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    <title><![CDATA[[SecurityRatty] tag: forensics]]></title>
    <link>http://securityratty.com/tag/forensics</link>
    <description></description>
    <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2008 06:41:30 +0000</pubDate>
    <generator>iRatty Engine</generator>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Picks, Day 2]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/bb5f61d931e262cc86324e4d585f8e2b</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/bb5f61d931e262cc86324e4d585f8e2b</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Heres the rest of my list
10:00-11:00 FX , Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics
11:15-12:30 Oliver Friedrichs , Threats to the 2008 Presidential Election (and more
13:45-15:00 Option 1: Scott Stender ,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here&#8217;s the rest of my list:</p>
<p><b>10:00-11:00</b> <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Lindner">FX</a>, Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics.</p>
<p><b>11:15-12:30</b> <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Friedrichs">Oliver Friedrichs</a>, Threats to the 2008 Presidential Election (and more).</p>
<p><b>13:45-15:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Stender">Scott Stender</a>, Concurrency Attacks in Web Applications. Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Goodspeed">Travis Goodspeed</a>, Side-channel Timing Attacks on MSP430 Microcontroller Firmware.  </p>
<p><b>15:15-16:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Sotirov">Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd</a>, How To Impress Girls With Browser Memory Protection Bypasses.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Nohl">Karsten Nohl</a>, Mifare - Little Security, Despite Obscurity.  This is one of the toughest time slots as you also have McFeters/Carter/Heasman and Grossman/Evans in the lineup.  Choices, choices.</p>
<p><b>16:45-18:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Dang">Bruce Dang</a>, Methods for Understanding Targeted Attacks with Office Documents.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Tarnovsky">Christopher Tarnovsky</a>, Inducing Momentary Faults Within Secure Smartcards/Microcontrollers.</p>
<p>Lots of intriguing hardware talks on Day 2.  A lot of it is probably over my head and my first options are more applicable to my day job.  There might have to be some room hopping.</p>
<p>I fly out to Vegas tonight &#8212; see you all there!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 13:48:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day">day</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option">option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concurrency attacks">concurrency attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco ios forensics">cisco ios forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msp430 microcontroller firmware">msp430 microcontroller firmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day job">day job</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/alexander sotirov">alexander sotirov</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impress girls">impress girls</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/?p=163">BlackHat Picks, Day 2</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[BlackHat Picks, Day 2]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/640a63fad4b288ad8b2f6f80cdfd9935</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/640a63fad4b288ad8b2f6f80cdfd9935</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Heres the rest of my list
10:00-11:00 FX , Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics
11:15-12:30 Oliver Friedrichs , Threats to the 2008 Presidential Election (and more
13:45-15:00 Option 1: Scott Stender ,...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here&#8217;s the rest of my list:</p>
<p><b>10:00-11:00</b> <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Lindner">FX</a>, Developments in Cisco IOS Forensics.</p>
<p><b>11:15-12:30</b> <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Friedrichs">Oliver Friedrichs</a>, Threats to the 2008 Presidential Election (and more).</p>
<p><b>13:45-15:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Stender">Scott Stender</a>, Concurrency Attacks in Web Applications. Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Goodspeed">Travis Goodspeed</a>, Side-channel Timing Attacks on MSP430 Microcontroller Firmware.  </p>
<p><b>15:15-16:30</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Sotirov">Alexander Sotirov and Mark Dowd</a>, How To Impress Girls With Browser Memory Protection Bypasses.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Nohl">Karsten Nohl</a>, Mifare - Little Security, Despite Obscurity.  This is one of the toughest time slots as you also have McFeters/Carter/Heasman and Grossman/Evans in the lineup.  Choices, choices.</p>
<p><b>16:45-18:00</b> Option 1: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Dang">Bruce Dang</a>, Methods for Understanding Targeted Attacks with Office Documents.  Option 2: <a href="http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/bh-usa-08-speakers.html#Tarnovsky">Christopher Tarnovsky</a>, Inducing Momentary Faults Within Secure Smartcards/Microcontrollers.</p>
<p>Lots of intriguing hardware talks on Day 2.  A lot of it is probably over my head and my first options are more applicable to my day job.  There might have to be some room hopping.</p>
<p>I fly out to Vegas tonight &#8212; see you all there!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2008 13:48:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day">day</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/option">option</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/attacks">attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/concurrency attacks">concurrency attacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cisco ios forensics">cisco ios forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/msp430 microcontroller firmware">msp430 microcontroller firmware</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/day job">day job</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/alexander sotirov">alexander sotirov</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/impress girls">impress girls</category>
