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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: extra]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/extra</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Straight Talking Warren Buffett]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c3eda8d642477dccc307b946fd1f4926</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c3eda8d642477dccc307b946fd1f4926</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[For those who did not hear Warren Buffett being interviewed last Friday morning on CNBC, he did not beat about the bush when talking about the former Presidential hopeful, John Edwards

Mr. Buffett...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[For those who did not hear Warren Buffett being interviewed last Friday morning on CNBC, he did not beat about the bush when talking about the former Presidential hopeful, John Edwards. <br /><span id="fullpost"><br />Mr. Buffett came straight out and accused Mr. Edwards of soliciting and taking money by deceitful means during his unsuccessful Presidential bid earlier this year.  According to Mr. Buffett, John Edwards knew back then that it was only a matter of time before the media uncovered the story of his mistress and alleged love-child.  <br />  <br /></span><br />Unfortunately, this did not stop him from asking suporters to fund his campaign.  Had people knew about the extra-marital affair, they most likely would not have sent in their hard earned dollars as there was no chance that he could continue in the race once the damning news broke.  Mr. Buffett suggested that Edwards should cut back on a few of those expensive haircuts and return those fifty and one hundred dollar donations that came in from ordinary hard working followers.<br /><br />This sentiment rings true for my industry.  At our training courses, we focus on Ethics at the beginning of the course and it runs throughout the training.  Nobody is saying that we are not human and we do not make mistakes - we all do, but covering up the truth to further your own selfish goals is a practice that would probably even disgust the animal Kingdom - except the reptiles possibly.<br /><br />Thank you Mr. Buffett for being so frank and forthright in this era of sterile political correctness.  This is why I enjoy working with successful business people and despise the empty promises and double-talking of policticians, to whatever party they belong.  To those of you in the security world, again I implore you to never forget that your word is your bond and at the end of the day, your reputation will live on after you are long gone.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2008 08:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/buffett">buffett</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/edwards">edwards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/john edwards">john edwards</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/successful business people">successful business people</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sterile political correctness">sterile political correctness</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hard">hard</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/unsuccessful presidential bid">unsuccessful presidential bid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ordinary hard">ordinary hard</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/08/straight-talking-warren-buffett.html">Straight Talking Warren Buffett</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Cute names can't come to rescue]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d2fa211d39b867e06c15e58dce810921</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d2fa211d39b867e06c15e58dce810921</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Most of us have heard the conversations about looming threat to survival Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Their names are cute but it can't help fix a bad strategy of making money by dishing out bad loans...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<P>Most of us have heard the conversations about looming threat to survival&nbsp;Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Their names are cute but it can't help fix&nbsp;a bad strategy of making money by dishing out bad loans.</P>
<P>I have had interaction with several security project&nbsp;managers who were very good in creating a buzz around their projects. Projects were given fancy names. The&nbsp;funniest project name&nbsp;I have heard was "Baby Rhino". One day I get an email in my inbox with a subject line which says: Baby Rhino Caputred! - The email&nbsp;got my attention, but the project did not gain any extra respect (because of the name) hardly there was any significant accomplishment in terms of its deliverable.</P>
<P>I would rather stick with project&nbsp;names that signify scope, relevance, meaning and value of&nbsp; a project. It is not bad to market a project, but trying to market a project without delivering value is a gimmick. </P>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 23 Aug 2008 19:26:05 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/names">names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/project names">project names</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/project">project</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security project managers">security project managers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad strategy">bad strategy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad">bad</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/baby rhino">baby rhino</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad loans">bad loans</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fancy names">fancy names</category>
      <source url="http://ravichar.blogharbor.com/blog/_archives/2008/8/23/3852899.html">Cute names can't come to rescue</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[ScienceLogics 5-Year Anniversary]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1287b8dac0ea60512bed5f303d15fe55</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1287b8dac0ea60512bed5f303d15fe55</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[August 2003. The largest blackout in U.S. history darkens the Northeast and Midwest, the Blaster worm has been unleashed and Madonna and Britney create a stir at the 2003 MTV Music Video Awards . In...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; margin: 0px 10px 10px 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="164" alt="B-day Cake" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/b-day-cake1.jpg" width="244" align="left" border="0"> August 2003. The largest <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/08/13/celebrating-the-anniversary-of-the-big-blackout/?mod=djemTECH" target="_blank">blackout</a> in U.S. history darkens the Northeast and Midwest, the <a href="http://news.cnet.com/2010-1001-5117862.html" target="_blank">Blaster worm</a> has been unleashed and Madonna and Britney create a stir at the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_MTV_Video_Music_Awards" target="_blank">2003 MTV Music Video Awards</a>. In the midst of this <a href="http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/download/ew_heat_wave.en.pdf" target="_blank">hot summer</a> madness, ScienceLogic was founded.
<p>To kick off our celebration of our first five years, we asked <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/leadership.htm" target="_blank">ScienceLogic founders</a> Dave Link, Richard Chart and Chris Cordray for their thoughts and memories on events leading to today’s milestone. How and why did they set out on this venture? What happened along the way – expected and unexpected? Why were they successful in times when other new (and established) businesses have come and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:2003_disestablishments" target="_blank">gone</a>?
<p><b>How did you three put together this team?</b>
<p>We all worked together at a large Managed Service Provider for a couple of years before leaving to start ScienceLogic, so we all knew each other and knew our collective strengths. More importantly, each of us had worked with network management tools on some level (sales and marketing, engineering and product development), and knew first-hand all of the customer pain points, from every perspective. So we left and began rapidly figuring out how to build a better network management solution based upon our real world operational experience..
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> One interesting aspect is that our areas of expertise don’t overlap, which has contributed to our success. Chris is excellent with developing the product front-end and interface, Richard handled the backend architecture and engineering and I focused on the technical business side of sales and marketing. Our roles have been to build a product that works well and that provides real value to operations teams that experience the same day to day frustrations that we felt.<b></b>
<p><b>Whose idea was it to start the company?</b>
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> It was really a collective effort. We were all passionate about “getting it right” and not just starting a company. We knew the industry need and between us, we had the knowledge and skill sets to address all of the right aspects of developing a product and a building a business around it.
