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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: establishment]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/establishment</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 03:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[I was right!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3c01ef2aba9e36c67875ce625f1aeb42</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3c01ef2aba9e36c67875ce625f1aeb42</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Allen does the dance-of-I-was-right

ahem

In my blog in July, I predicted that we would be seeing a perfect storm as cyber criminals start to see diminshing returns on PII (credit card info, mothers...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Allen does the dance-of-I-was-right...<br /><br />*ahem*<br /><br />In my blog in July, I predicted that we would be seeing a <a href="http://securethink.blogspot.com/2008/07/perfect-storm.html">perfect storm</a> as cyber criminals start to see diminshing returns on PII (credit card info, mothers maiden names and the kind of things they have been going after up until now) and thus start looking at the business information that they have been ignoring.<br /><br />According to usatoday, <span class="inside-head"><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2008-11-11-thieves-cyber-corporate-data_N.htm">internet thieves are making big money stealing corporate info. </a><br /><br /></span><blockquote><span class="inside-head">"</span>Elite cybergangs can no longer make great money stealing and selling personal identity data. Thousands of small-time, copycat data thieves have oversaturated the market, driving prices to commodity levels. Credit card account numbers that once fetched $100 or more, for instance, can be had for $10 or less, says Gunter Ollmann, chief security strategist at IBM ISS, IBM's tech security division." </blockquote>As I said in my original article - the only problem with this is the establishment of a market. The cyber-criminals have established a very viable underground trading system but they now need businessed to want to dip their toes in something that is highly illegal. It seems this is happening.<br /><br />The scary thing is how much information is actually being pulled out of the organisation. The criminals are literally dumping everyone's My Documents directory with no real aim to a storage facility outside of the organisation and yet the companies are not aware of this.<br /><br />My advice? Take measures now while the enemy are just getting established. How you manage to protect your employees' and customers' PII will determine how well you survive the next part of the battle - your company secrets.<br /><br />Also, don't be tempted to get information on your competitors from shady people. They may just be doing the same thing to you.<br /><br />PS1: (PII = personally identifiable information - anything that can be linked to a person and is usually stuff you don't want the public to know like your credit card details, address, salary, health, etc)<br /><br />PS2: Thank you to <a href="http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2008/11/intellectual-property-develop-or-steal.html">TaoSecurity </a>for the story. Read <span class="entry-author-name">Richard Bejtlich's post for more information. His take on the story is that it is all to do with money. Of course it is, if you think information security is about antivirus and firewalls then you are truely wrong.<br /></span><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~4/460587609" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 06:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business information">business information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/identifiable information">identifiable information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/start">start</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cyber criminals start">cyber criminals start</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/criminals">criminals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/credit card info">credit card info</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/info">info</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityThoughts/~3/460587609/i-was-right.html">I was right!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ePolicing - Tomorrow the world?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a75f8d8e609ad56200d2ab52efd2041c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a75f8d8e609ad56200d2ab52efd2041c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[This week has finally seen an announcement that the Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU) is to be funded by the Home Office. However, the largesse amounts to just 3.5 million of new money spread over...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week has finally seen an <a href="http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/new-specialist-ecrime-unit">announcement</a> that the <a href="http://www.met.police.uk/pceu/index.htm">Police Central e-crime Unit</a> (PCeU) is to be funded by the Home Office. However, the largesse amounts to just £3.5 million of new money spread over three years, with the Met putting up a further £3.9 million &#8212; but whether the Met&#8217;s contribution is &#8220;new&#8221; or reflects a move of resources from their existing <a href="http://www.met.police.uk/computercrime/">Computer Crime Unit</a> I could not say.</p>
<p>The announcement is of course Good News &#8212; because once the PCeU is up and running next Spring, it should plug (to the limited extent that £2 million a year can plug) the &#8220;level 2&#8243; eCrime gap that I&#8217;ve <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/02/06/mysterious-and-menacing/">written</a> <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/10/13/mainstreaming-ecrime/">about</a> <a href="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/11/soca-we-just-want-your-money/">before</a>. viz: that SOCA tackles &#8220;serious and organised crime&#8221; (level 3), your local police force tackles local villains (level 1), but if criminals operate outside their force&#8217;s area &#8212; and on the Internet this is more likely than not &#8212; yet they don&#8217;t meet SOCA&#8217;s threshold, then who is there to deal with them?</p>
<p>In particular, the PCeU is envisaged to be the unit that deals with the intelligence packages coming from the <a href="http://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/CityPolice/ECD/Fraud/">City of London Fraud Squad&#8217;s</a> new online Fraud Reporting <a href="http://www.kablenet.com/kd.nsf/Frontpage/356DD0A1942F3A998025745F0049092C?OpenDocument">website</a> (once intended to launch in November 2008, now scheduled for Summer 2009).</p>
<p>Of course everyone expects the website to generate more reports of eCrime than could ever be dealt with (even with much more money), so the effectiveness of the PCeU in dealing with eCriminality will depend upon their prioritisation criteria, and how carefully they select the cases they tackle.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, although the news this week shows that the Home Office have finally understood the need to fund more ePolicing, I don&#8217;t think that they are thinking about the problem in a sufficiently global context.</p>
<p>A little history lesson might be in order to explain why.<br />
<span id="more-401"></span></p>
<p>Back in 1930&#8217;s, <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/clyde/clyde.htm">Bonnie and Clyde</a> and other US bank robbers were using the new-fangled automobile to flee across state lines &#8212; creating jurisdictional problems as a result. The US solution was to make bank robbery (along with auto-theft and other related offences) into federal offences rather keeping them as state-specific infractions. In particular this meant that the FBI could provide federal level policing (tracking down and killing <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dillinger">John Dillinger</a> for example).</p>
<p>We have the same jurisdictional issues dealing with cyberspace, with criminals in one country fleecing consumers in another while using systems hosted in a third. The <a href="http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm">Convention on Cybercrime</a> addresses part of the problem by trying to ensure international consistency where eLaws are specifically needed (which of course is only the case for small parts of eCriminality, <a href="http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060035_en_1">fraud</a> is fraud whether eEnabled or not). However, there is limited inter-jurisdictional <em>co-ordination</em> for eCrime investigations &#8212; for example <a href="http://www.interpol.int/">Interpol</a> (often <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol#Interpol_in_popular_culture">incorrectly perceived</a> to be international police force)  merely keeps a large database and passes faxes from one place to another.</p>
<p>In practice, most cross-border investigations are done as &#8220;joint operations&#8221; and the jointness is usually very limited &#8212; one force does all the legwork and a liaison officer in the other country deals with local paperwork. There&#8217;s usually a <a href="http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/quid-pro-quo.html">quid pro quo</a> element to these joint operations, for budgeting reasons if no other.</p>
<p>What isn&#8217;t happening, or at least only in a handful of very specialised areas, is any international co-operation in setting priorities or selecting cases to pursue. Every country is doing its own thing about eCrime, and there&#8217;s a widespread impression that any criminal who can operate from &#8220;across the state line&#8221; is essentially immune from serious investigation.</p>
<p>We identified this problem last year when we (<a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/">Ross Anderson</a>, <a href="http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/index.php?node_id=489">Rainer Böhme</a>, <a href="http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~tmoore/">Tyler Moore</a> and <a href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/">myself</a>) wrote a report on <a href="http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/report_sec_econ_&#038;_int_mark_20080131.pdf">Security Economics and the Internal Market</a> for <a href="http://www.enisa.europa.eu/">ENISA</a>. It&#8217;s not an easy one to fix whilst politicians (and populaces) are unwilling to see &#8220;foreign&#8221; police officers operating in their country, and the establishment of a truly international &#8220;cyber police force&#8221; seems equally unlikely.</p>
<p>Our policy proposal to tackle the issue harks back to WWII&#8217;s <a href="http://www.archives.gov/research/holocaust/finding-aid/military/rg-331.html">SHAEF</a>, which has morphed into similar arrangements within <a href="http://www.nato.int/shape/about/background2.htm">NATO</a>. In essence liaison officers from multiple forces would sit around a single table, working with a central coordinator, to set policy and decide which investigations to pursue. They would then communicate back to their own countries, who have specifically budgeted to provide appropriate assistance. So it&#8217;s very like &#8220;joint operations&#8221;, but the scheme is multi-laterial, and has a true command and control function in the centre &#8212; who will quickly learn to shy away from politically sensitive topics and make a real impact on eCriminality.</p>
<p>To summarise then, a <a href="http://www.cartoonbank.com/item/34449">welcome</a> to the Home Office for finally finding a small amount of funding for some country-wide ePolicing; but it&#8217;s well past time to be working on world-wide initiatives.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 13:57:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime gap">ecrime gap</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime">ecrime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/provide federal level">provide federal level</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ecrime investigations">ecrime investigations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/online fraud">online fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/level">level</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country deals">country deals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/deals">deals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fraud">fraud</category>
      <source url="http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2008/10/02/epolicing-tomorrow-the-world/">ePolicing - Tomorrow the world?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Personal information stolen from State Street mystery vendor]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e36f5feb727edb6b2a9058889b8adb2b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e36f5feb727edb6b2a9058889b8adb2b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
5/29/08