      <source url="http://www.veracode.com/blog/2008/08/blackhat-picks-day-2/">BlackHat Picks, Day 2</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/5f5fba7cc0fecccc9eec606ee322456a</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/5f5fba7cc0fecccc9eec606ee322456a</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[It gets very ugly when someone owns both, the botnet, and the portfolio of parked domains actively participating in PPC (pay per click) advertising programs, where the junk content, or the...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2zsqetKuI/AAAAAAAAB9k/tEKkNsDYkC8/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2zsqetKuI/AAAAAAAAB9k/_l257acyNMg/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>It gets very ugly when someone owns both, the botnet, and the portfolio of parked domains actively participating in PPC (pay per click) advertising programs, where the junk content, or the typosquatted domain names is aiming to attract high value and expensive keywords in order for the scammer to year higher on per click percentage. This is among the very latest tactics applied by those engaging in click fraud. Hypothetically, the cost to rent the botnet and commit click fraud would be cheaper than sharing revenue on per click basis with "human clickers" who earn money based on how many ads they click given a set of scammer's owned sites, where the customer supports represents a DIY proxy switching application changing their IP on the fly. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1555">Click Forensics's recent Q2 2008 report indicates that botnets were responsible for over 25% of all click fraud</a> activity they were monitoring during Q2. Not surprising, given that <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1200">botnets have long been observed to commit blick fraud, using a common traffic exchange scheme</a>. What's new is the <a href="http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticleHomePage&amp;art_aid=86914">use and abuse of parked domains</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i><span class="articleText">Despite indication that some of the clicks from parked domains were invalid, Google failed to disclose to the plaintiff specific domain names in which these ads were clicked on, making detection of invalid clicks difficult and even worse concealing any evidence of invalid clicks," the lawsuit alleges. RK West eventually went through its server logs and discovered the source of the clicks, said Alfredo Torrijos, one of the company's attorneys.</span></i>"<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="text-align: left; clear: both;"><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI25xjFW2JI/AAAAAAAAB9s/I0B4dL0kNKs/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI25xjFW2JI/AAAAAAAAB9s/yO_zUYYDmDM/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based1.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a></div>Will cybersquat security vendors for improving the chances of attracting high-valued keywords to later on click fraud? <a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/05/brandjacking-index.html">The trend has been pretty evident</a> for a while, with <a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1240">cybersquatting increasing</a> on an yearly basis <a href="http://www.domaintrading360.com/2008/July/Cybersquatting-has-Increased-48-since-25.htm">according to multiple sources</a> :<br />
<br />
"<i>Rise in pay-per-click advertising where cybersquatters link the domain name they have registered with a website containing ads promoting a variety of competing brands.&nbsp; The cybersquatter receives money every time internet users access this website and click on one of the ads.</i>" <br />
<br />
However, the "internet users who are supposed to click on one of the ads on the parked domains owned by the scammers" will get clicked by a botnet owned or cost-effectively rented by the scammer. Here's a sample of currently parked domains attracting Symantec ads :<br />
<br />
<a href="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2_iieZvEI/AAAAAAAAB90/vBXDvrmIQ3Y/s1600-h/symantec_parked.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp2.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI2_iieZvEI/AAAAAAAAB90/75_WIDckWa4/s200-R/symantec_parked.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><b>symentec .com<br />
symantek .com<br />
symanteck .com<br />
symantac .com<br />
symantaec .com<br />
symantic .com<br />
symmantec .com <br />
symanntec .com<br />
ssymantec .com<br />
symanthec .com<br />
symanzec .com<br />
symanttec .com<br />
sjmantec .com<br />
saimantec .com<br />
seymantec .com<br />
symanrec .com <br />
symantrc .com<br />
symantwc .com<br />
aymantec .com<br />
dymantec .com<br />
sxmantec .com<br />
symantex .com<br />
symantev .com<br />
symabtec .com<br />
symamtec .com<br />
synantec .com<br />
stmantec .com<br />
symanyec .com<br />
sumantec .com<br />
symant3c .com<br />
syman5ec .com<br />
wwwsymantec .com<br />
symanteccom .com<br />
ymantec .com<br />
syantec .com<br />
symntec .com<br />
symanec .com<br />
symantc .com<br />
symante .com<br />
symattec .com<br />
symantcc .com<br />
syman-tec .com<br />
syymantec .com<br />
symaantec .com<br />
symanteec .com<br />
symantecc .com<br />
ysmantec .com<br />
syamntec .com<br />
symnatec .com<br />
symatnec .com <br />
symanetc .com<br />
symantce .com</b><br />
<br />
As well as recent sample brandjacking Kaspersky :<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3BgYCnt9I/AAAAAAAAB98/06ZAB3dzbCI/s1600-h/kaspersky_cybersquatted.png" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3BgYCnt9I/AAAAAAAAB98/GQ6jI4aBdFM/s200-R/kaspersky_cybersquatted.png" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a><b>kespersky .com<br />
kasparsky .com<br />
kaspaersky .com<br />
kaspasky .com<br />
kasperscky .com<br />
gaspersky .com<br />
kasbersky .com <br />
kasppersky .com<br />
kasperrsky .com<br />
kasperssky .com<br />
kasperskj .com<br />
kasperskey .com<br />
kaapersky .com<br />
kasperaky .com<br />
kasperdky .com<br />
laspersky .com<br />
kaspersly .com<br />
kasperskt .com<br />
kaspersku .com<br />
kasp3rsky .com<br />
kaspe4sky .com<br />
kas0ersky .com<br />
wwwkasperskycom .com<br />
wwwkaspersky .com<br />
kasperskycom .com<br />
aspersky .com<br />
kspersky .com<br />
kasersky .com<br />
kaspesky .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
kaspersy .com<br />
kaspersk .com<br />
kappersky .com<br />
kaspessky .com<br />
kas-persky .com <br />
kasp-ersky .com<br />
kasper-sky .com<br />
kasperskyy .com<br />
akspersky .com<br />
ksapersky .com<br />
kapsersky .com<br />
kaseprsky .com<br />
kaspesrky .com&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <br />
kaspersyk .com<br />
kaspersky24 .com<br />
kasperskyonline .com<br />
kaspersky-online .com</b><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: left;"></div><div class="separator" style="text-align: center; clear: both;"></div><a href="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3CDCHUR8I/AAAAAAAAB-E/CNtqkpXkdQY/s1600-h/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="border: 0pt none ; background-color: transparent; clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><img src="http://bp3.blogger.com/_wICHhTiQmrA/SI3CDCHUR8I/AAAAAAAAB-E/gwyx6ceVeec/s200-R/stats_click_fraud_affiliate_based2.jpg" style="border: 0pt none ;" /></a>What's most disturbing is that instead of having cybersquatting taken care take of a long time, and scammers emphasizing on the junk content in order to attract the relevant ads on the bogus domains, the still trendy cybersquatting still does the magic by including the targeted word in the domain name itself.<br />
<br />
<b>Related posts:</b><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03/cybersquatting-security-vendors-for.html">Cybersquatting Security Vendors for Fraudulent Purposes</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/04/cybersquatting-symantecs-norton.html">Cybersquatting Symantec's Norton AntiVirus</a><br />