<p><b>What process did you go through to get started?</b>
<p><strong>Richard:</strong> From the beginning we knew the type of solution the market needed and we knew that we wanted to build it as an appliance. From different vantage points, we had each experienced the effects of long, difficult and expensive installations that still exist with traditional network tools. Every install has unique variations: there are always different server types, varying hardware and software versions, different patches installed, and on and on. Every installation was time consuming and unpredictable. We knew that an appliance model would address all of these variables and save a lot of time on how quickly customers could achieve immediate value.
<p>The harder decisions were around actually starting the business, assessing the market and of course determining the product pricing.
<p><b>EM7 completely flips the traditional model of complex, lengthy and expensive deployments. How did you convince others that the EM7 Meta-Appliance product was valid?</b>
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> Yes, EM7 totally disrupts the traditional model for network management. While others take a narrow approach, we intentionally designed EM7 to focus on the broad problem – managing the data center. How do you cover a variety of technologies and make sure they work seamlessly together? The vision was to make it easier, not harder, for customers.
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> I have to give it to Dave – very early on, he realized the power of a demo. If Dave could get in front of someone, he’d make them a believer. He’d use the Peter Falk/Columbo technique of “let me show you one more thing.” It was very effective. It’s getting easier, but even today people sometimes have to see EM7 in action before they become believers.
<p><b>Can you describe the early days of running a new business?</b>
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> ScienceLogic is a classic case of entrepreneurship. For the first year we worked out of our basements. We kept the costs low in every conceivable way and spent the first year developing the product before we even made a sale.
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> We stayed at lots of odd places when we were on the road, took cheap flights with multiple layovers and purchased lots of our first test equipment on eBay. This was during the dot-com bust so there was lots of equipment for sale on eBay, really cheap!
<p><strong>Richard:</strong> The amount of equipment I had in my house was absolutely crazy. Back then, servers were huge – I had a Cisco 6509 Catalyst, a Compaq Proliant DL380, Brocade switch, IBM Netfinity 4500R, and tons of other machines.
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> I had to install a new circuit box at home because I was blowing breakers. I remember when that 6509 crashed, we revived it and it died again. The second death was final.
<p><b>So you started in your houses – what was your first office space?</b>
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> My friend, the CEO at Ernst &amp; Young Technology had a few extra cubes and a data center in their office that they graciously allowed us to use. Their help was an important step in helping us really formalize the business. We started doing well and adding people, but ironically, their company was downsizing. Before long, many of their original YET people were gone and the ScienceLogic team kept growing in to the open cubes.
<p>Our first leased space was converted warehouse space in Chantilly, VA that once housed an internet radio station. It was cool – it had a large salt water fish tank, a loft, a spiral staircase and a Star Trek door that retracted into the walls with the customary lights and “whooshing” sound.
<p>We outgrew the Chantilly space, leading to our current office in Reston, VA.
<p><b>Who was the first ScienceLogic customer?</b>
<p>Our first paying customer was <a href="http://martinspoint.com/" target="_blank">Martins Point Health Care</a>. We deployed there in July 2004 and are pleased to say they continue to be a ScienceLogic customer. Other early (and still) EM7 <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/customers.htm" target="_blank">customers</a> include Navy Knowledge Online and the Department of Transportation. Nearly all of our customers are still actively using EM7 and renewing their maintenance.
<p><b>Where do you see the company in the next 5, 10 or 15 years?</b>
<p>Well, our revenue has doubled year-over-year in each of the last three years, so of course we’d like to continue to grow like that or even faster. In five years we’ve gone from three founders to the point where Dave does not know everyone’s fondest childhood memory. We’ll continue to scale our growth to cover the demands of our growing customer base.
<p><b>Where do you see the industry going over the coming years?</b>
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> IT is always moving and gaining in complexity, so network management is also becoming more complicated. There’s increasing diversity, new standards, virtualization and cloud computing. All of these are today’s technologies. Customers have a mix of the old and the new, so EM7 has to accommodate and support both.
<p><strong>Richard:</strong> Each generation of products has a new set of ways to monitor, but the “old” doesn’t go away. Even when a new, hot technology comes along, the old technologies still need to be supported. We work to ensure EM7 keeps up with both.
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> After five years we’re just hitting our stride and we’re just now reaching the tipping point in awareness of ScienceLogic and EM7. We’re all still passionate about the product and as Chris and Rich said, there’s still a lot do. We’ll continue disrupting the market with EM7. Our vision hasn’t changed, and with the increasing levels of automation that customers demand, the market needs are greater than ever. Our future is as bright, or brighter, than ever and we’ll continue to be looking for smart ways to automate traditionally manual IT Operations processes.
<p><b>What’s your advice for someone interested in starting their own business?</b>
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> Be passionate. That’s what has gotten me through the tough times. I didn’t really appreciate this thought when I heard others say it before. But it’s very true.
<p><strong>Richard:</strong> I agree. We met and talked with lots of people who told us, “That’s been done before.” But we kept going because we truly believed in what we were doing and we knew that while our approach was different, that it would be successful.
<p><strong>Richard:</strong> Be fearless. You can’t be too nervous and you need to be able to expect and handle the stress because it will be there. You have to learn to accept the stressful times as a necessary part of the process of starting out on your own.
<p><strong>Dave:</strong> Know your niche from the beginning and give potential customers a compelling reason to trust you and really benefit from your solution. You have to know the problem, see the gap and have a clear and consistent vision of how to solve the problem. Then you have to execute. If you don’t build your team with “doers” you won’t make it.