Organization
State Street Corporation

Stock Symbol
NYSE: STT

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Unnamed vendor hired &quot;to provide legal support...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/statestreet.jpg" align="right" height="74" width="175"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>5/29/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.statestreet.com/default.html">State Street Corporation</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Stock Symbol:</span><br>NYSE: STT<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>Unnamed vendor hired "to provide legal support services"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"employees and some customers of the former Investors Financial Services Corp. (“IBT”)"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"more than 45,000"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Names, addresses, dates of birth, and, in some cases, Social Security numbers.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"State Street Corp. (STT) sent notices to employees and some customers of the former Investors Financial Services Corp. that computer equipment containing personal data was stolen from a vendor's facility."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://pr.statestreet.com/us/en/20080529_1.html">State Street Corporation News Release</a> <br><a href="http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2008/05/30/state_street_data_stolen_from_vendor/">The Boston Globe</a> <br><a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200805290840DOWJONESDJONLINE000656_FORTUNE5.htm">Dow Jones Newswires via CNNMoney</a> <br><a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2008/05/26/daily25.html">Boston Business Journal</a> <br><a href="http://www.cnbc.com/id/24875931">Reuters via CNBC</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>State Street Corporation<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>State Street Corp. said yesterday that a disk drive containing personal details from 5,500 employees and 40,000 customer accounts was stolen<br><br>BOSTON, MAY 29, 2008 – State Street Corporation (NYSE: STT) today began sending precautionary notifications to employees and some customers of the former Investors Financial Services Corp. (“IBT”) that computer equipment containing certain personal data was stolen from a vendor’s facility.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] So this vendor relationship is probably governed by a vendor/third-party security policy and supporting documentation and processes, right?</span><br><br>IBT had engaged the vendor for legal support services.<br><br>the compromised information was among a batch of data sent to the analysis firm, which she declined to identify except to say it was in the United States. (A spokeswoman for State Street of Boston)<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Why decline to identify?&nbsp; If I were someone affected by this (thank God I am not), do you think that I should have the right to know?&nbsp; After all, am I not the owner of my personal information?</span><br><br>At the time of the transfer, the data were encrypted, making it much more difficult to misuse. But the firm had unencrypted the information for its work and stored it on the hard drive that was then stolen<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is why data-at-rest encryption is as (or more) important that data-in-transit encryption.&nbsp; Both applications have their place in many information protection strategies.</span><br><br>Lost details included individuals' names, addresses, dates of birth, and, in some cases, Social Security numbers.<br><br>There is no evidence to date to suggest that the data has been misused or that legacy State Street customers or employees are impacted.<br><br>The theft was reported to federal authorities<br><br>the theft occurred in December and was reported to State Street in January<br><br>State Street didn't disclose the breach publicly or to individuals until yesterday because it took months to determine who was affected<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Yeah, like more than four months!&nbsp; Let's say that only one FTE was assigned to determining what data was on the stolen computer equipment.&nbsp; One FTE x 40 hours x 17 weeks (est.) = 680 hours.</span><br><br>As a precaution, State Street is notifying legacy IBT employees and certain legacy IBT customers whose personal data was on the stolen computer equipment.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I don't like the word "precaution" used in notification that is a "reaction".</span><br><br>This notification process is expected to be completed shortly.<br><br>State Street has developed a dedicated section of its website with more details for the legacy IBT customers and employees who will receive these precautionary notifications. This information can be found at <a href="http://www.statestreet.com/notification">www.statestreet.com/notification</a> and includes detail about a number of credit monitoring services being made available by State Street at no cost for two years.<br><br>State Street said this was the first case of data theft in its history.<br>[Evan] State Street was <a href="http://www.statestreet.com/company/company_information/fact_sheet.html">founded in 1792</a>, and this is the first case of data theft?&nbsp; If so, that's amazing!<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contact Information:</span><br>Customers: <br>Please contact your usual customer representative. <br>Media:<br>Please contact publicrelations@statestreet.com. <br>Employees:<br>Please contact GHR Customer Service at +1 617 985 8040.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>Make sure that your information security program takes into account the information that is shared with vendors, partners, and other third-party providers.&nbsp; There are numerous approaches that can be employed and customized to an individual business or organization.&nbsp; Most effective information security programs govern the security of confidential information shared with third-parties through policy, contractual language, standards, and periodic assessments for compliance.&nbsp; If possible, get information security personnel involved very early on in the establishment of the relationship. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>Unknown</font><br><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/06/03/statestreet.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 07:28:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/street">street</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/legacy ibt customers">legacy ibt customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ibt">ibt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/street corp">street corp</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customers">customers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information protection strategies">information protection strategies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/03/statestreet.aspx">Personal information stolen from State Street mystery vendor</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Breach at UCSF gets leadership response]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/dbb6821e12f4ebf3d4927d14118871fc</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/dbb6821e12f4ebf3d4927d14118871fc</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
5/28/08