<a href="http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2007/11/state-of-typosquatting-2007.html">The State of Typosquatting - 2007</a><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wafTVJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wafTVJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=xOMD9J"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=xOMD9J" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=8ZGBqj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=8ZGBqj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=wdaQsj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=wdaQsj" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=v3m4OJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=v3m4OJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=9nz2nJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=9nz2nJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?a=Vplsvj"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia?i=Vplsvj" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~4/348369914" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2008 03:58:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click">click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click fraud">click fraud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click percentage">click percentage</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click basis">click basis</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/pay-per-click">pay-per-click</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click forensics">click forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/click fraud activity">click fraud activity</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/invalid">invalid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/invalid clicks difficult">invalid clicks difficult</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/DanchoDanchevOnSecurityAndNewMedia/~3/348369914/click-fraud-botnets-and-parked-domains.html">Click Fraud, Botnets and Parked Domains - All Inclusive</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[VM Forensic Tools Remain MIA]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/349581ced94a343a2a536fd5d620bfaa</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/349581ced94a343a2a536fd5d620bfaa</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Computer forensics is an increasingly important field not only for investigating intrusions, hacks and data theft, but also to help analyze the security of a physical or virtual machine that has not...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Computer forensics is an increasingly important field not only for investigating intrusions, hacks and data theft, but also to help analyze the security of a physical or virtual machine that has not yet been compromised.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/data theft">data theft</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtual machine">virtual machine</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer forensics">computer forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/analyze">analyze</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/increasingly">increasingly</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hacks">hacks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/intrusions">intrusions</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/physical">physical</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/072808-vm-forensic-tools-remain.html?fsrc=rss-security">VM Forensic Tools Remain MIA</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1e09e5c89f15d3a4df4ea921f9230c2d</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[With all this talk and reporting about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the potential security benefits of Cloud Computing
In my view, there are some strong technical...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a title="Is the glass half empty or half full?" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/94094843@N00/2292559560/" target="_blank"><img class="alignright" style="border: 0; float: right; margin: 3px;" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3004/2292559560_378f226531_m.jpg" border="0" alt="Is the glass half empty or half full?" /></a></p>
<p>With all this <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org">talk</a> and <a href="http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument?id=685308">reporting</a> about security concerns, lets change the channel for a moment and assess the <strong>potential security benefits</strong> of Cloud Computing.</p>
<p>In my view, there are some strong technical security arguments in favour of Cloud Computing - assuming we can find ways to manage the risks.</p>
<p>With this new paradigm come challenges <strong>and </strong>opportunities.  The challenges are getting plenty of attention - I&#8217;m regularly afforded the opportunity to <a href="http://www.gridtoday.com/grid/2422309.html">comment</a> on them, plus obviously I cover them on this blog.  However, lets not lose sight of the potential upside.</p>
<p>In this post, I walk through seven technical security benefits.  Some are immediate, others may arise over time and have conditions attached (some unstated for the sake of brevity).  However, I&#8217;m including the longer-range benefits now to raise awareness.  Some of the outcomes listed are available today without the Cloud, but they are either complex and slow to implement (and thus less likely to happen) or prohibitive for capital cost reasons.  I don&#8217;t claim this is a definitive list - it reflects where my thinking is today.</p>
<p>Some benefits depend on the Cloud service used and therefore do not apply across the board.  For example; I see no solid forensic benefits with SaaS.  Also, for space reasons, I&#8217;m purposely not including the &#8216;flip side&#8217; to these benefits, however if you read this blog regularly you should <a href="http://cloudsecurity.org/2008/04/24/cloud-stacks-please-mind-the-gap/">recognise some</a>.</p>
<p>On a sidenote, I believe the Cloud offers Small and Medium Businesses major potential security benefits.  Frequently SMBs struggle with limited or non-existent in-house INFOSEC resources and budgets.  The caveat is that the Cloud market is still very new - security offerings are somewhat foggy - making selection tricky.  Clearly, not all Cloud providers will offer the same security.</p>
<h4>Seven Technical Security Benefits of the Cloud</h4>
<h4>1. Centralised Data</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduced Data Leakage</strong>: this is the benefit I hear most from Cloud providers - and in my view they are right.  How many laptops do we need to lose before we get this?  How many backup tapes?  The data &#8220;landmines&#8221; of today could be greatly reduced by the Cloud as thin client technology becomes prevalent.  Small, temporary caches on handheld devices or Netbook computers pose less risk than transporting data buckets in the form of laptops.  Ask the CISO of any large company if all laptops have company &#8216;mandated&#8217; controls consistently applied; e.g. full disk encryption.  You&#8217;ll see the answer by looking at the whites of their eyes.  Despite best efforts around asset management and endpoint security we continue to see embarrassing and disturbing misses.  And what about SMBs?  How many use encryption for sensitive data, or even have a data classification policy in place?</li>