<p><strong>Chris:</strong> It helps to have friends. ScienceLogic was built on friendships and relationships, starting with the three of us. If you look at our team, most of our hires are referrals – people who developed and maintained great connections with other great people throughout their careers. Maintain your connections and keep in touch with your network of friends.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 18:39:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 completely flips">em7 completely flips</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7">em7</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network management">network management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network management tools">network management tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/em7 meta-appliance product">em7 meta-appliance product</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sciencelogic team">sciencelogic team</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/team">team</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/front">front</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/product front-end">product front-end</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/sciencelogics-5-year-anniversary/08/2008">ScienceLogics 5-Year Anniversary</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Exploitability Index - More Information for Customers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/cfb1b0d0ac4da1790cd7aca4ecda7c95</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/cfb1b0d0ac4da1790cd7aca4ecda7c95</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Yesterday at Black Hat 2008, along with some other stuff , we announced that we will be adding some new information to Security Bulletins - an &quot;Exploitability Index&quot; for each of the vulnerabilities...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday at Black Hat 2008, along with some <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2008/aug08/05-08BlackHat08PR.mspx" target="_blank">other stuff</a>, we announced that we will be adding some new information to Security Bulletins - an "Exploitability Index" for each of the vulnerabilities addressed by the bulletin.</p> <p>Based upon talking with Microsoft customers over the past five years, they are always looking for that little bit of extra information to help make prioritization decisions.&nbsp; An obvious example of this is the severity attached to the vulns.&nbsp; However, as explained by Mike Reavey of the the <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/security/msrc/default.mspx">Microsoft Security Response Center</a> (MSRC) over <a href="http://blogs.technet.com/ecostrat/archive/2008/08/05/predicting-the-future-microsoft-launches-an-exploitability-index.aspx" target="_blank">on the Ecostrat blog today</a>, customers are also very interested in which vulnerabilities already have exploit code or sample exploits available.</p> <p>According to our analysis in the most recent <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/sir" target="_blank">Security Intelligence Report (SIR)</a>, only about 30 percent of the vulnerabilities we fix each year have exploit code released.&nbsp; Why is it not 100% ?&nbsp; Some are not interesting to attackers, sure, but some are simply more challenging to develop a consistent exploit against.&nbsp; It seems like it would be practically useful if this sort of information could be analyzed and published for customers.</p> <p>How does one come up with an Exploitability Index?</p> <ul> <li>The MSRC will analyze the vulnerability and explore what it would take to exploit it, with the support of our <a href="http://blogs.technet.com/swi/">Security Vulnerability Research &amp; Defense</a> (SVRD) team.&nbsp; This will include leveraging methodologies from the broad researcher community.  <li>We will also ask security researcher members of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) (<a href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/events/blackhat/docs/MAPPFS.doc" target="_blank">download FAQ</a>) to review the vulnerabilities and check our analysis before releasing the index.</li></ul> <p>The idea of the Exploitability Index is to provide more information to help customers prioritize Microsoft security updates. This Index will reflect our best estimate, scrutinized by MAPP partners, of the likelihood of a functional exploit being developed for a given vulnerability.</p> <p>If you are interested, I did an interview with Mike Reavey a while back, where we discuss what sort of information customers want that isn't yet in Security Bulletins.&nbsp; FYI, the video is about 15 minutes long and the early part focuses on Mike, how he got into security and how he ended up at Microsoft before we get to the Security Bulletin discussion ... if you want to get right to the Security Bulletin discussion, skip forward to about 08:40. </p> <p><iframe src="http://edge.technet.com/Media/1146/player/" frameborder="0" width="320" scrolling="no" height="325"></iframe></p> <p>If you like these sorts of videos, click on <br><a href="http://edge.technet.com/Media/Interview-with-MSRC-Leader-Mike-Reavey/">SecurityGuy 001 - Interview with MSRC Leader Mike Reavey</a> and it'll take you to the edge.technet.com site and you can check out the related videos.</p> <p>Regards ~ Jeff</p><img src="http://blogs.technet.com/aggbug.aspx?PostID=3100790" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2008 12:20:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft">microsoft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/microsoft security">microsoft security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bulletin">bulletin</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security bulletin discussion">security bulletin discussion</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exploitability index">exploitability index</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/index">index</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/customers">customers</category>
      <source url="http://blogs.technet.com/security/archive/2008/08/06/exploitability-index-more-information-for-customers.aspx">Exploitability Index - More Information for Customers</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Q&A with Sergey Katsev of Coyote Point Systems]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/e57e1ace426f0aef838f8f362c558571</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/e57e1ace426f0aef838f8f362c558571</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I recently had the opportunity to sit down with Sergey Katsev , an Engineering Project Manager at Coyote Point Systems and discuss his experiences with InteropNet and talk about the Coyote Point...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently had the opportunity to sit down with <a href="http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=24405331" target="_blank">Sergey Katsev</a>, an Engineering Project Manager at <a href="http://coyotepoint.com/" target="_blank">Coyote Point Systems</a> and discuss his experiences with InteropNet and talk about the Coyote Point products.  With a couple of years of experience as a vendor for Interop, he had some interesting insights in to how participating in the InteropNet can help a vendor.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> How long have you been involved in InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>I started at Coyote Point 3 years ago and <a href="http://blog.interop.com/2006" target="_blank">InteropNet 2006</a> was my first &#8220;big&#8221; assignment.  This was the first time Coyote Point had put in a proposal to participate, so we were very excited when we were selected.</p>
<p><strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>How long has Coyote Point been involved in Interop overall?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>We&#8217;ve been exhibiting at Interop for a number of years, and after seeing the InteropNet in action, we decided to submit a proposal in &#8216;06.  We were actually one of the first companies in the load balancing/traffic management space (we&#8217;ve been doing this for almost 10 years), so we have a lot of experience to share with InteropNet.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What is your role at Coyote Point?</p>
<p>My official title is &#8220;Engineering Project Manager&#8221;.  Basically, that means that I&#8217;m in charge of product releases and maintenance.  It sounds like a weird title for someone participating in InteropNet, but I&#8217;ve actually found it extremely useful since my position means that I don&#8217;t get to see our systems out in the field a lot.  We&#8217;ve added several features and have ideas for others just from my experiences at InteropNet.</p>
