Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

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• Moderator: Nick Hoover, Senior Editor, InformationWeek
• Speaker - Anne Berkowitch, Co-Founder & CEO, SelectMinds
• Speaker - J.B. Holston, CEO and President, NewsGator
• Speaker - Umberto Milletti, CEO, InsideView

Businesses can take advantage of social networks by finding innovative ways to reach out to people. Looking at who you know and how you know them can benefit you. Knowing a personal connection to someone that you are trying to contact (for sales) is helpful. The blurring between home, personal, and business life is making this information more available and better able to leverage. People are able to capture more valuable long term information from social networks.

A lot of social network applications can be taken from the talent management space. Deploying alumni networks as a talent source is also a great asset. Alumni represent a well-known and relevant population. This provides a great economic benefit from a social network.

If you are running a sales organization and looking at building a pipeline of leads, consider how these leads are relevant. The ability to get more leads is apparent in finding the right person, right connection, and right contact. Underlying everything are productivity and efficiency. How much time are sales reps spending researching and pursuing each opportunity? With information on social networks, the time can be greatly decreased. Knowledge sharing is something that can be actively measured.

The ROI varies with the business issue that’s trying to be addressed by a particular network. Recruiting for example has a very concrete, measurable ROI. Knowledge share gets a little more tricky. How do you measure how much is shared and the impact on business systems? Businesses need to determine what specific goal they are trying to address.

CFOs want to see ROI, not intuitive information. If you can demonstrate engagement and participation in these networks and knowledge sharing tools, more and more executives are getting comfortable seeing how it’s used at a qualitative and process level. It’s a very case by case basis.

One major crisis that we see in our customers is the competition between sales and marketing. Each wants to do their own thing, they go together like oil and water. However, the push of the economy is now forcing them work together. This is a great opportunity for IT to step in and help them collaborate and be more productive.

Other resistance from companies are how to manage what they are trying to accomplish while still giving employees free reign of sites like Facebook. What are the incentives for using these technologies? How does it fit into your company culture and productivity scale? You must bring meaning to the structure of engaging in social networks.

Social networks like LinkedIn and Facebook would not exist if people did not contribute information to them. However, if people don’t know that it is there, it does not exist. People need to see the value and get drawn in to engage. There are two ways that companies get into social networks. Tie it into the business process. The general idea of social networks are intuitive and easy to understand, which make it an easier case to present to chief executives. Make it clear - how do you go about it and what’s the value?

Social networks are intrinsically about extending the network, the more contacts you have, the more to choose from when researching a specific contact. It also has to be integrated into your dataworkflow. Companies are going to build a variety of networks inside and outside the enterprise. The big companies (SAP, IBM) are all rushing to offer collaborative and social network functionality. However, this is not entirely useful unless it’s integrated into the entire infrastructure.

Your first real lesson about locking down a host was how to reduce its attack surface. You learned how to disable services using /etc/inetd.conf. Then you learned about rc.d and how to prevent unnecessary services from being launched at startup. Next, maybe you configured the Xserver to disallow remote connections or moved on to removing setuid permissions from files. As you worked, you’d periodically re-scan the box to gauge progress, asking yourself “have I removed everything I don’t need?” The underlying motivation, of course, is that an attacker can’t hack something that isn’t there.

You learned how to extend those concepts to the network — configuring firewall rules, router ACLs, VLANs, etc. Segmenting the network. Creating a DMZ. No need to dwell on this, you get the idea.

Eventually, people realized that applications had an attack surface too. Web servers and application servers got a lot of attention, followed closely by custom web applications. “What do you mean you can execute SQL queries against my database? That’s impossible, I have a firewall!”

Some companies, the ones who could afford it anyway, started to build security into their development cycle. Doing threat modeling during the design phase made sense, because hey, it’s much cheaper to fix security holes in a whiteboard drawing than it is to rewrite your authorization module from scratch after it’s in production.

Let’s talk strictly about custom web applications now. What I’ve observed is that most development groups, even the ones who actively engage in threat modeling, do not understand their web application’s attack surface. The lead architect can whiteboard a high-level diagram of all the major components and how they interact. Individual developers can go a bit deeper, telling you which files they touch, what database permissions they need, or how various pieces of data are encrypted in storage. At the end of this exercise you have a complete picture of the processes, data flows, protocols, privilege boundaries, external entities, and so on, and you’re well on your way to understanding all of the potential attack vectors.

Or are you?

What often gets overlooked or glossed over is the impact of external libraries or packages. Nobody writes everything from scratch. A typical list of third-party libraries for a Java-based Web 2.0 application might include DWR, GWT, Axis, and Dojo, plus about 30 other libraries to do everything from logging to parsing to image manipulation. Nine out of ten times, the libraries will be installed in full, using the default configuration from page one of the README file.

