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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: flexible]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/flexible</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 10:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[National Security Perspectives A Post-Election Insider View]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/caa8257ee971993e58e1b834379f8c71</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/caa8257ee971993e58e1b834379f8c71</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Recently I participated in an event entitled National Security Perspectives held at the famous Congressional Country Club in Maryland . The featured panelists had impressive credentials from the NSA ,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently I participated in an event entitled National Security Perspectives held at the famous <a href="http://www.ccclub.org/" target="_blank">Congressional Country Club in Maryland</a>. The featured panelists had impressive credentials from the <a href="http://www.nsa.gov/" target="_blank">NSA</a>, <a href="http://www.dhs.gov/" target="_blank">DHS</a> and the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/" target="_blank">CIA</a>. The topics of discussion ranged from Current Geopolitical Threats and Evolving Technology Demands to predictions about the New Administrations Intelligence, Defense and Homeland Security focus.</p>
<p>The panelists were:<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Agency" target="_blank">William P. Crowell</a> – former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency<br />
<a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/m_jackson-bio.html" target="_blank">Michael P. Jackson</a> – Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jose_Rodriguez_(intelligence)" target="_blank">Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr</a>. – former Director CIA, National Clandestine Service &amp; CIA, DCI Counterterrorist Center</p>
<p>Overall, it was a very nicely arranged event on a brisk fall evening with about 100 CXO attendees; mostly large but some small government contractors and a few product companies like ScienceLogic that conduct business with military, intelligence and the public sector.</p>
<p>No surprise, given the financial crisis the economy is suffering from that the panelists said we also have a <a href="http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/11/defictits-actua.html" target="_blank">crisis coming on the Federal budget front</a>. This will put enormous pressure on the way Administration thinks, and how and where to spend the $$.</p>
<p>Obama’s tone regarding the issues he will be confronting in the world during the election was encouraging. Make the world more non-partisan and take on the threats that we have in front of us head-on!</p>
<p>The panel was very upfront about current threats. William Crowell said,</p>
<blockquote><p>“It is highly imprudent to believe that there will not be another 9-11. We have to fund and support the work to stop other attacks. We can only mitigate risk but we can’t eliminate risk. We have to try to absorb the sense of urgency and wake up every day looking at the intelligence screens as if 9-11 happened within the last couple of months.”</p></blockquote>
<p>He added,</p>
<blockquote><p>“They (the intelligence community) need the innovation, sense of commitment and urgency that comes from the private sector – a sense of mutual commitment to that mission.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Predicted Priorities for investment for DHS:</p>
<ol>
<li>Cyber attack as the top issue</li>
<li>Nuclear threats including dirty bomb</li>
<li>Chemical and biological attacks</li>
<li>Explosive attacks against critical infrastructure with maximum # of lives and or financial disruption / loss.</li>
<li>Large scale natural disasters – hurricane + earthquakes</li>
<li>Border penetration - identity management and border management issues</li>
</ol>
<p>An <a href="http://www.barackobama.com/index.php" target="_blank">Obama administration</a> will spend dollars around these threat vectors. They will want to spend $$ to help state and local governments. Grants to state and local governments should significantly increase with the Obama administration, so think about how you will increase your focus on the state and local government spending initiatives.</p>
<p><a href="http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/11/pressure-on-oba.html" target="_blank">Secure border investments</a> – the panelists believe that the new administration will feel compelled to invest here. Michael P. Jackson bluntly said, “You have to make investments in border tools to get meaningful immigration reform.”</p>
<p>Panelists agreed that the 1<sup>st</sup> year will be an intense period of scrutiny about fundamental directions. We can’t afford it all at DHS; it is dramatically under budgeted. At TSA/DOT and then at DHS, we spent about $4 Billion on technology investments since 9-11; those investments are now reaching the end of the original service life.</p>
<p>One gripe from the panel that I found humorous: “We don’t have a group of people who think like entrepreneurs.” It is insane how long things last when you buy things in the government. As an example, we are still replacing vacuum tubes in some of the very old FAA gear… this is well beyond what any reasonable person would think these initial investments should/would last.</p>
<p>Final Thoughts:<br />
I actually think that the Obama Administration will be quite favorable to COTS software products, SaaS offerings, and creative financing initiatives from the private sector. The government just won’t have the capital budget to do everything it wants to accomplish. I would say if you look at how intelligently and aggressively <a href="http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/11/obama_and_techn.html" target="_blank">Obama used technology</a> to assist his campaign, the odds are good that this new breed of IT talent (which is already really comfortable with SaaS products, blogs, wiki’s, hosted/outsourced Cloud solutions… this team really understands the latest technology trends) will quickly work to bring these new IT paradigms to the Federal marketplace. Clearly the private sector can help the Government achieve more with lower capital budgets – beginning to provide services rather than transaction-based selling. Another clear idea is to think about leasing as a better way to work with the government which going forward will have increased budgets restrictions.</p>
<p>They will likely be in confrontation with members of Congress that won’t change fast enough, however the future of our nation’s ability to fight terror lies in becoming more efficient and effective. It requires the government be flexible enough to figure out what <a href="http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/hiner/?p=880" target="_blank">jobs and IT functions to outsource</a> in a nimble and smart way. My prediction: this is great news for Service Providers. Overall the next 4 years should be great for our business as well as the Managed Service Provider/SaaS industry!</p>