Organization
University of California

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
University of California at San Francisco (&quot;UCSF
Departments of Pathology...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/ucsf.jpg" align="right" height="54" width="79"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>5/28/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/">University of California</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://www.ucsf.edu/">University of California at San Francisco ("UCSF")</a> <br><a href="http://labmed.ucsf.edu/">Departments of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Patients<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>3,569<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, dates of pathology service, health information and, in some cases, social security numbers"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"The University of California San Francisco is alerting a group of patients that it has discovered a security breach involving a computer that held personal patient information."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://pub.ucsf.edu/newsservices/releases/200805283/">UCSF News Release</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>Kristen Bole, UCSF<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>The University of California San Francisco is alerting a group of patients that it has discovered a security breach involving a computer that held personal patient information.<br><br>There is no indication that any patient files were accessed.<br><br>UCSF takes this situation very seriously and is therefore responding with the highest level of caution and concern.<br><br>During routine monitoring of the campus computer network on January 11, 2008, UCSF discovered unusual data traffic on one of its computers.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Its good that the unusual traffic was detected through routine monitoring, but I wonder how long the traffic was present before it was detected.&nbsp; Later on in the news release there is mention that an unauthorized movie-sharing program was installed on the computer on or about December 2, 2007.&nbsp; It seems likely that the unusual traffic may have started on or about December 2, 2007.&nbsp; Why the time gap between presence and detection?</span><br><br>The computer was immediately removed from the network to prevent further access.<br><br>UCSF conducted a thorough investigation into the incident to assess how this breach occurred and whether any patient information may have been compromised.<br><br>The investigation was completed this month.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is a long investigation.&nbsp; January 11th, 2008 through May 1st, 2008 is more than 3 1/2 months.</span><br><br>During the investigation, UCSF determined that an unauthorized movie-sharing program had been installed on this one computer on or about December 2, 2007, by an unknown individual.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Uh oh.&nbsp; If the installation of the program requires administrative access to the computer, it is conceivable that the local administrator credentials were compromised.&nbsp; The fact that the news release states "unknown individual" leads me to believe that the account used was potentially a shared account.</span><br><br>Installation of this program required high-level system access, which is why the incident is considered a security breach.<br><br>This computer contained files with lists of patients from the UCSF pathology department’s database.<br><br>The data included information such as patient names, dates of pathology service, health information and, in some cases, social security numbers.<br><br>The Department of Pathology has notified 2,625 UCSF patients whose information was contained on the computer.<br><br>The files also included 944 patients whose tissue samples had been referred by other health care providers to UCSF for analysis.<br><br>UCSF has established a special phone line (415) 353-7427 and a special email address PathHotline@ucsf.edu to answer questions from patients who receive the notification letters.<br><br>The security of protected health information at UCSF is of utmost importance<br><br>The campus has undertaken extensive work in this area, including upgrading system security and performing the monitoring that uncovered this breach.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Great!&nbsp; I just want to point out that the word "undertaken" is past tense.&nbsp; Information security is a lifecycle employing continuous management, improvement, monitoring, etc.</span><br><br>this event and others nationwide have caused UCSF to redouble its efforts in this area.<br><br>UCSF Chancellor J. Michael Bishop has formed a top-level task force to improve the system of controls to protect patient information and other sensitive data.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Excellent!&nbsp; This demonstrates good organizational leadership, of which information security is integral.&nbsp; It stinks that it took a breach affecting over 6,000 people before this action was taken.</span> <br><br>This task force is composed of campus leadership and is chaired by Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost Eugene Washington.<br><br>Chancellor Bishop has charged the group with conducting a comprehensive, expedited review of actions already taken and future actions needed to protect sensitive data, including reviewing associated practices, systems and policies.<br><br>He also has charged the committee with implementing the changes needed to safeguard protected health information and other sensitive data and has asked the group to report to him weekly on their status, with an emphasis on actions taken and planned.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>I commend UCSF leadership for the establishment of the new task force led from the top.&nbsp; Hopefully the momentum will continue.&nbsp; All organizations, non-profits and profits alike, need information security leadership that comes from the uppermost echelons in order to be effective. <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>University of California:<br>May, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/search.aspx?q=ucsf&amp;sc=tconcom&amp;dt=a&amp;al=">Health care practices and UCSF patient records exposed</a> <br>April, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/04/10/uci.aspx">University of California Irvine students are hit with mysterious breach</a></font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 31 May 2008 06:34:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security leadership">information security leadership</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ucsf">ucsf</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/breach">breach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system">system</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system security">system security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ucsf patient records">ucsf patient records</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/05/31/ucsf.aspx">Breach at UCSF gets leadership response</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[New Hurdles for Vulnerability Disclosure]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/f20273056546468d8fdebdd96683bd33</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/f20273056546468d8fdebdd96683bd33</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Vulnerability disclosure is an important part of information security. In recent years, vulnerabilities in specific Web sites and SCADA implementations have created new hurdles for vulnerability...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Vulnerability disclosure is an important part of information security. In recent years, vulnerabilities in specific Web sites and SCADA implementations have created new hurdles for vulnerability disclosure. These aspects of information security have different risks and benefits to the involved stakeholders, which has prevented the establishment of an ideal environment for vulnerability disclosure.<br style="clear: both;"/>
  <img alt="" style="border: 0; height:1px; width:1px;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?i=4719f44c653c8141e5f9261a0023a8d6" height="1" width="1"/>
