The lawsuit claimed that the students’ planned presentation would violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) by enabling others to defraud the MBTA of transit fares. A different federal judge, meeting in a special Saturday session, ordered the trio not to disclose for ten days any information that could be used by others to get free subway rides.

“The judge today correctly found that it was unlikely that the CFAA would apply to security researchers giving an academic talk,” said EFF Staff Attorney Marcia Hofmann. “A presentation at a security conference is not some sort of computer intrusion. It’s protected speech and vital to the free flow of information about computer security vulnerabilities. Silencing researchers does not improve security — the vulnerability was there before the students discovered it and would remain in place regardless of whether the students publicly discussed it or not.”

This sets a good precedent for future cases, and perhaps next time a similar situation arises, a judge will not be so quick to issue a gag order. It’s not a happy ending yet though, as the original lawsuit is still in effect.

As Chris Wysopal pointed out last week, the MBTA’s ire is misdirected. Rather than suing the vendor who sold them the defective system, they sued and attempted to silence the students who discovered the weakness. This is 2008, not 1988 — did they honestly think a gag order would prevent the information from reaching the general public? The DEFCON presentation was already available on the Intertubes prior to the injunction being issued, and the MBTA attorneys included a copy of the confidential whitepaper with their filing, thereby making it public.

I guess you wouldn’t expect that a transit authority would have paid any attention to theCiscogate fiasco from a few years ago. That presentation never got out either, did it? All that taxpayer money the MBTA spent on ridiculous lawsuits and restraining orders could have been put toward fixing the security flaws. What a concept.

You can not process complex events in some very simple way and expect to get accurate results.  You need knowledge, represented by one or more situational models, to process complex events.

Some folks, like to say that a “complex event” is simply an event which is an aggregation of two more more event objects.    If you follow this (flawed) logic, then counting integers is complex event processing; because 1 plus 1 is 2, and 2 is an aggregation of 1 and 1, so 2 is a complex event (not!).  

Since we know that counting is not a complex processing operation, then some folks would say that you can process complex events with very simple operations because you are processing complex events , in the case adding 1 to the previous number (counting), enriching an event object.

This is simply nonsense.

The logic flaw is that the basic definition of a “complex event” (used by many people) is wrong.   A complex event is not simply an event object with two more more events as sub-components. 

A complex event is when two event objects are combined (processed) to form a complex object with a higher degree of inference, or situational knowledge.   One plus one equals more than two in complex event processing, because the combination of event objects requires knowledge (e.g. a situational model).

A Complex Event = Sum (EventsObjects) + Situational Knowledge

Let there be no mistake about it.    Complex event processing is the complex processing of complex events.   You cannot accurately process complex events with simple event processing models.

The simple processing of complex events is not CEP, it is simple event processing (event track-and-trace, simple event object enrichment, simple event object aggregation, and so forth).
 

Bind("AmountCharged", "{0:C}")

While this displays just as you'd expect (e.g., $200), it doesn't do so well when you submit an edit that includes the same value ($200):

Input string was not in a correct format.

I searched around and didn't find much in the way of a clean solution, but I did solve the problem with just a few lines of code. The trick is to handle the data-bound control's Updating event. Since I was working with a GridView, my solution looked a bit like this:

<asp:GridView DataSourceID='myDataSource'
              OnRowUpdating='FixFormatting'
              AutoGenerateColumns='false'
              CellPadding="3" ...>

Notice the OnRowUpdating handler that I've installed in my grid view. That code looks like this:

protected void FixFormatting(object sender, GridViewUpdateEventArgs args)
{
    decimal amountPaid = ParseDecimal((string)args.NewValues["AmountPaid"]);
    args.NewValues["AmountPaid"] = amountPaid;
}

When you handle this event, you're given a dictionary of old and new values, which appear to come directly from the controls (in my case, a TextBox was used to gather the updated data AmountPaid, so the type of object that I found in NewValues["AmountPaid"] was a string. I wrote a little helper method called ParseDecimal that parses a string into a decimal value, allowing currency characters, decimal points, and thousands separators. I also allowed a blank value to indicate zero:

public static decimal ParseDecimal(string value)
{
    if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(value))
        return 0;
    return Decimal.Parse(value,
        NumberStyles.AllowThousands |
        NumberStyles.AllowDecimalPoint |
        NumberStyles.AllowCurrencySymbol,
        CultureInfo.InstalledUICulture);
}

This solved the problem quite nicely. Now two-way binding works with formatted data.