<p><em><span style="color: #333333;"> </span></em></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2008 11:13:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/secure border investments">secure border investments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/investments">investments</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government contractors">government contractors</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government">government</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/threats">threats</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/government achieve">government achieve</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/initial investments shouldwould">initial investments shouldwould</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/obama administration">obama administration</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/current threats">current threats</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/national-security-perspectives-a-post-election-insider-view/11/2008">National Security Perspectives A Post-Election Insider View</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Hosting Meets the Cloud Debate Part II]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3a3393b304f09ea17d212e2f5b730d65</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3a3393b304f09ea17d212e2f5b730d65</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I have to say that Part II of this session was much anticipated after the lively interaction yesterday. It turned out to be less of a debate and more like a fireside chat. (image from pro.corbis.com...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="220" alt="clip_image002" src="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/clip-image0024.jpg" width="323" align="left" border="0" />I have to say that Part II of this session was much anticipated after the lively interaction yesterday. It turned out to be less of a debate and more like a fireside chat. <a href="http://pro.corbis.com/images/CB042667.jpg?size=572&amp;uid=%7bDA13F798-FDA1-4B54-BFA9-4B15492E024F%7d" target="_blank">(image from pro.corbis.com)</a></p>
<p>The analysts paired up today:   <br />Antonio Piraino (<a href="http://www.t1r.com/" target="_blank">Tier1 Research</a>)    <br /><a href="http://the451group.com/about/bio_detail.php?eid=113" target="_blank">William Fellows</a> (<a href="http://the451group.com/" target="_blank">The 451 Group</a>)</p>
<p><em>My usual disclaimers on live-blogging: doesn&#8217;t include everything covered (just what was most interesting to me) and had to paraphrase some answers because I simply cannot type that fast. </em></p>
<p><strong>Quick definition of Cloud Computing     <br /></strong><strong>WF:</strong> The cloud is a continuum of grid, virtualization and utility done right. It is about provisioning services instead of servers; flexible computing instead of fixed assets. Done right, the cloud abstracts users from the complexity of grid. <a href="http://www.the451group.com/images/content/ice/ice_iceberg.jpg">Cloud computing is IT as a service</a>. Cloud computing is the Third Way &#8211; not entirely in-house or outsourced, but an optimized hybridized version of both. In light of the Goldman Sachs report out resetting IT spending forecast from up 6% to down 1%, don&#8217;t underestimate the ability for enterprises to move from capex to opex by buying cloud computing instead of building it themselves.</p>
<p>The 451 Group conducted a survey on cloud computing in March, and then revisited it a month ago. Some interesting results:</p>
<ul>
<li>84% have no plans to develop an internal cloud. 5% had no answer to this question. And for the 10% who did answer &#8211; the uses for a private/internal cloud were the same as those for a public cloud. </li>
<li>Top 6 vendors they look to help them develop an internal cloud: <a href="http://www.alleyinsider.com/2008/11/microsoft-s-smart-cloud-catch-up-plan-three-years-of-free-software-msft-" target="_blank">Microsoft</a>, <a href="http://topnews.in/ibm-expand-its-cloud-computing-efforts-285364" target="_blank">IBM</a>, Cisco, HP, Oracle, VMware </li>
</ul>
<p><strong><em>Is it all &#8220;upside&#8221; when it comes to cloud computing?       <br /></em></strong><strong>     <br />WF:</strong> Watch out for the Trojan horse, the red flag. What about the software needed to manage all this stuff? Any management software needs to take a holistic approach to solve the problem.</p>
<p><strong>AP:</strong> Increased management requirements and capability &#8211; this is actually a great story for managed hosters who can hold your hand while getting you up into the cloud. Hosters alleviate the pain points, and this is why we&#8217;re going to see continued growth and focus in the managed hosting sector.</p>
<p><strong>WF:</strong> I would argue that they&#8217;re too expensive. <a href="http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/10/25/amazons-ec2-cloud-moves-into-production/" target="_blank">Look at Amazon</a> &#8211; 10 cents a hit adds up.</p>
<p><strong>AP:</strong> It&#8217;s almost impossible to do an apples-to-apples comparison between cloud providers. One reason is that they charge differently. I&#8217;d say that when you&#8217;re talking about the big cloud providers, you are right &#8211; that they are expensive over the long-term, but for use in the short-term, they can be optimal.</p>
<p><strong>WF:</strong> The cloud is setting big expectations. Can IT deliver? It&#8217;s nice to talk about &#8220;shared resources for the greater good&#8221; but in any organization, you will still run into issues of power and control! Plus it&#8217;s still early days for resolution of regulatory issues and compliance around the cloud.</p>
<p><strong>Final Thoughts</strong></p>
<p><strong>AP:</strong> Think of the opportunities of using cloud computing resources in the areas of testing and pre-production &#8211; short-term use/environment (quick up/quick down), inexpensive, opex not capex. We&#8217;re already seeing the cloud fostering much innovation.</p>
<p><strong>WF:</strong> &#8220;It&#8217;s okay to fall in love with the term.&#8221; It is real but keep the expectations lower and realistic.</p>
<p><strong>AP:</strong> I agree with you. The reality is that the cloud is driving a very fundamental underlying platform change. This is not just a term or something that will fall out of fashion. There&#8217;s a real need to build trust in the cloud and leveraging shared resources in this way &#8211; so use the cloud computing term cautiously; don&#8217;t abuse it and make the cloud seem like IT&#8217;s new toy.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2008 18:35:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/public cloud">public cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud providers">cloud providers</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud abstracts users">cloud abstracts users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/privateinternal cloud">privateinternal cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/internal cloud">internal cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/term">term</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pre-production short-term useenvironment">pre-production short-term useenvironment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/short-term">short-term</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/hosting-meets-the-cloud-debate-part-ii/11/2008">Hosting Meets the Cloud Debate Part II</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Pseudo Email Marketing Tools Empowering Spammers]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7568db3beb1fe59141f6ec74902d2ae7</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7568db3beb1fe59141f6ec74902d2ae7</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Largely ignoring its real life applicability, a vendor of &quot;email marketing&quot; tools continues the development of a DIY spamming tools, whose features greatly evolved throughout the last couple of years....]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj-qLXa7XI/AAAAAAAACZs/eVrvlQbC73Y/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_6.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj-qLXa7XI/AAAAAAAACZs/ByNNe5khEhY/s200-R/marketing_spamming_6.gif" /></a>Largely ignoring its real life applicability, a vendor of "email marketing" tools continues the development of a DIY spamming tools, whose features greatly evolved throughout the last couple of years. Originally released in 2004, the vendor appears to have been actively improving the real-time metrics of the campaigns, next to building interactivity into the spamming process through the WYSIWYG editor.<br />