<p><strong></strong></p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> What do the Coyote Point products do?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>Coyote Point makes a Traffic Management appliance called <a href="http://coyotepoint.com/products/e650.php" target="_blank">Equalizer</a>.  What this means is that any traffic destined for a datacenter&#8217;s servers goes through our appliances and we make sure that the server which is best equipped to handle it, does.  Our systems sit between the clients and the servers and monitor the client traffic and the state of the servers.  If the clients start sending more traffic, we&#8217;ll balance it out so that no server is overloaded.  If one of the servers stops responding or starts responding very slowly, we&#8217;ll steer traffic away from that server.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>In what way are your products being used as part of InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>In the InteropNet, we&#8217;re utilizing a lot of our expertise:  We&#8217;re making sure that traffic is balanced and servers are redundant for show services such as DNS and SMTP.  We&#8217;re also using our geographic load balancing technology to ensure that the ScienceLogic EM7 appliances and some other internal NOC services are available from anywhere, with the lowest latency, with our <a href="http://www.coyotepoint.com/products/xcel.php" target="_blank">SSL acceleration </a>and <a href="http://www.coyotepoint.com/products/express.php" target="_blank">GZIP compression technology</a>.  Finally, we&#8217;re helping logistics in the NOC by allowing a physical separation between systems <a href="http://blog.interop.com/interopnet/2008/04/what-are-these-peds-you-speak-of" target="_blank">located in the NOC</a> and those in an emergency rack outside of the NOC.  If either of these two locations were to fail, the network will continue operating without a glitch.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Are there any special considerations for Interop that cause you to deploy your systems there differently that any other place?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>Interop is definitely different than most of our customer installations.   One difference from a standard environment is that the network (at least this year) is one large flat network, with pieces carved out where extra security is needed.  Because of this, we can actually run our failover pairs of Equalizer systems in a non-standard configuration where the two peers are in different racks, or even on different floors.  That&#8217;s one of the things that I really like about InteropNet &#8212; it definitely brings new ideas to mind, which end up becoming &#8217;special configuration&#8217; white papers after the show.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> Has InteropNet taught you anything that caused you to actually change your product?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>In addition to the failover configuration differences I mentioned above, participating in InteropNet has actually caused us to add several new features and allowed configurations.  One example is the &#8220;no-spoof&#8221; option for <a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/dcmmpmb53rjp5hr8/" target="_blank">Layer 4 clusters</a>.  Prior to the 2006 shows, we always &#8217;spoofed&#8217; the client&#8217;s IP address when talking to a server so that the server would see the client&#8217;s IP address instead of our own.  At Interop, we ran into a special configuration which would&#8217;ve been very difficult to set up in this manner, so our engineers added this feature, and it&#8217;s been very a very popular configuration with our customers ever since.</p>
<p>We have also had a couple of business relationships that extended outside of the show.  In 2006, we had a good experience using <a href="http://www.spirent.com/analysis/index.cfm?media=3&amp;ws=2" target="_blank">Spirent Communications</a> gear to benchmark the network, so we ended up purchasing a couple of these systems to test our products.  More recently, we have found a way to bundle our Equalizer e350si load balancers with the ScienceLogic <a href="http://www.sciencelogic.com/techdiagram.htm" target="_blank">EM7 collector appliances</a> to help ScienceLogic get the best performance in load balancing large quantities of syslog messages to be processed.  If it wasn&#8217;t for our participation in InteropNet, neither of these relationships would&#8217;ve happened.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic: </strong>What’s the best part of being involved with InteropNet?  What do you most look forward to?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>InteropNet is an amazing networking opportunity (no pun intended).  The group of engineers that put the network together every year is, well, amazing.  There is so much combined experience that any question instantly has several possible answers, and the best answer is chosen very quickly.  One of the &#8217;sayings&#8217; at Interop is &#8220;if you run into a problem, ask someone&#8230; we&#8217;ve probably seen that problem before&#8230; five times.&#8221;  One would think that being part of InteropNet is the same thing, year after year.  However, in the two years that I&#8217;ve been part of this (for four shows), there have been huge differences in the way that the network is designed and put together.  These are both because the vendors selected every year are different, and because the engineers who design the network change from year to year.  Somehow, though, when all is said and done, we have a <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-las-vegas-2008-some-interesting-stats/06/2008" target="_blank">network that works</a>.</p>
<p><strong>ScienceLogic:</strong> You don’t have to answer this one if you’re not comfortable… What would you like to see changed with the way things are done at InteropNet?</p>
<p><strong>Katsev: </strong>This isn&#8217;t a cop-out&#8230; I really can&#8217;t think of anything I would do differently.  Sure, there are small problems that pop up sometimes, but every project has those, and the people at InteropNet are more than capable of figuring them all out.  In fact, I know that Interop started out as a show to test the interoperability of devices&#8230; but I&#8217;m still amazed that all of these devices actually talk to each other and <a href="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-geoff-horne-of-interopnet/06/2008" target="_blank">&#8220;play nice&#8221; together</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://sharethis.com/item?&wp=abc&amp;publisher=ea11358c-69de-4e80-9804-e964a8930b70&amp;title=Q%26%23038%3BA+with+Sergey+Katsev+of+Coyote+Point+Systems&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.sciencelogic.com%2Fqa-with-sergey-katsev-of-coyote-point-systems%2F08%2F2008">ShareThis</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 12:34:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/katsev">katsev</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sergey katsev">sergey katsev</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/interopnet">interopnet</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/coyote">coyote</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/systems">systems</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sciencelogic">sciencelogic</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sciencelogic em7 appliances">sciencelogic em7 appliances</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/client traffic">client traffic</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/qa-with-sergey-katsev-of-coyote-point-systems/08/2008">Q&amp;A with Sergey Katsev of Coyote Point Systems</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Italians Use Soldiers to Prevent Crime]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c78f1c770359cb273d03943d7dec2ab0</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c78f1c770359cb273d03943d7dec2ab0</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Interesting : Soldiers were deployed throughout Italy on Monday to embassies, subway and railway stations, as part of broader government measures to fight violent crime here for which illegal...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/world/europe/05italy.html">Interesting</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Soldiers were deployed throughout Italy on Monday to embassies, subway and railway stations, as part of broader government measures to fight violent crime here for which illegal immigrants are broadly blamed.

<p>[...]</p>

<p>The conservative government of Silvio Berlusconi won elections in April while promising to crack down on petty crime and illegal immigrants. The new patrols of soldiers, who are not empowered to make arrests, do not seem aimed only at illegal immigrants, though the patrols were deployed to centers where illegal immigrants are housed. </p>

<p>“Security is something concrete,” Mr. La Russa said on Monday. The troops, he said, will be a “deterrent to criminals.”</blockquote></p>

<p>That reminds me of one of my favorite logical fallacies: "We must do something.  This is something. Therefore, we must do it."  It does seem largely to be a demonstration of "doing something" by the Berlusconi government.  The legitimate police, of course, think it's a terrible idea.</p>

<blockquote>“You need to be specially trained to carry out some kinds of controls,” Nicola Tanzi, the secretary of a trade union that represents Italian police officers. “Soldiers just aren’t qualified.”