<img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=4719f44c653c8141e5f9261a0023a8d6" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2008 02:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vulnerability disclosure">vulnerability disclosure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific web sites">specific web sites</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ideal environment">ideal environment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hurdles">hurdles</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scada implementations">scada implementations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/establishment">establishment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/stakeholders">stakeholders</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=4719f44c653c8141e5f9261a0023a8d6">New Hurdles for Vulnerability Disclosure</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Dynamic Security Assertion Markup Language: Simplifying Single Sign-On]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5b3217cd9b869c1683d764c90a1d862a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5b3217cd9b869c1683d764c90a1d862a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Dynamic Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) simplifies the establishment of secure single sign-on between Web applications in different organizations by automating the exchange of SAML...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Dynamic Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) simplifies the establishment of secure single sign-on between Web applications in different organizations by automating the exchange of SAML configuration information and simplifying cryptographic trust establishment.<br style="clear: both;"/>
      <a href="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?s=32eea31a31d281216bdce1fba31830aa"><img alt="" style="border: 0;" border="0" src="http://www.pheedo.com/img.phdo?s=32eea31a31d281216bdce1fba31830aa"/></a>
  <img src="http://www.pheedo.com/feeds/tracker.php?i=32eea31a31d281216bdce1fba31830aa" style="display: none;" border="0" height="1" width="1" alt=""/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2008 02:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/establishment">establishment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cryptographic trust establishment">cryptographic trust establishment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saml configuration information">saml configuration information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/saml">saml</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure single sign-on">secure single sign-on</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web applications">web applications</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/organizations">organizations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/simplifies">simplifies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exchange">exchange</category>
      <source url="http://www.pheedo.com/click.phdo?i=32eea31a31d281216bdce1fba31830aa">Dynamic Security Assertion Markup Language: Simplifying Single Sign-On</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Suns Scott McNealy Speaks at Potomac Officers Club]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/861772ad28ab8a7eeeaf0a40f4ca6237</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/861772ad28ab8a7eeeaf0a40f4ca6237</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday afternoon I met Sun Microsystems Chairman and Co-Founder Scott McNealy at an event that the Potomac Officers Club sponsored at the Tysons Corner Ritz Carlton. Scott was delivering a terrific...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/5705.jpg" style="border: 0px none ; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px" alt="5705" align="left" border="0" height="244" width="164" /> Yesterday afternoon I met <a href="http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/executives/mcnealy/index.jsp" target="_blank">Sun Microsystems&#8217; Chairman and Co-Founder </a><a href="http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/executives/mcnealy/bio.jsp" target="_blank">Scott McNealy</a> at <a href="http://www.potomacofficersclub.com/main/event.php?id=1081" target="_blank">an event</a> that the <a href="http://www.potomacofficersclub.com/main/index.php" target="_blank">Potomac Officers Club</a> sponsored at the Tysons Corner Ritz Carlton. Scott was delivering a terrific speech in which I learned a lot of interesting facts about Sun’s open source initiatives. As Chairman of <a href="http://blogs.sun.com/jonathan/entry/the_network_is_the_computer" target="_blank">the company who coined the phrase “The network is the computer”</a> his prediction continues to be fascinating, especially with Sun’s focus on Open Source software initiatives</p>
<p>To start off, Scott gave a very funny Top 10 list: &#8220;How the IT world is like our lovable Government and Washington establishment&#8221;. (Several of these were LOL for me!) A few of my favorites:</p>
<ul>
<li>Each has a different plan for Security</li>
<li>Both are huge cost centers with creative budget practices</li>
<li>Both are trying to secure our ports</li>
<li>Both invented the Internet</li>
<li>Both generate a log of “hot air”</li>
<li>Source code and Legislation are equally unreadable and buggy</li>
<li>Random misuse of power from the Mayflower Hotel to the Datacenter</li>
</ul>
<p>Scott talked about the world today with millions of new users of the internet, over 10 billion videos watched on the internet on a regular basis and the internet’s impact of disintermediation of traditional revenue producing business models:</p>
<ul>
<li>E-bay and Craigslist– disrupts the media business and want-ads revenue stream</li>
<li>Amazon.com disrupts the book/publishing business and becomes the worlds electronic card catalogue</li>
<li>Youtube is disinter mediating TV with their videos</li>
<li>Curriki is creating the new online coarse curriculum displacing scholastic books which we spend $4.3 Billion annually.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/suns-scott-mcnealy-speaks-at-potomac-officers-club/05/07/2008/#more-91" class="more-link">(more&#8230;)</a></p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=2.3.3&amp;publisher=f8a81d13-50d0-4a5c-833d-8e5f2341e305&amp;title=Sun%26%238217%3Bs+Scott+McNealy+Speaks+at+Potomac+Officers+Club&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fsuns-scott-mcnealy-speaks-at-potomac-officers-club%2F05%2F07%2F2008%2F">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 16:37:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/scott">scott</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/co-founder scott mcnealy">co-founder scott mcnealy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/suns">suns</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/potomac officers club">potomac officers club</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business">business</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/business models">business models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/chairman">chairman</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/billion videos">billion videos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sun microsystems chairman">sun microsystems chairman</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/suns-scott-mcnealy-speaks-at-potomac-officers-club/05/07/2008/">Suns Scott McNealy Speaks at Potomac Officers Club</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Al Qaeda Threat Overrated]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a2cca8f3de5ba8d12843762c784be853</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a2cca8f3de5ba8d12843762c784be853</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Seems obvious to me: &quot;I reject the notion that Al Qaeda is waiting for 'the big one' or holding back an attack,&quot; Sheehan writes. &quot;A terrorist cell capable of attacking doesn't sit and wait for some...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Seems <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/135654/">obvious</a> to me:</p>

<blockquote>"I reject the notion that Al Qaeda is waiting for 'the big one' or holding back an attack," Sheehan writes. "A terrorist cell capable of attacking doesn't sit and wait for some more opportune moment. It's not their style, nor is it in the best interest of their operational security. Delaying an attack gives law enforcement more time to detect a plot or penetrate the organization."