<br />
For better or worse, despite that these applications are empowering spammers and lowering down the entry barriers into spamming, the tools have gotten <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/07/dissecting-managed-spamming-service.html">largely replaced</a> by the <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/inside-managed-spam-service.html">increasing number</a> of <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/managed-spamming-appliances-future-of.html">managed spamming services</a>, whose quality assurance features of bypassing spam filters act as a main differentiation factor. Here are some of this tool's features :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3AWUp3WI/AAAAAAAACZE/IJaKNStG3tY/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_1.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="151" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3AWUp3WI/AAAAAAAACZE/A906A5o9i1I/s200-R/marketing_spamming_1.gif" width="200" /></a><i>"- High speed distribution - 200,000 letters per hour.</i><br />
<i>- Contains an embedded SMTP server that allows you to send letters directly to the recipient's mailbox without using your provider's SMTP server.</i><br />
<i>-&nbsp; If you are accessing the Internet via modem, and distribution using the SMTP server, you do not fit - also allowed to send mail through any number of remote SMTP servers (relay), or via SMTP server provider.</i><br />
<i>- Support for SMTP authentication.</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj_l02fWvI/AAAAAAAACZ8/V9kNzRzibCQ/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_2.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj_l02fWvI/AAAAAAAACZ8/_uP9YfEEhEk/s200-R/marketing_spamming_2.gif" /></a><i>- Supports up to 500 concurrent streams to send to each mailing.</i><br />
<i>- Automatic caching DNS requests to speed up distribution and reducing the load on the DNS server.</i><br />
<i>- Ability to run multiple independent shots at the same time.</i><br />
<i>- Ability to suspend delivery and continue later with a point.</i><br />
<i>- All modes distribution - TO, CC, BCC and PersonalCopy. In the latter case, the program generates a personal letter to each recipient.</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj_VDIUypI/AAAAAAAACZ0/-Zr9CYINTlY/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_3.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj_VDIUypI/AAAAAAAACZ0/aJp3Ub3Uwfo/s200-R/marketing_spamming_3.gif" /></a><i>- Ability to specify the size of BCC package regimes TO, CC, and BCC.</i><br />
<i>- Ability to specify the TO: field for mailing regimes and CS BCC.</i><br />
<i>- Full emulation signature letters Outlook Express to increase cross-your-mails through spam filters.</i><br />
<i>- Support for distribution via a proxy server.</i><br />
<i>- Automatically detect the bad (non-existent) and not by E-Mail addresses directly in the process of distribution based on a flexible, user SMTP rules. Thanks SMTP rules achieved a very precise definition of bad addresses virtually no false positives.</i><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3jFAM6tI/AAAAAAAACZc/Rf_WZkjuJ84/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_7.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3jFAM6tI/AAAAAAAACZc/kujVnisjcjY/s200-R/marketing_spamming_7.gif" /></a><i>- Ability to create lists of addresses, depending on the specific responses of remote servers for SMTP commands.</i><br />
<i>- Organize automatically subscribe / unsubscribe to the mailing addresses.</i><br />
<i>- Perform any processing of existing lists.</i><br />
<i>- Develop a letter to the powerful WYSIWYG Html editor.</i><br />
<br />
<i>- Automatically apply to each recipient by name, as well as paste in a letter to a specific, personalized information through powerful Mail Merge templates.</i><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3vx0a3PI/AAAAAAAACZk/dlmHlT-5hyw/s1600-h/marketing_spamming_8.gif" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SQj3vx0a3PI/AAAAAAAACZk/fRcQsC-6XlY/s200-R/marketing_spamming_8.gif" /></a><i>- Set the calendar to automatically launch shots at the right time.</i><br />
<i>- Quickly send out mail.</i>"<br />
<br />
With managed spam services' on-demand, risk forwarding and completely outsourced processes, they're not only going to replace such DIY tools, but also, <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/managed-fast-flux-provider.html">position them as a dynamically</a> evolving <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/10/managed-fast-flux-provider-part-two.html">cybercrime platforms</a>.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=CqO0M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=CqO0M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=HbgzM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=HbgzM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=KVshm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=KVshm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wJpMm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wJpMm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=ON79M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=ON79M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=nKPXM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=nKPXM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=hPU3m"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=hPU3m" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/436383197" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 16:28:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/bad addresses">bad addresses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/addresses">addresses</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/tools">tools</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smtp server">smtp server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/smtp server provider">smtp server provider</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/e-mail addresses directly">e-mail addresses directly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/distribution">distribution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/modes distribution">modes distribution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/speed distribution">speed distribution</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/436383197/pseudo-email-marketing-tools-empowering.html">Pseudo Email Marketing Tools Empowering Spammers</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[The Skein Hash Function]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c65ce3834e7790e113fa9e1fd1504568</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c65ce3834e7790e113fa9e1fd1504568</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[NIST is holding a competition to replace the SHA family of hash functions, which have been increasingly under attack . (I wrote about an early NIST hash workshop here
Skein is our submission (myself...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>NIST is <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/index.html">holding a competition</a> to replace the SHA family of hash functions, which have been <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html">increasingly under attack</a>.  (I wrote about an early NIST hash workshop <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/10/nist_hash_works_1.html">here</a>.)</p>