<p>He also questioned whether the $93.6 million that will be spent for the extra deployment, called Operation Safe Streets, might not have been better used to increase the budgets for Italy’s police and military.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=lUII6K"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=lUII6K" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?a=lLsCCK"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/schneier/fulltext?i=lLsCCK" border="0"></img></a>
</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2008 02:36:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/illegal immigrants">illegal immigrants</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/soldiers">soldiers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/police">police</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/broader government measures">broader government measures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/italys police">italys police</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite logical fallacies">favorite logical fallacies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/operation safe streets">operation safe streets</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fight violent crime">fight violent crime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/silvio berlusconi">silvio berlusconi</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/08/italians_use_so.html">Italians Use Soldiers to Prevent Crime</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Think "liability" if you want to stay out of trouble.]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/d9485be5d4b45a749942f44d816889ae</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/d9485be5d4b45a749942f44d816889ae</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I speak a lot about liability, but not everyone gets it

I have seen medical doctors, dentists, business people of all walks of life and lawyers (it is surprising how many lawyers disregard...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I speak a lot about liability, but not everyone gets it.<br /><span id="fullpost"><br />I have seen medical doctors, dentists, business people of all walks of life and lawyers (it is surprising how many lawyers disregard liability)pay little attention to potential lawsuits.  The latest category to leave themselves open, have been auctioneers. <br /></span><br />The current foreclosure crisis has meant that many properties are being auctioned off.  We have been providing security officers at some of the properties in order to make sure that people do not try to steal or commit vandalism when viewing the houses.  There was an incident recently in which a bidder decided to withdraw his offer after his bid became the winning bid.  He probaly got cold feet.<br /><br />While he should not have reneged on his offer to buy the property, it was a civil matter best left to civil remedy.  Unfortunately, the auctioneers involved decided to take the law into their own hands and would not let the man leave the property.  The man became anxious and informed them that he was having difficulty breathing and needed to go to his car for his asthma medication.  <br /><br />Was this true?  Maybe, maybe not - but would it be wise to gamble with a person's health when you already had their personal details and you could easily have obtained his vehicle registration if he decided to leave?<br />Thankfully, our security officer knew better that to get involved with blocking the man's way.  The auctioneers stood in front of his vehicle and yelled at him.  Eventually the man drove off.     <br /><br />If you represent a financial institution, a law firm or an auctioneering firm, you need to think twice before you act inappropriately.  I have no doubt that had that man had a serious attack and if he died as a result, his next of kin would have sued for umpteen millions.  When it comes to situations like this, you need to think rationally and realize what is involved.  What was the worse thing that could have happened when the person decided to renege on his offer?  <br /><br />Apparently, he would have signed forms and the like and most probably he could be sued civilly for not fulfilling his obligations after delivering the winning bid.  At the end of the day, the note holder would be in a strong position.  Even if the person had given false information and could not be subsequently located, all they had to do was to put the property back on the market.  What could that have cost, a couple of thousand in extra advertising and the like?  That would have been much better than having to pay the next of kin many millions - not to mention the bad publicity.<br /><br />We talk a lot about liability because it is a very real threat.  Think "threat mitigation".  Those who do not, may pay a very high price.<div class="blogger-post-footer">Visit Sexton Executive Security at www.sextonsecurity.com</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 03 Aug 2008 21:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/liability">liability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lawyers disregard liability">lawyers disregard liability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/law firm">law firm</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/auctioneers stood">auctioneers stood</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/auctioneers">auctioneers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/law">law</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lawyers">lawyers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/property">property</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/people">people</category>
      <source url="http://www.thebulletproofblog.com/2008/08/think-liability-if-you-want-to-stay-out.html">Think "liability" if you want to stay out of trouble.</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Keylogger Or False Positive Detected in Wall-E Demo?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bdaaa16ca0ffbacb4a405b5a248888de</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bdaaa16ca0ffbacb4a405b5a248888de</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I woke this morning to find an interesting set of blog entries regarding the Wall-E demo game from THQ - someone downloaded the demo and found their AV scanner flagging it as potentially dangerous

A...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[
        I woke this morning to find an interesting set of blog entries regarding the Wall-E demo game from THQ - someone downloaded the demo and found their AV scanner flagging it as potentially dangerous.<br /><br />A quick roundup of posts:<br /><br /><b>1)</b> Security researcher Timeless Prototype downloads the Wall-E demo, only to find his <a href="http://www.timelessprototype.com/tpdc/blog/post/2008/08/Keylogger-Detected-in-Wall-E-Demo-PC-Game.aspx">antivirus software going crazy</a>. It has detected <a href="http://securityresponse.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-052616-5512-99">Spyware.Ardakey</a>.<br /><br /><b>2)</b> Over at Spyware Sucks, Sandi Hardmeier decides to try <a href="http://msmvps.com/blogs/spywaresucks/archive/2008/08/03/1643166.aspx">downloading versions of the game from different regions</a>, only to find the French, German ,Danish and Italian versions are all 177MB in size, whereas the US version is "only" 133MB. Furthermore, the 177MB versions all have different filenames. Note that (so far) it's the UK version (clocking in at 177MB) that has been snagged by an antivirus program. As Sandi notes, there is no way an extra 40-odd MB are needed for a keylogger, so why the extra filesize?<br /><br />3) Wayne Porter <a href="http://www.wayneporter.com/2008/08/02/keyloggers-games/">contacted Cachefly</a> (who manage the servers the game is downloading from), and they said this:<br /><br /><i>"I can confirm that our servers were not compromised, beyond that I can't offer much else.<br /><br />Obviously we'd like to be as helpful as possible, but since it's related to customer data we're rather limited in what we can discuss. I've opened a ticket to make THQ aware of this, and we can/will work them on tracking stuff down if we need to (we do have a history of all versions of a file w/ filesizes/md5 checksums, and the dates/times/src ip of all revisions)."</i><br /><br />The 177MB file is still available to download, I grabbed it a little earlier on today:<br /><br /><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="walle3.jpg" src="http://blog.spywareguide.com/images/walle3.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" height="186" width="380" /></span>
