Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

“Experienced end users are very intelligent.

These end users know the complex event processing problems they need to solve; and they know the limitations of the current COTS approaches marketed by the CEP community.  Even in Thailand, a country many of you might mistakenly think is not very advanced technologically, there are experts in telecommunications (who run large networks) who are working on very difficult fraud detection applications, and they use neural networks and say the results are very good.   However, there is not one CEP vendor, that I know of, who offers true CEP capability in the form of neural nets.

Almost every major bank, telco, etc. has the same opinion, and the same problem. They need much more capability than streaming joins, selects and rules to solve their complex event processing problems that Dr. Luckham outlined in his book.   The software vendors are attempting to define the CEP market to match their capability; unfortunately, their capabilities do not meet the requirements of the vast majority of end users who have CEP problems to solve.

If the current CEP platforms were truely solving complex event processing problems, annual sales would be orders of magnitudes higher.  Hence, the users have already voted.   The problem is that the CEP community is not listening.”

Not to be overly repetitive,  but the last part of this quote from a year ago is worth highlighting:

“If the current CEP platforms were truely solving complex event processing problems, annual sales would be orders of magnitudes higher.  Hence, the users have already voted.   The problem is that the CEP community is not listening.”

Frankly speaking, nothing in the “CEP world” has changed, technologically speaking, since this September 2007 post was written.  From a sales perspective, we have seen less CEP-related sales in 2008 than in prior years.   If these so called CEP products were actually capability of detecting “real” complex network-centric situations (threats) in real-time, they would be selling faster than a cup of ice water in the blazing hot Sahara desert.

Don’t shoot the messenger.  Build better detection engines!

On the other hand, maybe complex detection is too hard for most of these companies and that is why they focus on routing, mediation and relatively simple rule-based scenarios, versus complex event processing?

First of all, as background information, I learned the Thai alphabet (script with 44 consonants and 32 vowels) nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty decent foundation for the Thai language compared to most foreigners visting or working in Thailand.   I can read (slowly) and speak better than 99.99+ percent of all foreigners in Thailand.  For this reason, I thought it was ”the right thing to do” to redirect my career to a “new challenge” in the business climate of Thailand as I continue to improve my foreign language skills.   I wanted to help Thailand progress in IT and IT security, so where else would I go but where I have second language skills?

This was no small decision as you can imagine.  Your career and life changes quite dramatically when you give up a long established consulting practice in the US and dive into business in a foreign land, seeking a new challenge.  I can frankly tell you thatit is more difficult to do business in Thailand (as a foreigner) than I expected, for a number of reasons.  Here is my first off-topic post on this topic.

First of all, it is not legal for foreigners to directly own land in Thailand.  Foreigners can ”own” land using a variety of legal loopholes, proxy owners and shell companies; but all of this is risky and not advised.  Many foreigners lose a lot of money coming to Thailand and attempting to buy land via various “structures”.  Some get lucky, but the entire process of foreigners buying and selling land is quite risky and not recommended.

Foreigners can legally own condominiums, under certain conditions, but this “foreign market” results in inflated prices for condos in Thailand that are traded in an “artificial market place” designed for foreigners.   Condos in Bangkok and major resort areas that are up-to-par with condos in the US can easily cost more than condos in major cities in the US.  Hence, the cost of living in Thailand is not as economical as some might believe when you visit Thailand as a tourist.

Second, business in Thailand can best be described as protectionism with discrimination where the government has placed many barriers to entry to foreigners working and competing in Thailand.     Every foreigner must have a work permit and these work permits are expensive and time consuming to maintain.   If you own a business you must pay high professional service fees for “auditors” to perform annual and semiannual audits regardless of how much income you have (including zero).   Firms in Thailand charge thousands of dollars for these ”audits”.      

Third, if you operate a business in Thailand, you must have a place of business (you cannot legally work from your condo you bought at high prices!), so you are forced, by law, to lease office space.   Foreigners from the US, for example, must be paid a minimum of 50,000 Thai Baht per month, so the government will take 10 percent of that each month as their share of tax withholdings.  Startups with no income simply pay income taxes against their personal savings to comply with the law.  Therefore, to start a company and maintain the business in Thailand, you are required to pay significant startup, monthly, semi-annual and annual fees, permits, tax, leases, visas, etc. 

Forth, generating incoming revenue in Thailand can be quite difficult in a climate of both protectionism and discrimination.   In Thailand, it is easy when you are spending money.  This is the ”Land of Smiles” that tourists see and experience.   However, when you are legally permitted to work in Thailand and trying to generate in-country income, you cannot help but notice the protectionism and discrimination against foreigners working and living here.  Many foreigners working in Thailand just “give up” because the barriers to business success are quite high.