<p>Skein is our submission (myself and seven others: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niels_Ferguson">Niels Ferguson</a>, <a href="http://th.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/People/Lucks/">Stefan Lucks</a>, <a href="http://www.hifn.com/executiveTeam.aspx?id=182">Doug Whiting</a>, <a href="http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~mihir/">Mihir Bellare</a>, <a href="http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/yoshi/">Tadayoshi Kohno</a>, <a href="http://www.pgp.com/about_pgp_corporation/management.html">Jon Callas</a>, and Jesse Walker).  <a href="http://www.schneier.com/skein.pdf">Here's</a> the paper:</p>

<blockquote><strong>Executive Summary</strong>

<p>Skein is a new family of cryptographic hash functions.  Its design combines speed, security, simplicity, and a great deal of flexibility in a modular package that is easy to analyze.</p>

<p>Skein is fast.  Skein-512 -- our primary proposal -- hashes data at 6.1 clock cycles per byte on a 64-bit CPU.  This means that on a 3.1 GHz x64 Core 2 Duo CPU, Skein hashes data at 500 MBytes/second per core -- almost twice as fast as SHA-512 and three times faster than SHA-256.  An optional hash-tree mode speeds up parallelizable implementations even more.  Skein is fast for short messages, too; Skein-512 hashes short messages in about 1000 clock cycles.</p>

<p>Skein is secure.  Its conservative design is based on the Threefish block cipher.  Our current best attack on Threefish-512 is on 25 of 72 rounds, for a safety factor of 2.9. For comparison, at a similar stage in the standardization process, the AES encryption algorithm had an attack on 6 of 10 rounds, for a safety factor of only 1.7.  Additionally, Skein has a number of provably secure properties, greatly increasing confidence in the algorithm.</p>

<p>Skein is simple.  Using only three primitive operations, the Skein compression function can be easily understood and remembered.  The rest of the algorithm is a straightforward iteration of this function.</p>

<p>Skein is flexible.  Skein is defined for three different internal state sizes -- 256 bits, 512 bits, and 1024 bits -- and any output size.  This allows Skein to be a drop-in replacement for the entire SHA family of hash functions.  A completely optional and extendable argument system makes Skein an efficient tool to use for a very large number of functions: a PRNG, a stream cipher, a key derivation function, authentication without the overhead of HMAC, and a personalization capability.  All these features can be implemented with very low overhead.  Together with the Threefish large-block cipher at Skein core, this design provides a full set of symmetric cryptographic primitives suitable for most modern applications.</p>

<p>Skein is efficient on a variety of platforms, both hardware and software.  Skein-512 can be implemented in about 200 bytes of state.  Small devices, such as 8-bit smart cards, can implement Skein-256 using about 100 bytes of memory.  Larger devices can implement the larger versions of Skein to achieve faster speeds.</p>

<p>Skein was designed by a team of highly experienced cryptographic experts from academia and industry, with expertise in cryptography, security analysis, software, chip design, and implementation of real-world cryptographic systems.  This breadth of knowledge allowed them to create a balanced design that works well in all environments.</blockquote></p>

<p><a href="http://www.schneier.com/code/skein_NIST_CD_101308.zip">Here's</a> source code, text vectors, and the like for Skein.  Watch the <a href="http://www.schneier.com/skein.html">Skein website</a> for any updates -- new code, new results, new implementations, the proofs.</p>

<p>NIST's deadline is Friday.  It seems as if everyone -- including many amateurs -- is working on a hash function, and I predict that NIST will receive at least 80 submissions.  (Compare this to the 21 submissions NIST received -- five were rejected as not being complete --  for the AES competition in 1998.)  I expect people to start posting their submissions over the weekend.  (Ron Rivest already <a href="http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-TheMD6HashFunction.ppt">presented</a> MD6 at Crypto in August.)  Probably the best place to watch for new hash functions is <a href="http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/hflounge.html">here</a>; I'll try to keep a listing of the submissions myself.</p>

<p>The selection process will take around four years.  I've previously called this sort of thing a cryptographic demolition derby -- last one left standing wins -- but that's only half true.  Certainly all the groups will spend the next couple of years trying to cryptanalyze each other, but in the end there will be a bunch of unbroken algorithms; NIST will select one based on performance and features.</p>