<li><strong>Monitoring benefits</strong>: central storage is easier to control and monitor.  The flipside is the nightmare scenario of <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/most-attractive-targets-saas/">comprehensive data theft</a>.  However, I would rather spend my time as a security professional figuring out smart ways to protect and monitor access to data stored in one place (with the benefit of situational advantage) than trying to figure out all the places where the company data resides across a myriad of thick clients!  You can get the benefits of Thin Clients today but Cloud Storage provides a way to centralise the data faster and potentially cheaper.  The logistical challenge today is getting Terabytes of data to the Cloud in the first place.</li>
</ul>
<h4>2. Incident Response / Forensics</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Forensic readiness</strong>: with Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers, I can build a dedicated forensic server in the same Cloud as my company and place it offline, ready for use when needed.  I would only need pay for storage until an incident happens and I need to bring it online.  I don&#8217;t need to call someone to bring it online or install some kind of remote boot software - I just click a button in the Cloud Providers web interface.  If I have multiple incident responders, I can give them a copy of the VM so we can distribute the forensic workload based on the job at hand or as new sources of evidence arise and need analysis.  To fully realise this benefit, commercial forensic software vendors would need to move away from archaic, physical dongle based licensing schemes to a network licensing model.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence acquisition time</strong>: if a server in the Cloud gets compromised (i.e. broken into), I can now clone that server at the click of a mouse and make the cloned disks instantly available to my Cloud Forensics server.  I didn&#8217;t need to &#8220;find&#8221; storage or have it &#8220;ready, waiting and unused&#8221; - its just there.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate or reduce service downtime</strong>: Note that in the above scenario I didn&#8217;t have to go tell the COO that the system needs to be taken offline for hours whilst I dig around in the RAID Array hoping that my physical acqusition toolkit is compatible (and that the version of RAID firmware isn&#8217;t supported by my forensic software).  Abstracting the hardware removes a barrier to even doing forensics in some situations.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease evidence transfer time</strong>: In the same Cloud, bit fot bit copies are super fast - made faster by that replicated, distributed filesystem my Cloud provider engineered for me.  From a network traffic perspective, it may even be free to make the copy in the same Cloud.  Without the Cloud, <strong>I </strong>would have to a lot of time consuming and expensive provisioning of physical devices.  I only pay for the storage as long as I need the evidence.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate forensic image verification time</strong>: Some Cloud Storage implementations expose a cryptographic checksum or hash.  For example, Amazon S3 generates an MD5 hash <a href="http://docs.amazonwebservices.com/AmazonS3/2006-03-01/index.html?RESTObjectPUT.html">automagically</a> when you store an object.  In theory you no longer need to generate time-consuming MD5 checksums using external tools - its already there.</li>
<li><strong>Decrease time to access protected documents</strong>: Immense CPU power opens some doors.  Did the suspect password protect a document that is relevant to the investigation?  You can now test a wider range of candidate passwords in less time to speed investigations.</li>
</ul>
<h4>3. Password assurance testing (aka cracking)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Decrease password cracking time</strong>: if your organisation regularly tests password strength by running password crackers you can use Cloud Compute to decrease crack time and you only pay for what you use.  Ironically, your cracking costs go up as people choose better passwords ;-).</li>
<li><strong>Keep cracking activities to dedicated machines</strong>: if today you use a distributed password cracker to spread the load across non-production machines, you can now put those agents in dedicated Compute instances - and thus stop mixing sensitive credentials with other workloads.</li>
</ul>
<h4>4. Logging</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>&#8220;Unlimited&#8221;, pay per drink storage</strong>: logging is often an afterthought, consequently insufficient disk space is allocated and logging is either non-existant or minimal.  Cloud Storage changes all this - no more &#8216;guessing&#8217; how much storage you need for standard logs.</li>
<li><strong>Improve log indexing and search</strong>: with your logs in the Cloud you can leverage Cloud Compute to index those logs in real-time and get the benefit of <a href="http://blogs.splunk.com/thewilde/2008/06/24/splunk-ninja-inside-the-cloud/">instant search results.</a> What is different here?  The Compute instances can be plumbed in and scale as needed based on the logging load - meaning a true real-time view.</li>
<li><strong>Getting compliant with Extended logging</strong>: most modern operating systems offer extended logging in the form of a C2 audit trail.  This is rarely enabled for fear of performance degradation and log size.  Now you can &#8216;opt-in&#8217; easily - if you are willing to pay for the enhanced logging, you can do so.  Granular logging makes compliance and investigations easier.</li>
</ul>
<h4>5. Improve the state of security software (performance)</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Drive vendors to create more efficient security software</strong>: Billable CPU cycles get noticed.  More attention will be paid to inefficient processes; e.g. poorly tuned security agents.  Process accounting will make a comeback as customers target &#8216;expensive&#8217; processes.  Security vendors that understand how to squeeze the most performance from their software will win.</li>
</ul>
<h4>6. Secure builds</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Pre-hardened, change control builds</strong>: this is primarily a benefit of virtualization based Cloud Computing.  Now you get a chance to start &#8217;secure&#8217; (by your own definition) - you create your Gold Image VM and clone away.  There are ways to do this today with bare-metal OS installs but frequently these require additional 3rd party tools, are time consuming to clone or add yet another agent to each endpoint.</li>
<li><strong>Reduce exposure through patching offline</strong>: Gold images can be kept up securely kept up to date.  Offline VMs can be conveniently patched &#8220;off&#8221; the network.</li>
<li><strong>Easier to test impact of security changes</strong>: this is a big one.  Spin up a copy of your production environment, implement a security change and test the impact at low cost, with minimal startup time.  This is a big deal and removes a major barrier to &#8216;doing&#8217; security in production environments.</li>
</ul>
<h4>7. Security Testing</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Reduce cost of testing security: </strong>a SaaS provider only passes on a portion of their security testing costs.  By sharing the same application as a service, you don&#8217;t foot the expensive security code review and/or penetration test.  Even with Platform as a Service (PaaS) where your developers get to write code, there are potential cost economies of scale (particularly around use of code scanning tools that sweep source code for security weaknesses).</li>