Fifth, on top of the challenges of protectionism/discrimination regarding foreigners and foreign investments, which I have only just scratched the surface here, is the overall global business slowdown combined with a climate of political instability which I am sure you have seen in the news.  Thailand has seen 18 coups since 1932.   Currently, Thailand is under a State-of-Emergency  which negatively impacts business even more.  Sound challenging? 

Most people who live and work in Thailand have the opinion that it is far better to enjoy being a tourist here. Working in Thailand is very difficult for many reasons.   Being a tourist in Thailand is completely different than working here.  When you are a tourist, foreign currently flows from you into Thailand, so life in Thailand as a tourist is fun and friendly, hence the “Land of Smiles” you have heard about or experienced.     However, when you are working in Thailand and trying to generate income from Thailand versus bringing in foreign currency, you don’t see the “Land of Smiles” quite the same anymore.

Without getting into too many details in this post, I can simply say that a foreigner doing business in Thailand experiences both protectionism and discrimination.  I came to Thailand hoping to contribute my experience to help the Kingdom.  However, sometimes it feels like foreigners are only welcome if you are working for free, giving seminars for free, and bringing in lots of foreign currency here.

In a future post on business in Thailand I will dive into some details on a number of topics that might be of interest to readers who will never have a chance to come and work here.   

First of all, I learned the Thai alphabet nearly 20 years ago, so I have have a pretty good foundation for the Thai language.   I can read (slowly) and speak better than 99.99+ percent of all foreigners in Thailand; so, I thought it was time to redirect my career to a “new challenge” in the business climate of Thailand.   

This was no small decision.  Your career changes dramatically when you give up a successful consulting practice in the US and dive into business in a foreign land for a new challenge.  I can frankly tell you that often the challenge is sometimes overwhelming.    It is quite difficult as a foreigner to do business in Thailand.

First of all, it is not legal for foreigners to own land in Thailand.  Foreigners can ”own” land using a variety of legal loopholes, proxy owners and shell companies; but all of this is risky and not advised.  Foreigners lose a lot of money coming to Thailand and attempting to buy land.  Some get lucky, but the entire process of foreigners buying and selling land is quite risky.

Foreigners can own condos, under certain conditions, but this results in  inflated prices for condos in Thailand that are traded in an artificial market place.   Condos that are up-to-par with condos in the US can easily cost more than condos in major cities in the US.  Hence, the cost of living is not as cheap as some might believe.

Business can best be described as “protectism” where the government has placed many barriers to entry to foreigners working in Thailand.     Every foreigner must have a work permit and these work permits are expensive and time consuming to maintain.   If you own a business you must pay high professional service fees for auditors to perform annual and semiannual audits even if your business has no income yet.   Firms in Thailand charge thousands of dollars for these ”audits”.      

In addition, if you operate a business, you must have a place of business, so you are forced to lease office space.   Foreigners from the US must be paid a minimum of 50,000 Thai Baht per month, so the government will take 10 percent of that each month as their share of tax withholdings.   Therefore, to start a company, you will pay a lot of money in startup fees, permits, tax, leases, visas, etc.  The entire system is designed to secure money from you, even if you do not have a penny of incoming revenue.

Of course, generating incoming revenue can be quite difficult in a climate of protectionism.   In Thailand, it is easy when you are spending money.  When you are trying to generate income from Thailand, as a foreigner the challenge can seem overwhelming at times.   Many foreigners here give up because the barriers to business here are very high.

On top of all these challenges, which I have not described in detail, is the overall global business slowdown combined with a climate of political instability, which I am sure you have seen in the news.  

Most people I know say it is better to be a tourist here.   Being a tourist is completely different.  Money flows from you, so life in Thailand is fun and friendly, complimentary to the “Land of Smiles” you have heard about.     However, when you are working to have money flow the other direction, flow to you versus away from you, you don’t see the “Land of Smiles” as tourists experience.

Without getting into too many details, I can simply say that a foreigner doing business in Thailand experiences protectionism and, to a certain degree, discrimination, and sometimes I wonder if coming here for a “business challenge” was a good idea.    I was seeking a “new challenge” and I got more than I bargained for!

In a future post on business in Thailand I will discuss issues regarding how little value is placed in intellectual property in Thailand and how this adversely impacts professional services.    I will also touch on how this lack of regard for intellectual property impacts a consulting practice.   Also, I will touch on some cultural differences in how Thais appear to view teamwork, which is very different than in the US.