<p>NIST has stated that the goal of this process is not to choose the best standard but to choose a good standard.  I think that's smart of them; in this process, "best" is the enemy of "good."  My advice is this: immediately sort them based on performance and features.  Ask the cryptographic community to focus its attention on the top dozen, rather than spread its attention across all 80 -- although I also expect that most of the amateur submissions will be rejected by NIST for not being "complete and proper."  Otherwise, people will break the easy ones and the better ones will go unanalyzed.</p><div class="feedflare">
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</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 01:35:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skein">skein</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hash function">hash function</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/function">function</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement skein-256">implement skein-256</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/implement">implement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skein hashes data">skein hashes data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/skein website">skein website</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hashes data">hashes data</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/key derivation function">key derivation function</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/the_skein_hash.html">The Skein Hash Function</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Massive SQL Injection Attacks - the Chinese Way]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/42e493c2424af4f8ef6cc5dd581317bf</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/42e493c2424af4f8ef6cc5dd581317bf</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[From copycats and &quot;localizers&quot; of Russian web malware exploitation kits , to suppliers of original hacking tools, the Chinese IT underground has been closely following the emerging threats and the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP46U3HSQHI/AAAAAAAACUY/QH40puDsgXY/s1600-h/security_company_hacking_tools.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP46U3HSQHI/AAAAAAAACUY/QO3L0OWKJcY/s200-R/security_company_hacking_tools.JPG" /></a>From <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/05/firepack-exploitation-kit-localized-to.html">copycats</a> and <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/10/mpack-and-icepack-localized-to-chinese.html">"localizers" of Russian web malware exploitation kits</a>, to suppliers of original hacking tools, the Chinese IT underground has been closely following the emerging threats and the obvious insecurities on a large scale, and so is either filling the niches left open by other international communities, or coming up with tools setting new benchmarks for massive SQL injection attacks, like the case with this one :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DX0GzAtI/AAAAAAAACUg/3GOnK2TsSRk/s1600-h/search_engines_mass_SQL_injection.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DX0GzAtI/AAAAAAAACUg/pdCwjwri7LM/s200-R/search_engines_mass_SQL_injection.JPG" /></a>"<i>A professional web site vulnerability scanning, use of tools, SQL injection is a new generation of tools to help Web developers and site of the station quickly find vulnerabilities in order to be able to effectively prepare Security work. At the same time, the tool to Web developers to demonstrate the ways in which hackers are using these vulnerabilities, hackers, as well as through the loopholes to do things, can effectively raise the safety awareness of relevant personnel.</i>"<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DkEEtbqI/AAAAAAAACUo/Mm7pCwd7LT4/s1600-h/search_engines_mass_SQL_injection2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DkEEtbqI/AAAAAAAACUo/qMaY93_QOvY/s200-R/search_engines_mass_SQL_injection2.JPG" /></a>Nothing's wrong with the marketing pitch at the first place, but going through the features, the "massive SQL injections through search engine reconnaissance" and automatic page rank verification which you can see in the attached screenshots, ruin the "security auditing" marketing pitch. The tool not only allows easy integration of potentially vulnerable sites obtained through <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/07/sql-injection-through-search-engines.html">search engines reconnaissance</a>, but also, is prioritizing the results based on the probability for successful injection, next to the page rank of the domains in question. A simple demonstration offered by the company is also, directly enticing its users to "localize" the search engine reconnaissance, by filtering the search results for a particupar country, in this case they used French sites for one of the demos. Here are some excerpts from its CHANGE log speaking for themselves :<br />
<br />
"<i><b>2008.7.15 release version 1.3 </b><br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DyBXVu7I/AAAAAAAACUw/37LsW8yh_AE/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5DyBXVu7I/AAAAAAAACUw/ub8OVgeWC6Y/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector.png" /></a><i>- New powerful "automatic machine cycle" feature&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>- Automatic machine cycle is to provide assistance to the advanced user manual into the use of a very&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>- powerful and flexible module, the main sites used for some special filtering into the hand, is almost a&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>- universal tool, you can achieve the following: <br />
&nbsp;</i><br />
<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5D-g3FyAI/AAAAAAAACU4/xYACViJuVn4/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector2.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5D-g3FyAI/AAAAAAAACU4/oPVCur3PMgI/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector2.png" /></a><i>1. In support of GET / POST / COOKIES in a variety of ways, such as the injection.&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>2. Scan the key to the page (background, upload, WebShell, databases, backup files, etc.).&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>3. According to the dictionary to violence landing back-guess solution WebShell password and password (required to verify that the code can not guess solution).&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>4. Page language does not limit the types and databases (to provide specific statements into the database).&nbsp;</i><br />
<i>5. At the same time, support for the circulation of the two variables and two dictionaries, fast running and violent content of the database solution to guess a password.</i>"<br />
<br />
It gets even more interesting in terms of the massive SQL injection attacks mentality which is pretty evident on all fronts :<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5ELiLoBiI/AAAAAAAACVA/0fb6Epapby0/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector3.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5ELiLoBiI/AAAAAAAACVA/nmrC87TeCxo/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector3.png" /></a>"<i>- The use of the three search engine sites scans to invade the side to complete<br />
- in scanning probe into the Web site ranking points<br />
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site. <br />
- New "sequence document scanners" <br />
- What is the sequence document scanners role? Upload to find loopholes, some of the procedures to upload the file after the upload will be renamed, rename the way the system is usually based on time or incremental increase in the number prefix code for the upload process, if not to return after the file name, Upload files to know the url is usually very difficult to sequence the use of paper scanner can be scanned out</i><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FUvl0FhI/AAAAAAAACVY/Y5mM2l7Q6K4/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector4.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FUvl0FhI/AAAAAAAACVY/DU7feV1pnjU/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector4.png" /></a><i><br />
- The best reverse domain name query engine, and quasi-wide <br />
- in scanning the database of basic information, an increase of the database of information related to the process, the link has information on the database server user login (sa need permission) <br />
- control of the interface had a big adjustment, the interface process easier to understand and operate. <br />
- based on a significant site of the wrong mode of access to a comprehensive code optimization and more accurate access to the content, accuracy and access to show progress. <br />
- added, "VBS upload to download", "upload directory Web site viewer," "FTP upload to download configuration file" function to make it more convenient for the sa rights to use the site.&nbsp;</i><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FgfdkSbI/AAAAAAAACVg/R77obP_vxig/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector5.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FgfdkSbI/AAAAAAAACVg/ORo853Aicy4/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector5.png" /></a><i><br />
- point into the types of improved detection order to improve the efficiency of detection. <br />
- improved automatic keyword detection, automatic keyword detection more accurate. <br />
- probe into the points the way to improve and increase the use of automatic detection of the keyword detection. <br />
- type of database to improve the detection, the use of the contents of the length of the failure to detect the type of database automatically switch to the probe through the keyword. <br />
- automatically save and load solution has been to guess the tree structure of the database, guess Solutions has been the content and structure of the database will automatically save and open the next time the injection point will be automatically made available, the solutions do not have to guess again, the continuity of work Greatly increased.&nbsp;</i><br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"></div><a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FrcWctII/AAAAAAAACVo/DcQNU5crc5k/s1600-h/chinese_SQL_injector6.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="131" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SP5FrcWctII/AAAAAAAACVo/9zGp4bsPB2U/s200-R/chinese_SQL_injector6.png" width="200" /></a><i><br />
- solved from the database to read large amounts of data (on hundreds of thousands or millions of records), the half-way card program will die. <br />
- increased significantly on the wrong model of ASP.NET and SQL Server2005 significant mode of dealing with mistakes, error messages can be extracted from a Web directory! <br />
- significant amendments to the wrong mode, some of the injected one by one point in the field or access to the contents of the issue can not be successful (error code in hand); for increased access to specific points table and into the field.&nbsp;</i><br />
<i><br />
- amendments to the text of a significant error patterns to detect and correct use of loopholes in the system can be used more to expand. (Text significantly in the wrong mode in version 1.1 already supported, but in the version 1.2 upgrade in the process of scanning to improve the performance of the Gaodiao careless. -_-#) <br />
- on a variety of encoded text can be significantly wrong in the right-compatible, able to correctly handle the ASP.NET page of the text marked wrong. Through custom error keyword, truly compatible with any language, any coding error message. <br />
- crack anti-improvement and enhancement. <br />
- An increase of auto-detection feature keywords.&nbsp;</i><br />
<i><br />
- Mssql database specifically for significant points into the wrong mode of detection and the use of up and down the hard work, and many other software can not detect the point of injection can also be used. <br />
- Automatic save and load access to the database, to allow manual known to add tables and fields for solutions to guess. <br />
- Can be used to amend the degree of accuracy; optimize the code to reduce memory footprint; enhance the stability of multi-threading. <br />
- Significant amendments to the wrong mode solution guess the contents of the database must be checked first field defects.</i>"<br />
<br />
The public version of the tool has been in the while for over an year, with a VIP version available to customers only.<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=PsITM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=PsITM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=JBO9M"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=JBO9M" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=owYAm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=owYAm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LTzNm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LTzNm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=LaPQM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=LaPQM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=go5fM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=go5fM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=rYJ9m"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=rYJ9m" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/427878843" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2008 12:18:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/keyword detection">keyword detection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/detection">detection</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database">database</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/database solution">database solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/solution">solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/process">process</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/upload process">upload process</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/text">text</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/load solution">load solution</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/427878843/massive-sql-injection-attacks-chinese.html">Massive SQL Injection Attacks - the Chinese Way</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Designing a Malicious Processor]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/b9e9bea2fb5860d2b7a3f8f7fae049a6</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/b9e9bea2fb5860d2b7a3f8f7fae049a6</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[From the LEET '08 conference: &quot; Designing and implementing malicious hardware ,&quot; by Samuel T. King, Joseph Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, and Yuanyuan Zhou. Abstract
Hidden...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the LEET '08 conference:  "<a href="http://www.usenix.org/event/leet08/tech/full_papers/king/king.pdf">Designing and implementing malicious hardware</a>," by Samuel T. King, Joseph Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, and Yuanyuan Zhou.</p>