</ul>
<h4>Your Thoughts?</h4>
<p>What benefits do you see that I haven&#8217;t included in the above list?  Where do you agree/disagree and importantly, why?</p>
<img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~4/341289594" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2008 03:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/benefits">benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud">cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security">security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/technical security benefits">technical security benefits</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/based">based</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/virtualization based cloud">virtualization based cloud</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/efficient security software">efficient security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security software">security software</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/cloud market">cloud market</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/CloudSecurity/~3/341289594/">Assessing the Security Benefits of Cloud Computing</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Houghton Mifflin Harcourt server breach leads to notification]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/a32c42499f84224830293f2af83d152f</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/a32c42499f84224830293f2af83d152f</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
7/1/08

Organization
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (&quot;HMH

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
None

Victims
individuals affiliated with Harcourt Trade

Number...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/hmh.jpg" width="200" align="right" height="44"><font size="2"><b>Date Reported: </b><br>7/1/08<br><br><b>Organization: </b><br><a href="http://www.hmco.com/indexf.html">Houghton Mifflin Harcourt ("HMH")</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br>None<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>"individuals affiliated with Harcourt Trade"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>194<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>Social Security numbers<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (HMH), a publishing company based in Boston, will begin notifying individuals whose information may have been compromised by a worldwide Internet-based attack that affected one of its websites."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://doj.nh.gov/consumer/pdf/wilmerhale.pdf">New Hampshire State Attorney General breach notification</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>The New Hampshire State Attorney General<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online source cited above:<br><br>Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (HMH), a publishing company based in Boston, will begin notifying individuals whose information may have been compromised by a worldwide Internet-based attack that affected one of its websites.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] A "worldwide Internet-based attack" sounds impressive.&nbsp; In order for an attack to be successful, a vulnerability must be exploited.&nbsp; I wonder what the vulnerability was.</span><br><br>On April 25, 2008, HMH's Information Security group learned of a worldwide Internet-based attack that affected one of its non-e-commerce websites.<br><br>Within minutes, HMH took steps to secure the affected databases.<br><br>HMH has reported this matter to the U.S. Secret Service and state law enforcement, who are actively investigating the incident.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I question how "actively" the U.S. Secret Service is investigating this incident.&nbsp; The incident doesn't seem to be significant enough.&nbsp; Sad but usually true.&nbsp; The Secret Service has to prioritize just like everyone else.</span><br><br>As part of its internal investigation, which is still ongoing, HMH retained digital forensics experts to collect and analyze data from the relevant computer systems.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] The attack was detected on April 25th (not necessarily originated on this date), and the notification went out to the New Hampshire State Attorney General on June 1st.&nbsp; This is a long forensic investigation!&nbsp; I also noticed that this statement mentions "computer systems".&nbsp; Does this mean that more than one server was compromised?</span><br><br>They have determined that social security numbers of approximately 194 individuals affiliated with Harcourt Trade, 2 of whom are New Hampshire residents, were in a company database on the affected computer server, and may have been compromised as a result.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I don't like the "may have been" portion of this statement.&nbsp; My definition of compromise probably differs though.</span><br><br>HMH has no evidence to date to suggest that the data has been misused.<br><br>Although we do not know whether any of your information has been misused, we are committed to doing what we can to make sure support is available to you<br><br>Since learning of the incident, HHM [sic] has:<br></font><ol><li><font size="2">Reported this matter to the U.S. Secret Service and state law enforcement;</font></li><li>Cooperated with law enforcement, which is actively investigating the incident;</li><li>Conducted a thorough investigation of the incident, including an assessment of whether or not the theft created any prospective data security risk;</li><li>Identified the sensitive personal information about individuals stored on the affected server; and</li><li>Made arrangements to notify affected individuals about the incident in accordance with state laws, offer premium credit monitoring, ID theft insurance, and ID theft resolution services, and provide additional information about prevention and detection of ID theft including information about credit alerts and credit freezes.<br></li></ol><font size="2"><br>HMH is continuing to work with information security professionals to review current policies and procedures to identify steps that can be taken to better protect against incidents of this kind.<br><br>We apologize and deeply regret that this happened.<br><br>I have asked our editors to reach out directly to everyone affected by this matter and I hope they will be or already have been able to answer your questions.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This is a nice touch.&nbsp; The letter to the affected persons was signed by Gary Gentel, President or Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, Trade and Reference Division.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>There aren't many publicly available details available other than those outlined in the breach notification, so we are left to speculate.&nbsp; Why was a server that contained a database of Social Security numbers available to this "worldwide Internet-based attack"? <br><br><b>Past Breaches:</b><br>Unknown<br></font><br>
