just for you. A revered classic.

Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, Second Edition

The so-called bible of Crypto. With good reason too: Bruce Schneier provides a seriously comprehensive introduction to cryptography. Refreshingly, he starts at the ground floor - you don’t need a degree in maths to benefit from this tomb - its very accessible. Digest this and you will learn about the most important crypto protocols and algorithms in existence today. I still reference this book at least once a month - I’ve owned it for about 5 years now. How many books can you say that about?

Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, 2nd Edition

Ross Anderson teaches us how to avoid repeating the mistakes of those that went before us. Another author with real passion for the subject, his intelligence and pragmatism shine through. This book will introduce you to IT security as an engineering discipline. Don’t let those last two words put you off - Anderson is a master at telling you what you need to know, when you need it. The book itself underlines why effective security design is all about “the human element”. Fascinating case studies that will make you thank your lucky stars you don’t have to design security for prepayment meters or ATMs.  Want to read online?  Click here.  Aside from the book, I highly recommend his papers on the Economics of Information Security.

Hacking: The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Edition

The majority of the security books on my bookshelf are pretty thick. Thick books give an air of authority - “wow, this must be a very serious book by a very knowledgeable author, if I read this, I will breathe in the knowledge of the gods and impress anyone willing to listen to me for long enough”. The author of this book - Jon Erickson - somehow manages to pack an incredible amount of content into less tree than most (he even manages to get root on the cover!). You will learn techniques that shave hours off exploit development time.  A great introduction to blowing (precise) holes in software.

The Art of Software Security Assessment: Identifying and Preventing Software Vulnerabilities

The holy trinity of Software Vulnerability Researchers deliver a mammoth treatise on why my eyes would bleed if I had to do what they do all day. This book will change the way you see software security auditing. If it doesn’t, you probably need to read it more carefully. This should be mandatory reading for people that get paid to do software vulnerability research. For more, check the Taossa blog.

Silence on the Wire: A Field Guide to Passive Reconnaissance and Indirect Attacks

Michal Zalewski is refreshing because (a) he does his own thing (b) those ‘own things’ tend to be interesting and (c) he enjoys the subtle/obscure/funny. And he can write! For a non-native English speaker he writes with great charm and wit. Reading this book is like stepping into the Matrix - everything we take for granted can be unwoven, refactored and turned inside out. Buy this book and read it cover to cover then go check out his lair, where he shares his ongoing digital experiments.

###

What security books would you recommend to an aspiring Security Wannabe and why?  Tell us in the comments…

Good article by Neil Roiter from Information Security Magazine on NAC moving ahead as the hype subsides. For a change from other articles we have read recently, Neil gives a true to life, no holds barred assessment of where NAC is in the market.  I think some of the comments from Lawrence Orans over at Gartner are right on.  However, one he misses is in talking about the Cisco-Microsoft NAC partnership. I think the TCG-Microsoft partnership has replaced that one and Cisco is going to join that party through the NEA. 

For me though the quote of the article was this one by Brendan O'Connell, Cisco's product line manager for NAC, "NAC is an Easter egg hunt. Policy lives in a lot of different places .."  So does that make Cisco the NAC Easter Bunny? Seriously, policy does live in a lot of different places.  I think eventually the answer lies in marrying network based admission control policies with endpoint based configuration policies.  This is an area that is ripe for interaction and integration.  I also think that Symantec talking about customers want a NAC solution, but not another console or another agent was a bit ironic.  Just because you lump your agents together doesn't mean you have not added yet more overhead to the equation.  Anyone who has used Symantecs new Endpoint Security with all of the mods turned on can talk to you about overhead and resource use. Whether the agent is separate or not, it is what the overhead is that counts.

In any event, though Neil did not mention StillSecure (tsk, tsk) I thought this article was right on, that despite the naysayers and the inflated hype, NAC is being adopted in the market. It is maturing and most of all it is providing value to customers.

Good article by Neil Roiter from Information Security Magazine on NAC moving ahead as the hype subsides. For a change from other articles we have read recently, Neil gives a true to life, no holds barred assessment of where NAC is in the market.  I think some of the comments from Lawrence Orans over at Gartner are right on.  However, one he misses is in talking about the Cisco-Microsoft NAC partnership. I think the TCG-Microsoft partnership has replaced that one and Cisco is going to join that party through the NEA. 

For me though the quote of the article was this one by Brendan O'Connell, Cisco's product line manager for NAC, "NAC is an Easter egg hunt. Policy lives in a lot of different places .."  So does that make Cisco the NAC Easter Bunny? Seriously, policy does live in a lot of different places.  I think eventually the answer lies in marrying network based admission control policies with endpoint based configuration policies.  This is an area that is ripe for interaction and integration.  I also think that Symantec talking about customers want a NAC solution, but not another console or another agent was a bit ironic.  Just because you lump your agents together doesn't mean you have not added yet more overhead to the equation.  Anyone who has used Symantecs new Endpoint Security with all of the mods turned on can talk to you about overhead and resource use. Whether the agent is separate or not, it is what the overhead is that counts.

In any event, though Neil did not mention StillSecure (tsk, tsk) I thought this article was right on, that despite the naysayers and the inflated hype, NAC is being adopted in the market. It is maturing and most of all it is providing value to customers.

Her case was remarkably similar to that of John Munden, about whom I wrote here (and in my book here). Like John, she worked for the police; like John, she complained to a bank about some ATM debits on her bank statement that she did not recognise; like John, she was arrested and suspended from work; like John, she faced a bank (in her case, Egg) claiming that as its systems were secure, she must be trying to defraud them; and like John, she faced police expert evidence that was technically illiterate and just took the bank’s claims as gospel.

In her case, Egg said that the transactions must have been done with the card issued to her rather than using a card clone, and to back this up they produced a printout allocating a transaction code of 05 to each withdrawal, and a rubric stating that 05 meant “Integrated Circuit Card read - CVV data reliable” with in brackets the explanatory phrase “(chip read)”. This seemed strange. If the chip of an EMV card is read, the reader will verify the signature on the certificate; if its magnetic strip is read (perhaps because the chip is unserviceable) then the bank will check the CVV, which is there to prevent magnetic strip forgery. The question therefore was whether the dash in the above rubric meant “OR”, as the technology would suggest, or “AND” as the bank and the CPS hoped. The technology is explained in more detail in our recent submission to the Hunt Review of the Financial Services Ombudsman (see below). I therefore advised the defence to apply for the court to order Egg to produce the actual transaction logs and supporting material so that we could verify the transaction certificates, if any.

The prosecution folded and today Jane walked free. I hope she wins an absolute shipload of compensation from Egg!

"One of the fun questions I used to ask my firewalls tutorial
attendees (back in the day) is: What is a stateful inspection firewall? I.e.: what does it DO?

The answers are usually illuminating. Nobody seems to actually know." (more here)

• On Security Marketing