<blockquote><b>Abstract:</b>

<p>Hidden malicious circuits provide an attacker with a stealthy attack vector. As they occupy a layer below the entire software stack, malicious circuits can bypass traditional defensive techniques. Yet current work on trojan circuits considers only simple attacks against the hardware itself, and straightforward defenses. More complex designs that attack the software are unexplored, as are the countermeasures an attacker may take to bypass proposed defenses.</p>

<p>We present the design and implementation of Illinois Malicious Processors (IMPs). There is a substantial design space in malicious circuitry; we show that an attacker,<br />
rather than designing one specific attack, can instead design hardware to support attacks. Such flexible hardware allows powerful, general purpose attacks, while remaining surprisingly low in the amount of additional hardware. We show two such hardware designs, and implement them in a real system. Further, we show three powerful attacks using this hardware, including login backdoor that gives an attacker complete and highlevel access to the machine. This login attack requires only 1341 additional gates: gates that can be used for other attacks as well. Malicious  processors are more practical, more flexible, and harder to detect than an initial analysis would suggest.</blockquote></p><div class="feedflare">
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</div>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Oct 2008 08:39:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/design hardware">design hardware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/design">design</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional">additional</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/additional hardware">additional hardware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hardware">hardware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flexible hardware">flexible hardware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/specific attack">specific attack</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attack">attack</category>
      <source url="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/10/designing_a_mal.html">Designing a Malicious Processor</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[A horse's ass approach to virtualization security]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/6d6310950dd47b0806138e4729f21f01</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/6d6310950dd47b0806138e4729f21f01</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The interest and excitement around virtualization is palpable. However, it seems like the security approaches in this area are similar to the constrains that a horse's ass put on the space shuttle...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The interest and excitement around virtualization is palpable. However, it seems like the security approaches in this area are similar to the constrains that a <a href="http://www.astrodigital.org/space/stshorse.html">horse's ass put on the space shuttle design</a>.<br /><br />Virtualization security solutions today primarily focus on protecting the virtual OS, the virtual networks, or the hypervisor software itself. More specifically, most current virtualization security technologies are focused on preventing hypervisor root kits, providing intrusion detection, anti-malware, anti-virus, network security, etc. In the physical world, this is similar to individually protecting hardware, operating systems, and the networks that connect them. That is, the focus is mainly on protecting infrastructure and perimeter, not data. Protecting that data, however, should be the single most important aspect of virtualization security.<br /><br />Here is why: Any execution environment requires four elements: devices/hardware/OS, networks, applications, and data. With the advent of virtualization, physical devices/OS are being replaced by flexible, on-demand virtual “devices,” networks are being virtualized and applications are being streamed down from virtual environments. Therefore, the only remaining “constant” element is the data itself - which also has a longer lifetime than the ephemeral virtual environment. While protecting the virtual infrastructure is important, I believe the primary focus for protection should be the data – the true IT asset.<br /><br />Virtualization is a game-changer for computing and has forced the IT world to rethink its infrastructure; now virtualization security has to be rethought as well. An information-centric approach to persistently protecting the data itself is the only way to really benefit from virtualization and keep the data truly secure.<br /><br />Or thinking about it another way - why was Google's approach to navigate the web using search better than the initial Yahoo approach of hierarchical mapping? Coz Yahoo was mapping an old yellow-book approach to managing data, while Google took advantage of the new medium.<br /><br />I shall try and elaborate on my thoughts in upcoming posts...<div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=I3ERM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=I3ERM" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=Y0Zmm"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=Y0Zmm" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?a=uQozM"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/BitArmor1?i=uQozM" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~4/420080548" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2008 21:52:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security">virtualization security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization security solutions">virtualization security solutions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual">virtual</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual infrastructure">virtual infrastructure</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/approach">approach</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/on-demand virtual devices">on-demand virtual devices</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/ephemeral virtual environment">ephemeral virtual environment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data">data</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BitArmor1/~3/420080548/horses-ass-approach-to-virtualization.html">A horse's ass approach to virtualization security</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Can you keep users from importing their own applications?]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/7086a257099ae412ea77872cdc0f0144</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/7086a257099ae412ea77872cdc0f0144</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Shadow IT is all the IT that was neither planned nor approved by anyone but gets chosen, deployed and used by end users. Some see this as grass-roots deployment of cool technologies; some see it as...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Shadow IT is all the IT that was neither planned nor approved by anyone but gets chosen, deployed and used by end users. Some see this as grass-roots deployment of cool technologies; some see it as weeds growing from any crack in the IT plan. If you don't build it, they will go find it elsewhere. And even if you build it, if it isn't adequate, comprehensive, flexible and easy to use, they will go find it elsewhere.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/users">users</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/grass-roots deployment">grass-roots deployment</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cool technologies">cool technologies</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/flexible">flexible</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/shadow">shadow</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/weeds">weeds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/easy">easy</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/comprehensive">comprehensive</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/plan">plan</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2008/092908-andreas.html?fsrc=rss-security">Can you keep users from importing their own applications?</source>