Blogger: Ramon Krikken

The web browser is one of those peculiar pieces of software, having to accept input from arbitrary sources and then parse and render the data that is sent to it. Part of this it does by itself, and other parts are taken care of by handlers and plug-ins. In doing so, it displays hypertext, images, videos, and even runs active content like Flash, JavaScript, and ActiveX.

But however much we love the browser, we’ve also come to hate the myriad of vulnerabilities that affect it. Everything from cross-site scripting to remote code execution via maliciously formed animated cursor files and Flash content can make browsing a hazardous activity. The browser is sick, and that’s not desirable for a platform we use for important business and personal transactions.

Worsening the browser’s diagnosis is the recent paper from Mark Dowd and Alexander Sotirov, sub-titled “Setting back browser security by 10 years,” which discusses how to bypass Microsoft Vista’s memory protection capabilities with some added effort for the exploit designers. It’s not that all of the techniques are necessarily new, but the browser appears to be particularly vulnerable to easy exploitation.

Surprising? Not exactly, when we take into account that the browser is suffering from the same disease as the general purpose operating system: bloat and compatibility. We expect the browser to do ever more, but everything we used it for before still needs to work as if it were yesterday. It feels a bit like people insisting on using a cardboard box as a safe, and wondering why their money keeps getting stolen.

It’s not like we haven’t been working on the browser’s cure, though. There have been some improvements in the browsers themselves, the operating systems have also implemented compensating controls, but most of all, there has been an enormous push for securing the web applications that deliver the data in the first place. Unfortunately, the latter two won’t help secure the browser in the long run.

The first issue is that not all content will come from ‘nice’ servers, the second that the server can only make an educated guess on how a browser will parse and render a given set of data, and the third that operating system controls have their own limitations, whether by design or implementation (for example needing to re-compile existing code to enable certain protections.) The browser, in the end, has to be mostly responsible for keeping itself safe; the operating system must assist it in doing so.

So we’re in a pickle. The browser is sick (and the operating system is too), but it’s hard to cure it without a redesign that will undoubtedly impact compatibility, the ever-so-desired multi-functionality, or its ease of use. We can layer defenses by using web filtering in the enterprise environment, but in the end – for the consumer market in particular – we need to fix the browser itself. I can think of a few things I think might help:

• Some kind of site security policy  to restrict where the browser loads auxiliary content from, and which data it can ‘trust’, when loading a web page (I’d prefer mandatory enforcement, and adding an HTML tag to be able to indicate blocks of untrustworthy data.)
• Restricted compartments for plug-ins to run in, ensuring that their bugs cannot easily affect the whole browser.
• Better software development practices for the plug-ins and content parsers themselves, so that they’re less vulnerable, and compiled with the latest protection measures to begin with.

All of this means more work, and some of it means a lot of unhappy reactions when things stop working. Even then we will of course still have to deal with additional vulnerabilities, such as those that may be present in hardware, but we will at least have taken prudent steps to ‘find a cure.’

It's basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cyber security advisor, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security the devil is always in the details -- and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic -- McCain supposedly is "working on the issues" as well -- I have three pieces of policy advice for the next president, whoever he is. They're too detailed for campaign speeches or even position papers, but they're essential for improving information security in our society. Actually, they apply to national security in general. And they're things only government can do.

One, use your immense buying power to improve the security of commercial products and services. One property of technological products is that most of the cost is in the development of the product rather than the production. Think software: The first copy costs millions, but the second copy is free.

You have to secure your own government networks, military and civilian. You have to buy computers for all your government employees. Consolidate those contracts, and start putting explicit security requirements into the RFPs. You have the buying power to get your vendors to make serious security improvements in the products and services they sell to the government, and then we all benefit because they'll include those improvements in the same products and services they sell to the rest of us. We're all safer if information technology is more secure, even though the bad guys can use it, too.

Two, legislate results and not methodologies. There are a lot of areas in security where you need to pass laws, where the security externalities are such that the market fails to provide adequate security. For example, software companies who sell insecure products are exploiting an externality just as much as chemical plants that dump waste into the river. But a bad law is worse than no law. A law requiring companies to secure personal data is good; a law specifying what technologies they should use to do so is not. Mandating software liabilities for software failures is good, detailing how is not. Legislate for the results you want and implement the appropriate penalties; let the market figure out how -- that's what markets are good at.