<p>Terrorism is not about standing armies, mass movements, riots in the streets or even palace coups. It's about tiny groups that want to make a big bang. So you keep tracking cells and potential cells, and when you find them you destroy them. After Spanish police cornered leading members of the group that attacked trains in Madrid in 2004, they blew themselves up. The threat in Spain declined dramatically.</p>

<p>Indonesia is another case Sheehan and I talked about. Several high-profile associates of bin Laden were nailed there in the two years after 9/11, then sent off to secret CIA prisons for interrogation. The suspects are now at Guantánamo. But suicide bombings continued until police using forensic evidence—pieces of car bombs and pieces of the suicide bombers—tracked down Dr. Azahari bin Husin, "the Demolition Man," and the little group around him. In a November 2005 shootout the cops killed Dr. Azahari and crushed his cell. After that such attacks in Indonesia stopped.</p>

<p>The drive to obliterate the remaining hives of Al Qaeda training activity along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier and those that developed in some corners of Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003 needs to continue, says Sheehan. It's especially important to keep wanna-be jihadists in the West from joining with more experienced fighters who can give them hands-on weapons and explosives training. When left to their own devices, as it were, most homegrown terrorists can't cut it. For example, on July 7, 2005, four bombers blew themselves up on public transport in London, killing 56 people. Two of those bombers had trained in Pakistan. Another cell tried to do the same thing two weeks later, but its members had less foreign training, or none. All the bombs were duds.</p>

<p>[...]</p>

<p>Sir David Omand, who used to head Britain's version of the National Security Agency and oversaw its entire intelligence establishment from the Cabinet Office earlier this decade, described terrorism as "one corner" of the global security threat posed by weapons proliferation and political instability. That in turn is only one of three major dangers facing the world over the next few years. The others are the deteriorating environment and a meltdown of the global economy. Putting terrorism in perspective, said Sir David, "leads naturally to a risk management approach, which is very different from what we've heard from Washington these last few years, which is to 'eliminate the threat'."</p>

<p>Yet when I asked the panelists at the forum if Al Qaeda has been overrated, suggesting as Sheehan does that most of its recruits are bunglers, all shook their heads. Nobody wants to say such a thing on the record, in case there's another attack tomorrow and their remarks get quoted back to them.</p>

<p>That's part of what makes Sheehan so refreshing. He knows there's a big risk that he'll be misinterpreted; he'll be called soft on terror by ass-covering bureaucrats, breathless reporters and fear-peddling politicians. And yet he charges ahead. He expects another attack sometime, somewhere. He hopes it won't be made to seem more apocalyptic than it is. "Don't overhype it, because that's what Al Qaeda wants you to do. Terrorism is about psychology." In the meantime, said Sheehan, finishing his fruit juice, "the relentless 24/7 job for people like me is to find and crush those guys."</blockquote></p>