<br /><br />What we <i>really</i> need to know, is if this is anything to be worried about or not. I would have contacted THQ UK directly, but they <a href="http://www.thq-games.com/uk/pages/contact">don't seem to be available</a> on a Sunday. Until this is resolved one way or another, I'd have to advise people not to download this demo as a precaution until THQ (or Norton, whose AV program flagged the file) have clarified exactly what is going on here. We're currently running some more antivirus / antispyware scans against the download in question, but as you can imagine, this takes some time. A particular problem here is that there are issues submitting a file like this to sites such as <a href="http://www.virustotal.com/">Virustotal.com</a>, because of their 10MB file size limit.<br /><br />Sorting this one out might take a while...<br /><br />/ Update - some people are saying AVAST <a href="http://games.internode.on.net/forums/viewtopic.php?p=1844560">flags the file</a>, too.<br />
        
    ]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 03 Aug 2008 07:23:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/demo">demo</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall-e demo">wall-e demo</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/177mb versions">177mb versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/versions">versions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/wall-e demo game">wall-e demo game</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/177mb">177mb</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/file">file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/177mb file">177mb file</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/10mb file">10mb file</category>
      <source url="http://blog.spywareguide.com/2008/08/walle.html">Keylogger Or False Positive Detected in Wall-E Demo?</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Twisted Coronas]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7ceb9ae30eb4801d1b48db211acf0539</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7ceb9ae30eb4801d1b48db211acf0539</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Okay it's Saturday, so let me share something completely nontechnical and fun
What you need to make these cocktails: Six pack of Corona Extra
Bottle of Bacardi Limon
Lime
Coctail stirrer (a chopstick...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Okay it&#39;s Saturday, so let me share something completely nontechnical and fun.</p> <p>What you need to make these cocktails:</p> <blockquote>Six pack of <a href="http://www.corona.com/" target="_blank">Corona Extra</a><br />Bottle of <a href="http://www.bacardi.com/us/en-us/products/additionalproducts/bacardilim%C3%B3n?accessibility=true&amp;marketlanguageid=2" target="_blank">Bacardi Limon</a><br />Lime<br />Coctail stirrer (a chopstick works fine)</blockquote> <p>Pop a slice of lime into a Corona and hand to a friend. Have them drink the neck, then refill with Bacardi Limon (putting the lime in first seems to reduce fizzing). Stir and hand back to them so they can drink it down as it fizzes up a bit.</p> <p>Mixing rum and beer may sound nasty, but this actually results in a very smooth, tasty drink. It&#39;s our favorite accompaniment when we are playing <a href="http://www.xbox.com/en-us/games/r/rockband/" target="_blank">Rock Band</a>.</p> <p>We took this recipe and applied it to one of our other favorite beers as well: <a href="http://www.epinions.com/content_369863855748" target="_blank">Honey Moon Summer Ale</a> (also works with <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Moon_(beer)" target="_blank">Blue Moon</a>, or any other typically orange-flavored beer). Just use <a href="http://www.bacardi.com/us/en-us/products/additionalproducts/bacardio?accessibility=true&amp;marketlanguageid=2" target="_blank">Barcardi O</a> instead of Limon.</p> <p>Enjoy!</p><div style="clear:both;"></div><img src="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=52330" width="1" height="1">]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 02 Aug 2008 13:33:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/limon">limon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bacardi limon">bacardi limon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/drink">drink</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tasty drink">tasty drink</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/lime">lime</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/corona extra">corona extra</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/corona">corona</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/blue moon">blue moon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/favorite beers">favorite beers</category>
      <source url="http://www.pluralsight.com/community/blogs/keith/archive/2008/08/02/twisted-coronas.aspx">Twisted Coronas</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Summarizing July's Threatscape]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/2860027a1eaa69350d814429c3bf6070</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[July's threatscape -- consider going through June's summary as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/WogqT88LBdc/s1600-h/ddanchev_july.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SJLdSTaizDI/AAAAAAAAB_E/Bb9z-K3ib7c/s200-R/ddanchev_july.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>July's threatscape -- consider going through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/summarizing-junes-threatscape.html">June's summary</a> as well -- once again demonstrated that nothing is impossible, the impossible just takes a little longer where the incentive would be the ultimate monetization of the process.<br />
<br />
Russian hacktivists attacking Lithuania and Georgia, several Storm Worm campaigns, a couple of new malware tools, Neosploit team abandoning support for their web malware exploitation kit, CAPTCHA for several of the most popular free email providers getting efficiently attacked in order to resell the bogus accounts registered in the process, several copycat SQL injects next to the evasion techniques applied by the copycats, botnets continuing to commit click fraud and generate revenue for those who own or have rented them, an infamous money mule recruitment service taking advantage of the fast-fluxed network provided by the ASProx botnet - pretty interesting month indeed.<br />
<br />
<b>01.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/decrypting-and-restoring-gpcode.html">Decrypting and Restoring GPcode Encrypted Files</a> -<br />
The GPcode authors read the news too, and are catching up with the major weaknesses pointed out in their previous release in order to come with a virtually unbreakable algorithm. And since more evidence of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/whos-behind-gpcode-ransomware.html">who's behind the GPcode ransomware</a> was gathered, vendors and independent researchers realized that the latest release is also susceptible to a plain simple flaw, namely the encrypted files were basically getting deleting and not securely erased making them fairly easy to recover.<br />
<br />
<b>02.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/chinese-bloggers-bypassing-censorship.html">Chinese Bloggers Bypassing Censorship by Blogging Backward</a> -<br />
When you know how it works, you can either improve, abuse or destroy it in that very particular order. Chinese bloggers are always very adaptive in respect to spreading their message by obfuscating their messages in a way that common keywords filtering software wouldn't be able to pick them.<br />
<br />
<b>03.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/gmail-yahoo-and-hotmails-captcha-broken.html">Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail’s CAPTCHA Broken</a> -<br />
This has been an urban legend for a while, but with more services starting to offer hundreds of thousands of pre-registered accounts at these providers, it's surprising that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1514">spam and phishing emails coming from legitimate email providers is increasing</a>. The "vendors" behind these propositions are naturally starting to "vertically integrate" by offering value-added services for extra payments, namely, scripts to automatically abuse the pre-registered accounts for automatic registration of splogs and anything else malicious or blackhat SEO related.<br />
<br />
<b>04.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/antivirus-industry-in-2008.html">The Antivirus Industry in 2008</a> -<br />
If it were anyone else but a security vendor to come up with such a realistic cartoon aiming to stimulate innovation by emphasizing on how prolific and sophisticated malware groups have become, it would have been a biased cartoon. However, this one is courtesy of a security vendor, and it's pretty objective.<br />