Three, broadly invest in research. Basic research is risky; it doesn't always pay off. That's why companies have stopped funding it. Bell Labs is gone because nobody could afford it after the AT&T breakup, but the root cause was a desire for higher efficiency and short-term profitability -- not unreasonable in an unregulated business. Government research can be used to balance that by funding long-term research.

Spread those research dollars wide. Lately, most research money has been redirected through DARPA to near-term military-related projects; that's not good. Keep the earmark-happy Congress from dictating how the money is spent. Let the NSF, NIH and other funding agencies decide how to spend the money and don't try to micromanage. Give the national laboratories lots of freedom, too. Yes, some research will sound silly to a layman. But you can't predict what will be useful for what, and if funding is really peer-reviewed, the average results will be much better. Compared to corporate tax breaks and other subsidies, this is chump change.

If our research capability is to remain vibrant, we need more science and math students with decent elementary and high school preparation. The declining interest is partly from the perception that scientists don't get rich like lawyers and dentists and stockbrokers, but also because science isn't valued in a country full of creationists. One way the president can help is by trusting scientific advisers and not overruling them for political reasons.

Oh, and get rid of those post-9/11 restrictions on student visas that are causing (.pdf) so many top students to do their graduate work in Canada, Europe and Asia instead of in the United States. Those restrictions will hurt us immensely in the long run.

Those are the three big ones; the rest is in the details. And it's the details that matter. There are lots of serious issues that you're going to have to tackle: data privacy, data sharing, data mining, government eavesdropping, government databases, use of Social Security numbers as identifiers, and so on. It's not enough to get the broad policy goals right. You can have good intentions and enact a good law, and have the whole thing completely gutted by two sentences sneaked in during rulemaking by some lobbyist.

Security is both subtle and complex, and -- unfortunately -- it doesn't readily lend itself to normal legislative processes. You're used to finding consensus, but security by consensus rarely works. On the internet, security standards are much worse when they're developed by a consensus body, and much better when someone just does them. This doesn't always work -- a lot of crap security has come from companies that have "just done it" -- but nothing but mediocre standards come from consensus bodies. The point is that you won't get good security without pissing someone off: The information broker industry, the voting machine industry, the telcos. The normal legislative process makes it hard to get security right, which is why I don't have much optimism about what you can get done.

And if you're going to appoint a cyber security czar, you have to give him actual budgetary authority -- otherwise he won't be able to get anything done, either.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

It's basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cyber security advisor, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security the devil is always in the details -- and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic -- McCain supposedly is "working on the issues" as well -- I have three pieces of policy advice for the next president, whoever he is. They're too detailed for campaign speeches or even position papers, but they're essential for improving information security in our society. Actually, they apply to national security in general. And they're things only government can do.

One, use your immense buying power to improve the security of commercial products and services. One property of technological products is that most of the cost is in the development of the product rather than the production. Think software: The first copy costs millions, but the second copy is free.

You have to secure your own government networks, military and civilian. You have to buy computers for all your government employees. Consolidate those contracts, and start putting explicit security requirements into the RFPs. You have the buying power to get your vendors to make serious security improvements in the products and services they sell to the government, and then we all benefit because they'll include those improvements in the same products and services they sell to the rest of us. We're all safer if information technology is more secure, even though the bad guys can use it, too.

Two, legislate results and not methodologies. There are a lot of areas in security where you need to pass laws, where the security externalities are such that the market fails to provide adequate security. For example, software companies who sell insecure products are exploiting an externality just as much as chemical plants that dump waste into the river. But a bad law is worse than no law. A law requiring companies to secure personal data is good; a law specifying what technologies they should use to do so is not. Mandating software liabilities for software failures is good, detailing how is not. Legislate for the results you want and implement the appropriate penalties; let the market figure out how -- that's what markets are good at.

Three, broadly invest in research. Basic research is risky; it doesn't always pay off. That's why companies have stopped funding it. Bell Labs is gone because nobody could afford it after the AT&T breakup, but the root cause was a desire for higher efficiency and short-term profitability -- not unreasonable in an unregulated business. Government research can be used to balance that by funding long-term research.