<p>I've ordered Sheehan's book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Crush-Cell-Terrorism-Terrorizing-Ourselves/dp/0307382176/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210107615&sr=8-1"><i>Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves</i></a>.</p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=HeAtlH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=HeAtlH" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=B3npqH"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=B3npqH" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 08:56:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sheehan">sheehan</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sheehan writes">sheehan writes</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qaeda">qaeda</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorist cell capable">terrorist cell capable</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/terrorism">terrorism</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cell">cell</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/defeat terrorism">defeat terrorism</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack tomorrow">attack tomorrow</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/al_qaeda_threat.html">Al Qaeda Threat Overrated</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Loads.cc's DDoS for Hire Service]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3236554f7bd0cc2b7205d631bc8e47b1</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3236554f7bd0cc2b7205d631bc8e47b1</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Snakes never whisper in one another's ear - it's supposed to tickle. In a blog post yesterday, Sunbelt Labs pointed out on the re-emergence of the Botnet on Demand Service that I covered last year....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c5GU-0GCI/AAAAAAAABdQ/bOKwV-4iTn4/s1600-h/snake_malware_CC.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5176669077559842850" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px" alt="" src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c5GU-0GCI/AAAAAAAABdQ/bOKwV-4iTn4/s200/snake_malware_CC.jpg" border="0" /></a>Snakes never whisper in one another's ear - it's supposed to tickle. In a blog post yesterday, <a href="http://www.securecomputing.net.au/news/71788,screensaver-spam-is-new-malware-from-old-gang-sunbelt.aspx">Sunbelt Labs pointed out</a> on <a href="http://sunbeltblog.blogspot.com/2008/03/dangerous-loadscc-malware-gang-re.html">the re-emergence</a> of the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/botnet-on-demand-service.html">Botnet on Demand Service</a> that I covered last year. It's great to see we're on the same page, or wiki article as we can always expand the discussion. In need of more such fancy snakes admin panels <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/02/blackenergy-ddos-bot-web-based-c.html">courtesy of</a> a <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/09/google-hacking-for-mpacks-zunkers-and.html">web based malware</a> C&amp;C? Here are four more related :<br /><br /><div><div></div><div><strong>legendarypornmovies.net/ts</strong> (88.85.81.211)</div><div><strong>slutl.com/ts</strong> (88.85.78.7)</div><div><strong>cwazo.net/ts</strong> (83.222.14.218)</div><div><strong>oin.ru/ts</strong> (194.135.105.203)</div><br /><div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c7sk-0GDI/AAAAAAAABdY/gy2ggpU06_M/s1600-h/loadscc_advertising_repositioning2008.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5176671933713094706" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px" alt="" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c7sk-0GDI/AAAAAAAABdY/gy2ggpU06_M/s200/loadscc_advertising_repositioning2008.jpg" border="0" /></a>Now the juicy details regarding <strong>loads.cc</strong>. During the time of posting this, the malicious domain is starting to redirect to a very descriptive one, which basically says "<em>given up on ddos-ing</em>", and a featured ad in between loads.cc's old interface is pitching the new service - contextual advertising consultations, as you can see in the attached screenshot. Apparently, a little more in-depth research acts as public pressure, especially when they're lazy enough to have a great deal of malware variants "phone back home" to their promotional domain. However, the current one responding to <strong>67.228.69.191</strong> is hosted by <strong>SoftLayer</strong>, and is using <strong>ns1.4wap.org</strong> as DNS server provided by <strong>Layered Technologies </strong>again confirming the Russian Business Network connection since, both, <strong>Layered Technologies</strong> and <strong>SoftLayer</strong> are known to have been and continue providing services to the RBN, knowingly or unknowingly. Moreover, the malware infected counter at the stats section continues reporting new additions.</div><br /><div></div><div>Being one of the most venerable examples of DDoS for hire services, it's worth reposting its FAQ in an automatically translated fashion, so that a better perspective to the dynamics of offering such services is provided to the readers. Here's the FAQ on using the service, which is relatively easy to understand :</div><br /><div><a href="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c8V0-0GEI/AAAAAAAABdg/bdU0S1YyPTM/s1600-h/loadscc_ddos_2008.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5176672642382698562" style="FLOAT: left; MARGIN: 0px 10px 10px 0px" alt="" src="http://bp0.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/R9c8V0-0GEI/AAAAAAAABdg/bdU0S1YyPTM/s200/loadscc_ddos_2008.jpg" border="0" /></a>- All that is pure downloads nothing is loaded simultaneously</div><br /><div>- The "mix" is not Buro countries on specified individual prices</div><br /><div>- Loaded only those countries which are specified in the problem</div><br /><div>- The country is determined to maxmind geoip</div><br /><div>- When it ALL loaded all countries and the price of downloads is calculated separately for each country that is DE for the download you pay for a $ 0.2 PE 0.03</div><br /><div>- Prices for downloads can sometimes vary slightly this watch themselves</div><br /><div>- As such, the concept of mix does not exist, each country has its own price, and if the country is not clearly specified in the price is $ 30 price / 1k</div><br /><div>- The money is withdrawn from the account in accordance with the facts and running leaps ekze by car users</div><div></div><div><br />- In the balance on deposit $ 5 or less stopped loading</div><div></div><div><br />- No minimum, it is possible to load even though 3 pc 10k limit pointing in the problem</div><div></div><div><br />- The claims, made by ALREADY download will not be accepted, DICOM small parties or do the test to check quality</div><div></div><div><br />- Following the establishment of tasks it must be activated by clicking on the link in the status, the same method could be suspended</div><div></div><div><br />- Pole challenge "received" shows how many bots believed assignment, it is usually little more than a "loaded" on the fabric sur somehow prichnam some boats were not able to download and run your ekze dolzhili or not yet know</div><div></div><div><br />Undercover DDoS in between contextual advertising, or "<em>giving up on DDoS</em>" entirely? Let's wait and see, without being naive enough to forget that this among the hundreds of other DDoS for hire services currently available in the wild.</div></div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=T48Oo5F"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=T48Oo5F" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Gcc6LOF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Gcc6LOF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=IapV2Ef"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=IapV2Ef" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=H7P8ZLf"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=H7P8ZLf" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=axN8qLF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=axN8qLF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=psWxHpF"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=psWxHpF" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=22Tofpf"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=22Tofpf" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/249865248" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Mar 2008 18:35:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ddos">ddos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/service">service</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/services">services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hire services">hire services</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/web based malware">web based malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/undercover ddos">undercover ddos</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/loads">loads</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/country">country</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/249865248/loadsccs-ddos-for-hire-service.html">Loads.cc's DDoS for Hire Service</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Mike Rothman - The 419]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cf6cf72068f89700ac14e97f4b73e3b5</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cf6cf72068f89700ac14e97f4b73e3b5</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I do get some random stuff in my email, but this one takes the cake. Evidently, someone calling themselves Mike Rothman is running a 419 scam . Here is the message, then we can decompose it to see the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_hafMI9V8sC8/R6xBqe-somI/AAAAAAAAAFE/uIC8Fkuplxw/s1600-h/scam-truck.jpg"><img style="margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; float: right; cursor: pointer;" src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_hafMI9V8sC8/R6xBqe-somI/AAAAAAAAAFE/uIC8Fkuplxw/s400/scam-truck.