<br />
<b>05.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lithuania-attacked-by-russian.html">Lithuania Attacked by Russian Hacktivists, 300 Sites Defaced</a> -<br />
This attack is a good example of a decent PSYOPS operation. Of course they have already build the capabilities to deface and even execute DDoS attacks against Lithuania, so why not put them in a "stay tuned" mode, by speculating on the upcoming attack and then executing it making it look like they delived what they've promised? This a lone gunman mass defacement given that the sites were all hosted on a single ISP, with no indication of any kind of coordination whatsoever. The same for the <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1533">Georgia President’s web site which was under DDoS attack from Russian hackers</a> later this month. Despite that the hacktivists behind it dedicated a separate C&amp;C for the attack, one that hasn't been used in any type of previous attacks so far, they did a minor mistake by using a secondary command and control location that's known to have been connected with a particular "botnet on demand" service in the past. The second attack once again proves that you don't need to build capacity when you can basically outsource the process to someone else.<br />
<br />
<b>06.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/icann-responds-to-dns-hijacking-its.html">The ICANN Responds to the DNS Hijacking, Its Blog Under Attack</a> -<br />
The ICANN finally issued a statement concerning the DNS hijacking of some of their domains, which is in fact what Comcast.net and Photobucket.com should have done as well, next to stating it was a "glitch". The ICANN also took advantage of the moment and also pointed out that their blog has also been under attack during the month. There's no better example of how the combination of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/icann-and-ianas-domain-names-hijacked.html"> tactics can result in the hijacking of the domains</a> of the organizations implementing procedures aiming to protect against these very same attacks. And while Photobucket.com remained silent during the entire incident, the hosting provider that was used by the Netdevilz team in the two attacks, since they were also responsible for the ICANN and IANA DNS hijackings, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/06/update-to-photobuckets-dns-hijacking.html">technological and social engineeringissued a statement</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>07.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/risks-of-outdated-situational-awareness.html">The Risks of Outdated Situational Awareness</a> -<br />
Security vendors are often in a "catch-up mode" and if I were an average Internet user not knowing that real-time situational awareness speaks for the degree to which my vendor knows what going on online, I'd be pretty excited. However, I'm not. <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1085">Prevx were catching up with a service which I covered approximately two months ago</a>, I even had the chance to constructively confront with one of the affected sites on how despite their security measures in place, this attack was still possible. Recently <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/18/limbo_trojan/">Prevx have once again demonstrated an outdated situational awareness</a> by coming across a banking malware in July 2008, whereas the malware has been around since July 2007, and earlier depending on which version you're referring to.<br />
<br />
<b>08.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/fake-porn-sites-serving-malware-part.html">Fake Porn Sites Serving Malware - Part Two</a> -<br />
Yet another domain portfolio of fake porn sites serving rogue codecs and live exploit URLs, just the tip of the iceberg as usual, however their centralization is greatly assisting in tracking them down.<br />
<br />
<b>09.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-us-invasion-of-iran.html">Storm Worm's U.S Invasion of Iran Campaign</a> -<br />
Stormy Wormy is once again making the headlines with their ability to actually make up the headlines on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>10.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/mobile-malware-scam-isexplayer-wants.html">Mobile Malware Scam iSexPlayer Wants Your Money</a> -<br />
The best scams are the ones to which you've personally agreed to be scammed with without even knowing it. Like this one, which was tracked down and analyzed a couple of hours once a uset tipped on it.<br />
<br />
<b>11.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/template-ization-of-malware-serving.html">The Template-ization of Malware Serving Sites</a> -<br />
The increase of fake porn and celebrity sites is due to the overall template-ization of these, with the people behind them basically implementing several malicious doorways to ensure that the domains get rotated on the fly. Despite that they all look the same, they all sever different type of malware, and zero porn of celebrity content at all except the thumbnails.<br />
<br />
<b>12.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/violating-opsec-for-increasing.html">Violating OPSEC for Increasing the Probability of Malware Infection</a> -<br />
No better way to expose your affiliations and several unknown bad netblocks so far, by adding the netblocks and the malicious domains as trusted sites upon infecting a PC with the malware. Of course, the usual suspects lead the "trusted netblocks".<br />
<br />
<b>13.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/monetizing-compromised-web-sites.html">Monetizing Compromised Web Sites</a> -<br />
Several years ago, a script kiddie would install Apache on a mail server, they claim that they defaced it. Today, these amusing situations are replaced by monetization of the compromised sites, by reselling the access to them to blackhat SEO-ers, malware authors, phishers, or personally starting to manage a scammy infrastructure on them, by earning money on an affiliate based model, like this particular attack.<br />
<br />
<b>14.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/malware-and-office-documents-joining.html">Malware and Office Documents Joining Forces</a> -<br />
A recent DIY malware kit, sold as a proprietary tool basically crunching out malware infected office documents, whose built-in obfuscation makes them harder to detect. It will sooner or later leak out, turning into a commodity tool, a process that's been pretty evident for web malware exploitation kits as well.<br />
<br />
<b>15.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/are-stolen-credit-card-details-getting.html">Are Stolen Credit Card Details Getting Cheaper?</a> -<br />
Depends on who you're buying them from, and whether or not they offer discounts on a volume basis, namely the more you buy the cheaper the price of a card is supposed to get. With the current oversupply of stolen credit card details, what used to be an exclusive good once where they could enjoy a higher profit-margin, is today's commodity good.<br />
<br />
<b>16.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-malware-kit-updated-with.html">The Neosploit Malware Kit Updated with Snapshot ActiveX Exploit</a> -<br />
Since alll the web malware exploitation kits are open source, and leaked in the wild at large, their modularity allows everyone to easily embed any type of exploit that they want to, resulting in Neosploit's single most beneficial feature, the fact that certain versions include all the publicly available exploits targeting Internet Explorer, Firefox and Opera. Moreover, the open source nature of the kit is resulting in a countless number of modified versions yet to be detected and analyzed, therefore keeping track of the exploits included in a malware kit can only be realistic if you take into considered the exploits that come with the default installation.<br />
<br />
<b>17.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/obfuscating-fast-fluxed-sql-injected.html">Obfuscating Fast-fluxed SQL Injected Domains</a> -<br />
Now that's a very good example of different tactics combined to attack, ensure survivability, and apply a certain degree of evasion in between.<br />
<br />
<b>18.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/unbreakable-captcha.html">The Unbreakable CAPTCHA</a> -<br />
There's never been a shortage of ideas, there's always been an issue of usability.<br />
<br />
<b>19.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/ayyildiz-turkish-hacking-group-vs.html">The Ayyildiz Turkish Hacking Group VS Everyone</a> -<br />