<script src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/%7Es/breachblog?i=http://breachblog.com/2008/07/08/hmh.aspx" type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8"></script>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2008 08:22:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/houghton mifflin harcourt">houghton mifflin harcourt</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security professionals">information security professionals</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/sensitive personal information">sensitive personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/server">server</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/notification">notification</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/hmh">hmh</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/company based">company based</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/07/08/hmh.aspx">Houghton Mifflin Harcourt server breach leads to notification</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Misc Reading Related To Verizon Breach Report]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/1c291acddf9bcf88c7738b092ad66b32</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/1c291acddf9bcf88c7738b092ad66b32</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[All sort of fun stuff was unearthed, discussed and - sometimes - made-up upon reading the Verizon Security Breach Investigations report. Here are some things from the pile which I found fun
Report...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>All sort of fun stuff was unearthed, discussed and - sometimes -&nbsp; made-up upon reading the Verizon Security Breach Investigations report. Here are some things from the pile which I found fun:</p> <ul> <li><a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/databreachreport.pdf">Report itself [PDF]</a> and <a href="http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2008/06/10/2008-data-breach-investigations-report/">brief on it</a> from Verizon (and two fun follow-ups, <a href="http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2008/06/19/reasonable-controls/">this</a> and <a href="http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2008/06/13/patching-conundrum/">this here</a>)</li> <li>"<a href="http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1322">90% of all statistics can be made to say anything… 50% of the time, aka my thoughts on the Verizon report</a>"</li> <li>"<a href="http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/06/data-breach-pos.html">Data Breach Post Mortem Offers Surprises</a>" (well, to some people, they are surprises ...)</li> <li>"<a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/147098/insider_threat_exaggerated_study_says_.html">Insider Threat Exaggerated, Study Says</a>" (not, it doesn't, BTW)</li> <li>"<a href="http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2008/06/verizon-business-report-speaks-volumes.html">Verizon Business Report Speaks Volumes</a>" (from Richard, thus a MUST read)</li></ul> <p>And of course, here is my favorite part: "<em>In 82 percent of cases, our investigators noted that <strong>the victim possessed the ability to discover the breach had they had they been more diligent in monitoring and analyzing event-related information</strong> [AC - i.e. logs] available to them at the time of the incident." </em>and this&nbsp; "Furthermore, <strong>a crime scene devoid of any network and system logs</strong>, a key resource for computer forensics, is <strong>a disturbingly common occurrence</strong>."</p> <p>What can I say? Back to battle stations for me - to fight the war of making logs more popular! :-)</p>  <div class="blogger-post-footer">About me: http://www.chuvakin.org</div><div class="feedflare">
<a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=hgkkjJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=hgkkjJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=IsZmaJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=IsZmaJ" border="0"></img></a> <a href="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?a=moLmsJ"><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~f/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog?i=moLmsJ" border="0"></img></a>
</div><img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~4/326113386" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 10:07:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon">verizon</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/report">report</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fun">fun</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/fun follow-ups">fun follow-ups</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/logs">logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/system logs">system logs</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/verizon report">verizon report</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/crime scene devoid">crime scene devoid</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/disturbingly common occurrence">disturbingly common occurrence</category>
      <source url="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/AntonChuvakinPersonalBlog/~3/326113386/misc-reading-related-to-verizon-breach.html">Misc Reading Related To Verizon Breach Report</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Live from the 20th Annual FIRST Conference]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/8f5b32eca2e471054acd118ae718ad31</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/8f5b32eca2e471054acd118ae718ad31</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[I've been at the FIRST conference in Vancouver, BC this week presenting , attending great presentations, and meeting a fantastic group of people
I'd like to applaud some great presenters I've seen so...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been at the <a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/">FIRST</a> conference in Vancouver, BC this week <a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/program/#p875">presenting</a>, attending great presentations, and meeting a fantastic group of people.<br />I'd like to applaud some great presenters I've seen so far, including Par Osterberg Medina (<a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/program/#p865">Detecting Intrusions</a>), Anton Chuvakin (<a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/program/#p864">Log Analysis</a>), Raffael Marty (<a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/program/#p876">Applied Security Visualization</a>), and Steve Mancini (<a href="http://www.first.org/conference/2008/program/#p886">RAPIER</a>).<br />I've also been advised of some tools for your consideration, to aid in the security analysis / incident response cause, as well as possible topics for <span style="font-style:italic;">toolsmith</span>. <br />Take a look at these, if you aren't already familiar with them:<br /><a href="http://bitblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/">BitBlaze</a> - Binary Analysis for COTS Protection and Malicious Code Defense<br /><a href="http://www.f-response.com/">F-Response</a> - The First Truly Vendor Agnostic Solution for Remote Forensics and eDiscovery<br /><a href="http://www.paterva.com/maltego/">Maltego</a> - Maltego is an open source intelligence and forensics application. It allows for the mining and gathering of information as well as the representation of this information in a meaningful way. <br /><a href="https://www.volatilesystems.com/default/volatility">The Volatility Framework</a> - Volatile memory artifact extraction utility framework<br />Thanks to Richard Bejtlich for pointing out F-Response and Volatility and Steve Mancini for BitBlaze and Maltego.