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5164575070813463138" border="0" /></a><br />I do get some random stuff in my email, but this one takes the cake. Evidently, someone calling themselves Mike Rothman is running a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance_fee_fraud">419 scam</a>. Here is the message, then we can decompose it to see the typical "tells" that indicate that there is a REALLY high likelihood the message is bogus.<br /><br /><blockquote> From: XXXXX<br />To: mike_rothman@XXXXXX<br />Subject: RE: Att.<br />Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 22:36:52 +0100<br /><br /><br />Dear mr Rothman,<br /><br />I do not know you either, so I will send you some pictures of my estate in Germany, you can look at it at google earth from above. Sended you the adress before.<br /><br />XXXXXX<br />Barendorf<br />Germany<br /><br />#############<br /><br />My age is 50, married with a German Lady, having two Sons.<br /><br /><br />Further, I 'am not interested in the company you are working for, only how to get the money to Germany. <strong>BUSINESS</strong> ! ! !<br /><br />Now it's your turn.<br /><br /><br />Sincerely<br /><br />XXXXXXXXXXX<br /><br /><br /><br /><hr /> From: mike_rothman@XXXXXX<br />To:<span style="text-decoration: underline;"> XXXXXXXXX</span><a href="mailto:multimodis_hoeksema@hotmail.com" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"></a><br />Subject: Att.<br />Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 21:25:38 +0100<br /><br />Att. XXXXX,<br />I received your quick response to my proposal. To formally introduce my self to you, I am an old top banker and have worked with Scottish Investment Trust for so many as one of their fund manager. I am an international staff, presently in Scotland office.<br />Scottish Investment Company is registered in Scotland number 1651. I started work with SIT 2004 and I am responsible for the European Jurisdiction Equity. I was with Abbey National Asset mangers before I moved to SIT, and a member of CFA institute.<br />I graduated from University of Dundee and Edinburgh where I got my BSc and MBA in civil engineering respectively.<br />First, I believe it is necessary for me to express my profound gratitude to you for even responding to my email with interest. I am obliged to you for your gracious concern and I hope your assistance is really genuine, although through your email I would know if I could count on you at least to an extent. <script><!-- D(["mb","\u003cbr\u003eI sincerely, appreciate your interest to assist me in this project. I need a reliable foreigner who would be of assistance to me in order to have the funds transferred. \u003cbr\u003eHowever, I would like to be convinced of your willingness, commitment and most of all your trustworthiness to execute this deal with me. I certainly cannot compromise any of these virtues, you know what I mean, and I have my principles.\u003cbr\u003eWithout doubt, you will eventually earn the benefits or our partnership if we are able to work things out and have the funds relocated within couple of weeks or thereabout and thereafter disbursed to your other respective accounts. \u003cbr\u003eIndeed, it is necessary for me to be certain of the person to whom I will be entrusting this deal, my trust will definitely not be given out lightly, I need to be fully convinced that you are a matured person with some integrity, we should at least have respect for each other, this I would say is very essential. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eScottish Investment Trust (SIT) was founded in 1887; The Scottish Investment Trust (SIT) today is one of the world’s oldest and largest independent, self-managed investment trusts with assets of over £45 billion at 30 September 2007.\u003cbr\u003eWe have been working to provide solid returns for investors for over 115 years - through a number of bull and bear markets and the most volatile conditions. Our approach has generated real long term growth in both capital and income.\u003cbr\u003eWhen you invest in SIT you are buying shares in a company that invests in the stocks and shares of companies on the world\u0026#39;s major stockmarkets. Your investment has the potential to grow both through incomes from dividends and through capital growth from increases in share price.\u003cbr\u003eSIT has a diversified equity portfolio and invests in a broad spread of international equities. Although there is always an element of risk involved in any stockmarket investment, we aim to lower this by spreading investment over numerous companies and sectors around the world, while actively searching for opportunities to benefit our investors and maximise returns.",1] );  //--></script><br />I sincerely, appreciate your interest to assist me in this project. I need a reliable foreigner who would be of assistance to me in order to have the funds transferred.<br />However, I would like to be convinced of your willingness, commitment and most of all your trustworthiness to execute this deal with me. I certainly cannot compromise any of these virtues, you know what I mean, and I have my principles.<br />Without doubt, you will eventually earn the benefits or our partnership if we are able to work things out and have the funds relocated within couple of weeks or thereabout and thereafter disbursed to your other respective accounts.<br />Indeed, it is necessary for me to be certain of the person to whom I will be entrusting this deal, my trust will definitely not be given out lightly, I need to be fully convinced that you are a matured person with some integrity, we should at least have respect for each other, this I would say is very essential.<br /><br />Scottish Investment Trust (SIT) was founded in 1887; The Scottish Investment Trust (SIT) today is one of the world’s oldest and largest independent, self-managed investment trusts with assets of over £45 billion at 30 September 2007.<br />We have been working to provide solid returns for investors for over 115 years - through a number of bull and bear markets and the most volatile conditions. Our approach has generated real long term growth in both capital and income.<br />When you invest in SIT you are buying shares in a company that invests in the stocks and shares of companies on the world's major stockmarkets. Your investment has the potential to grow both through incomes from dividends and through capital growth from increases in share price.<br />SIT has a diversified equity portfolio and invests in a broad spread of international equities. Although there is always an element of risk involved in any stockmarket investment, we aim to lower this by spreading investment over numerous companies and sectors around the world, while actively searching for opportunities to benefit our investors and maximise returns.<script><!-- D(["mb","\u003cbr\u003eWe aim to provide steady growth in both capital and income, whilst prudently spreading investment risk. We consider these to be the key requirements for anyone seeking a solid core holding for their investment planning. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHowever, in my First Email Proposal to you, I stated that the said funds came out as a result of the following: \u003cbr\u003e\u0026quot;\u0026quot;I handle all our Investor\u0026#39;s Direct Capital Funds and secretly extract 1.3% Excess Maximum Return Capital Profit (EMRCP) per annum on each of the Investor\u0026#39;s Magellan Capital Funds. \u003cbr\u003eAs an expert, I have made over £27.4m from the Investor\u0026#39;s EMRCP and hereby looking\u003cbr\u003efor someone to trust who will stand as an Investor to receive the funds as Annual Investment Proceeds from Scottish Magellan Capital Funds. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eEXPLANATION: I have more than 158 Corporate Investors attached to my PORTFOLIO who’s Capital Investment Funds are been managed and administered by me alone.\u003cbr\u003eThis Capital Investment Funds has a value of US$5.4Billion FIXED. The $5.4billion is been used for trading in Stock Market, Crude Oil and Lending with Profit Returns. \u003cbr\u003eEvery Year, each Corporate Investor is expected to receive 20% interest from his total Investment Capital Funds which is paid to the Investor annually as their Excess Maximum Return Capital Profit (EMRCP). However, I made average of 21.3% from the Investor\u0026#39;s Investment Capital Funds annually, which have exceeded our targeted 20% of Total Investment Capital Funds. On this note, I retained the extra 1.3% from the 21.3% as my personal profits for managing the Capital Investment which is this £27.4m. On the other hands, I cannot claim this funds without presenting someone to stand as an Investor otherwise our Establishment will convert the funds into the Company\u0026#39;s Treasury. This is why I came to you for the deal to take place. \u003cbr\u003eDURATION: If you are very serious as I am, we will have this transaction concluded with 25 Banking days from the date of start. \u003cbr\u003eHowever, for such a business of lofty magnitude, I think the most important thing is for us to build a strong association between each other so that I can be able to trust you because I have been betrayed by so many people even by my co workers that I have now decided to play my cards very close to my chest. I will like this deal to be secret and confidential. No third party. Just between you and me. Do not discuss it with any Scottish Investment staff to avoid jeopardizing my work and position.",1] );  //--></script><br />We aim to provide steady growth in both capital and income, whilst prudently spreading investment risk. We consider these to be the key requirements for anyone seeking a solid core holding for their investment planning.