That's a pretty inspiring mission if you are to ensure your future in the next couple of years, by targeting everyone, everywhere that has ever publicly stated their disagreement with the Turkish foreign policy.<br />
<br />
<b>20.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/money-mule-recruiters-use-asproxs-fast.html">Money Mule Recruiters use ASProx's Fast Fluxing Services</a> -<br />
A true multitasking in action with a botnet that's been crunching out phishing emails, SQL injecting and now hosting a well known money mule recruitment service. <br />
<br />
<b>21.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/sql-injecting-malicious-doorways-to.html">SQL Injecting Malicious Doorways to Serve Malware</a> -<br />
Constantly switching tactics and combining different ones to achive an objective that used to be accomplished by plain simple techniques, is only starting to take place. In this case, instead of a hard coded SQL injected domain, we have the typical malicious doorways the result of the converging traffic management tools with web malware exploitation kits.<br />
<br />
<b>22.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/impersonating-stopbadwareorg-to-serve.html">Impersonating StopBadware.org to Serve Fake Security Warnings</a> -<br />
Typosquatting popular security vendors and services is nothing new, by having HostFresh providing the hosting for the parked domains promoting the rogue security software, is a privilege and flattery for the success of the Stopbadware initiative.<br />
<br />
<b>23.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/coding-spyware-and-malware-for-hire.html">Coding Spyware and Malware for Hire</a> -<br />
Customerization -- not customization -- has been taking place for a while, that's the process of tailoring your upcoming products to the needs of your future customers, compared to the product concept myopia where the malware coder would code something that he believes would be valuable to the potential customers. End user agreements, issuing licenses for the malware tool, as well as forbidding the reverse engineering of the malware so that no remotely exploitable flaws could be, are among the requirements the coder assists on.<br />
<br />
<b>24. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/lazy-summer-days-at-ukrtelegroup-ltds.html">Lazy Summer Days at UkrTeleGroup Ltd</a><b> -</b><br />
Taking a random snapshot of the current malicious activity at a well known provider of hosting services for rogue security applications, live exploit URLs and botnet command&amp;control locations, always provides an insight into what are their customers up to. In this case, centralization of their scammy ecosystem, and parking a countless number of rogue domains on the same server.<br />
<br />
<b>25. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/email-hacking-going-commercial.html">Email Hacking Going Commercial</a> -<br />
Cybercrime is in fact getting easier to outsource, and while the number of scammers trying to offer non-existent services, or at least services where they cannot deliver the goods, the business model of this service that is that you only pay once they show you a proof that they've managed to hack the email address you game them. How are they doing it? Social engineering and enticing the user to click on live exploit URL from where they'll infect the PC and obtain the email password, of course, next to definitely abusing it for many other purposes in the process.<br />
<br />
<b>26.</b> <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/vulnerabilities-in-antivirus-software.html">Vulnerabilities in Antivirus Software - Conflict of Interest</a> -<br />
You can easily twist the number of vulnerabilities found in your antivirus solution, but not recognizing them as vulnerabilities at the first place. It's all a matter of what you define as a vulnerability, or perhaps what you admit as a serious vulnerability - remote code execution through a security software, or a flaw that's allowing malware to bypass the security solution itself.<br />
<br />
<b>27. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/counting-bullets-on-malware-front.html">Counting the Bullets on the (Malware) Front</a> -<br />
Emphasizing on the number of malware/threats/viruses/worms/slugs your solution detects may be marketable in the short-term, but is damaging the end user's understanding of the threatscape in the long-term. So, by the time he catches up with what exactly is going on, he'll recall the moment in time where he was using the number of threats his solution was detecting as the main benchmark for its usefulness. In reality through, the number is irrelevant from a pro-active point of view, with zero day malware like the one coded for hire undermining the signatures based scanning model.<br />
<br />
<b>28. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/smells-like-copycat-sql-injection-in.html">Smells Like a Copycat SQL Injection In the Wild</a> -<br />
It was pretty obvious that copycats seeing the success of SQL injections the the huge number of sites susceptible to exploitation, would also starting taking advantage of the practice. Some are, however, targeting local communities and trying to avoid detection by using targeted SQL injections.<br />
<br />
<b>29. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</a> -<br />
The scheme is nothing new, what's new is that the botnet masters are trying to limit the revenues that used to go out to affiliate networks they were participating in, and are trying to own or rent the entire infrastructure on their own.<br />
<br />
<b>30. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/over-80-percent-of-storm-worm-spam-sent.html">Over 80 percent of Storm Worm Spam Sent by Pharmaceutical Spam Kings</a><b> -</b><br />
With access to Storm Worm sold and resold, and new malware introduced on Storm Worm infected hosts used as foundation for the propagation of the new malware in this case, it's questionable whether or not the Storm Worm-ers themselves are sending out the junk emails, or are they people who've rented access to the botnet doing it. <br />
<br />
<b>31. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/neosploit-team-leaving-it-underground.html">Neosploit Team Leaving the IT Underground</a> -<br />
Pretty surprising at the first place, but in reality it clearly demonstrates that when you cannot enforce the end user agreement on your crimeware kit, but continue seeing it used in a very profitable malware operations, you basically shut down the support for the public version. The team is not going to stop innovating for their own purposes, and in the long-term they may in fact re-appear with an updated malware kit that's converging different services next to the product itself.<br />
<br />
<b>32. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">Dissecting a Managed Spamming Service</a> - <br />
Managed spamming services using botnets as the foundation for the campaigns are starting to introduce improved metrics for the delivery, as well as experienced customer support ensuring the spam messages make it through spam filters, or at least increase the probability of making the happen. This is an example of a random service emphasizing on the improved metrics they're capable of delivering.<br />
<br />
<b>33. </b><a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-worms-lazy-summer-campaigns.html">Storm Worm's Lazy Summer Campaigns</a> -<br />
Looks like a "cybercrime intern" launched this campaign, lacking any of the usual Storm Worm evasive practices, no exploitation of client side vulnerabilities, as well as no survivability offered by their usual fast-flux nodes.<div class="feedflare">
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      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2008 12:08:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware">malware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/profitable malware operations">profitable malware operations</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware authors">malware authors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware tools">malware tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware coder">malware coder</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware kit">malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/malware infection">malware infection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/neosploit malware kit">neosploit malware kit</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/spam">spam</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/352993637/summarizing-julys-threatscape.html">Summarizing July's Threatscape</source>
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