<br /><br />On another front, in support of Eva Chen's (Trend Micro) recent <a href="http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2008/06/22/trend_micro_eva_chen/">claim</a> that the anti-virus industry <span style="font-weight:bold;">sucks</span>, John Stewart of Cisco, in his keynote this morning, reiterated the premise that the fight against malware is a lost cause. The point he was really driving at is the downfall of blacklisting and that whitelisting is essential given that "the total good is smaller than the total unknown and bad". This, as his fourth postulate of many good postulates this morning, truly supports my own beliefs. I'm more focused on whitelisting in the web application security space,   but the premise is the same. If the vast majority of requests to secured elements of your applications are <span style="font-style:italic;">bad</span>, then simply deny all, and allow only that which you trust.<br /><br />More to come...<br /><br /><a href="http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/live-from-20th-annual-first-conference.html&title=Live%20from%20the%2020th%20Annual%20FIRST%20Conference " title="Live from the 20th Annual FIRST Conference">del.icio.us</a> | <a href="http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&amp;url=http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/live-from-20th-annual-first-conference.html" title="Live from the 20th Annual FIRST Conference ">digg</a>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2008 04:53:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/steve mancini">steve mancini</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/volatility">volatility</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/volatility framework">volatility framework</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/anti-virus industry sucks">anti-virus industry sucks</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/total unknown">total unknown</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/maltego">maltego</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/par osterberg medina">par osterberg medina</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/vendor agnostic solution">vendor agnostic solution</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/total">total</category>
      <source url="http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/2008/06/live-from-20th-annual-first-conference.html">Live from the 20th Annual FIRST Conference</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[Group out front of online child-pornography battle]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/3e9c24aba637889060f714ce583f6455</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/3e9c24aba637889060f714ce583f6455</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The Alexandria, Va.-based National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is on the front lines of combating child pornography by providing computer forensics help to law enforcement and working...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Alexandria, Va.-based National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is on the front lines of combating child pornography by providing computer forensics help to law enforcement and working with ISPs monitoring for criminal images.<p><A href="http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=73425?">
<IMG src="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/idg.us.nwf.rss/security;sz=468x60;ord=73425?" border="0" width="468" height="60"></A>
</p>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2008 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/child pornography">child pornography</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/national center">national center</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/law enforcement">law enforcement</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/criminal images">criminal images</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/front lines">front lines</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/computer forensics">computer forensics</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/isps">isps</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/alexandria">alexandria</category>
      <source url="http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/061808-child-porn.html?fsrc=rss-security">Group out front of online child-pornography battle</source>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title><![CDATA[University of Florida student information online for years]]></title>
      <link>http://securityratty.com/article/70535b81354ea161a0135979f7d38509</link>
      <guid>http://securityratty.com/article/70535b81354ea161a0135979f7d38509</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: Security Breach

Date Reported
6/11/08

Organization
University of Florida

Contractor/Consultant/Branch
Office for Academic Support and Institutional Services

Victims
Students
...]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Technorati Tag: <a href="http://technorati.com/tag/security+breach" rel="tag">Security Breach</a><br><br>
<img src="http://breachblog.com/images/95781-88451/uflorida.jpg" align="right" height="165" width="165"><font size="2"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Date Reported: </span><br>6/11/08<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organization: </span><br><a href="http://www.ufl.edu/">University of Florida</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Contractor/Consultant/Branch:</span><br><a href="http://web.oasis.ufl.edu/">Office for Academic Support and Institutional Services</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victims:</span><br>Students <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Number Affected:</span><br>"more than 11,300"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Types of Data:</span><br>"names, addresses and Social Security numbers"<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Breach Description:</span><br>"GAINESVILLE, Fla. - University of Florida officials today mailed letters of notification to more than 11,300 current and former students regarding a privacy breach that resulted in names, addresses and Social Security numbers being posted online that may have been accessible to the public."<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Reference URL:</span><br><a href="http://privacy.ufl.edu/CLASBreach/">University of Florida</a> <br><a href="http://www.miamiherald.com/top_stories/story/565567.html">Miami Herald</a> <br><a href="http://insideuf.ufl.edu/2008/06/10/clas-breach/">Inside UF</a> <br><a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/06/11/Security_breached_at_Florida_university/UPI-38151213211913/">United Press International</a> <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Report Credit:</span><br>University of Florida<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Response:</span><br>From the online sources cited above:<br><br>GAINESVILLE, Fla. - University of Florida officials today mailed letters of notification to more than 11,300 current and former students regarding a privacy breach that resulted in names, addresses and Social Security numbers being posted online that may have been accessible to the public.