Spread those research dollars wide. Lately, most research money has been redirected through DARPA to near-term military-related projects; that's not good. Keep the earmark-happy Congress from dictating (.pdf) how the money is spent. Let the NSF, NIH and other funding agencies decide how to spend the money and don't try to micromanage. Give the national laboratories lots of freedom, too. Yes, some research will sound silly to a layman. But you can't predict what will be useful for what, and if funding is really peer-reviewed, the average results will be much better. Compared to corporate tax breaks and other subsidies, this is chump change.

If our research capability is to remain vibrant, we need more science and math students with decent elementary and high school preparation. The declining interest is partly from the perception that scientists don't get rich like lawyers and dentists and stockbrokers, but also because science isn't valued in a country full of creationists. One way the president can help is by trusting scientific advisers and not overruling them for political reasons.

Oh, and get rid of those post-9/11 restrictions on student visas that are causing (.pdf) so many top students to do their graduate work in Canada, Europe and Asia instead of in the United States. Those restrictions will hurt us (.pdf) immensely in the long run.

Those are the three big ones; the rest is in the details. And it's the details that matter. There are lots of serious issues that you're going to have to tackle: data privacy, data sharing, data mining, government eavesdropping, government databases, use of Social Security numbers as identifiers, and so on. It's not enough to get the broad policy goals right. You can have good intentions and enact a good law, and have the whole thing completely gutted by two sentences sneaked in during rulemaking by some lobbyist.

Security is both subtle and complex, and -- unfortunately -- it doesn't readily lend itself to normal legislative processes. You're used to finding consensus, but security by consensus rarely works. On the internet, security standards are much worse when they're developed by a consensus body, and much better when someone just does them. This doesn't always work -- a lot of crap security has come from companies that have "just done it" -- but nothing but mediocre standards come from consensus bodies. The point is that you won't get good security without pissing someone off: The information broker industry, the voting machine industry, the telcos. The normal legislative process makes it hard to get security right, which is why I don't have much optimism about what you can get done.

And if you're going to appoint a cyber security czar, you have to give him actual budgetary authority -- otherwise he won't be able to get anything done, either.

---

Bruce Schneier is chief security technology officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

If you still subscribe to fixed site recovery services using shared IT infrastructure from the likes of HP, IBM BCRS, or SunGard, among others, you will quickly become a dinosaur in the next 1 to 2 years.

These types of shared infrastructure services involve lengthy restores from tape and a recovery time objective of 72 hours, at best. Plus, you'll be lucky if you recover at all because chances are, you've had trouble scheduling a test with your service provider and it's been a LONG time since the last one, if indeed you’ve ever tested.

72 hours recovery just doesn't cut it anymore. And frankly, understanding your provider's oversubscription ratio to shared infrastructure to determine the risk of multiple invocations, or attempting to negotiate exclusions zones and availability guarantees is a time suck. Most companies are either taking DR back in-house or, if they still rely on a DR service provider, they are using dedicated infrastructure.

A dedicated infrastructure is attractive as it enables replication to improve recovery objectives. But it’s expensive, and puts advanced IT recovery out of the reach of many companies who can't measure downtime in millions of dollars.

But, there are new services on the horizon that will make advanced IT recovery affordable for the masses. This month SunGard announced the availability of its new Virtual Server Replication Service. As I discussed in my most recent Forrester Wave™ of DR Service Providers and other reports, server virtualization is transforming IT recovery. With replication to a virtualized server infrastructure and shared storage infrastructure, customers can enjoy improved recovery-time and recovery-point objectives without the cost of dedicated and custom IT recovery solutions from the DR services provider.SunGard is the first DR service provider to productize these virtual services. I expect other DR service providers to follow suit.

So, the next time your contract is up for renewal, you need to completely rethink your approach to IT recovery. Get off tape and move to these new virtual services. It will improve your recovery capabilities and you don't have to worry about the oversubscription issue with shared virtual infrastructure -- the DR provider can manage capacity much more easily in this environment. In fact, SunGard is offering an RTO SLA of 6 hours as part of the offering. To my knowledge, this is the first time a DR service provider is offering this as part of a standard contract. I'm looking forward to the day when vendors will offer most services with transparent, subscription-based pricing, and standard contract terms that don't take a team of procurement professionals to negotiate.