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    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[So Logically, If She Weighs The Same As A DuckShes A Witch!]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3fa3a2c5641e284f4fc5fc76430d2faa</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3fa3a2c5641e284f4fc5fc76430d2faa</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I usually try to stay far away from politics and current events, but my friend Rich has put up a blog post blaming the credit crisis on quantitative analysis, and then positing that because the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I usually try to stay far away from politics and current events, but my friend <strong><a href="http://securosis.com/2008/09/17/the-fallacy-of-complete-and-accurate-risk-quantification/">Rich has put up a blog post</a></strong> blaming the credit crisis on quantitative analysis, and then positing that because the economy sucks, Information Security should be only qualitative.</p>
<p>Now I&#8217;ve been &#8220;accused&#8221; of being a quant in the past (hi rybolov!) but in reality the only dogs I have in this fight are the model and the application of scientific method - and really, ethically speaking, I have to be tied to the latter while applying the former.</p>
<p>And I see a false dichotomy in this whole Quant vs. Qual thing.  We, as a profession, tend to create a political divide between the two which, if it even exists, I&#8217;d say is based more on our ignorance rather than our expertise.  After all, we are the profession that regularly multiplies across ordinal scales and uses wonderful models like R=VxTxI.   As someone  learning to deal in probabilities and rationalism, I have to recognize that this discussion is really just about the act of observation using different metrics of measurement.</p>
<p>But how we&#8217;re going about observing does not change the fact that there is measurement based on observation.  So if I&#8217;m working with you I can easily turn your qualitative scale into a quantitative one, and vice-versa.  Yes, Shrdlu, if we had the time, even your most seemingly Qual things could be Quant! (This flexible world view, btw, is an outcome of that new-fangled Bayesian thing).</p>
<p><strong>COGNITIVE BIAS A-PLENTY</strong></p>
<p>But back to what Rich is saying there about information security and risk - and he isn&#8217;t/won&#8217;t be the only one saying these sorts of things - we should try to understand what&#8217;s really going on rather than get caught up in the emotional hurricane.  Our profession suffers several forms of cognitive bias.  The nature of our jobs and what we do can cause us to be focused on the outcome and not the quality of the decision at the time it was made.  We want to bring in things from other professions that are useful, but at times we do view things outside our profession with false correlation to our own (unfortunately for those who write these sorts of articles, financial risk is <em><strong>completely different</strong></em> than operational risk).  We also have the tendency to focus on negative outcomes without acknowledging the positive outcomes (For example, I hear that Alan Greenspan&#8217;s new firm is up a couple of $billion in all this mess since he joined them, short sellers are doing quite well - must be because they have qualitative models or something <em>-grin-</em>).  The effect of these biases are compounded by the facts that proper correlation takes more work than we usually give it, and rational thought is not that easy when there&#8217;s a witch-hunt mentality.</p>
<div class="wp-caption alignnone" style="width: 257px"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrzMhU_4m-g"><img src="http://www.riskmanagementinsight.com/media/images/weblog/peasants.png" alt="Burn her anyway!" width="247" height="219" /></a><p class="wp-caption-text">What also floats in water? (link to Youtube)</p></div>
<p><strong>WHAT SHOULD WE BE THINKING ABOUT?</strong></p>
<p>So as you and I read opinions that seem to be the polar opposite of irrational exuberance (and there will be plenty between now and the election) we&#8217;ll have to ask ourselves, &#8220;what really failed here?&#8221;  At the risk (pun) of over-simplification:</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There an Error on the part of Probability Theory?</li>
</ul>
<p>After all, Probability Science like all other fields of knowledge is always &#8220;advancing&#8221; as they say.  So perhaps probability theory is wrong somehow?</p>
<p>I&#8217;m personally disinclined to put the blame here, primarily because I would think that there would be evidence from other fields (like Quantum Mechanics) that something is amiss waaaaay before it hit a field like economics.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error In The Model Used to Determine Risk?</li>
</ul>
<p>Some people who understand real estate valuation and complex derivatives and financial risk want to put the blame here.  It&#8217;s a little too early to tell, but one thing is for sure - Financial risk is so different from operational risk I couldn&#8217;t begin to hazard an opinion on the subject.   But it would seem that this is really somewhere we might look.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error In The  Scale Used (Quantitative vs. Qualitative)?</li>
</ul>
<p>Honestly?  I find it extremely difficult to understand how this could be the source of financial ruin.</p>
<ul>
<li>Was There Error on the part of the Decision Maker?</li>
</ul>
<p>What if all of the above were just fine, and the decision maker chose short term gain over long term stability?  What if this was (to simplify the matter greatly) a choice of &#8220;heads&#8221; over &#8220;tails&#8221; and the coin landed on tails?  What if the model represented the right risk (probability of negative outcome vs. positive outcome), but the complex derivative was sold to someone else who had poor &#8220;risk management&#8221; (ability to make a good decisions)?</p>
<p>Now I have no clue about complex derivatives, and I&#8217;m oversimplifying to be sure - chances are like most things, there are several problems that helped create the primary cause. But it seems to me that as we go into incident response mode for the economy, it&#8217;s more helpful to do so in a rational, logical manner.<br />
<strong><br />
OTHER THINGS WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER</strong></p>
<p><span style="color: #008000;"><strong>Consider the Source</strong></span><br />
Some authors (who I think tend to exploit outcome and hindsight bias,and then combine those with indirect ad hominem attacks in order to sell their books), are actually putting forth arguments against the use of analytics.  The source of this is a current epistemic debate between those who believe that only falsification is certain, and those who maintain that neither proof nor falsification are certain, there are only probabilities.    So before you go believing any &#8220;quadrants&#8221; of usefulness on faith - I encourage you to understand what is at the heart of the discussion.<br />
<span style="color: #008000;"><strong><br />
We All Have to Live In The Real World</strong></span><br />
The sun will rise tomorrow, and someone will try to find the source of the problem and do a better job.  Now chances are, they&#8217;ll be doing it in a quantitative manner.  Chances are also that at some point their models will fail and we&#8217;ll need to build new ones.  And this will happen whether the field is cosmology, economics, meteorology, information security, or professional baseball.<br />