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Not "may have been".&nbsp; The information was accessible to the public and was not even protected by a password.</span><br><br>The student information was actively used from 2003 through 2005 and remained posted until it was recently discovered during a routine audit of UF systems.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] If I am reading this right, this means that some of the personal information was available publicly for ~5 years!</span><br><br>School officials emphasized that the site would not have been easy to find and they do not believe it was accessed by anyone outside the school.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] There is no security through obscurity.</span><br><br>"The risk of someone outside actually finding this information and using it inappropriately is very low," - Steve Orlando, UF Spokesman<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I wonder how Mr. Orlando came to the conclusion that the risk of disclosure and misuse is "very low".&nbsp; As I understand, the server was publicly accessible, presumably via the internet.&nbsp; If so, was the site indexed by search engines like Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft?&nbsp; It is much easier to find information through a search index because folder structure is much less relevant.&nbsp; The fact that this information was available for 3-5 years adds to the risk too.&nbsp; I only know what I read and based on this and experience, I wouldn't classify this as a "very low" risk situation.&nbsp; Either way, the risk was increased due to poor information security practice and was not necessary. </span><br><br>"We've done computer forensics, and we don't have any evidence that anybody accessed this information," he added.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] This indicates poor logging and monitoring which are both essential detective controls (in most situations).&nbsp; Information security personnel (or admins) should be empowered to reconstruct events.</span><br><br>"But because we can't say that with absolute certainty, we're going through with the notification out of an abundance of caution," Orlando said.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I am NOT a fan of the "abundance of caution" claims that seem more popular in breach notifications lately.&nbsp; Organizations would be best advised to use an "abundance of caution" in the prevention and early detection of breaches by applying sound information security principles.</span><br><br>Since 2005, the site has been "dormant but accessible," said university spokesman Steve Orlando. "It was just sitting there."<br><br>The information has been removed and is no longer available online or elsewhere in the UF systems.<br><br>The breach occurred when former student employees of the Office for Academic Support and Institutional Service, or OASIS, program created online records of students participating in the program.<br><br>The student employees posted the information online so that they could work with it from remote locations, but they did not install security measures to keep others from accessing it as well<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] I have so many questions and arguments.&nbsp; Were the students aware of the risks?&nbsp; If not, then there is probably an information security training and awareness problem.&nbsp; Why was it necessary to include Social Security numbers in the records?&nbsp; Why were the seemingly untrained students allowed to post the information without being stopped or detected?&nbsp; I have many more questions, but I am starting to confuse myself now.</span><br><br>The university sent letters of notification to about 11,300 students whose information is believed to have been potentially compromised.<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Here's my take on the word "compromised".&nbsp; If an organization cannot provide reasonable assurance that the information has not been subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction, then the information has been "compromised".&nbsp; </span><br><br>University officials were unable to find contact information for about 570, so they are asking students who were enrolled in CLAS from 2003 to 2005 and did not receive a letter but who believe their information may have been compromised to call UF’s Privacy Office Hotline at 866-876-HIPA and provide the requested information.<br><br>Anyone who thinks he or she may be one of the 570 people who were not notified is urged to go to <a href="http://privacy.ufl.edu">privacy.ufl.edu</a> and read the information posted there before calling the privacy hotline.<br><br>"This would certainly appear to be the largest privacy breach we've had," Orlando said.<br><br>We're in the process of strengthening some of those policies regarding what information can be posted and what security measures should be in place<br><span style="font-style: italic;">[Evan] Good start.</span><br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Victim Reaction:</span><br>"Why would it be necessary to use a Social Security number instead of something else?" asked Reixach, pointing out that students were given ID numbers. "It's just silly".<br><br>"It's negligence on their part, especially if anyone has been affected with identity theft,"<br><br>Johann Arias, a spring CLAS graduate, had not heard about the breach Wednesday and said UF should be doing more to notify those affected.<br><br>"They always make information very prominent when you have a hold or owe them money," Arias said.<br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Commentary:</span><br>This is a case where poorly trained students are granted access or obtained access to confidential information and posted the information to an unsecured location which went undetected for years.&nbsp; Bad all around.&nbsp; <br><br><span style="font-weight: bold;">Past Breaches:</span><br>May, 2008 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2008/05/22/uflorida.aspx">University of Florida doctor loses job over breach</a> <br>November, 2007 - <a href="http://breachblog.com/2007/11/28/uf.aspx">University of Florida student info online</a> </font><br><br>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2008 06:41:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information">information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information online">information online</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/personal information">personal information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security">information security</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/confidential information">confidential information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/information security personnel">information security personnel</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/student information">student information</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/security measures">security measures</category>
      <category domain="http://securityratty.com/tag/install security measures">install security measures</category>
      <source url="http://breachblog.com/2008/06/12/uflorida.aspx">University of Florida student information online for years</source>
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