Why is this relevant? Because just as those old Unix boxes exposed unnecessary services, libraries expose unnecessary code. Let’s say you installed Dojo to simplify the process of creating an HTML table with rows and columns that can be sorted on demand. Did you remember to remove all the .js files you didn’t need? Or maybe you installed Axis or DWR or anything else that has its own Servlet(s) for processing requests. Have you compared what that Servlet can do against what you need it to do?

A fictitious example may help illustrate further. Imagine you just downloaded a new library called WhizBang. You follow the installation instructions to define and map two servlets in your web.xml file, WhizServlet and BangServlet, and you configure it to integrate with your web app. After a bit of trial and error, it’s functional. Yay! This is where most developers stop.

Nobody asks, “how much of this do I actually need?” Case in point, what if your application only uses WhizServlet? BangServlet is still exposed, and you don’t even use it! Similarly, what if WhizServlet takes an “action” parameter which can be either “view”, “edit”, or “delete”, and your application only uses “view”? You’re still exposing the other actions to anybody who knows the URL syntax (pretty trivial if it’s open source). You wouldn’t expose large chunks of your own code that you weren’t using, so why should it be any different with libraries?

This post is getting kind of long so I’m going to split it up. In the next post, I’ll continue the discussion of attack surface minimization, as well as some of the tradeoffs that go along with this approach.

1. To permanently remove the ability to engage in unfair play;
2. To complete its investigation and come to a full understanding of what occurred;
3. To refund the affected customers; and
4. To implement measures that prevents future incidents.
   

• January 2008: UltimateBet is alerted to suspicions of unfair play on the part of the account "NioNio". Within 24 hours, UltimateBet contacts the KGC to provide formal notice that UltimateBet has initiated an investigation of the incident. UltimateBet subsequently forwarded a copy of all related data to the KGC.
• January 2008: The "NioNio" account and related accounts are suspended pending further investigation.
• February 2008: Preliminary findings indicate abnormally high winning statistics for the suspect accounts. After discussions with the KGC, UltimateBet engages third-party gaming experts to assist with the analysis.
• February 2008: Investigators confirm that the suspect accounts are associated with individuals who had worked for UltimateBet under the previous ownership.
• February 2008: UltimateBet discovers the unauthorized code that allowed the perpetrators to obtain hole card information during live play. The code was part of a legacy auditing system that was manipulated by the perpetrators of the fraud.
• February 2008: UltimateBet immediately removes the unauthorized code and works with the KGC and with third-party auditors to verify that the security hole has been eliminated.
• March 2008: Six player accounts are confirmed to have participated in this scheme. No accounts were deleted at any point, although some account names were changed multiple times. The following account names are known to have been used in the fraudulent activity: NioNio, Sleepless, NoPaddles, nvtease, flatbroke33, ilike2win, UtakeIt2, FlipFlop2, erick456, WhackMe44, RockStarLA, stoned2nite, monizzle, FireNTexas, HeadKase01, LetsPatttty, NYMobser, and WhoWhereWhen.
• May 2008: The investigation confirms that the fraudulent activity took place from March 7, 2006 to December 3, 2007.
• May 2008: Gaming Associates certifies that the software code that enabled unfair play was removed from UltimateBet servers in February of 2008.
• May 2008: Customers affected by this incident are identified, and plans for corrective action are reviewed with the KGC.
  

• The security hole identified in UltimateBet's investigation has been permanently eliminated.
• UltimateBet is establishing a state-of-the-art software Security Center that consolidates and greatly enhances existing security capabilities. The first release of the new Security Center focuses solely on the immediate detection of abnormal winnings. Gaming mathematicians, poker professionals, and security software developers have all contributed to the specifications for the new Security Center.
• UltimateBet customers are no longer permitted to change account names unless they have suffered abuse in chat rooms. Requests for changes must be supported by proof of abuse and must be approved by the Chief Compliance Officer.
• In addition to its existing security department, UltimateBet has established a new specialized Poker Security team of professionals dedicated to fraud prevention.
• The refund process will begin immediately. The accounts associated with fraudulent activity did not use an unfair advantage in all play sessions. Regardless, UltimateBet is refunding all losses to these accounts.
• Accounts related to the fraudulent activity have been disabled, and the individuals associated with those accounts permanently banned from the site.
• UltimateBet has worked closely and transparently with its governing body, the KGC and its designated expert auditors, to determine exactly what happened, how it happened, and who was involved, and has taken action to prevent any possibility of this situation recurring.
• Tokwiro is pursuing its legal options in regard to this incident.