You can read plenty of other blogs about some of the great presentations at Black Hat.  So I thought I would take another angle and talk about some of the other stuff that may be important to you.

1.  secure@microsoft.com – This years hottest party was again the Microsoft party.  This year it was at the LAX club in the Luxor.  As usual there were quite a number of people at the door who thought they could talk their way in or worse yet were told they “were one the list”.  I was happy to be able to go and saw many of the usual suspects there as well. I had to leave the party early to go catch my red eye flight home, so went right to the airport from the party.  As I wrote earlier, Microsoft is trying really hard on security.  But I couldn’t help but notice the irony of this grainy, lousy picture of the DJ booth at the party.  If you can, notice the computers that the secure@microsoft.com DJs are using. That’s right they are Macs!

2. A new low for booth babes – What would a Shimel review of a trade show be without a booth babe rant.  Hey I recognize it is Vegas and all, but EdgeOS went way over the line this year.  A booth babe dressed as a Las Vegas showgirl or some other type of costume makes a statement.  I personally don’t like exploiting woman to make that statement, but I understand.  However, these guys had woman who were dressed so raunchy and classless, that I could not bring myself to post a picture of them.  Come on guys!  You want to resort to the booth babe thing (and BTW I think the Black Hat crowd does not respond to that), at least have a little class.  These girls looked like street walkers and do you and your company no favors.  Is that really the image you want to promote?  Grow up!

3.  The Security Bloggers Network – We are back!  With the end of the Black Hat show, the SBN is going back to being the SBN.  The old logo is back and our promotion with Black Hat is at an end.  However, I want to personally thank so many of you SBN members who blogged about Black Hat.  The Black Hat marketing folks made it a point to come over to me and thank us for the overwhelming support and help of the community.  Our network delivered big time with them and they are already thinking about ways we can work together next year.  I will keep you all posted on that.

We have several new promotions we are working on with the SBN and will have more on that soon. Also, we learned some valuable lessons.  Next time we will work with the network members more closely in doing these affiliations.  Also, for any show like this we need to have an official bloggers get together.  Not because we don’t want to buy our own drinks (thanks to Chris Hoff for doing more than his share in picking up a big bar tab), but frankly we need to reserve a place that has enough space for us.  Security bloggers are big time. We have a great community of people who get together. Lets make it better.

I have some other ideas around the SBN I am working on too and want to form a committee to help. If you are a member and want to get involved, please drop me a line or comment.

Anyway, another year of Black Hat is in the books. It was a good one and I can’t wait until next year!

If you still subscribe to fixed site recovery services using shared IT infrastructure from the likes of HP, IBM BCRS, or SunGard, among others, you will quickly become a dinosaur in the next 1 to 2 years.

These types of shared infrastructure services involve lengthy restores from tape and a recovery time objective of 72 hours, at best. Plus, you'll be lucky if you recover at all because chances are, you've had trouble scheduling a test with your service provider and it's been a LONG time since the last one, if indeed you’ve ever tested.

72 hours recovery just doesn't cut it anymore. And frankly, understanding your provider's oversubscription ratio to shared infrastructure to determine the risk of multiple invocations, or attempting to negotiate exclusions zones and availability guarantees is a time suck. Most companies are either taking DR back in-house or, if they still rely on a DR service provider, they are using dedicated infrastructure.

A dedicated infrastructure is attractive as it enables replication to improve recovery objectives. But it’s expensive, and puts advanced IT recovery out of the reach of many companies who can't measure downtime in millions of dollars.

But, there are new services on the horizon that will make advanced IT recovery affordable for the masses. This month SunGard announced the availability of its new Virtual Server Replication Service. As I discussed in my most recent Forrester Wave™ of DR Service Providers and other reports, server virtualization is transforming IT recovery. With replication to a virtualized server infrastructure and shared storage infrastructure, customers can enjoy improved recovery-time and recovery-point objectives without the cost of dedicated and custom IT recovery solutions from the DR services provider.SunGard is the first DR service provider to productize these virtual services. I expect other DR service providers to follow suit.

So, the next time your contract is up for renewal, you need to completely rethink your approach to IT recovery. Get off tape and move to these new virtual services. It will improve your recovery capabilities and you don't have to worry about the oversubscription issue with shared virtual infrastructure -- the DR provider can manage capacity much more easily in this environment. In fact, SunGard is offering an RTO SLA of 6 hours as part of the offering. To my knowledge, this is the first time a DR service provider is offering this as part of a standard contract. I'm looking forward to the day when vendors will offer most services with transparent, subscription-based pricing, and standard contract terms that don't take a team of procurement professionals to negotiate.