<strong><br />
WHAT ABOUT YOU, ALEX?</strong></p>
<p>I&#8217;m far from certain and subject to change, but these days I lean towards <strong><a href="http://www.overcomingbias.com/2008/09/who-to-blame.html">Robin Hanson &amp; MIchael Lewis</a></strong> w/regards to placing blame.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 10:59:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/risk">risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/financial risk">financial risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/poor risk management">poor risk management</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/operational risk">operational risk</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/outcome">outcome</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/exploit outcome">exploit outcome</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/probability">probability</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/qualitative models">qualitative models</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/models">models</category>
      <source url="http://riskmanagementinsight.com/riskanalysis/?p=420">So Logically, If She Weighs The Same As A DuckShes A Witch!</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Interop NY Keynotes: Cisco]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/c55a3293fe594f4363a5830f6da4d48c</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/c55a3293fe594f4363a5830f6da4d48c</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[After some rousing introduction music, Marie Hatter , Vice President, Network Systems and Security Solutions Marketing / CMO of Cisco began her presentation on virtualization
Introduction...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After some rousing introduction music, <a href="http://blogs.cisco.com/authors/bio/83" target="_blank">Marie Hatter</a>, Vice President, Network Systems and Security Solutions Marketing / CMO of Cisco began her presentation on virtualization.</p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>Virtualization is a word used by consumers and also by IT. But, do we all mean the same thing?</p>
<p>A very cool video from Cisco provided answers to &#8220;what is virtualization&#8221; from an  engineering perspective, data center perspective, IT perspective and the user perspective (virtual world).</p>
<p>Virtualization is about breaking the bonds between applications and server hardware, nodes and networks, applications and operating systems.</p>
<p>Why is this interesting? Virtualization holds the promise to transform the way we work, live, learn and play.</p>
<p><strong>Why virtualize?</strong></p>
<p>The real estate boom over the last 30 years has driven people to the suburbs. People didn&#8217;t mind commuting for an hour with lower gas prices. Today, we have a weak economy and gas prices are high. Something has to change.</p>
<p>Many are opting to stay at home. Businesses are trying out telecommuting, some (like Cisco) are even offering telepresence. This helps by reducing carbon footprint. Corporations are breaking free from physical requirements. The global workforce is also having an impact on the network. These changes are having a huge impact on the network.</p>
<p>We are on the cusp of transitioning from virtualization to VIRTUALIZATION.</p>
<p><strong>&#8220;One to many&#8230;.many to one.&#8221;</strong></p>
<p>This is Cisco&#8217;s idea of virtualization.</p>
<p>Consider the different roles we play in life - one to many. Spouse, executive, friend, parent, gym rat. This would be &#8220;one to many&#8221;. This is exactly what virtualization does. It allows you to partition resources off that you can use on the fly.</p>
<p><strong>Where do I start?</strong></p>
<p>Virtualization starts with server and storage. But, it&#8217;s the network that touches everything - it spans the physical, the virtual, and the cloud. This provides the connectivity to all these resources. The network brings transparency to the picture. It allows you to better monitor performance and better implement security - great benefits!</p>
<p><strong>Why do I need this?</strong></p>
<p>At Cisco, we saw that we were only using 20% of our storage utilization. We wanted to virtualize our datacenters. When we did that, we were able to get 68% storage utilization. For each year that we were able to defer buildup, we saved $40 million.</p>
<p>From a business standpoint, virtualization helps you differentiate and work faster. Provisioning in minutes, improved productivity and competitive differentiation, using less power (environmental impact), and up the ante of business continuity. If VMWare fails? It&#8217;s OK. You can reprovision it on the fly.</p>
<p><strong>Is it for everyone?</strong></p>
<p>IT organizations tend to be siloed. You have the IT side and the Operations side. Each has responsibility. For virtualization to work, these walls have to come down. The concept of virtualization depends on shared resources.</p>
<p><strong><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metcalfe%27s_law" target="_blank">Metcalfe&#8217;s Law of the Network</a> Effect</strong></p>
<p>Everytime you add a node to the network, you increase the value. This is what happens with virtualization. Every device you virtualize increases the power of each device. More control of environment and more efficiency.</p>
<p>This leads to&#8230;</p>
<p><strong>Cloud computing.</strong></p>
<p>Wow, show of hands from the audience when Marie asked &#8220;how many are using cloud computing?&#8221; and &#8220;how many are using your own clouds?&#8221; - not a lot of hands were raised. Interesting considering the coverage cloud computing has and the focus of it.</p>
<p>Cloud computing has three possibilities at Cisco:</p>
<ul>
<li>Flexible infrastructure (hosting)</li>
<li>Abstract services (APIs)</li>
<li>Application services (SaaS)</li>
</ul>
<p>Automation is going to be key, and will need to integrate virtualization-aware elements.</p>
<p>Can you imagine if you wanted interoperability in the cloud? People haven&#8217;t even begun thinking about it.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>As you virtualize, your role will change. You will think more about strategy. But keep in mind these &#8220;minefields&#8221; of virtualization:</p>
<ul>
<li>Insufficient planning</li>
<li>Lack of standards</li>
<li>Weak security</li>
</ul>
<p>Security cannot be an afterthought. It has to be planned. We&#8217;ve seen new forms of malware, hypervisor attacks, and root kit infections.</p>
<p>As higher expectations from end users evolve, we&#8217;re becoming not server oriented, but SERVICE oriented.</p>
<p><strong>Tips:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Think holistically</li>
<li>Consider IT culture - equipment and people</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 10:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization">virtualization</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization starts">virtualization starts</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization helps">virtualization helps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/helps">helps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization depends">virtualization depends</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization holds">virtualization holds</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network">network</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/network brings transparency">network brings transparency</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco">cisco</category>
      <source url="http://blog.sciencelogic.com/interop-ny-keynotes-cisco/09/2008">Interop NY Keynotes: Cisco</source>
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