<br /><br />However, in my First Email Proposal to you, I stated that the said funds came out as a result of the following:<br />""I handle all our Investor's Direct Capital Funds and secretly extract 1.3% Excess Maximum Return Capital Profit (EMRCP) per annum on each of the Investor's Magellan Capital Funds.<br />As an expert, I have made over £27.4m from the Investor's EMRCP and hereby looking<br />for someone to trust who will stand as an Investor to receive the funds as Annual Investment Proceeds from Scottish Magellan Capital Funds.<br /><br />EXPLANATION: I have more than 158 Corporate Investors attached to my PORTFOLIO who’s Capital Investment Funds are been managed and administered by me alone.<br />This Capital Investment Funds has a value of US$5.4Billion FIXED. The $5.4billion is been used for trading in Stock Market, Crude Oil and Lending with Profit Returns.<br />Every Year, each Corporate Investor is expected to receive 20% interest from his total Investment Capital Funds which is paid to the Investor annually as their Excess Maximum Return Capital Profit (EMRCP). However, I made average of 21.3% from the Investor's Investment Capital Funds annually, which have exceeded our targeted 20% of Total Investment Capital Funds. On this note, I retained the extra 1.3% from the 21.3% as my personal profits for managing the Capital Investment which is this £27.4m. On the other hands, I cannot claim this funds without presenting someone to stand as an Investor otherwise our Establishment will convert the funds into the Company's Treasury. This is why I came to you for the deal to take place.<br />DURATION: If you are very serious as I am, we will have this transaction concluded with 25 Banking days from the date of start.<br />However, for such a business of lofty magnitude, I think the most important thing is for us to build a strong association between each other so that I can be able to trust you because I have been betrayed by so many people even by my co workers that I have now decided to play my cards very close to my chest. I will like this deal to be secret and confidential. No third party. Just between you and me. Do not discuss it with any Scottish Investment staff to avoid jeopardizing my work and position.<script><!-- D(["mb","\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eBefore we go into this deal, I will like to know about you.\u003cbr\u003eFollowing this mail, send me your telephone number so I can call you to discuss on the modalities of the transaction. You may as well call me on my number +44 704 571 0649 so that we can discuss on the modalities of the transaction. \u003cbr\u003eSincerely \u003cbr\u003eMike Rothman\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\nFrom: \u003ca href\u003d\"mailto:multimodis_hoeksema@hotmail.com\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003emultimodis_hoeksema@hotmail.com\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003eTo: \u003ca href\u003d\"mailto:mike_rothman@live.com.au\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003emike_rothman@live.com.au\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSubject: \u003cbr\u003eDate: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 13:09:36 +0100\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\n \u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eDear mr. Rothman,\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eI\u0026#39;am a businessman, Dutch, living and working in Germany have several companies.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eoff course I\u0026#39;am interested for the 30%.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eWhen this is phishing I\u0026#39;am not interested and can you better try to find someone else.\u003cbr\u003eI will not pay any money for taxes, transport, lawyers, barristers or others.\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003eSincerely\u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003e \u003cbr\u003edrs. J.Hoeksema\u003cbr\u003e0049 173 2433 759\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\nBlijf onderweg online met Windows Live for Mobile! \u003ca href\u003d\"http://www.windowslivemobile.msn.com/nl/\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003eDownload \u0026#39;t nu op jouw mobiele telefoon.\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/blockquote\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\nExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! \u003ca href\u003d\"http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003eMSN Messenger\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/blockquote\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\nIn 2 tellen je eigen webpagina voor al je foto\u0026#39;s! \u003ca href\u003d\"http://spaces.live.com/\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003eMakkelijk en gratis met Windows Live Spaces\u003c/a\u003e \u003c/blockquote\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003chr\u003eExpress yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! \u003ca href\u003d\"http://clk.atdmt.com/AVE/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/\" target\u003d\"_blank\" onclick\u003d\"return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)\"\u003e",1] );  //--></script><br /><br />Before we go into this deal, I will like to know about you.<br />Following this mail, send me your telephone number so I can call you to discuss on the modalities of the transaction. You may as well call me on my number +4XXXX so that we can discuss on the modalities of the transaction.<br />Sincerely<br />Mike Rothman<br /><br /><br /><hr /> From: XXXX<br />To: <a href="mailto:mike_rothman@live.com.au" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)">mike_rothman@XXXXX</a><br />Subject:<br />Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 13:09:36 +0100<br /><br /><br /><br />Dear mr. Rothman,<br /><br />I'am a businessman, Dutch, living and working in Germany have several companies.<br /><br />off course I'am interested for the 30%.<br /><br />When this is phishing I'am not interested and can you better try to find someone else.<br />I will not pay any money for taxes, transport, lawyers, barristers or others.<br /><br /><br />Sincerely<br /><br /><br />XXXXXXX</blockquote>To be clear, I haven't called the numbers to truly verify it's a phishing scheme. Who has time for that? But this message would have been on the express train to the circular bin for a couple of reasons:<br /><ol><li><span style="font-weight: bold;">The complicated story</span> - The scammer uses a fairly complicated story, which would really require an investment professional to figure out whether it's kosher or not. But all that complicated vernacular contributes to building a credible front in the form of the Scottish Investment Trust, which is a global and well known investment house.<br /><br /></li><li><span style="font-weight: bold;">The request for "confidentiality"</span> - The fact that this guy is claiming that he's got some additional funds because he "out-performed" sound like a hoax to me. Also the fact that he's requested confidentiality, even from other SIT personnel means this is a ruse.<br /><br /></li><li><span style="font-weight: bold;">The fact that he needs a "foreigner" to place the money</span> - Again, this just sounds funky. If he outperformed the expectation, I'm sure he'd be due a nice bonus from SIT. Not an illicit $35 million dollar payout that he needs to get out of the country.<br /><br /></li><li><span style="font-weight: bold;">Other inconsistencies</span> - You can't see the domain (I removed it), but it's a public email service in Australia. Yet the phone number he provided (I removed that also) is in the UK. These are inconsistencies that you need to catch.</li></ol>But most of all USE YOUR HEAD. Seriously. Even if you play the lottery, you need to take action to buy the ticket. Beware of strangers offering gifts in the millions of dollars. If it sounds too good to be true, it pretty much is.<br /><br />Instead the victim shared information about his life and family. He attached pictures of his house and put in addresses and phone numbers (which I removed to protect the idiotic). It's just ridiculous.<br /><br />As Barnum said, there is a sucker born every minute. Don't you be one of them.<br /><br /><span style="font-size:78%;">Photo credit: <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/jepoirrier/2046188221/">http://www.flickr.com/photos/jepoirrier/2046188221/</a></span><div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 03:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capital investment funds">capital investment funds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/capital investment">capital investment</category>
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      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/SecurityMike/~3/231561418/mike-rothman-419.html">Mike Rothman - The 419</source>
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